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ABSTRACT
In Central and Eastern Europe, wealth is on the rise, but democracy is in decline. Populist
parties assail the foundations of constitutional rule of law and enhance their networks of
patronage and clientelism to gain greater support with the electorate. Yet, it is little understood as
to why citizens vote for illiberal parties in the region. This paper seeks to address this ongoing
phenomenon by exploring voter support for clientelistic behavior by the middle classes of
Russia, Poland, and Estonia. I develop and test a theory of “middle class clientelism” which
seeks to explain under what conditions more wealthier voters become a cost-effective target for
vote buying, patronage, and particularistic goods. The literature on clientelism has been fairly
consistent in explaining that middle class voters are too cost prohibitive for parties and elites to
clientelize because they have better access to personal wealth and employment opportunities.
However, I determine two critical variables that can account for this occurrence. These are the
levels of state management of the economy and vulnerabilities within the middle class that has
been induced by years of financial crisis in Central and Eastern Europe. This type of clientelism
is damaging for democratic outcomes because it allows parties to participate in state capture and
fuse themselves into the state without responsive democratic pressure in response from the
middle.
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PREFACE
Why is democracy in decline? The ongoing phenomenon has affected just about every
corner of the globe and yet its causes are unknown. In this dissertation I was motivated to seek
out the relationship of democratic decline and apply it to Eastern Europe. There are
methodological reasons for using this region, but my motivations were also out of curiosity and
passion for these countries. It is for these reasons I applied my energies to understanding what is
occurring in Central and Eastern Europe with the intention of applying these lessons more
broadly.
The post-Soviet world is sadly much overlooked in comparative politics. Most
universities had dedicated faculty to the study of the Soviet Union, but the collapse of its empire
changed all that. Researchers turned their attention to China, and other developing countries.
While these other countries are worth studying and analyzing, this left a whole in the research
that very few scholars, in the United States at least, have been interested in filling. My
dissertation is focused on mending these gaps. I dedicated several years of intensive Russian
language study with the hopes of conducting in-country research to utilize compelling evidence
for this dissertation. While Covid-19 prevented this goal, I was able to conduct research in the
countries of Estonia and Poland which greatly benefitted this dissertation.
The conclusion I came to regarding this dissertation’s question was that political elites in
these countries were using clientelism to their advantage. The research regarding state capture by
elites and parties is fairly extensive but a missing component was who they were targeting. In
this case, I argue that parties are targeting the middle class for patronage and clientelism. My
first inklings of how populist and autocratic leaders can target middle income families came from
after reading Bryn Rosenfeld’s The Autocratic Middle Class (2021). His work illuminated the

xviii
potential connections that compelled me to investigate further. Further research uncovered a
compelling connection between a party’s policies, middle income households, and democracy
quality.
However, the availability of a middle class does not necessitate that they would then want
patronage. Indeed, the theories around state capture and clientelism argue to the counter. Recent
events after the Financial Crash of 2008 changes the calculus though. The middle class is in
decline, or at least elements of itself are. This shaky ground creates vulnerabilities, which I argue
acts as the demand side this clientelistic relationship. Vulnerabilities in the middle class hardens
dependence on patronage and corruption, secures loyalties, and ensures elections can be
purchased by redistributing rents and goods to these constituencies.
There was still a missing component from this argument that required further
investigation. How could middle income households be bought off given they are typically too
expensive to do so? My research led me to the Varieties of Capitalism literature developed by
Soskice and Hall (2001) but was further expanded to include more developmental types of
capitalism. My conclusion was that state capitalism, that is to say how leaders use the state’s
access to resources, has given parties and rulers an advantage for clientelizing the middle class.
This provides the supply aspect of the argument and ensures that clientelistic elites have enough
resources to offer their constituencies.
The formula for this paper was set and I began applying the argument to several cases.
The use of in-country investigation, interviews, and data from the World and European Values
Surveys provided me the methodological tools to apply my argument and examine the results.
Those results were both compelling for their support of the argument and illuminating as to what
this argument could provide when applied more broadly. I am enthusiastic to see what more can

xix
be explored by applying an economic understanding to clientelism and observing how parties
and elites target constituencies in exchange for political and electoral support.

1
1. INTRODUCTION
“We have fewer democracies in the world today than we did 15 years ago. Fewer, not more.
Fewer!” President Joseph Biden said as he banged his hand on the podium in October of 2021
(Samuels and Gangitano 2021). The president of the United States was addressing a crowd at the
dedication ceremony for the new Dodd Center for Human Rights at the University of
Connecticut when he made this ominous claim. His words were quite relevant given the current
condition of global democracy. The quality and quantity of democracies has been on the wane
these past ten years. No more so is this more apparent than in the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) which have experienced the consequences of democratic decline. The
institutions that support democracy have been eroded by the insertion of populist and nationalist
politics. More troubling is the dearth of systematic, scholarly investigations to better understand
what is occurring.
Democratic backsliding has occurred in tandem with a sharp rise in populist parties who
have emerged to capture large swaths of disaffected voters who do so by orienting themselves
towards the political extremes (Spruyt, Keppens, and van Droogenbroeck 2016). Comparative
and democrat scholars first started to note the rise of illiberal parties in CEE countries since the
2000s (Greskovits 2007; Mesežnikov, Gyárfášová, and Smilov 2008). According to Fukuyama
(2015, 16), “The legitimacy of many democracies around the world depends less on deepening
their democratic instituitons than on their ability to provide high quality governance.” If this is
the case, democracies may be turning ever more towards autocratic politics as a function of
stability and economic security rather than to maintain competitive electoral politics. This is a
problem which may lead to further democratic unravelling as once secured democracies reorient
their constitutions and laws towards one party dominance. Such an occurrence is not beyond the
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imagination. As Anne Applebaum (2018) portentously writes, “Given the right conditions, any
society can turn against democracy. Indeed, if history is anything to go by, all societies probably
will.”
These kinds of crises are not unknown to Europe. The early 20th Century spelled the
doom of many early European democracies as they fell towards fascism and communism. A
momentous event that occurred in a time of extreme privation, depression, war, and economic
frailty. This is not the case for 21st century Europe. The recent growth of illiberal trends in
Central and Eastern Europe has come at a time when domestic wealth has dramatically
increased, and consumer indexes have soared. This elucidates a pertinent question regarding
democracy’s future. Why have these illiberal tensions occurred in the wake of increased wealth
and purchasing power in Eastern Europe?
The deterioration of democracy in CEE has led me to estimate the presence of three main
types of democracies in Central and Eastern Europe: constrained democracies, retrograde
democracies, and democracies. In other words, countries where democracy has yet to be
achieved, where democracy is in decline, and where democracy has been achieved and is stable.
What are the causal mechanisms that lead to these variated democratic outcomes? As most CEE
governments attain their legitimacy from popular consent, even in autocratically leaning ones
like Russia, questions linger as to why populations give their electoral support to parties who
formulate these policies. Further investigation reveals that as democracy erodes, problematic
relationships tend to form between the polity and their representatives.
Some formulations of these corrupt interactions between voter and politician have been
described as clientelistic and patronal (Rosenfeld 2021). That is to say, state resources are
exchanged with voters for continuous loyalty and support. However, a theoretical gap remains as
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to when populations in CEE countries are cost effective participants that parties can buy them off
with clientelism, and personalistic patronage? These corrupt practices ultimately lead to
democratic erosion and state capture, a phenomenon by which elites go about “manipulating

policy formation and even shaping the emerging rules of the game to their own, very
substantial advantage” (Hellman and Kaufmann 2001). Elites can, when the right variables
align, absorb huge swaths of the state and its institutions, bureaucracies, and resources in order to
corruptly engineer them to best sustain their own political dominance. Elite authority varies in
degrees from fully entrenched and clientelistic all the way to competitive politics with low levels
of patronage and abuse. In this dissertation, I attempt to unravel the connections that determines
this variation in Central and Eastern Europe.
1.1. The Problem in the Middle
Throughout his many successful campaigns to become President of Russia (1999, 2004, 2012
and 2018), Vladimir Putin has made a wide range of overtures for needed economic, social, and
political reform. Commentators have noted that many of these promises are oriented at elevating
and growing Russia’s middle class citizens. Such goals included provisions and promises to
increase wages, access to consumer goods, and government services (Belton 2012; Goodman
2018; LLoyd 2018). Whatever the case may be regarding the legitimacy of those promises or the
electoral process in Russia, observers cannot disregard Putin’s rhetorical interest in bettering the
lives of Russians as emblematic of his campaigns promises (Bremmer 2018; Bushuev 2019).
And for obvious reasons, too. Following his election in 1999, the economic disposition of
Russia’s citizens had increased dramatically. The average citizen’s purchasing power per capita
went from $5500 (1998) to $20,000 (2008) in the span of ten years (World Bank 2022). As a
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result, Putin has increasingly targeted economic prosperity during his 2012 and 2018 electoral
bids at middle income Russians particularly.
During his 2012 electoral campaign, Putin promised that “The average salary in the
economy will grow in real terms by 1.6 to 1.7 times to almost 40 thousand rubles in 2011
prices….” (Korval 2018).1 There were reasons to expect that such promises could be delivered as
worker’s incomes climbed in Russia along with rising global energy prices (Myant and
Drahokoupil 2012). Yet, such promises revealed a counter intuitive logic. A stronger and
economically more influential middle class in Russia has the potential to drive future
democratization in a country that has yet to fully democratize (Evans 2011; Gozman 2021;
Robertson 2009). By promoting the wellbeing and entrenchment of middle class interests,
President Putin may be undermining his own political authority. At least, theoretically. The
growth of middle class interests is often theorized to be the preamble of successful
democratization and necessary for the opposition to dictatorial authority (S. M. Lipset 1959).
While many democratic observers were hopeful that Russia’s speedy and chaotic
transition from one-party communist control towards electoral politics would lead to sustainable
democratization, Russia emerged from its reforms less as a democracy and more as a mixed,
hybridization of autocracy with electoral institutions. Such regimes have been distinguished by
their stability and their balance of elections with autocratic governance (Diamond and Plattner
2002; Marina Ottaway 2003). Mixed regimes have confounded academics who study
democratization, and the typology has spurred debate as to whether they are a form of transitory
regime or a final destination within a corrupted democratization process (Gandhi and Lust-Okar
2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). As noted by O’Donnell and

Putin’s direct quote in Russian was: <<Средняя заработная плата по экономике вырастет в реальном
выражении в 1,6-1,7 раза, почти до 40 тысяч рублей в ценах 2011 года.>> (Korval 2018).
1
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Schmitter (1986, 3), the process of democratization has the potential to become “an uncertain
‘something else’… a new, and possibly more severe, form of authoritarian rule.” Yet there
remains a future potential for further transition.
So then, should Putin be worried about pressure from below for regime change,
specifically from Russia’s middle class? Despite rising income statuses amongst Russian
citizens, democratization scholars remain skeptical that any transition will happen soon.
Obstacles such as corruption, societal forces, and power politics ensnared by political elites
known as siloviki are all cited as likely culprits (Dawisha 2014; Ledeneva 2013; Vasileva-Dienes
2019).2 Other scholars have shown increasing skepticism towards a governmentally dependent
middle class whose interests lie in perpetuating the regime rather than working against it which
has promoted an ‘autocratic middle class’ (Gontmakher and Ross 2015; Rosenfeld 2021).
It is estimated that some 59% of middle class Russian’s are employed by the Russian
government, and this same group will often profess electoral preferences towards the regime
which guarantees their employment (Rosenfeld 2021, 11). Strong ties between narrow,
prosperous sectors of the economy and middle income employment opportunities have served to
reinforce the bonds between client-patron relationships and patrimonial politics in Russia
(Becker and Vasileva 2017). As a result, Russia, at all levels of society, relies heavily on
informal networks and obscure principal-agent relationships that heighten the citizenry’s
dependence on these governmental structures (Vasileva-Dienes 2019).

Siloviki is a term to that roughly translates to “strongmen” in Russian. In Russian politics, the term is
widely used by academics to describe the political processes that personalistically ensnare much of Russian social,
economic, and political life (Dawisha 2014).
2
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1.1.1. Russia is Not Unique
The trend between an increasingly wealthy middle classes not buttressing democratic expectation
is not unique to Russia. Rising incomes across Central and Eastern Europe have had
contradictory effects on democratic attitudes, as well. Anti-democratic policies and sentiments
have become increasingly common amongst post-communist countries. Even those that have
experienced a longer democratic transition and consolidation period are not immune to this
backsliding (Kubas 2020). Countries like Poland and Hungry have experienced these trends but
they are not alone in this regard.

Figure 1-1 GDP Per Capita PPP and Democratic Attitudes for CEE Countries3
Figure 1-1 demonstrates the inverted trend between growing wealth and declining
democracy scores amongst a selection of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. The left
axis indicates their deliberative democracy score since 2000 from the Varieties of Democracy

3

GDP per Capita using PPP US dollars in 2021 with data provided by World Bank. Democracy scores
provided by Varieties of Democracy dataset.
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dataset.4 The darker lines show a strong downward trend in deliberative democracy scores for
democratic Hungary and Poland. Other countries remain relatively low while some have
continued to maintain high scores throughout the past two decades. The grayed-out lines trace
GDP per capita data using purchasing power parity. PPP per capita is a useful economic tool that
captures improvements and deteriorations to economic conditions in a country relative to the
population. Interestingly, these trend lines are universally sloped upwards which indicates
growing economic prosperity within these countries. This presents an interesting, if not
concerning puzzle. Democracy, both occurrence and quality are not responding to widespread
wealth accumulation and prosperity. Democracy, especially liberal democracy, has become a
weaker feature in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in spite of growth.
Shifts in attitudes by political leadership are most apparent in these faltering democracies.
Populist parties and charismatic leaders have grown more reliant on illiberal rhetoric and
investing in political reforms that only further undermine democratic stability. One supposed
populist leader, Victor Orban, Hungary’s Prime Minister since 2010, delivered a controversial
speech in which he criticized the future of liberal governments when he declared, “...societies
founded upon the principle of the liberal way to organize a state will not be able to sustain their
world-competitiveness in the following years...” (Toth 2014). Accordingly, Hungarian policy has
been increasingly oriented towards emulating Putin’s illiberal Russia rather than liberal
European Union leadership. Hungary’s democracy scores reflect this trend. Furthermore, many
policies in CEE countries have been aimed at regenerating the position of the state and
increasing government’s control over the levers of the economy (Jasiecki 2017). For instance,

4

Deliberative democracy score measures the likelihood that decision making processes are deliberated in a
manner “in which public reasoning focused on the public good motivates political decisions” see QoG Codebook
2021 (Teorell 2022).
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Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) has been increasingly enamored by Orban’s
consolidation of economic and political power in Hungary. Jaroslaw Kaczynski stated in 2011,
that he was “deeply convinced that the day will come when we will have Budapest in Warsaw”
(The First News 2018).
The growth of economic prosperity of in CEE countries has not secured democracy in the
region. This is a result that confounds previous scholarship that has estimated otherwise (Åslund
2006; Mucha 2007). Even among middle class groups who are often perceived as pro-democrat,
for a variety of economic and structural reasons, there have been measurable declinations in prodemocratic outcomes. This requires a new program of scholarship that tempers older
expectations within a new framework. One that highlights the growing dissatisfaction in the
professional labor classes and their preferences for challenging or maintaining their sociopolitical status quo (Cianetti, Dawson, and Hanley 2018; Rosenfeld 2021).
The works by Hellman and Kaufman (2001) and Grzymala-Busse (2008) help shed light
on the issue that confronts this dissertation. These authors have emphasized a phenomenon
known as state capture by elites and incumbents. This is a clientelistic method by which elites
and parties within a country may seek to exploit their own political institutions in order to further
dominate it. State capture was initially regarded as a method of outsider elites shaping policy and
institutions within the government for their own uses and gains (Hellman and Kaufmann 2001)
However, in this dissertation I lean heavily on Grzymala-Busse’s (2008, 640) conceptualization
of incumbent state capture whereby political elites attempt to fuse their political party or
organization to the state in order to gain additional autonomy and resources in a process known
as state-party fusion. This should be thought of as state capture from within and that the
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methodologies used by incumbent leaders to undertake this process are unique from oligarchic
state capture.
Democracy’s remission in Central and Eastern Europe can’t alone be placed at the foot of
state capture as it fails to explain democratic outcomes in response to voter preference. “State
seizure does not simply corrode the state” (Grzymala-Busse 2008, 639). Parties and elites may
use corrupt procedures, such as clientelism and patronage, to bolster their political chances, but
these methods require a functioning society to operate within. Hardin (Hardin 2009, 247) very
poignantly points out this fact, “even a devoted criminal must prefer a society that is well enough
organized to produce enough to steal.” Once parties are in position to do so, they can then initiate
clientelistic relationships with constituent groups in their society to maintain that power.
1.2. A New Theory of Clientelism and the Goals of this Dissertation
This dissertation seeks to answer the questions: can the middle class be bought off by clientelism
and what affect does that have on democracy in Central and Eastern Europe? The theory
presented here argues that the middle class can engage in clientelism and that it leads to
constrained, eroded, and nominal democratic outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe. This
research led me to conclude that each of these outcomes indicate the presence of various levels
of incumbent state capture as a result of middle class clientelism where state management of the
economy precedes vulnerable constituencies. Throughout this dissertation, I find both qualitative
and quantitative evidence to support this contention by showing that clientelistic linkages are
stronger with the middle class in states with the worse democracy scores.
Clientelism often targets the vulnerable of society as a means of vote procurement that
can snowball into state capture. My claim goes a step further. Incumbent state capture occurs,
and democracy can fail when party elites clientelize the middle class. The middle class is often
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heralded as essential to democracy and too expensive for incumbent elites to motivate to their
causes. However, I have noted that a devaluation of material and psychic wellbeing within the
middle class coupled with high levels of state ownership of the economy can change the calculus
of buying off this constituency by elites. Support for this contention would be unexpected within
the confines of the original clientelism literature.
Buying off the middle class through clientelism is not apparently obvious or clear. The
group is more costly to clientelize, is democratically leaning, and are varied in their interests and
political preferences. My theory proposes that vulnerabilities assist parties and elites in creating
an available demand for patronage and clientelism, but a component is missing: the supply. The
second piece of this puzzle relates to the status of the government in relation to its economic
system which I describe as state management of the economy (SMotE). When state management
of the economy is high then parties and politicians have more resources to offer emerging
vulnerable constituents. This increases the chances of constituent state capture, a variation of
state capture that describes state capture of the institutions and economy by incumbents but with
the support of a specific interest group, or constituency. In this case, middle class voters. This
relationship should be thought of as reciprocal whereby the government creates public goods that
focus on middle class needs which then secures those voter’s loyalty in future elections.
Constituent clientelism is different from welfare because the products and services are typically
not programmatic in nature or means tested.5 Instead, clientelistic goods are meant to increase
the connection between middle income voters and their political patrons.
The main dependent variable in this dissertation is democratic outcomes described
previously. However, the theory uses clientelism in the middle class as a proxy estimate for

5

Programmatic political parties are those that offer public policies and goods as electoral promises but
these goods are not conditioned on political support. See Kitschelt and Kselman (2013).
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when democracy is weaker or stronger. I demonstrate how constrained democracies experience
the strongest elements of clientelism and incumbent state capture while retrograde democracies
experience a polarized relationship between those who support state capture and those who do
not within the middle class. I engage directly with estimates of clientelism and corruption as the
main determinants of my theory and how they interact with different social groups in each case
as it provides a testable proxy for each of these outcomes. Clientelism and corruption scores
were generated using factor scores based on responses to survey questions from the most recent
World Value and Euro Value Surveys. While not a perfect proxy of these theoretical
components, by showing that respondents respond differently to public goods and corruptions
based on income it provides significant evidence to support the dissertation’s theory.
1.2.1. What is the Middle Class?
Growing prosperity in Central and Eastern Europe has not been evenly distributed across all
social groups and has contributed to disparate amounts of social inequity in society. I contend
that this social inequity stimulates the fragility of middle- and lower-income groups because of
the economic transitions which occurred in the 1990s and the resultant collapse of organized
labor’s political power in most CEE countries. Consequently, middle class vulnerabilities are tied
to identifiable, political-economic arrangements that may either heighten or weaken professional
labor’s dependency on the government to protect and maintain their middle income status and
access to resources. Rather than an ideological shift in temperament towards populist parties,
voting behavior by the middle class is the resultant conjunction of increased dependency on
governments which incentivize political elites to engage in state capture practices. To test the
veracity of this claim, I rely on Mill’s method of difference and use three CEE cases for
comparison: Estonia, Russia, and Poland.
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My approach invokes the middle class as a heuristic for middle income households
within a given country. This unit, while both sociological and economic in nature, is treated as an
autonomous entity with its own unique economic and political interests that is distinct from
unskilled labor, higher income earners, and owners of large concentrations of wealth.
Furthermore, this dissertation in concerned with how citizens in the middle strata can be bought
off rather than the social activism of class consciousness. The middle class has limited access to
resources which make them more vulnerable compared to wealthier groups in society.
Simultaneously, they are more economically independent than lower income earners (Leventoğlu
2014). In turn, this access to moderate amounts of resources should make these middle income
households more likely to turn away from patron-clientelist dependencies and towards antipersonalistic rule of law (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Diamond and Brun 2014). However,
the results of this investigation are counterintuitive to these previously held arguments.
The middle class is a group that is best defined by their professional, and educational
status along the lines of identities similar to Moore’s (Moore 1993 [1996]) description of the
bourgeoisie. However, I do not limit this analysis to strictly the sociological as I mainly
emphasize the econometric measurements of meso-level incomes and material wealth in order to
better define middle class groups (Levy and Michel 1983). Throughout this dissertation I refer to
income and class interchangeably. While it may be the case that such designations are important
to distill as unique objects, I do not make such distinctions and treat them as interchangeable. I
calculate the sociological trappings of middle class life as a functional proxy of those who are
able to attain that middle income status. The predictions of this dissertation emphasize the
estimations of material loss or gain as relevant indicators of middle class vulnerability along this
behavioral heuristic position. Elite forces may seek to alleviate those vulnerabilities in a given

13
country by exposing them and using them for political advantage. Such behavioral outcomes
amongst the middle class occur even when controlling for other variables such as education,
ideology, religion, etc.
1.2.2. A Challenge to Previous Arguments
This dissertation is aimed at filling in the current incompleteness within the literature whose host
of arguments have emerged in the wake of populist and autocratic tendencies to explain
democratic erosion. For one, the relationship between the middle class and state capture has been
largely overlooked. Theoretically, it is estimated that the poorer elements of society make for
cheap and cost-effective targets for rulers (Magaloni 2006; Stokes 2005). Other scholars have
observed middle class cooptation but have placed their explanations too much on cultural
organizations (J. Clark 2004) or economic modalities between rural and urban voters
(Berenschot 2018). I emphasize that the middle class represents a trojan horse, so to speak, for
parties to go about implementing incumbent state capture and clientelistic practices.
The arguments that have looked at middle class vulnerabilities have tended to emphasize
dependence and social mobility as causative. Public sector employment is estimated to impede
voting behavior as government employees have a stake in maintaining the status quo (B.
Rosenfeld 2021). However, voting behavior is not consistent when looking at the evidence and
across cases. For instance, in Russia the evidence suggests that both private and public sector
professional workers are still likely to support Putin’s party (Ross 2020). Then there is the
confounding aspect that public sector employment has largely been eroded in CEE countries. Or
should not be thought of in the same terms as what Soviet era dependence for employment
implies. Others have argued that social mobility plays a key role in determining when political
transitions occur in the middle (Leventoğlu 2014; Piketty 1995). These scholars argue that short
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term gains are often balanced against long term distribution schemes that align with autocracy
and democracy respectively. However, the insinuation with these arguments is that democracy is
a means by which to redistribute broadly when vulnerabilities are high rather than the
clientelistic inverse.
Perhaps the largest gap in the literature on incumbent state capture and state party fusion
is the lack of applied economic explanations. The theoretical implications of political elites
expanding their control through the redistribution of rents, that is to say, “sharing with
supporters”, as a means of entangling political support and fusing political leadership to the state
(Grzymala-Busse 2008, 639). This is fundamental to the state capture discourse (Innes 2014).
Yet, the nexus of what side transfers a party can redistribute in exchange for electoral support in
relation to the economic arrangements of the state are relatively mute. In order for incumbents to
capture the state by redistributing its wealth for political gains there must first be a state that has
access to resources for which to offer its clients. For this paper, I have emphasized the levels of
state management of the economy (SMotE) as a fundamental feature of, constituent state capture
and indicate cases where the state is captured by incumbents at the behest of a constituent group.
Constituent state capture and democratic outcomes correlate to when high levels of state
intervention in the economy collude with a vulnerable middle class who then becomes a costeffective patron for political support.
Finally, as this paper is an exploration of democratic outcomes and its intersection with
political economy, I likewise seek to expand the comparative economic literature. Since the
vulnerabilities within the middle class are largely material, I produce an explanation that
balances those insecurities with state action. This approach relies heavily on an expanded
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Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach.6 While I do not attempt to produce unifying typologies
for political-economic outcomes, I do rely on an interpretation of state, business, and labor
relations to better define my theory. My assessment of the state’s capacity to manage the
economy are in relationship to the three factors studied by VoC scholars. Importantly, organized
labor relations have been greatly reduced since the 1990s making their addition to working class
vulnerabilities near universal among CEE cases.
1.3. Why Central and Eastern Europe?
The tension and democratic volatility produced by popular support for elite led state capture is
not solely the provision of post-Communist societies. Nor are these tensions novel given that the
global crises as to the future viability of democracy has long been a hypothesized debate in
political science.7 However, CEE countries present a methodologically valuable region for
investigation. The relatively recent comparable history of political and economic conditions after
WWII makes for a more epistemologically sound comparative research design. By focusing on
CEE countries, I can more neatly isolate causal relationships from historical happenstance, and
other incidental explanations.
Central and Eastern European countries are made up of a collection of former Soviet
Union member states as well as those countries that were within the USSR’s sphere of influence
after WWII. Each of these outsider countries experienced a hostile takeover of their governments
by Soviet oriented communist parties which ruled them as one-party states from WWII until the

6

The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature provides a theoretical tool for discerning the diversification
of capitalist markets after World War II. Initially developed in Andrew Shonfield’s Modern Capitalism (1965), it
was popularized by Peter Hall and David Soskice (Hall et al. 2001) articulated the main themes of capitalism
divergence by focusing on several important policy factors, such as vocational training, corporate governance, and
labor relations.
7
Samuel Huntington, Joji Watanuki, and Michel Crozier released their findings of the Trilateral
Commission ((1975) which argued that democratic governance was vulnerable to an “excess of democracy” (113)
and advocated a return to the prestige and political authority of national governments.
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early 1990s. CEE countries include Poland and the Czech Republic, to its far western extent, and
Russia at its most eastern with several European countries in between. While some
classifications of Central and Eastern Europe include the former Yugoslavia countries as a part
of Central and Eastern Europe, I do not. Although I include the Balkan countries of Romania and
Bulgaria in the definition, the former Yugoslavia territories have undergone their own series of
transitions which are unique from the second world’s experience.8 Throughout this paper I often
refer to CEE countries by regional associations and groupings. For instance, I use the term
Visegrad to refer to the Visegrad pact states that are complemented by Hungary, Poland, and the
Czech and Slovak Republics.9 A Map of Central and Eastern Europe is presented in Figure 1-2
with those associations demarcated for the reader’s benefit.

Figure 1-2 Map of Central and Eastern Europe
Due to their similar post-war histories and transitionary experiences in the 1990’s, CEE
countries possess some unique contexts regarding the development of middle class groups within

8
The 2nd World was a Cold War classification of socialist, industrialized states tied either directly or
closely to the Soviet Union. The term was used to differentiate those states that were aligned with the Western
capitalist states (1st World) and those that were nonaligned (3rd World) such as Yugoslavia.
9
The Visegrad group or V4 is a formal pact initiated in 1991 between four former socialist countries:
Poland, Czech and Slovak Republic, and Hungary for mutual aid and assistance along military, cultural, and
economic matters (Pakulski 2016).
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these countries. This is because middle class identities emerged from relatively flat, postcommunist societies. Throughout the 1990s, the flatness of these societies became much more
dynamic. CEE countries underwent similar market and electoral reforms which economically
dispersed groups to various degrees over the decades. The region is distinctive in that it
transitioned from a hardened, quasi-corporatist structure that managed labor and state-owned
government enterprises, emblematic of the socialist system (Pravda 1983), to their current styles
of liberal and free market relationships.
There are obvious limitations to this approach given that there are disproportionate sizes
of middle class groups throughout Central and Eastern Europe. In Russia, accounting for middle
class influence yields somewhat underwhelming results given its small size and difficulty in
identifying the Russian middle class. This has forced scholarship to rely more heavily on
sociological conceptualizations of the term for that country (Nissanov 2017; B. Rosenfeld 2021;
Sibirskaya et al. 2015). The issue becomes much less confounding when moving beyond the
Russian context towards the broader CEE states where the middle classes are more easily
identifiable and much more robust. However, the transition from a relatively flat, socialist
society, to one that is dynamic and socially stratified is a shared occurrence within the CEE
region. For these reasons, countries in Central and Eastern Europe are ideally suited for
comparison between cases.
1.4. Methodology
For this manuscript, I employ a mixed methodological approach in my research design to
rigorously analyze and scrutinize the validity of the state capture thesis in CEE countries. I rely
on an inductive design whose outcomes are already known but require explanation. I do so with
epistemological tools that emphasize case selection objectivity and detailed comparative
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historical research to draw out the explanatory variables of my argument. Within each case, I
apply a process-tracing framework which I lay out in Chapter 3 to best overcome the
explanatory obstacles of my argument and focus in on the main causal variables. This processtracing approach was essential for sketching out democratization, marketization, and crises
events which played out over years and required me to link causal inferences with their temporal
counterparts. In building my overall methodological approach, I applied a thorough protocol to
my case selection method and relied quite extensively on Collier’s systematized approach which
uses descriptive and process-tracing tests (Collier 2011).10
My method for case selection was essential given the small number of CEE cases and the
variability that existed between each case. My motives for selecting which cases to use were
predicated on which countries would provide the strongest challenges to my hypotheses. For this
argument, I selected Estonia, Poland, and Russia as the evidence for rival theories and
hypotheses were much more potentiated than other cases in the region. I explored each of the
selected cases using a deep scraping of descriptive and historical analyses that were further
buttressed by qualitative methods of primary source document analysis, and interviews with incountry academic experts and several government and business elites. However, the initial
design was obstructed due to the onset of the Covid-19 global pandemic. As such, this project
had to rely more discreetly on quantitative methods to further enrich the validity of this
dissertation’s theory.
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See Table 1 in Collier’s (2011, 825) Understanding Process Tracing for a great example of the processtracing test through rigorous application of counter theories and case selection.
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1.4.1. Research in the Time of Covid
The global Covid-19 pandemic has spared very few from its reach. Drastic, life changing policies
and their associated effects have had deleterious costs to travel and face to face interactions. As
such, this research program has had to undertake drastic overhauls since its late 2019 inception
and the subsequent onset of Covid’s stay-at-home orders. Cross border travel was heavily
sanctioned and reduced a once relatively easy research opportunity into a more than yearlong
impossibility. The original aspects of this research design included a prolonged in-country
investigation of Russia other CEE cases along with extensive Slavic language development to
gain the necessary linguistic skills to best navigate the region. While in 2019, such ethnographic
work would have been readily achievable, by 2020 and 2021 it has presented researchers with
novel barriers. In addition, the sidelining of political and social science conferences during the
crisis has presented further challenges in building networks and contact opportunities for the
researchers beginning such a rigorous investigation.
Covid stifled the timeline of this research design to a modest extent, but recent
developments have allowed me to take advantage of ongoing trends. Most academic, and
professional access has been pushed online. This has allowed me to conduct interviews both in
and out out-of-country with some success. Second, Summer 2021 openings for travel in Europe
has alleviated the burdens placed on crossing borders to some extent. In the second half of 2021 I
was able to conduct field research throughout Central and Eastern Europe including the Baltic
states. Sadly, not all countries in Europe were open for travel for research development with
Russia remaining quite difficult to get a visa to travel to. Despite initial limitations, this research
program greatly benefited from my travels and the months of in-country investigation that I
conducted throughout Central Europe and the Baltic region.
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1.4.2. Case Selection
The case selection process was centered around two epistemological principals: comparative
methodology and case identification through qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The nature
of the questions being asked in this manuscript leans heavily on between case comparisons
which makes comparative methods more useful than other large-N methodologies. The
comparative approach is able to emphasize the importance of case selection with limited case
numbers and can better isolate the unique and causal relationships between independent and
dependent variables. This method gains empirical leverage when differentiating across cases and
between similar outcomes with very few variables in common or cases with dissimilar outcomes
and near holistically identical cases with one uniquely identifying feature that can be inferred as
causal.
I have already iterated the benefits of focusing on Central and Eastern Europe for this
study as it provides a relatively uniform area of post-Communist states that underwent huge
political, economic, and societal transformations at approximately the same time. Despite the
similarities, a deep scan of comparative historical analysis is still needed to draw out post-Cold
War histories and provide for a strong enough conclusion which avoids the simplicity of path
dependence. A comparative historical approach is especially useful in this regard as it
disentangles “divergent theoretical frameworks, for which the tension between structuralism and
culturalism is a major example” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 5). The relative similarity
across CEE cases allowed me to control for confounding factors that may have preceded my
argument as it developed. To build off this approach with more rigor, I utilized QCA set
intersection to determine CEE country outcomes and interpreting the necessary and sufficient
conditions of my argument.
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The benefit of QCA is that it generates ideal types for constructing case-specific
arguments while using the context of each case (Saylor 2020). In doing so, the researcher can
unlock necessary and sufficient conditions by discovering where these variables intersect in each
case. In addition to finding multiple pathways to similar outcomes, QCA is appropriate for an
inductive approach of theory building. QCA effectively determines how multiple variables can
work in cohesive fashion to generate specific events (Longest and Vaisey 2008). For this
dissertation, I have isolated the main variables as being levels of state control and the presence of
a vulnerable middle class. Middle class vulnerability is a near universal variable and is shared
across all cases and for similar reasons. However, as outcomes are different, variation in state
management of the economy reflects on the level of state capture a country may experience.
State capture can occur in cases without vulnerability in various regime types but for
democracies it is an important aspect that drives outcomes. Higher levels of state investment in
the economy are a necessary component of elites embedding into the state and distributing
resources for gains.
The other layer of my argument seeks to explain democratic outcomes as they relate to
their illative factors. The three democratic outcomes in the context of CEE democracies are also
important in the causal framework. Democracy, retrograded democracy, and constrained
democracy each have associated CEE states with whom I tie back to my QCA of cases and final
case selection. To identify which are which, I operationalize each term along a two-dimensional
basis using the “liberal democracy index” and overall regime classification from the Varieties of
Democracy (V-Dem) dataset.11 First, I establish if the V-Dem coding has indicated whether a

11
The V-Dem dataset is time-series that takes a multidimensional and disaggregated approach to
interpreting and indexing the components of Democracy: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and
egalitarian (Coppedge, Gerring, and Henrik Knutsen 2021; v-dem.net 2021). From this dataset, limit my coding of
democracy to cases after 1990 and to CEE countries.

22
country has reached “liberal democracy” from 1990 to 2020.12 I then control for whether their
liberal democracy index score is negative or positively sloped.13 The results of this analysis is
presented in Table 1-1.
Table 1-1 List of Central and Eastern European Countries and Democracy Type
Democracy Type
Democracy

Country
Latvia; Estonia; Slovakia; Lithuania;

Retrograde democracy

Poland; Czech Republic; Hungary

Constrained democracy

Russia; Romania; Belarus; Bulgaria;
Ukraine

Table 1-1 provides a categorization of each CEE country based on my operationalization
of V-Dem data. The countries termed as “democracies” are countries which have reached a high
V-Dem value and maintained that status. There is one outlier in this case, Slovakia. Slovakia has
reached liberal democracy status but declined in 2019 back to “electoral democracy”. However,
its liberal democracy index does not indicate a negative slope and so I categorize the case as a
democracy. I code as “retrograde democracy” those countries that have been indicated as a
liberal democracy by V-Dem estimations in the past but have declined to a less democratic
regime type. All these cases are universally sloped downwards in their liberal democracy scores

12
The regime variable indicates a countries status on a 4-level basis (0 to 3) with “liberal democracy” being
a 3 and “closed autocracy” being a 0. No CEE states since 1990 have been marked as a “closed autocracy”.
13
The liberal democracy variable is an index which indicates a country’s level of liberal democracy as
“achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective
checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power.” (Coppedge, Gerring, and Henrik Knutsen
2021, 44)
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indicating a parallel decline in democratic quality. The last grade of “constrained democracy”
was given to those countries that V-Dem coders estimated as never attaining liberal democracy
status and are categorized as such in Table 1-1. Note that these democracy’s V-Dem scores may
be sloped upwards despite their status.
The information gained from QCA set intersection and analysis provided with V-Dem’s
identification of democratic outcomes narrowed the cases of this paper along two conditions: the
presence of the strength of state control over market forces and the level of state capture. With
that in mind, this dissertation relied on the three cases of Estonia, Poland, Russia to make its
point. These are laid out in Table 1-2, below which also lists their important identifying variables
per the analysis of this dissertation. The comparative economic growth data captures how the
three states relate to each other in terms of GDP per capita growth using World Bank data.
Table 1-2 Case Selections and Identifying Features

Organized labor
Comparative economic
growth
Democratic quality
Middle class sizet
Middle class status
SMotE
State capture prediction

Russia
Weak

Poland
Weak

Estonia
Weak

Weakest

Middling

Strongest

Constrained

Retrograde

Democracy

Smallest

Largest

Middling

Vulnerable1

Vulnerable2

Vulnerable2

High

Medium

Low

Highest

Medium

Lowest

Data on middle class in Russia provided by Svetlana Mareeva, “Socio-Economic Inequalities in Modern
Russia and their Perception by the Population” (Mareeva 2020).
2
Data on middle class in Estonia and Poland provided by Josephine Ulbrich, “Who are the ‘middle’? –
The struggle of the European middle class to improve their living standards”, (Ulbrich 2015).
t
Middle class size is the proportion of the middle class to the rest of the population. These are rank
ordered at the time of modeling based on multiple sources.
1
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Per my identified variables, I’ve selected the Russian case as it is emblematic of strong
state influence over its markets with weak interference from independent businesses and firms.
Russia is also heavily used by authors to describe state capture and was one of the original cases
used by Kaufmann and Hellman in their 2001 article. Researchers like Rosenfeld (2021) have
highlighted the autocratic tendencies of its middle class which makes it an interesting case to
examine potential directional problems with the theory. For example, if political elites aren’t
seizing on the vulnerable constituent groups but instead are reacting to an already present feeling
in the polity. This case will test the relationship and directionality of the argument to expose how
high levels of state involvement begets high level of state-party fusion.
Meanwhile, the Polish case provides the main test of my argument. The Polish scenario
possesses a resurgent state that has increased its influence over the market. Middling levels of
state control of the economy may be enough to deliver democratic backsliding if political parties
attempt to leverage the state’s access to rents for political gain. The presence of high amounts of
independent companies and firms pushes back on the credibility of my argument to a much
further extent than the Russian case. I also rely on Poland, rather than other possible retrograde
democracies, like Hungary, because it is not as democratically eroded as. Additionally, its
declination in democratic scores is more recent which could favor other confounding factors as
explanatory. The effect of a proportionally large control of the economy by the Polish
government would go a long way to demonstrate the validity of my thesis.
Finally, the Estonian case is ideally suited as its government lacks a strong,
interventionist approach to the market. Estonia’s successful maintenance of its democratic status
despite being host to ethnic polarization between native Estonians and Russians, its economic
dependency on complex technology firms and investment, and middle class fragility makes for
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an ideal counterfactual. Its citizens are amongst the CEEs highest earners while simultaneously
having the weakest protections for labor. Proof of the absence of elite interest in incumbent state
capture in Estonia further strengthens my argument as the null case. Each of the three examples
are developed in further detail within the later portions of this manuscript.
Comparative historical examination is not without its limitations. I have undertaken a
rigorous process of case selection in an attempt to avoid any excessive biases in building and
applying my theory to CEE countries. The small number of instances makes some amount of
bias in case selection inevitable but with some positives. The narrow selection of cases provides
some defense against exogenous variables by controlling for extreme variations such as large and
overriding differences in culture, historical precedents, and economic starting points. These
components are largely controlled within the CEE case selection process. Still comparative
analysis necessitates that a researcher demonstrates extensive knowledge of the “relevant
theories, the relevant research literature and, most important of all, the relevant cases” (Ragin
1987, 121). As a result, comparative and qualitative analysis lends itself quite neatly to area
specialization to fill in the relevant epistemological information demanded of such a
methodological approach (Easton and Schelling 1991).
1.4.3. Quantitative Analysis
Per the discussion earlier, much of this work is centered around qualitative and comparative
analyses of the three cases at hand. While much of the exactitude of my results comes from the
interpretation of state capture and possible alternative theories, I also rely extensively on
quantitative tools to test the validity of these arguments in order to gain increased confidence
over the results. To do so, I drew upon many aggregated datasets and several national surveys to
evaluate how clientelism and corruption distinguish themselves in these societies. Throughout
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each investigatory chapter, I intersperse quantitative models and figures to assess the validity of
my various hypotheses and conclusions. I break these data points into two categories: state level
variables, and individual variables.
Previous scholarship on clientelism have used survey data as a methodological tool for
explaining clientelistic outcomes (Bobonis et al. 2017; Zeng 2019; Bue, Sen, and Lindberg
2021). While multiple country comparisons lend themselves to clientelism indices, like V-Dem’s
corruption index, the within country micro analysis allowed me to use survey data to measure
responses within the middle class. This provides a fairly accurate measurement of whether or not
individuals in this group are being targeted by clientelism, patronage, or participating in
corruption. In each case, I analyze clientelism and corruption using factor analysis to create
composite scores around specific questions from each survey. These questions include the
justification of corrupt behavior (corruption) and the confidence in public goods (clientelism)
which I distinguish between. I use confidence in public goods because assessments of confidence
and their quality should not be distinguishable across income groups predictably. Instead, any
noticeable differences in survey attitudes should reflect the deeper underlying theoretical
imposition of this dissertation and represent clientelistic offerings that are distinguishable.
Wealthier respondents should be less inclined towards public goods as they tend to gain the least
utility and pay more in taxes for them. Meanwhile, lower income respondents should be more
likely to indicate higher confidence in public goods per welfare policies or the previous logic of
clientelism and poorer constituencies. The use individual survey data to allows me to draw
deeper micro analysis conclusions about state capture that other measurements of clientelism
may only approximate on the ground level effects (Bue, Sen, and Lindberg 2021).
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I drew much of my statistical analysis from a series of survey data collected in Estonia,
Poland, and Russia, as well as other CEE and European countries over the course of several
decades. Much of the quantitative analysis was done using the European and World Value
Survey (Gedeshi, Zulehner, and Rotman 2021; Inglehart et al. 2021). These surveys are
implemented typically every five to ten years and takes a random selection of citizens for each
country. This should provide a reasonable expectation for a normalized distribution of income
groups and responses. Respondents are given a battery of questions that measure demographics,
democratic values, and political changes. This data was supplemented by horizontal studies such
as the Polish POLPAN, and Russian HSE survey of household data when they are available and
useful.
My reliance on the two factor analysis follows Bue et al.’s (2021, 9) methodology of
building a clientelism indices whereby public goods can be assessed within populations by way
of distinguishing their availability and quality. They distinguish between three levels of
measurement: vote buying, bribery, and public goods provisions. In this paper, I rely on two
umbrella concepts: corruption and clientelism. I measure confidence in the provision education,
social security, health care, civil service, court, and police as provided by the EVS and WVS
when available. I am not as interested in the size of offerings, per se, but as to how the perceived
quality of the goods are differentiated between income groups. The corruption factor analysis
composite score was collected using responses to the justification of bribery, cheating on taxes,
skipping a fare, and accepting benefits that are unearned. Corruption scores on an individual
basis provide only limited information but they are useful in cases where participation in the
system begets corrupt behavior. I expect that when there are economic alternatives for the
vulnerable middle income respondent, the corruption score will be lower.
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To identify the middle class among survey respondents I had to rely on specifications that
correlated with outside data. The EVS and WVS do not provide a direct measurement of
respondents by class groupings, but they do provide data on total household incomes in deciles
referred to in the surveys as ‘scale of incomes.’ This is a useful technique given that the middle
class implies a variegated scale that adjusts with incomes and by country and across surveys.
With this in mind, I rely on the OECD standard (Nolan, Roser, and Thewissen 2019; OECD
2019) that estimates the middle class as earners of 75% to 200% of the median monthly income.
If we factor that into deciles, with 5 being the approximate the median earner, that estimates
middle class as being between 3.75 and 7.5 deciles. I adjusted those values upwards to decile
groups 4 and down to 7 respectively as a conservative estimate for middle class respondents.14
This removes more lower income earners for a much smaller pool of higher income earners and
will lower the likelihood of clientelistic responses associated with poorer or wealthier
individuals.
This manuscript also draws extensively on the latest versions of the datasets V-Dem and
Quality of Governance (QoG) to produce supplemental figures and visualizations. Both datasets
are frequently updated (as of late 2021) and provide time-series data covering for all countries
with datapoints going back as far as the 1940s, in some cases. The Quality of Governance
(Teorell 2022) is an extremely useful tool for running time-series regressions using country-level
factors as it compiles over 100 other datasets of various sizes and description. This data includes
economic, political, and descriptive variables making it an ideal complimentary to the data I use
for longitudinal modeling as the compiled dataset is laid out by country-year.

14

See Appendix A.1 for coding details.
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These data were essential understanding how attitudes within each case’s population
correlates with preferences for party patronage and corrupt practices. The arguments in this paper
benefitted greatly from the application of statistical analyses when necessary to fill in epistemic
gaps that were formed by the qualitative comparative analysis. Given the limitations placed on
this research design by the emergence of the Covid-19 global pandemic in 2020, this paper’s
reliance on data helped to validate the more stringent hypotheses which could not be ascertained
by using in-country research.
1.5. Scope of the Cases and Argument
While the communist past of CEE countries is an important aspect of the setting with which this
dissertation explicates its arguments, it is not a necessary component of the theory. The middle
class may be a logical mark for elites who seek to enhance their control over government outside
the borders of CEE states. Indeed, as I have stated, the phenomenon of populism, growth of
radical parties, and the undermining of institutional constraint is an ongoing global trend. The
hesitancy of many states to adopt or maintain democracy in the wake of income inequality and
increased country wealth highlights the realities of the 21st century and the decline of the liberal
aesthetic on a global scale. It is especially salient when one considers the rising dominance of
authoritarian states like China.15
My thesis of middle class clientelism is applicable beyond the boundaries of postcommunist Europe and can, likewise, be expanded against future cases. My intention to focus on
CEE cases was spurred by epistemological concerns and the region’s continued endorsement of
illiberal behaviors despite growing wealth and accession to the liberal European Union order in

For a more detailed analysis of the Liberal aesthetic, please see David Russell’s (2013) interpretation of
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty.
15
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many cases. Still, proximity to early democratizers is not enough to spur democratic
consolidation or instigate full committal to democracy and institutions. Beyond the borders of
Central and Eastern Europe, the middle class reliance on enterprising elites has been successfully
applied by other scholars to China given it hosts a similar tension between rising economic
statuses without democratization (Chen and Lu 2011; Miao 2016). Still, there has been no
application of this argument to those countries that have already democratized as a theoretical
explanation for democratic erosion. Instead, the lack of a systematic investigation of the middle
class as a potential fifth column for state capture outcomes assumes that democracies are static
and that democratic populations will always prefer liberal democracy once attained.
With the scope of the project in mind, I also wish to iterate that I am not making a
normative argument. The changing attitudes in the world and the emotional attachments people
have to certain values and ideas create a hazardous ground to maneuver when considering how
these changes come about. While some scholars apply a more pessimistic outlook of the future,
complete with calamitous prophecies (Kirchick 2017), it is not the purview of this paper to
examine what should be and to only explain what is. As clarified by Schmitter (2015) and
Lührmann and Lindberg (2019), the experiences of democratic decline must be understood
through the structures in which it has occurred and judged against the decision making of its
principal components: its voters and elected officials. This dissertation proposes that challenges
to our collective understanding of how democracy should be studied and provides a rubric of
impartiality and systematic evaluations to be rigorously applied in order to gain the best and least
biased results.
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1.6. Layout of the Dissertation
This dissertation presents a series of arguments that articulates how political-economic decisions
relate to those in the middle class. In doing so I come to several important conclusions regarding
the relationship of middle class prosperity and the state’s regulation of economic and market
forces. Precisely put, the state’s control over class mobility, access to socioeconomic status, and
the privileges afforded to those groups will create a clientelistic confluence between voters who
will become dependent on that access. The growth of wealth observed in CEE countries the past
two decades and the 2008 recession has created an interesting admixture of class vulnerabilities
and a subsequent political discourse that has emerged to manage those fears. I make this
argument over several chapters which I have divided between cases and the extent of the
argument that they examine.
In the following chapters, Chapter 2 and 3, I review the literature and lay out my
argument in full. I spell out the various components of the dissertation and articulate the process
tracing aspects of the theory. In conjunction with the specification of my theory of state capture,
I also establish the hypotheses of this paper. Likewise, I entertain several alternative arguments
and possible hypotheses that derive from those positions. These include ideational and partisan
arguments that attest to political affiliation, endogeneity of democratic decline predicting
clientelistic attitudes, theories of societal inequality, and dependency on outside economic
investment.
The next three chapters are dedicated to applying the theory to each of my three cases:
Estonia, Russia, and Poland. In Chapter 4, I explore the Russian case as a test of the ideal
conditions that created a country defined by total state-party fusion and elite dominance. With
little avenues for middle income groups to gain access to wealth or status except through state
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sanction, they are more likely to perpetuate those features of the state that benefit them in
exchange for United Russia’s continued control of Russian politics. I move on to Poland in
Chapter 5. This makes for a much stronger test case of the arguments in this manuscript. Poland
has undergone a successful democratic transition, embraced deregulation of markets, and
promoted business interests as a way of feeding middle class success. Recent roll backs in
democratic scores and changes to attitudes amongst voters makes for a dynamic case with
possible strong alternative explanations. Finally, Chapter 6 explores what is the arguments nullcase, Estonia. This country experienced strong economic growth and has continued to maintain
high levels of democratic quality. Likewise, Estonia provides an alternative outcome for a region
that has seen extensive of democratic erosion.
I conclude the manuscript with an examination of the overall argument along with a
summary of the supporting and contradicting evidence. This chapter also examines the
limitations of my argument and how it may be improved beyond geographic specificity. The
conclusion is finished with a discussion of how this theory may be broadened beyond Central
and Eastern European cases and speculation as to what may be gained by applying a theory of
this paper to other declining democracies around the globe. In doing so, I conclude with a
sanguine estimation as to what may occur when the state management of the economy collides
with globalized middle class frailty.
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2. DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS
The global decline of liberal democracies has been an ongoing and consistent trend. However,
the extent to which the decline is occurring, what it means for democracy, and whether it
constitutes a “third wave of autocracy” is debatable (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). Some
scholars emphasize the changing conditions brought on by capitalism and the appeal of populist
demagogues to solve their polity’s withering appetite for competitive politics (Mysíková 2016;
Bochsler and Juon 2020). Others suggest that the world is experiencing a crisis of transition
rather than an actual decline (Fukuyama et al. 2015; Levitsky and Way 2015). Whether this,
indeed, indicates a wave of autocratic fervor, measurable rates of intrastate polarization are on
the rise and undergirds a noticeable decline in the quality of democracy across the globe. Nearly
thirty years after Fukuyama (Fukuyama 1989) declared the ‘end of history’ and the supremacy of
liberalism, scholars are now examining if the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe
represented a democratic wave or merely a misinterpretation of the facts.
Fukuyama’s (1989) declaration that the “end of history” was upon the world at the end of
Cold War is often critiqued as premature.16 Historical events have demonstrated that the
expectation that history was at a new synthesis following the struggle between capitalist and
communist ideologies is decidedly a bit too optimistic. Though ideology had become less of a
focus in global conflict, liberalism still had its competitors. Huntington’s (1993) ‘clash of
civilizations’ thesis pointed at the struggle between cultures as the new dominant aesthetic, rather
than ideology. Other researchers began emphasizing the transitory nature of liberal transitions

16
The critique of Fukuyama’s assessment is, however, a misattribution of his overall argument. Instead of
historical finality, Fukuyama was arguing for a Hegelian interpretation of post-Cold War politics and asked may
come next in the vacuum of communism. See Dun Zhang’s analysis in his 2010 article, “The End of History and the
Fate of Philosophy of History”.
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and pointed out that democratization is not a linear process (Kubas 2020; O’Donnell and
Schmitter 1986). Instead, these authors emphasized how emergent alternatives were on the rise.
Democratic stultification and erosion have also been linked to an increase of antipathy for
capitalism in societies (Corneo 2017). Political leaders in CEE countries are apt to harness the
state to absorb and redistribute societal problems that have emerged as a result of adopting free
markets. Along with increased wealth in CEE countries, there have been rising disparities
between actual growth and slower growing household incomes (Nolan, Roser, and Thewissen
2019). In many CEE countries, middle income groups are shrinking as society becomes more
dynamically stratified. This has prompted political leaders to grab more control over the levers of
economic activity in response to the problems presented by “global capitalism” (McNally 2013).
But these decisions occur at the cost of individual economic power. In McMann’s (2012)
analysis of democracy and capitalism, the importance of economic autonomy has been shown to
be a crucial component for the maintenance of democracy. Indeed, evidence from CEE countries
has shown entrepreneurship to be democratically enhancing, not destructive (Bruton, Sutter, and
Lenz 2021). Rather than strictly the result of capitalism, income inequality is more likely to be
shaped by local policies, especially protective welfare policies (Auguste 2018, 683).
Growing inequality adds fuel to the democratic crisis by encouraging an ever-widening
gap of trust for democratic institutions that outsider political leaders rush in to fill (Algan et al.
2017). Citizens have increasingly focused their electoral hopes on these candidates who promise
guarantees of stability and protections against the unequal predations of market forces
(Fukuyama 2015). In Poland, Tworzecki (2019) identified this elite driven behavior as a main
contributor for the increase in polarization in the country. Polarization being defined as the
growing of ideological distances between political groups, parties, and issues and how they
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persist over time within a polity (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). The connection with
polarization and the ongoing democratic crisis has been heavily contemplated in recent decades
and a host of scholarship has been written that attempts to identify the causal relationships at
play and how polarized attitudes undermine democratic principles (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer
2018; Stavrakakis 2018). Such divisions have manifested and expanded throughout Europe, a
continent which consistently ranks as one of the most divided regions in the world (Groskopf
2016). Polarization has had a profound effect on the nation’s political discourse across European
parliaments. Since the 2000s, European outsider parties have steadily gained ground at the
expense of older, more centrist parties (Groskopf 2016).
The process of democratic retreat has also been suggested to be an illusion and whose
effects are not as impressive as was noted above. Levitsky and Way (2015) point to the relatively
few democracies that have broken down since the 1990s when compared to other time periods.
Instead, they posit that decline in democracy scores are the result of classification errors by
overzealous students of democratization in the 1990s (Levitsky and Way 2015, 45-46).
Additionally, increased political polarization cannot be regarded as a novel occurrence given that
dramatic attitudinal shifts have occurred in democracies before (Kundnani 2021). In fact,
democratic competition between ideas is an essential aspect of democracy whose function is
dependent on the free expression of differences of opinions. It is also under evaluated how
supposed anti-democratic parties are often legally elected and have attained political power
through legitimate means as opposed to illegal powers grabs (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019,
1108). Rather than a decline in democratic quality, Phillipe Schmitter (2015) argues that what is
being witnessed is a shift in democratic structures. He argues that democracy has undergone a
transition towards stronger executive authority and a devolution of political authority through a
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process of decentralization. Lastly, the temporal graduality of democratic erosion has led other
scholars to declare that the crisis may be overexaggerated when the overall pacing is considered
(Bochsler and Juon 2020).
Despite democratic erosion being gradual, the democratic trajectory of some CEE
countries is still pointed towards autocratic crisis. Future reversals of this trend after subsequent
electoral cycles remain to be seen, and some scholars are less sanguine about whether democracy
will be able to right itself (Kubas 2020). They cite roll backs of constitutional oversight,
constitutional redesigns, and the grinding down of the judiciary as being all too pervasive
(Coman and Tomini 2014). The ability for corrupt practices and shadowy clientelistic networks
to pervade in states that have an elevated command over the economy has been argued to be
detrimentally pervasive (Wedel 2011). Others see the situation as even more dire than previously
hypothesized. Kirchick (2017) argues that the transitions being experienced in Europe represents
a turn towards an irrevocable dark age and goes on to draw some uncanny parallels to the rise of
the destructive ideologies of the early 20th century in Europe. Kirchick (2017) writes:
“Nationalist, anti-American, often racist and anti-Semitic, these forces evoke Europe’s
foulest traditions. Movements both left and right—to which, in light of their popularity,
the qualifier “far” can no longer accurately be appended—promise a return to an
idealized past through the efforts of strong men (and women). Discouraged by their
governments’ inability to handle a slew of problems, Europeans are questioning the very
legitimacy and effectiveness of liberal democracy and turning to the siren calls of
firebrands, who, whatever their ostensible political differences, all vow the restoration of
a prelapsarian era that supposedly existed before European integration, when life was
easier, cheaper, and safe.” (4)
2.1. Democracy and Clientelism
The literature on state capture is emerged in the 2000s and emphasizes the confluence of
clientelistic and predatory practices within government (Kitschelt 2000; Magaloni 2006; Stokes
2005). This scholarship has focused on the insufficient quality of institutional standards which
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allows for such advantages to be taken by self-motivated government actors. The term was
formulated by Hellman and Kaufmann in 2001 in their description of Russia’s political evolution
in the 1990s. Party leaders, in such instances, seek to replace members of the bureaucracy and
administration with partisan elites as a tool of enhancing a single party’s dominance over those
same institutions. The authors connected state captivity with governance and ultimately
economic growth measures. They reported that states with high levels of capture reported much
lower levels of growth as a function of bad governance and corrupt practices.
This conceptualization leans heavily on state building theories. Strong emphasis is placed
on Weberian concepts of state extractive capacity and how these tools may be commandeered by
disingenuous elites or groups that replace the rational-legal state with one of patronage-based
authority (Marandici 2021). In other words, the practice of clientelism erodes the state’s
governance and ultimately its social compact. I rely on a traditional definition of clientelism in
this case which is expressed as a dyadic exchange of goods and services between social unequals
(Stokes 2011). Typically, it is a state agent (patron) who exchanges access to those goods to gain
the political support of a client (Bratton and Walle 1997; Bratton and van de Walle 1994;
Eisenstadt and Roniger 1981).
In the incumbent state capture literature, clientelism is the main method by which
government operatives gain authority within the exploited system. It can be engaged in by parties
who practice vote buying, patronage, or redistributing access to public goods in order to make
them more clublike to their constituent clientele (Carlin and Moseley 2015; Scott 1972; Zeng
2019). This process is meant to ensure a dyadic exchange of goods for fealty. But this is not the
whole story. Grzymala-Busse (2008, 639) argued that state capture by incumbents is not merely
the actions of exploitative elites taking advantage of volatile regimes. Instead, regimes
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influenced the kinds of corrupt practices parties and elites will engage in. She distinguishes
between types of corrupt practices along competitive political grounds and between exploitative
and predatory practices. Grzymala-Busse (2008) goes further stating that the practice is not
necessarily institutionally destructive in of itself. State capture represents avenues of exploitation
for personal gain that some rulers may legitimately seek. Rulers can enhance the state’s welfare
contributions and disperse rents to their chosen beneficiaries as deemed necessary for their own
political continuity as well as weaken administrative overwatch to carve off profitable pieces of
the state for themselves.
We should not think of democracies being immune to state capture. Rather, democratic
state capture represents a cohesive polarity in the state building process that a nascent country
must observe (Innes 2014). The erection of guardrails to monitor party behavior as a means of
ensuring electoral competition is thought to be a necessary component of ensuring that political
elites do not tread this path. Grzymala-Busse’s book, Rebuilding Leviathan, criticizes CEE
governments for their failure to institute the proper models of party competition and are now
reaping the fruits of that failure into the 2010s (Innes 2014, 90). This perspective places a heavy
burden on elite commitments for exercising democratic competition and resist the temptation to
re-monopolize political power within the state.
State capture points to fragile competitive regimes as the main culprit of its own
outcome. Grzymala-Busse (Grzymala-Busse 2008, 668) notes that clientelism doesn’t
necessarily destroy democracy by itself. However, it is theoretically incompatible to assume that
a state that falls into an incumbent state capture spiral could produce the same quality of
democracy than if it had not. For one, state capture erodes the competitive components of
regimes through party-state fusion whereby the administrative and governmental apparatus is
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entrenched under new management that becomes difficult to change out (Innes 2014). It also
places the controls of the state’s resources and rents under this new personalistic umbrella of
supervision which allows state-aligned cadres to undermine the democratic practices by
selectively sharing access to these material advantages and networks (Marandici 2021). It allows
for the creation of a ‘shadow state’ or a government that shrouds itself in informal rules (Chipkin
and Swilling 2018). As will more become apparent later, voters are often willing to exchange
democratic quality for this style of patronage which fundamentally alters the discourse and
function of democratic politics in a country.
The theory, as explicated, is incomplete. For one, it fails to ascertain how reform can lead
to positive and stable outcomes for an extended amount of time only to eventually fail. The
prophetic nature of determining inevitable shortcomings and eventual state capture
vulnerabilities for states, ex post, does little to further our understanding of the phenomenon. The
proliferation of clientelism within a country is not an indicator of institutional governance
shortcomings. Grzymala-Busse (2008, 639) is accurate in her assessment that “although

extractive rulers seek to maximize their discretion by weakening regulation and oversight,
they also construct rules and durable practices of redistribution, budgeting, and authority.”
Scholarship should instead draw its attention to how elites manage their access to political
institutions as the distinguishing characteristic of state capture within democracies and how
they leverage that access. Or, in the ominous words of Russian President Vladimir Putin:
"I only want to draw your attention straightaway to the fact that you have yourselves
formed this very state, to a large extent through political and quasi-political structures
under your control. So perhaps what one should do least of all is blame the mirror."
(Hoffman 2011)
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2.2. State Managed Economies
One of the main fundamental arguments of this dissertation is that state capture potential is
relative to the size of state management of the economy. This aspect of clientelism is often
overlooked as researchers tend to focus on the extractive or institutional capacity of the state
instead. This may be due to the extant variation between economies and levels of state
interference that are not always clearly defined. The fingers of nearly all state governments reach
into economies to varying degrees across and control the market in indirect ways. A researcher
would be hard-pressed to find occasions where the modern state does not manage some aspects
of its economy. Welfare states tend to spend large sums of their GDP on social programs. It is
much more likely to find an instance where the economy is wholly managed by the state than
none at all. A fact that is increasing in frequency as countries turn to state-capitalist solutions to
solve economic, social, and political problems in a post Great Recession world (Dolfsma and
Grosman 2019; Kozarzewski and Bałtowski 2019; McNally 2013). Nor is it restricted to the
realm of the autocrat. Democracies, autocracies, and hybrid regimes all engage in the practice.
Levels of state-capitalism does not predict democracy outcomes or its quality.
The state can manage the economy in several direct and indirect way. During the planned
economies in communist Eastern Europe the state managed nearly every aspect of the economy.
The government settled labor disputes, set demand and production quotas, and owned nearly
every piece of capital in the economy (Frye 2010). In the more modern sense, state involvement
in the economy is meant to regulate the forces of capitalism through law and less direct means
while still relying on the free market to be the lifeline of the economy (Ozsvald 2019).17 The
state can do so by taking on the role of stakeholder in the economy, manipulating companies

17

well.

This is often referred to as ‘state capitalism’ throughout the literature. I use the term in this dissertation as
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through carrots and sticks to encourage particular behavior. The use of tax policies is another
tool that can be used to gain leverage over free market forces while not directly interfering with
economic decision making (Kozarzewski and Bałtowski 2019). Then, of course, the state may
interfere with more direct methods of outright state ownership, promote industry champions, and
regulate large sections of the labor market to shift advantages.
The more the state manages the economy the more rents and resources elected parties
have their disposal. This does not automatically assume state capture as a result, but it provides
clarity as to how higher amounts SMotE could imbibe higher levels of state capture. However,
the state does not have to be in direct ownership of capital to produce clientelistic outcomes. The
state may be captured by administrative and bureaucratic agents who expropriate resources for
their own advantages, not just elites (Trantidis and Tsagkroni 2017). Whether the case represents
unlawful management of resources for self-interest or the acceptance of a bribe to look the other
way while other bad faith actors do likewise, the corrupt practice is a means to an end meant to
exchange goods with the implication of reciprocation in some act of loyalty at a future time.
What is exchanged for loyalty can vary between groups along with the timelines that are
managed by the unspoken expectations that go along with the patron-clientelist relationship
(Innes 2014). Repeated acts can create informal cohesion where formal relationships could be
lacking. Reiteration of exchange can supplant typical programmatic relationships, associated
with party platform, and replace them with clientelistic networks (Trantidis and Tsagkroni 2017).
These theories of clientelist practices presupposes an extractive capacity of the state and a
likewise “prior extraction of resources by the state” (Trantidis and Tsagkroni 2017, 266). Rents
are extracted by the state and then exploited by enterprising elites for political gain. GrzymalaBusse (Grzymala-Busse 2008, 649) highlights the distributive nature of rents as a tool for both
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selective apportionment of goods and to monitor the loyalty of recipients. Which is to say, that
when goods are distributed one must ensure that the resultant outcome was as the patron
originally desired. State capture is a two-way street in that the ease of which provisions may be
provided need to be weighed against the costs of defection by the recipient. The expectation here
is that for clientelism to be an effective tool it needs to target supporters accurately with goods
and services in order “to generate sufficient support to stay in power without providing public
goods to all” (Grzymala-Busse 2008, 642).
This notion requires further explication. The state capture thesis presupposes economic
exploitation but no information as to how. The presence of the state seems merely sufficient for
such political outcomes to occur. However, a more reasonable perspective to take would be that
the extent of state capture is correlated with the reach of the state’s access over extractable
resources and distributional networks. Marandici (2021) makes this clear in a recent article about
Moldovan state capture by private firms who are managed by the country’s few oligarchs. Antiauthoritarian oligarchs and business leaders in Moldova inevitably replaced the old patronage
networks with new clientelistic networks that benefitted themselves. Access to resources and
material wealth that could be distributed for political advantage played an important role in
organizing this new arrangement.
Lastly, it is important to consider the targets of clientelistic practices. State-capitalists
manage their economies in order to keep their constituents placated by politicizing the economy
for their own benefit (McNally 2013). The motivations behind state capture are likewise the
same. Clientelistic procedures in electoral politics target voting constituents for rent exchanges
(Auyero 2001; Stokes 2005). Stokes (2005) identified the poor as likely targets given their
material disadvantageous position which makes them cheaper targets for patronage. There are
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some issues with this description. First, we should consider if they do represent a cheaper
alternative to other groups when in many societies, they make up a large percentage of the
population. Second, what manner of monitoring does such exchanges guarantee. Finally, we
should seek to scrutinize whether elites view the poorer elements of society as electorally fertile
grounds.
I propose a counter thesis and emphasize the middle class as possible targets for these
kinds of relationships. When they share an economically vulnerable status, they too can be
offered patronage and goods for votes and even participate in corruption. The vulnerability of
voters to clientelism has been theorized before by Bobonis et al. (2017) who showed that the
presence of water cisterns during droughts made Brazilian voters less susceptible to engage in
these kinds of practices. Though the middle class can often represent a large section of the
population, rent exchanges do not need to be so large as to provide security to the vulnerable
elements of a society. They only need to offer enough as to supplement the different between
staying or falling out of the middle class, in this case. Yet by doing so, state capture that uses the
middle class produces highly destructive outcomes for democracy.
2.3. The Middle class and Democracy
The destructive potential that coincides with middle class support for state capture practices is
inherent in the theoretical underpinnings of what this group provides for democracy. The
importance of the middle class and its effect on democratization has been the subject of intense
theory building and critique for decades. Early democratization and modernization arguments
have alluded to the connection between democracy and increased citizen wealth and the
subsequent effects that create new sets of interests which are rooted in property rights protection
and the rule of law (Dahl 1971; S. M. Lipset 1959; Milbrath 1981). The propertied middle
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classes are tied to democratization in a variety of ways with some going as far to declare it a
necessary condition of democracy occurrence. As Barrington Moore (Moore 1993 [1966])
famously proclaimed, “No bourgeoisie, no democracy!”
Scholars have emphasized how changes to values in response to modernity and increased
rates of education lead to a proclivity towards egalitarianism and democratic principles (Lerner
1958; Huntington 1968). Others emphasize how new tensions between emergent interests results
from material accumulation which requires coordination through constitutional processes to
ensure stability and the rule of law (North and Weingast 1989; Ostrom 1993). Then there are
those scholars who stress that a variety of interests in the middle class leads to a destabilization
of older clientelist networks in favor of public goods access and redistributive welfare (Boix
2003; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Haggard and Kaufman 2012). Application of these
arguments to Central and Eastern Europe present their own ontological dilemmas as these
theories stretch to accommodate post-communist societies.
The middle class is theorized to be uniquely disposed to democracy because they are less
vulnerable than unskilled workers but possess less resources than the wealthiest members of
society (Glassman 1995). They have access to some power of influence over government which
they utilize in order to maintain their access to property rights and the lubricants of business for
which they are a benefactor (Glassman 1991). Whereas the underclasses of society lack the
resources to coordinate and, as a result, are “far too weak to achieve by itself democratic rights”
(Bradshaw et al. 1993, 59). Additionally, lower income groups get more marginal utility out of
state patronage and welfare which makes them far more likely to be tied into a state’s network of
patron-clientelist dependencies to begin with (Stokes 2005).
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Class position and access to resources impacts who is more likely to rely on which
governance tools. Upper class groups in society will have less need for investing in democratic
power sharing and will seek to pay off other groups to maintain their social hegemony
(Glassman 1995). The wealthy strata have a more access to resources and prestigious patronage
networks which elevates their position in society. Instead, they will rent seek to supplement their
own wealth rather than codify it through rule of law (Johnston and Kouzmin 1998).
One logic as to why-middle class groups in society shift towards democracy is due to the
changes in values experienced through modernization and education. Modernization acts to
disrupt society by unleashing new social forces that obstruct older, more traditional bonds
(Lerner 1958; Huntington 1968; Migdal 1988). This argument contends that modernization is an
automatic outcome of state policies which seek to consolidate and create a modernized state
(Gerschenkron 1962; Kohli 2004). Modernization can also be the result of a societal force for
change as the individual gains more autonomy and the resources to express themselves on a
larger scale (Inkeles 1969; McMann 2012). These approaches underscore the different elements
of societal change in the wake of modernity as being either fixed in redistributive demands or as
a moment of state reinvention. The importance of middle income groups is to temper the
elements of state expansion and hinder illegitimate practices, such as corruption and clientelism
when they do not benefit from them. Throughout this dissertation I distinguish between the two
concepts as one being participatory on an individual level (corruption), and the other being the
policies and programs of parties to gain more traction over the state (Trantidis and Tsagkroni
2017).
A more potent middle class is expected to undermine clientelistic procedures in several
ways. They provide a capable set of professionals to build a competent bureaucracy which
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supports the functioning of the modern state (Weber 1964). The lack of a competent bureaucratic
administration has the potential to act as a vehicle for state capture and encourage side transfers
of goods and services that bypass rule of law norms (Waldner 1999). Professionalization of
bureaucratic functions provides stronger oversight along with checks and balances. Growing
middle class interests also foster competing values that challenges clientelism and, in
democracies and political parties will orient themselves towards those shifts (Acemoglu and
Robinson 2006; Meltzer and Richard 1981). This is because as the middle class becomes more
numerous than wealthy elites and lower-income groups, the calculus of goods distribution
changes. Selective, side transfers and patron-clientelistic goods provisions become less practical
and more expensive. Instead, the middle class will want goods and services to be provisioned on
a universal level rather than specified (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). However, clientelism,
too, has also been argued to be a binding feature of democracy as these relationships connect and
fix electorate demands to parties (Kitschelt 2000).
2.3.1. Weaknesses of the Middle class and Democracy
Despite extensive theoretical expectations that middle class societal forces are correlative with
democracy, recent challenges have emerged to explain empirical shortcomings that remain. First,
modern states create contemporary obstacles that obstruct the middle class from engaging in the
democratization of the state. A wave of institutionalized autocracy scholarship has upended the
connection between autocratic governments and how they may coopt democratic forces from
below. Additionally, the disconnect between professional, white-collar workers from clientelism
is not always deterministic. In some CEE countries, bureaucratic professionals and government
employees are more directly tied into maintaining status quo equilibria which replicates
clientelistic practices. These circumstances leave openings for the advent of state capture at the
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behest of the middle class. Especially in the wake of state led modernization practices reinforced
by neopatrimonial politics, or a society organized around bureaucracies that ensures patronclientelist relationships (Erdmann and Engel 2007).
One miscalculation of middle class support for democracy is that successful early
adopters of democracy did not have modern governments and their extensive capacity to tax and
spend to contend with. In North America and Europe, through the 19th and 20th century, wages
began to rise in the professional classes which resulted in a middle income stratification that was
invested in their concomitant privileges (Fukuyama 2015). Conversely during the communist
era, citizens of CEE countries experienced wage increases but society was kept level due to the
socialist state’s capacity to extract wealth and redistribute it. Lack of political options and
dependence on the state for the most basic commodities and employment produced an extremely
flat society with few opportunities outside of that system. To leverage access to private goods
and luxuries, a high degree of tolerance was permitted for corruption and abuse (Dawisha 2014;
Ledeneva 2013; Vasileva-Dienes 2019).
The subsequent surge of democratization which occurred in the 1990s is argued to be a
genuine removal of the old communist elites by their revolting polities (Haggard and Kaufman
2016). It is thought that rising wealth in Eastern Europe decreased the tolerance for illegitimate
political practices and ultimately led to the collapse of the old communist regimes beginning in
1989 (Huntington 1991). However, the ‘wave’ of democratization and market reforms which
followed resulted in a muddled collection of regimes with varying degrees of societal reliance on
the state rather than a uniform quality of democracy and free markets. Countries can be grouped
and separated into two columns: democratizers and failed democratizers. Democratizers were
those states that were able to adapt democratic institutions and reform their previous command
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economies into ones driven by market forces. These include most of Central Europe and the
Baltic states. The failed democracies were those further east, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia,
which were unable to institute full democratic accountability or fully open their markets (Frye
2010).
Importantly, those failed democratizers did not revert to their previous autocratic statuses
and instead retained some semblance of electoral politics and the rule of law. The leaderships of
these countries have come to rely on the legitimizing processes that are afforded by democratic
institutions and elections. Such processes allow authoritarian institutions to take up the slack of
democratic pressure from below and coopt any would-be destabilizing agents of change in order
to prolong the lifespan of the regime (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007;
Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2006). This in-between status has prompted scholars to refer to these
states as hybrid regimes, or institutionally mixed autocracies. In Russia, institutionalized
democratic processes allow for opposition parties to compete at all levels of the government
though the United Russia Party has dominated electoral politics since 1999.18
Hybrid regime theory is unable to contend with all aspects of the continued success
experienced by CEE’s failed democratizers. The preference to use cooptation through electoral
politics has the potential to lead to those same competitive processes which can elevate viable
alternatives. Instead, mixed regimes may merely represent symptoms of a specific stage in the
transitory process of democratization (Stokke and Aung 2020), and mixed regimes may not be as
resistant to political change as previously theorized (Knutsen and Nygård 2015). This is because
the cooptation of opposition parties and the creation of rule of law norms has the potential to

18
Putin’s United Russia evolved from the Unity party that was created by Kremlin insiders as a means of
challenging Fatherland-All Russia in the 1999 Duma and presidential elections. The party was a merger of Unity
with the Fatherland, Our Home, and Russian Agrarian parties and has since dominated Russian electoral politics and
has maintained the most seats in the Duma.
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gain traction over time. Recent electoral results in Russia support this democratization assertion
as opposition candidates have gained in national and local elections in the past few years (Smyth
2019).19
Additionally, regime theory offers some explanation as to why nondemocratic regimes
may adopt democratic institutions but offers little in the way of why a polity will go along with
those choices. Likewise, they propose deficient insight as to when a polity will go along with
democratically eroding behavior per the recent decline of democratic quality in Central and
Eastern Europe. It must be considered if democracy is functioning in these societies as desired.
For instance, in a democracy, political elites seek to win elections and so they tap into powerfully
salient forces with the interests of middle class groups being one of those forces. The middle
class voters of these countries may be affected by a variety of issues that turn them increasingly
towards populistic and polarizing parties. These issues include their overall size within the polity
and how entrenched corruption and clientelism can interfere with societal functions.
The size of middle class affects not only the amount of agency that the middle class can
wield in order to coordinate political action but also how their interests relate to democracy.
Models have shown that the more numerous the middle class is the stronger a democracy will be
(Lu 2005). Yet, the amount of professional and highly educated population differs greatly from
country to country in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite emerging from command economies
that suppressed social mobility, CEE countries have transitioned from their communist forms as
socially dynamic countries and with increasingly stratified socioeconomic classes.

19
Local Russian election results in 2019 reduced United Russia party’s dominance over several key cities.
Increased protests and government resistance has led some to contemplate the possibility of future political crises in
coming 2021 and 2024 elections. Smyth, Regina. “Moscow’s Municipal Elections Illustrate the Growing Political
Crisis in Russia.
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As stated earlier, it is much more difficult to measure middle class sizes in the failed
democratizers of Central and Eastern Europe because they are more likely to be smaller and less
cohesive (Nissanov 2017). In Russia, the middle class’s relative size to the rest of the population
makes its position in the economy much weaker when compared to its CEE neighbors
(Begemann 2018). The middle class is not stable in countries where its presence is more easily
measured. In the CEE countries that successfully democratized, economic and survey data have
some scholars troubled that indicators are showing higher levels of middle class destabilization
(Drahokoupil and Piasna 2018; Žičkutė 2013). A lack of mobilization from the polity related to
this instability may indicate an increased tolerance for inequality and social stratification. Such
tacit support would signal a shift in values away from the egalitarian principles that defined pre1989 CEE countries (Josifidis, Supic, and Glavaski 2018).
According to some scholars, the shifts in values and the challenges brought on by the
diminishment of socioeconomic standards has had several deleterious effects for middle class
behavior (Chen and Lu 2011; Ross 2019). Firstly, it is expected that values and education affect
the ideological appeal of parties who may be democratically unscrupulous. The evidence is not
as clear in Central and Eastern Europe, however. For instance, it is supposed that increased
tolerance and cultural openness correlates with expanded cognitive resources (Lipset 1959;
Stubager 2008). However, the attractiveness of anti-immigrant and nationalistic parties is even
popular amongst the most educated classes who have been had been theorized to be more
resistant to populist rhetoric (van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018). Higher educated groups in
CEE countries are also more likely to turn out to vote which makes it difficult to argue that the
political successes of populist parties in Europe are due to educational gaps between voters
(Sondheimer and Green 2010).
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Why the middle class may support illiberal policies and parties has been the source of
some focus in recent decades and has produced some durable results in dysfunctional
democracies (e.g., Russia, and China). In China, for instance, rising wealth and a distinguishable
middle class has not led to predictions of democratic revolution that many observers may have
theorized or hoped for. A logic of cooptation and clientelistic offerings have been proposed as
sources that remand Chinese citizens to authoritarian politics (Chen and Lu 2011). Chinese
citizens are in a system in which they exchange political voice for financial prosperity. Russia’s
middle class operates in a similar fashion and often go further in participating in corruption.
It remains to be demonstrated if, and how, democracy could be downgraded in countries
that have successfully transitioned. Citizens in autocracies may not possess strong democratic
feelings in their regimes but there is little agreeance as to how a polity may backslide from a
consolidated democracy. Evidence regarding anti-democratic attitudes is much more
contradictory in such instances. A Pew survey of Poland from 2020 showed that seven in ten
Poles believed voting gives them a say in government. This result was higher than in France
(67%) or Germany (62%) (Mordecai 2020). In that same survey, however, barely less than five
out ten Poles felt it was important that opposition parties should be able to operate freely in a
democracy. These kinds of inconsistencies are lubricative for democratic decline and certainly
do little to reinforce the importance of electoral competition in political discourse. These
discrepancies also indicate a possible confusion between attitudes and actual voting behavior that
I go into more detail discussing in Chapters 2 and 3.
Some researchers point to populism as the main culprit. The associated rise of populist
parties in Europe has produced several descriptions and explications within social and political
sciences. Populism, in this dissertation, represents the clash between outsider and insider groups

52
that signify the “antagonist and purportedly homogenous groups, the pure and the corrupt elite”
respectively (Zagórski and Santana 2021, 265). There is a strong relationship between populism
and societal polarization as such. The heightened appeal of an outsider candidates may, likewise,
indicate failures within democratic polities to include disaffected voters as a part of its political
discourse (Kaltwasser 2014). Even after electoral success, populist parties maintain their reliance
on a polarized framing of society as they see it as necessary for continued political support (van
Kessel 2015). Parties do so by redefining which groups are loyal in society and then selectively
rewarding those groups (Zagórski and Santana 2021). It is this reward mechanism that reinforces
personalistic and patron-clientelist linkages between enterprising elites and their constituencies.
In this paper, I do not discern between populism of a democratic or autocratic variety but only
use the term as a viable theme of elite rhetoric and campaign promises. For instance, while
Putin’s rule would not be considered populist, the way he appeals himself to Russian voters
could be considered as such (Burrett 2020).
Instead of deconstructing corrupt bargains and clientelist networks, middle income
groups may become more dependent on them to sustain their privileges and livelihood. The latter
point is especially relevant given the mediating relationship that once existed between state and
workers under socialism that corrupted principal-agent behavior. The Soviet remnants of the
power-vertical are still used to describe the ever-present vestiges of Russian political and
economic elite and how the population must interact with these phantom institutions through a
practice referred to as systema (Dawisha 2014; Ledeneva 2013).20 The informality of social
systems and required adherence to unwritten rules deteriorates trust and inhibits cooperation

20

Sistema (система) is the description of unwritten rules regarding social and political relationships in Russia that is
theorized to underlie personal and public interactions. Ledeneva (2013, 249) states, “Sistema is complex,
anonymous, unpredictable and seemingly irrational, but it serves to glue society together, to distribute resources and
to mobilize people; it contributes to both stability and change; and it ensures its own reproduction.”
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within larger, and more formal systems (Vasileva-Dienes 2019). Even amongst the successful
democratizers, personalistic and patron-client relationships are beginning to become more
apparent. Van de Walle (2003) characterized these corrupt and clientelistic procedures as
intrinsic to the modern state which has a higher capacity to extract wealth and redistribute it for
political gain.
Even the modern bureaucratic structures that were once considered quite robust in CEE
countries that developed outside of the Soviet Union show signs of feebleness. The formation of
a highly trained corps of competent government agents since the 1970’s provided an advantage
to some CEE countries that had higher levels of autonomy outside of direct Soviet control.
During the early stages of democratization, bureaucratic appointments were commiserated with
professional development and education rather than totally beholden to patronage or party
building (Wasilewski 1990). Recent tensions in CEE countries have given rise to corrupt
bargains by the administrative elements of society in the wake of declining trust, and elitepopular polarization. For example, in Hungary, the public’s perception of its institutions has
become so bad that one-third of polled Hungarians are convinced that high levels of corruption is
present in their own country (Makarenko 2020).
2.4. Economic Vulnerability and Democratization
While modernization scholarship points to the evolving nature of values due to middle class
development and professionalization, there is an economic dimension that should not go
unappreciated. The control of capital and its relationship with the political structures that
maintain economic systems has been central to the work of democracy scholars, such as Charles
Linblom (1977), who have argued that businesses have a distinct advantage in democracies.
Critics of this argument have pointed more towards the sophisticated nature in which capitalism
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and democracies coordinate and relate to each another (Dahl 1991). Still, debate abounds as to
the necessary or sufficient relationship between capitalism and democracy (McMann 2012).
These debates center around the institutionalization of democracy, how those institutions serve
capitalist interests, how opportunities within society allow for economic mobility, and the
dependencies and vulnerabilities produced by capitalistic systems.
There is a suspicion that capitalist systems are more conducive to the creation of
democracy as a bourgeois class is necessary to facilitate interest in capital protections and the
rule of law being one of its defining characteristics (Schmitter and Todor 2014). Yet democracy
has been shown to not be solely dependent on economic mobility as poor states are not incapable
of democratizing themselves. Instead, democratization represents an “equalized power
distribution among groups”, which implies a relatively even distribution of resources (Schmitter
and Todor 2014, 88). This is necessary as, otherwise, middle class groups may be hesitant to
democratize for fear of downward redistribution of their own resources and assets (Bradshaw et
al. 1993; Huber and Stephens 2014). The middle class will seek to protect itself from the
redistributive lust from society’s masses and design democracy to be that shield. Therefore, the
size of the middle class and its disposition amongst the other classes is an important aspect to
consider when understanding the relationship between capitalism and democracy.
McMann (2012, 4) contended that the “economically autonomous man” is the most
essential aspect of capitalism’s relationship with democratic outcomes. If this is the case, it
becomes essential to understand the relationship between state governance over market forces
which promote or stifle the economic autonomy of its citizens. Democracies require institutional
constraints to flourish but so too must institutions be used to govern free markets. North’s (1990)
thesis on the relationship between repeated interactions lays out this fact. Repeated interactions
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change the equilibrium of trust in such a system which increases the credibility of those
participating. They are more likely to adhere to the rules of that system and legitimately punish
defectors.
It is this system of rules promoted by repeated interactions that that make up institutions,
according to North. Institutions are constraints that are humanly devised as means of managing
social, economic, and political interactions and may be both formal and informal (North 1990).
Institutions enhance markets by way of institutional oversight that manages secular transactions.
In free market systems, institutions facilitate economic interactions by decreasing unknown
information between participants and, therefore, decreasing the transactional costs associated
with trade (Ostrom 1993). In capitalistic democracies, institutions function as protections for the
material interests of the middle class who advocate against governmental interferences or
arbitrary seizures of property and prefer the predictability inherent in rule of law practices
(Maravall and Przeworski 2003).
Some scholars promote the presence of a capable state as essential for the functionality of
capitalism and democracy which, in turn, rely heavily on the nature and imposition of institutions
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Kohli 2004). In multi-class societies, institutions that govern the
boundaries of state and market relationships are essential for the developmental state to manage
clashing demands within itself. When those instituitons are powerful enough to manage both
contradicting forces with positive market outcomes the result is a cohesive-capitalist state that
fuels growth and prosperity (Kohli 2004, 13). Without secular governance over separating statemarket relationships, the state is likely to become neopatrimonial and personalistic as it seeks to
generate profit a few enterprising individuals at the expense of the greater whole (Kohli 2004,
15). Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) identified this dichotomy between states as “inclusive” and

56
“extractive” regimes. These were epitomized by their institutionalized capacity to share access to
resources or restrict them to a privileged few who could extract resources for their benefits. Such
statuses were likewise used to determine the success of states.
Democracies, while less likely to be extractive, are not immune to clientelistic pressure
which emerges between party members and the guarantees they make to their constituents.
Wantchekon’s (2003) survey of villages in Benin during an election cycle highlights the
enduring connection between party graft and voting behavior. The nature of embedded patronclientelistic relationships between a polity and their elected representatives are managed by the
limitations of what may be offered and how those promises may be implemented. Per Kitschelt
and Kselman (2013), the amount of reliance on party platforms for the promise of club-like
goods, or ‘programmatic platforms’ rather than clientelism, is contingent on increased levels of
development and democratization. This is due to the transactional costs associated with
clientelistic goods dispersion and to effectively monitor the political loyalties of their
constituents. In democracy, it no longer becomes evidently clear that loyalty can be easily
coerced or purchased because of the availability of electoral choices defect to. However, in
younger democracies, which lack credibility capital, the connection between party members and
constituents is more likely to buttressed by personalistic guarantees (Keefer and Vlaicu 2008).
2.4.1. The Varieties of Capitalism
Just as all democracies are not equal in kind, so too do contradictions between capitalistic
systems exist. Some scholars have interpreted the connections between types of capitalism and
democratic quality as being more theoretically related (Schmitter and Todor 2014, 89). The
convergence between institutional pressures and capitalistic outcomes is made clearer when
considering the comparative capitalist approach and the varieties of capitalism’s (VoC)
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interpretation of divergent capitalisms around the globe. The VoC approach examines the
institutionalized relationships between labor, government, and capital as a means of explaining
divergence between market types within the limited scope of the developed European and
British/American economies. In this original and narrower framework, divergent capitalist
outcomes were the result of variant levels of state involvement in the coordination of marketbased interactions between the factors of production (FoP): labor and capital owning firms. This
was expressed by Hall and Soskice (2001) as two archetypal economic regimes: liberal market
economies (LME) and coordinated market economies (CME). The relevant distinctions between
these capitalist types hinged on how the state manages the FoP interactions either as a hands-on
corporatist approach (CME), or a deregulated force in favor of market solutions (LME).
Naturally, VoC types must manage capital relationships within a globalized context. The
global reliance on the shuffling of capital between countries as firms seek out comparative
advantage in both markets and labor costs has had an increased influence over invoked stateprotectionist responses (Pierre 2015). The reaction by some scholars to globalization and the
untethering of capital has been to examine the dependent linkages of capital dependent markets
and state regulatory practices (Hay and Rosamond 2002; Pierre 2015). This has informed a wave
of research which largely critiques these dependencies as deleterious to state development
(Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009; Wallerstein 1976). Still, not all associations are negative. The
successful development of market economies in CEE has been argued to be the result of outside
investment linkages before 1990 (Pula 2018). Contemporarily, economic growth for transitioning
economies continues to be tied up in their ability to attract investment dollars with cheap labor
and technology transfers via transnational firms or TNCs (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009, 672).
Dunning’s (1988) OLI paradigm emphasized that the coordination between foreign direct
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investment (FDI) and its influence over the trajectory of state development cannot be easily
explained away.21
2.4.2. Economic Vulnerability in CEE Countries
Globalized capital not only creates dependencies between developing economies, even in Central
and Eastern Europe, but also leads to a decline in social equality and exacerbates income
inequality. As a result, there has been a collection of scholarship which has investigated the
connection between inequality and democratic backsliding (Drahokoupil and Piasna 2018; Saar
and Trumm 2017; Večerník 2012; Wood and Allen 2020). The two political-economy archetypes
promoted by VoC have been very incomplete in application to CCE cases. In this regard, a
subsequent literature that expands the VoC has been very prolific by expanding comparative
capitalism arguments and applying them to wider range of cases and develop more accurate
capitalistic archetypes to better explain these transition economies (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009;
Becker and Vasileva 2017; Fainshmidt et al. 2018).
Democratization and free markets may have a tangible association but there remains a
constructive debate as to which leads to which. It seems plausible that erecting democracy before
the imposition of institutional constraints that allow it to function may act to undermine the
success of democracy (Rose and Shin 2001). This has been promoted as sequence theory of
electoral and economic development and has been particularly applied to Central and Eastern
Europe’s democratization in the 1990s. David Olson (1998) argued that, in democratizing CEE
countries, the development of parties and nascent legislatures was far more likely to lead to

21
John Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (1988) is a variation of internalization theory which argues R&D costs
are absorbed by firms become public goods in intermediate markets. He expanded the theory to account for how
interstate trade flows from a logic of comparative advantage of ownership, location, and internationalization
benefits. Developing states make use of FDI through the transfer of technologies which they then use to develop
their own markets.
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irresponsible leadership outcomes as interest groups and parties had not yet synthesized to
counteract elite decision making. Institutions were still far too weak to challenge runaway
decision making which left many CEE countries on unstable footing as they transitioned. Still
others contend that the sequence of democratization through party development and the
imposition of free markets does not matter as much because of the graduality of the democratic
transition process will limit hostile takeovers by elites (Carothers 2007).
It is also important to understand what effects democratizing and market deregulation has
had in CEE countries. By adopting free markets, nascent CEE democracies were able to court
new forms of private ownership and investment. This investment came in both local forms and as
outside investment dollars or foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI inflows are theorized to
depend heavily on state level policy which may compel countries to acquiesce to globalized
capital’s demand for fewer regulations on their markets and less protections for labor (Pandya
2010). This has led some scholars in the VoC literature to conclude that CEE countries that have
used policies that encouraged FDI inflows have encouraged a cycle of dependency on foreign
dollars (Lane 2005; Myant and Drahokoupil 2012; Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009). Nölke and
Vliegenthart (2009) were one of the first scholars who pushed the boundaries of the original,
dichotomous VoC literature in this direction. They identified a new variety of comparative
capitalism in CEE countries as dependent market economies (DME) which purposely draws
parallels to Dependency Theory developed in the 1970’s (Wallerstein 1976) and the theories
expansion to account for Latin American dependence on foreign capital (Bollen 1983). In CEE
countries, the lynchpin of dependency is centered around converting CEE economies into an
assembly point for high value goods using cheaper labor to then export to Western European
countries.
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The vulnerability of DMEs became more apparent in the aftermath of the Great
Recession in 2008 as market uncertainty led to a domino of economic recessions and capital
flight (Ban 2013).22 This event shifted CEE governments’ appetite and dependence on foreign
capital as investment dollars were shown to be footloose in its quest for comparative advantage
(Kattel 2010). In response, many of those countries thought of as dependent market economies
have switched gears and became more heavily entrenched in managing their own economies
through regulation and increased government ownership of domestic firms. The process of reetatization, or returning to state control, was aimed at gaining better control over market
fluctuations and to protect against the social problems that follow economic downturns. Per
(Ozsvald (2019), “when it comes to the question of whether state ownership in public companies
is justified, many argue that the state’s role includes solving and managing broader social issues
beyond private corporate interests.”
How these seemingly contradictory forces have been able to undergo this union has been
debated, albeit unsatisfactorily. Some authors contend that the entrenchment of the economy
back into society is ‘long over due’ (Dolfsma and Grosman 2019, 579). Researchers argue it is
the result of higher levels of corruption in the wake of aggressive state consolidation and point
towards an increase of state influence over media and a heightened reliance on interpersonal
bargaining between the individual and the state (Becker and Vasileva 2017). Other scholars
blame the destabilizing forces inherent in deregulated markets and the subsequent effects of
increasing inequality across economic groups within society (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006;
Auguste 2018; Večerník 2012). To their credit, shrinking middle income populations have

22
The Great Recession was a period of rapid economic decline felt across most developed economies,
especially in North America and Europe from 2007 to 2009. Its causes have been linked to a housing bubble in the
United States, but quickly emanated outwards to other countries due to the interconnected, global economy that
most developed states were tied into. For a detailed analysis, see (Bogetic 2013).
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become the norm rather than the exception in CEE societies. As a result, the Great Recession
saw greater political pressure from the middle onto elite policy makers who had lost credibility
to control economic outcomes (Szanyi 2022).
2.5. Putting the Pieces Together
By exploring the relationship between the economic growth and democratic conditions in Central
and Eastern Europe, several key confounding factors have emerged. Firstly, the evolution of
economic conditions in CEE countries has led to a counterintuitive outcome. Wealth has
generally increased in CEE countries, but the prognosis of democracy is not as certain as it once
was in the region. Secondly, the influence of the state in managing the economy has become
increasingly apparent in CEE countries which encourages any discourse that treats with political
outcomes to entreat with reference to political-economic relationships. Finally, the viability of
middle class voters as a constituent source of incumbent state capture has yet to be fully
explicated across CEE cases. As I go on to elucidate, these motivating factors go beyond the
expectations of education and ideology and instead fall in line with a vulnerable middle class that
finds itself structurally deposed between state and market forces.
Middle class vulnerability is a result of two tensions. First, growing economic inequality,
and fear of social and material loss have been exacerbated by years of economic crisis and
instability. These vulnerabilities expressed by middle class groups lead to societal friction. Social
breakdown created by economic growth is not a novel concept within the social sciences and has
informed a variety of theories from Karl Marx to Theda Skocpol. Karl Polanyi (1956) famously
referred to a similar tension as key to his famous double movement which occurs when market
capitalism grows, and labor seeks government protections from the predations of market forces.
Labor does so by seeking to re-embed markets back within the confines of society. Blythe (2002)
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further expounded on this transformational tension by emphasizing the informational
asymmetries produced because of uncertainties that change inevitably brings. Uneven economic
growth affects most societies, but it is the pervasive feeling of vulnerability that is specific to
middle class groups which leads to disruptive outcomes for democracy.
The vulnerability of middle class interests assumes that they are operating in an
institutional framework that governs behaviors through rule setting and norm building (North
1990). These institutions act as rationally constraining structures for which all layers of society
operate within and to at least maintain their current statuses if not at least to elevate their status.
However, the vulnerabilities experienced by a group produces a disequilibrium crisis that can
create and legitimize political responses that targets the interests and welfare of that
constituency. Institutional frameworks constrain the ways in which political elites may respond
to any crisis as well as conditions and obscures rational decision-making regarding material
distribution and the maintenance of control by political groups (Boix 2003). Typical notions of
institutional change that legitimize policy shifts are thought of in gradual terms of change (James
Mahoney and Thelen 2010). However, crisis can have an exponential effect on policy change. It
can shift loyalties and create new pathways of legitimate political response. Political elites may
elevate competition between social groups and use techniques that create insider and outsider
effects tied to incentives for loyal behavior and gain political advantage.
The middle class makes for an ideal constituency for elite attempts at state-capture
because of their status and relation to society. Previous theories may have played up poverty and
income inequality amongst the poorer segments of society as ideal candidates, but these
arguments discount vulnerabilities experienced within the middle class (Weitz-Shapiro 2008).
Middle income workers are more likely to rely on credit, spend more of their money, and
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consume more which makes any economic instability likely to hurt their status and sift them out
of the middle rungs of society (Bussolo et al. 2018). It is not a stretch to assume that enterprising
elites can then target rent transfers to these vulnerable elements in society. This is not as costly as
it seems because such patronage only needs to make up the material differences produced by
middle class insecurity. Furthermore, it encourages a level of dependence on future transfers that
ensures future loyalty. Lower income individuals may use welfare to rise to middle income status
which may shift their interests, attitudes, and preferences when they change social groups.
Welfare targeted at the middle of society is unlikely to push recipients into high earner status
which resists the possibility of shifting those dependency preferences.
The second tension of middle class vulnerability has been in response to economic
development and growing societal anxieties are structured is by the relationship between the
state and the factors of production. More specifically, the vulnerability of the middle class was
exacerbated by the systematic weakening of organized labor in CEE countries since the 1990s.
The erosion of trade unions, labor coordination, and collective bargaining has been a key
component of post-communist marketization with attendant deleterious effects for organized
labor (Drahokoupil 2009; Magda 2017; Vanhuysse 2007). In Central and Eastern Europe, only
Romania possesses substantial collective bargaining coverage, at approximately 70%. Without
labor, collective action costs are much higher as organized unions provide a stable and cheap
source of organizational resources (Naidu 2019).23
Weak organized labor means the middle class is more likely to participate along with the
corrupt behavior of parties and permit the state’s capture. In addition to their weak bargaining

23

Collective action represents a coordination dilemma that must be overcome for individuals, groups, or
states to coordinate their various interests in a way that they are able to get some, or all their goals met. For more
detail see Mancur Olson’s Collective Action (Olson 1989).
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position, the vulnerability of the middle classes and their susceptibility for clientelistic politics is
colored by their tenuous position between the state and the interests of private firms. The
weakness of labor in CEE countries puts a higher premium on middle class groups to coordinate
with those elements of society which determine their access to privileges, income, and status.
Unlike Western European precedence, CEE workers have relatively low unionization and labor
bargaining protection. This increased the effects of crisis because it can push workers towards
more radical demands during such events. They may seek out market protections from
responsive parties and elites who will trade class security for political support. Even among
middle-class workers, the lack of labor representation adds to their sense of confusion and
dissociation when vulnerabilities are introduced.
2.5.1. Redistributing the State for Political Support
In order to clientelize the middle class, elites and parties must have a cost advantage to do so.
Organizations and collective action tools are a few ways that can alter these costs; for instance,
in the Middle East the middle class are often coopted by political parties who use Islamic
organizations to bring voters together and focus their interests (Clark 2004). However, to
exchange rents for political support, political elites must have access to a large number of
resources. High levels of state management of the economy provide easier access for the state to
rely on neopatrimonial and clientelistic networks (Becker and Vasileva 2017).
The more economy managed by the state, then the more state can be theoretically
captured and redistributed as a result. That is to say, clientelization of constituencies, like the
middle class, allows parties to gain an advantage. Welfare economies that provide a social
security net to all citizens, or tax and redistribute are not done so as a nefarious scheme to fuse
the party to the state. Nor are the public goods separable from the larger public as obviously as
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constituent clientelism cases. Such systems will rely on state-capitalist economic relationships
whereby “the state dominates markets primarily for political gain” (Bremmer 2010, 250). The
state can own a majority or minority of shares in companies and subsidizes private industry
through targeted policies and privileges (Kozarzewski and Bałtowski 2019, 3). Both labor and
firms are generally weak and beholden to the ‘grabbing’ hand of the state in these instances.
However, this process is not without its problems. Party control over patronage and vote buying
will often have a negative effect on further development and future rent procurement (Shchukin
and Arbatli 2022).
The middle class makes for an optimum constituency for clientelism because of the
unique features of post-communist Europe. These reasons are residual state presence in the
economy after reforms, weak organized labor, and a vulnerable middle class. Income
stratification, wealth accumulation, and economic crisis have made middle income households a
distinguishable target for clientelization and patronage because they are theoretically more open
and willing to receive these benefits. Additionally, redistribution in exchange for loyalty is more
compelling within the middle class because the calculus for obliging clientelistic parties for
resources and goods and then defecting are distinct from lower and higher income groups.
Higher income groups are more likely to seize the state for themselves when opportunities align
(Marandici 2021). Meanwhile, the lower strata’s size can often make it an unwieldy ally for
redistribution and its desire to level off societal inequalities distorts future economic returns and
growth (Boix 2003; Huber and Stephens 2014). Middle income households can be aimed at
effectively with specific public goods that the group is more likely to take advantage while
simultaneously allowing for political parties to appear programmatic in their policies.
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As state investment in the economy goes down, so too does the cost effectiveness of
clientelistic policies targeted at middle class constituencies. Less access to state resources
coupled with an increased cost to monitoring due to more alternatives in the form of opposition
parties and a more robust private economy that can redistribute economic gains through
employment. The opposite is true when there is a lack of political and economic alternatives
other than the state. In these systems, rampant informality and personalistic networks ensures
that abuses and corrupt behavior proliferates. This makes defection monitoring cheap as the
vulnerable elements of society that promote the dominance of their patrons which is unlikely to
faulter because loyalty is one of their few tradeable political commodities. I refer to this as
strategic dependence.
The strategic dependence of the middle class is more ambiguous in systems where state
and private capitalism is in play. This raises costs associated with payoffs and lowers costs of
defection and disloyalty. However, these costs can be altered by introducing political
polarization into the system. For the middle class, the potency of both state and firms over
welfare offerings strains their obligations as access to the middle class is double doored in this
case. Enterprising politicians can take advantage of political polarization by conditioning access
to public goods to a narrower group of supporters and loyalists. This type of outcome has
become especially apparent after the 2008-2009 financial crisis which undid pitted parties and
leaders against the liberal reforms that were undertaken in the 1990s in Central and Eastern
Europe. Many states in Central and Eastern Europe increased their power over their economy at
the cost of independent businesses and foreign direct investment. This likewise decreased the
costs of state capture as the amounts of resources at the disposal of exploitative elites increased
as well.
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Meanwhile, those states that have very little state intrusion into the economy will be
much more market oriented. Market oriented economies proliferate with independent firms and
businesses and able to operate without aggressive sate interference. The likelihood of state
capture is low because the number of resources that can be distributed is much smaller even if
demand is still high. These states are not bereft of vulnerable middle class individuals who may
seek out parties and elites to promote their social welfare. As with markets, demand outstrips the
available supply which drives up the costs inherent in state capture. In this case, elites are
unlikely to promote rent transfers to the middle class except as universal public goods. The
market is shared amongst a variety of independent players and vested actors with no single
interest group or entity controlling the commanding heights of the economy. Political
competition will be higher in tandem with the collision of multiple interests and democracy is
unlikely to be in jeopardy.
The variation of state or market dominated capitalism within a country interacts with
vulnerabilities experienced within society. The middle class provides a furtive constituency for
inauspicious elites to apply policies that better position them to capture the state or entrench
completely into it. Democratic decline is merely an outgrowth of the collision between
clientelistic practices and growing rates of economic inequality. The pro-democratic expectations
that are inherent in the center of society are turned on its head in this case. Political behavior like
protesting and voting can become absorbed by political interests when those interests are a cheap
target for elites (McMann 2012, 1). This becomes especially important to consider when the
leadership in a state work to obligate loyalties in exchange for access to limited resources. To
borrow the terminology of Albert Hirschman (1970), loyalty, as it is defined within the
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conditions of societal associations, becomes a valuable tool to maintain one’s socioeconomic
status, rather than to voice one’s dissent.
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3. A THEORY OF CONSTITUENT STATE CAPTURE
What has been presented thus far is a concept of Central and Eastern European democratic
decline and a theory that may explain why this phenomenon occurs. In CEE countries, the appeal
of populist rhetoric and political parties that do little to promote democracy have created a call to
action for researchers to reflect on its occurrence. I have evoked three democratic typologies as
being typical of CEE countries: democracy, retrograde democracy, and constrained democracy
but I have yet to fully develop as to how these concepts come about. These outcomes are clear
and evident when considering the literature and data regarding democracy and how it has shifted
in the past decade. However, this clarity becomes less so when discussing the causal
mechanisms. There is a large amount of theoretical and empirical ground that needs to be
covered in this work to ascertain which variables are associated to which outcomes. In doing so I
have produced a theory that explains democratic outcomes as a result of state capture by elites.
In Chapters 1 and 2, I laid out the foundations of what I established as constituent state
capture. In this regard, democratic outcomes are manipulated by a process of clientelism that
targets the middle class of society. The middle class is comprised of professional, educated, and
skilled labor and has access to higher incomes and property that is indicative of their social
station. Why this group may be a cost-effective supporter of nondemocratic policies has gone
unappreciated. Political agents use clientelism as a method of exchange between themselves and
electoral groups within society in order to gain autonomy to act over the government. In this
case, it is the middle class that represents a constituent client. By commandeering the institutions
of the state, the state’s captors can then exploit more resources and re-engineer those institutions
to increase the longevity of their own tenure. Scholars who focus on the phenomenon identify
porous institutions and poor governance of the state as the main method that guarantees access to
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resources (Grzymala-Busse 2008, 640). I, however, have broken down this limited theoretical
framework and supplemented it with a parsimonious theory of democratic outcomes in Central
and Eastern Europe.
The foundations of my argument have already been given a cursory explanation. In this
chapter I elucidate the entirety of the theory, its applicability, and its causal mechanisms in order
to dispel any remaining uncertainties. The development of economic state capture is predicted by
high levels of state management of the economy (SMotE) and a reaction to socioeconomic
destabilization that I’ve term as middle class vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities interact with
elites who rely on institutional-capitalistic conditions to solve these issues in legitimate ways.
Political responses and the amount of state-capitalism overlap to create the three levels of
democracy outcomes. Throughout this chapter I lay out what these variables are, how they are
operationalized, and what the circumstance of each particular instance may lead to
This chapter presents the theory in a series of steps that articulate its various component
parts. I introduce several rival hypotheses and explanations that challenge this dissertation’s
argument and set these up as possible counter arguments over the course of the book. Once these
have been laid out, I go about setting up my theory in several stages. I lay out the social
vulnerabilities experienced by the middle class and how its engages with elites. Uneven
economic growth and crises in CEE countries has produced an appetite for state-capitalist
solutions in reaction to the liberal reforms of the 1990s. These inequalities exacerbate the
vulnerabilities of middle class groups, which are spelled out in the following sections. Lastly, I
express how various levels of control by the state and firms over market conditions allow
governments to respond to the vulnerable middle class in ways that censor or deregulate that
same market. Each of these outcomes are accompanied by formalized hypotheses.
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3.1. The Theory
Constituent clientelism relies on a logic of supply and demand. Clientelistic networks must be
cost effective in the first place for parties to then be able to redistribute rents to voters. Middle
class vulnerabilities ensure that there is a ready and available demand for patronage, but it
doesn’t determine the number of resources available to be redistributed. In other words, it
doesn’t determine clientelistic supply that must first be available. To this end, the amount of
control over the economy the state can exert ensures the availability of resources that can be
offered in exchange for going along with state capture. The liberalization process of the 1990s
led to the various capitalistic systems that citizens found themselves a part of. Where the state
never fully liberalized and maintained stable access to a percentage of the economy, parties
similarly could use those large tracts of resources and clientelize the middle class. Constituents
may permit incumbents to capture the state in exchange for goods, services, and privileges.
The importance of the state’s access to wealth cannot be underestimated. Access to
revenues is often the conflated as a state’s defining characteristic. As Edmund Burke (1909, 14)
famously wrote, “the revenue of the state is the state.” With that in mind, it is important to weigh
the state’s resources with the propensity for state capture. The size of SMotE is important to
consider as its effect is multiplicative with constituent vulnerabilities. I evaluate this as the
prevalence of state capitalist policy and institutional make up. In the contemporaneous sense,
state capitalism is a political-economic arrangement indicated by a bureaucratic free market
system which is “particular to each government that practices it” (Bremmer 2010, 23). This
definition requires further explanation. State management of the economy reflects a particular
level of domestic state involvement in the free and regulated market. Assets do not have to be
directly owned by the state, though often times countries will partially or completely own large
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firms and enterprises. Policy tools are market-oriented and mercantile in character. These
policies seek to protect domestic industry and promote national champions while not necessarily
undermining the private economy. Put another way, “market forces are good, as long as state
control over key economic aspects remains intact” (McNally 2013, 39). In this dissertation, I
estimate SMotE as the state’s share of the overall economy and its contribution to production.
The more the state controls, the more goods elites can offer or limit in exchange for
support. They can increase public good distribution or narrow it down as incentives to loyal
supporters. This changes the calculus for state capture in several ways. First, it raises the payoff
for state capture as there are more resources to risk the gamble if a party should fail to capture
the state successfully or when voters renege. Candidates are often defeated by lack of resources,
either to offer or to finance their campaign.
The calculus for elites who target the middle class therefore changes the more that
resources are available because more expenditures can balance against the overhead of
clientelizing voters who have more resources to begin with. Figure 3-1 presents a 2x3 matrix of
when the middle class is an affordable target for clientelism and patronage. Only when this group
experiences crises and the availability of resources to be distributed is increased should we see
the calculus shift towards the middle as an efficient source of clientelism. The highest levels of
state managed resources are likewise to be the most cost-efficient arrangement. When access to
state assets is not as robust, distribution for loyalty must be more selective. When the state has
low SMotE, demand from the middle class outstrips the supply of patronage.
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Figure 3-1 Elite Calculus for Middle class Clientelism
3.1.1. Strategic Dependence and the Middle Class
The cost effectiveness of the middle class for side transfers is incumbent on their status in
society. Vulnerability occurs when their status is no longer secure or future prospects begin to
deteriorate. Economic reforms, financial crises, and unequal distribution of resources all serve to
lower the costs for middle income voters to support parties in exchange for patronage. If this
group is not vulnerable, then the costs of buying off the group is too cost prohibitive. It would be
more effective for parties to engage in large scale welfare programs and programmatic policies
rather than clientelism. This is because the middle class has its own particular agenda and
preferences which they wish to electorally activate. When they are vulnerable, they must actively
switch their loyalty to whichever economic force may benefit them. These forces often have
primacy over economic production. I refer to this as strategic dependence. It emphasizes the
dependent nature of voters in a country due to the relative disposition of market and state
economic status.
Vulnerabilities can be attached to the fallibility of organized labor in CEE societies which
give middle class workers very little protection against market forces and are unlikely to be able
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to coordinate efficiently. When parties can use the state as the supreme force for securing middle
class fortunes, middle income voters will likewise vote for parties to secure the state. These
incumbents can offer state-capitalist solutions that are likely to resonate with middle class
preferences which further elevates their dependence on the state.
The state is not always dominant in the market though. Various degrees of state
involvement in economic outcomes means that we should expect changes to the strategic
dependence of voters and the cost efficiency of building middle class clientelistic networks.
When markets dominate in a country, private businesses and independent firms can be seen as
strategically optimum for the middle class. In these instances, vulnerability is not enough to
make groups cost-effective targets of clientelism. Levels of SMotE will be low as the private
sector is relied upon to generate profits and wealth for society. Instead, we should expect to find
higher levels of political competition as elites and parties can’t directly trade off of middle class
support to stack the deck in their favor.
Clientelism in countries with a moderate amount of state control presents more of a
puzzle. For one, voters can see either markets or the state as a solution to the hardships they are
experiencing. This challenges the assumptions of the voter’s strategic dependence and provides
multiple exits for voters in the middle class to renege on received payoffs. We should expect that
these voters will be too expensive for elites to buy off. However, variations alter this cost
calculus. The vulnerability of the middle class in these cases makes it so some voters are cost
effective instruments for state capture. When parties can identify, and selectively target those
individuals likely to remain loyal after such exchanges as well as heighten their dependence on
further payoffs then the cost of doing so will equilibrate. These systems are likely to be
politically polarized given that such targeting alienates group dynamics (Kinowska-Mazaraki
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2021). Democracy will undergo challenges depending on which parties are able to gain political
ground and utilize rent distribution to their favor.

Figure 3-2 Process Tracing Model of Incumbent State Capture
I present the process tracing model in full in Figure 3-2. The final point of the figure
shows the state capture outcomes as being constrained, retrograde, or nominal democracies. In
CEE countries, the starting point emerged during the liberalization process in the 1990s which
led to variation between how much the state was extracted from the economy. Where high levels
of SMotE remained, so too do parties have access to those resources. I distinguish this as
clientelist supply, or the amount that could be offered through the state by parties and elites
intent on controlling more of the government. Meanwhile, clientelist demand is represented by
the vulnerable middle class who have experienced insecurities in terms of economic crises,
constraints on organized labor, and wealth inequality. When these forces interact, it is more
likely to lead to stronger middle class clientelism and eventual incumbent state capture. Parties
who operate in a system of high clientelist supply and demand have a higher chance of middle
class clientelism as compared to the inverse. In the presence of moderate SMotE, however,
reciprocity becomes polarized. The potential for constituent clients to renege from their
obligations is much higher leading to thinner clientelistic relationships. Expectations of
incumbent state capture will also be weaker. Instead, democratic outcomes depend on
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competitive elections and will shift based on whether clientelistic parties and leaders gain the
advantage.
3.1.2. Why Middle class, and Not Lower and Upper?
The middle class is uniquely disposed to undermine democracy when clientelized despite the
presence of strong institutions that promote electoral politics. Is that a feature that is unique to
this group? In short, yes and no. Clientelism is often used as a tool of state capture that targets
the lower and upper rungs of society. Poorer citizens are cheaper to pay off because they are
more often ready to sell their votes because they experience a marginal utility of the benefits
gained (Weitz-Shapiro 2008)). However, lower income households may be too large in number
to buy off in any cost effective way. Wealthy individuals are typically fewer in number but more
expensive which makes selectivity and partiality important. Elites must be fiscally prudent when
redistributing rents to any group. The question becomes as to whether such policies would
undermine democracy if it was present.
I argue that political elites seeking to capture the state can, and do, target the middle class
and that, by doing so, democracies can face severe impediments. Clientelism represents a corrupt
bargain between government elites and some proportion of the population that transfers loyalty
for resources or access to resources. As a result, it is correlated with lower rates of
democratization regardless of who is targeted (Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; Kitschelt and Kselman
2013; S. Stokes 2005). Wealthy constituents may provide a useful material advantage for
incumbents, but they are ultimately rivalrous. They may likewise seek to capture institutions for
their own benefits or attempt to obstruct if their material position is threatened (Marandici 2021).
Additionally, these wealthy citizens often pay more in taxes and receive less in return which
makes public goods less appealing and prefer particularistic and club-like goods instead. Elites
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and parties are also motivated to cast a wide net in democracies to gain as many votes as possible
(Keefer and Vlaicu 2008). It is no wonder then that there is a well-regarded expectation that the
poor make effective targets for clientelistic politics. While they make for cheap votes, they are
often seen as the losers of clientelistic bargains between themselves and political elites which
makes their use only as effective as when they are unaware of their losses. Awareness can induce
them to switch parties when a better benefactor comes along (Bue, Sen, and Lindberg 2021;
Weitz-Shapiro 2008).
Past interpretations of clientelism were aimed at explaining how different classes of
people may explain the failure of democratization or the weakness of institutions but it does little
to explain our current predicament. The rise of wealth is a generalizable phenomenon and one
that should decrease the likelihood of clientelism and state capture as a result. Yet democracy
falters in Central and Eastern Europe in spite of this fact. Rather than focus on oligarchs and
poverty, the economically vulnerable in the middle are conditioning the kinds of outcomes being
examined in this paper. Russia, Poland, and Estonia possess high shares of oligarchic elites and
impoverished citizens between them and yet this fails to explain the variation of outcomes.
It’s not that state capture using the middle is more effective but rather that the outcome
may be more destructive for democracy. Resistance to clientelism is often placed at the lap of
middle income groups because they both have the advantages to resist but also make for overall
weak targets (Berenschot 2018). The ability to overcome clientelistic corruption and the forces of
state capture can be placed on the shoulders of those who are best suited to resist such incursions
(Alence and Pitcher 2019, 7). When civil society gives in, it could be expected that there would
be less resistance to state capture overall. As a result, cooptation in the middle will gain
increased traction overtime as it falls to dependency-building strategies by elites.
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3.1.3. Middle class Assumptions
This dependence can be incentivized and encouraged because the middle class, as a concept, will
be oriented towards its own preferences. These preferences are rooted in the psychological
attachment to its status, and it will likewise seek to protect itself against any psychic
vulnerabilities or losses (Walsh, Jennings, and Stoker 2004). However, material definitions of the
middle class are used extensively in this manuscript as a calibrated tool to measure who is in
middle class. I employ a statistical measurement of socioeconomic factors that define the middle
class by their education, income, and employment statuses. The middle class will similarly be
attached to their material status and be invested in protecting themselves from any deteriorating
effects.
The material assumption of the middle class also assumes that the middle class will have
a “labor” component. Older sociological scholarship under Marx, Moore, and Weber have
identified the entrepreneurial and capital owning status of the bourgeois as middle class.24
However, the modern middle class of Central and Eastern Europe is more likely to be identified
as professional white-collar groups of educated workers rather than the capital owners from the
industrial era. Despite the penumbra surrounding middle class definitions, its modern form is
often associated by economists and social scientists with how close one is to the medium income
or by occupational status (Vaughan-Whitehead 2016) rather than a sociological status like
bourgeois or meshchane, to use the CEE terminology (Mironov 2017).
Kiviven’s (1989) study of Finnish society argued that any analysis of the modern middle
class must also include the more marginal groups of that social band and not just higher income
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The bourgeois could likewise be expanded from middle class downwards to the petite bourgeois or lower
caste of tradesmen and merchants. However, this paper makes no distinction within middle class specification
(Kocka 1995).
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earners. Per this logic, the middle class exists as a convergence of working class and bourgeois
social features. Meanwhile, the modern bourgeois is constructed of owners of capital and is more
relevant to business owners, entrepreneurs, and a wide range of property managers. As such, they
are more likely to be identified with the upper strata in CEE societies (van Apeldoorn 2014).25
The modern bourgeois could be more closely identified with Marx’s notions of capital
concentration and ownership rather than those citizens of the contemporary middle of society.
Therefore, I distinguish the middle class in CEE countries as a component of labor that is
differentiated by their income and occupational standing.
Another theoretical assumption to be taken into consideration is the unique effect that
middle class attitudes may have on democracy. Scholarship, much of which has been presented
here, points out the important role that the middle class plays in supporting democratic principles
and commitments. There is a commiserate effect when the middle class turns towards supporting
elite state capture behavior with democratic quality that is more evocative than lower- or upper
class sentiments. A middle class dominated society, while still possessing inequality, will more
likely be oriented towards income and status mobility based on education and occupational
achievement (Lu 2005). Meanwhile, upper class groups are likely to lean towards maintaining
their elite position in society and be much more resistant to distributive welfare, and
entrepreneurial competition (Boix 2003). Lower-income groups, sometimes archaically referred
to as the ‘working class’, have their interests in short term economic gain and trying to meet their
basic needs. In this case, it is expected that corrupt bargains, like clientelism, is more functional
to lower waged workers. For these reasons, low-income workers and the capital owning classes

25
Early sociologists identified small scale capital owners as the petite bourgeoisie who were distinct from
their more prosperous counterparts. This group likewise identify with the bourgeois culture and seek to gain similar
levels of success. The differences between the bourgeois and petite bourgeois were material, not psychological
affinity. See Bechhofer and Elliott (Bechhofer and Elliott 1985).
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are more likely to embrace clientelism and fall into state capture traps regardless of democratic
status and be sympathetic to organized clientelist states and rent seeking behavior. Moore
(Moore 1993 [1966]) noted that the coordination that can arise from the highest and lowest levels
of society is likely to produce totalitarian regimes oriented towards rigid class preservation
(fascism) or class destruction (communism).
While the middle class is essential to the preservation of democratic norms and
institutions, so too does the interplay between who is coopted by parties in their clientelistic
schemes. The presence of clientelistic bargains with the middle class does not preclude
democratic existence, but it does work to undermine it. This is to say, that a middle class who
feels vulnerable to status decay can potentially experience preferences for parties and elites who
promote democratic erosion. Attitudes for this behavior will shift under the weight of different
structures which may harness or stifle middle class prospects. When tensions within that
structure pull on middle class loyalties, the size and scope of constituent clientelism becomes
more important to consider.
3.2. Alternative Explanations
This theory emphasizes certain political behavior as a response to economic and political
conditions. State capture and middle class clientelism provides an articulate explanation to the
quality of democracy experienced in contemporary CEE countries but there are several
alternative hypotheses that must be explored. For one, institutional quality might be influencing
elite behavior rather than the inverse. Clientelism is theorized to prey on weak systems that lack
constraint or competitive electoral protections. To solve this problem, I use examples of
constrained and retrograde democracies provide opportunities to place the onus of causality on
elite behavior that can influence the decision making of the middle class.
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Theories of democratic erosion would also be important to include in this regard. State
capture provides for some theoretical explanations, but a more thorough scraping is required.
Additionally, I explore how CEE democratic outcomes may be reflective of societal and
historical antecedences. Namely, the perseverance of Homo Sovieticus and decades of command
economy that can serve to explain levels of state involvement in the economy. Lastly, I explore
how CEE countries may be more dependent on outside investments and foreign direct
investments. Such a factor has been theorized to create an environment that contributes to
institutional decline and a source of cheap rents that can be easily distributed. For example,
external capital can provide a cheap source of jobs that can be politicized for party gain by
determining where, when, and who gets to apply for access.
3.2.1. Behavioral Explanations
The middle class becomes an economical source of support when the state has enough resources
to exploit, and the middle class is in a receptive position. While elites may poke and prod in
order to leverage political gains to possibly capture more of the state, this argument places much
of the causal logic on middle income to bargain with parties who will exploit their vulnerable
position in society. However, there are serious contentions that the middle class electorate will
often have diffuse interests that makes them difficult to capture (Cianetti, Dawson, and Hanley
2018; Markowski 2016; Tworzecki 2019). These arguments downplay the reciprocal relationship
between electorate and representative. Instead, the degeneration of democracy is directed by
exploitative political elites who are only inclined towards growing their state capture without
electoral support. This debate is identified as supply-sided, state capture rather than observing
and moving party platforms to meet the demands of changing constituencies. If this were
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accurate, democratic outcomes would be the result of only a small portion of the electorate
(Markowski 2016).
Certainly, this argument has some validity for explaining the perseverance of illiberal
parties in constrained democracies and the rise of populist parties, more broadly. Yet, it fails to
grapple with the more important aspects of voter-party relationships. It assumes the electorate
has no agency and will simply go along with the decision making of its representatives no matter
the cost. Yet, as the theory of middle class clientelism points out, it is quite expensive to attempt
to nudge the middle class into a receptive position for vote buying or patronage. Something must
first alter the calculus between party and voter that allows such platforms to then be successful.
There are relevant segments of society that are invested in supporting these illiberal parties and
politicians as they will produce favorable political and economic outcomes for themselves. These
supply side arguments are relatively quiet as to why clientelistic salience with certain strands of
the voting public exists.
Favorable outcomes for the middle class are ones that not only reproduce their material
advantages but their status advantages as well. This argument should also consider when state
capture outcomes are not motivated by economic features but are influenced by affect and
psychology. Ideation and partisan feelings can play an important role in determining political
outcomes (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). Elites rely on ideational compatibilities to support
their programs when considering elite led behavior in relation to the destruction of democratic
norms. In CEE countries, elites are known to invest in narratives that invigorate traditional roles
in society and emphasize historical victimhood to motivate voters (Enyedi 2020). Though the
reach of these cultural platforms and the likelihood of them influencing political behavior is yet
to be fully understood (Algan et al. 2017).
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Party affiliation is also rather weak in Central and Eastern Europe with legislatures often
dominated by coalitional governments (Ibenskas 2020; Olson 1998). The relatively short time
horizon of political parties and the parliamentarian structures in which they compete may serve
to reinforce clientelistic solutions in order to build credibility (Keefer and Vlaicu 2008). The
parliamentarian systems of Central and Eastern Europe heavily lends itself towards multiple
parties with a wide spread of competing ideologies which create unique party combinations
when forming government rather than ideologically unified (Olson 1998). Nor are these
ideological differences always as they seem. The ideological drift between voters tends to take
on a libertarian/authoritarian dimension in CEE countries, rather than being expressed as socioeconomic values (Walczak and van der Brug 2010). Public spending, for example, does not often
conform to party-ideological expectations when discussing Central and Eastern Europe (Bursać
2021).
3.2.2. Institutional Explanations
The perseverance of autocratic institutions and devolution of democracy in the region also
presents challenges to the directionality of my argument. It should be considered whether the
cooptation of the middle class by clientelistic elites is merely a response to structural changes
that have been preceded by state capture in the first place. The perpetuation of democracy has
been theorized to hinge on a set of ever-changing winners and losers who agree to serially
compete within the context that the loser will consent in an honest competition. This has led to a
phenomenon described as “institutional uncertainty” whereby winners and losers in democracy
are relative unknowns but the structure in which they compete is defined and specified
(Przeworski 2005). Yet, illiberal parties and political leaders are oriented towards eroding the
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same rules they will compete under. A decision which “…can hardly be attributed to an alleged
political demand by the people” (Markowski 2019).
State capture could be an ongoing occurrence before the middle class is tapped for
support. The process itself typically ends up being that “under the guise of state reform…
regulatory, budget management, and audit agencies are brought under partisan control,
increasing access to state resources and their distribution” (Grzymala-Busse 2008, 650). The
more resources captured the more that parties have to offer to their more affluent middle class
voters.
I do not deny that there is a sense of circular logic to this argument. While clientelism
could predate middle class vulnerability, it this switch to cater to those insecurities that I
emphasize as being deterministic to outcomes. To rearrange the government’s resources in
partisan fashion assumes that there are resources being managed in the first place. I take this
endogeneity concern seriously by using historical process tracing to better alleviate the problem.
This also helped me to avoid democratization theories that may explain democratization failure
by tracing the moments when the middle class was activated by unscrupulous elites. According
to Huntington’s (1991) description of regime transition, regimes will transition by way of exit,
political infrastructure, and consolidation. Liberal democracies in Central and Eastern Europe
could therefore have experienced a corruption of this transition (Stokke and Aung 2020).
Historical analysis of the liberalization process in CEE countries is the most effective way to
separate out these preconditions as alternative possibilities.
Failed democratic transitions may also be the result of the failure to adopt democratic
values and norms which can corrupt into a processes of clientelism. Antidemocratic outcomes
could be the resultant participation of only a minority of voters or a select group of sophisticated
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parties who seek to increase their political control. Markowski (2016) specifically makes this
claim for Poland’s shift towards illiberalism since 2015. The success of populist parties in
Poland, he argues, is due to relatively low voter participation rates and a small plurality of voters
who have been able to maximize their voting power in order to achieve majoritarian outcomes.
In fact, low voter turnout is indicative of most CEE elections. However, even with low
participation rates, scholars have estimated that the value spread of those who vote is not
significantly different than the values of those who don’t (Kostelka 2014). Nor could such an
argument overcome the longevity of support that would be required to ensure clientelism and the
loyalty of patrons would be secure. We can’t chalk democratic failures to a outliers when such
outcomes are so systemic in the region.
The dependent nature of middle class clientelism in CEE countries must be tempered on
how the state may meet those expectations with patronage and direct transfers. One way the state
may do this is through outside investment. Throughout the empirical chapters, I apply a critical
eye towards global capital and the effect it may be generating within each case. I expect that
foreign direct investment (FDI) should invoke state reactions in both policy and institutional
preferences. Insalubrious democracies who attract FDI potentially may use investment dollars as
a form of cheap patronage through taxed rents and job proliferation. This also means that these
same states can be incentivized by foreign firms to curtail their democratic quality to satisfy
potentially labor repressive demands of FDI (Li and Resnick 2003).
I counter argue that dependency does not create the kinds of democratically eroding
behavior that has been witnessed in Central and Eastern Europe. For one, FDI tends to be
relatively low in autocracies and higher in democratic states because FDI favors the kinds of rule
of law provisions that will protect their investments from expropriation (Li, Cui, and Lu 2014).
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Exploitative parties that seek to capture more of the state do so at the cost of foreign investment
potential. Russia and Poland’s turn towards this behavior is evidence of this because state
managed economies may expropriate FDI by increasing taxes and regulations as a function of
gaining electoral appeal or to placate popular demands. Investors may ignore the warning signals
of weak institutional protections when the reward-to-risk ratio is favorable, but they are unlikely
to put much of their production in the host country out of fear of expropriation (Drabek 2002).
The ability to exploit cheaply extracted resources that are in high demand also factors for
whether a firm might invest, even, in an institutionally bunk country.26
3.2.3. Cultural Explanations
One must also consider the aspects of soviet legacies of CEE states which possessed an anti-civic
culture and informally operated a shadow society underneath the state. Civic values in CEE may
be undermined by the lingering remnants of the Soviet man, homo sovieticus, who’s pre-1990
life was dominated by the Communist Party that fused the entirety of the state with society
(Sharafutdinova 2019). The state pervasively dominated all aspects of society and economy right
down to the individual’s identity, their personal goals, and their ideals and values. Each core
component of the individual was, instead, held in deference to the state and its goals
(Sharafutdinova 2019). Dramatic changes and reforms which undid the formal institutions of
communist control thirty years ago should be weighed against whatever lingering effects remain.
Another theoretical explanation that must be considered are other societal forces within
Central and Eastern Europe such as education and religion. Religious influence over individual
preferences and behavior is highly variable between CEE countries. While the religiosity of CEE

26
The rentier, or resource curse literature explicates the effects of resource endowments as detrimental to
democracy and democracy transformation. The logic behind this inhibiting force is how the state can use its
resources (especially energy resources) to buy off the population and opposition groups cheaply and effectively. See
(Dunning 1988; Ross 2015) for further explanation.
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populations was suppressed in large degree by their respective communist parties, there were
widespread revivals after the 1990 reforms (Mojzes 2020). This has led to the presence of both
high and low levels of religiosity in CEE countries but not in any discernable pattern of
predictability in terms of democratic quality. Within country, religiosity in society has been
shown to be negatively correlated with aspects of social capital, such as trust in institutions and
voting (Algan et al. 2017; Markowski 2016).
Education, along with religion, is often touted as another heuristic by scholars to predict
societal openness or hostility to out groups. Throughout this manuscript, I actively demonstrate
that this is not the case. I control for the effects of religion and education with quantitative
regressions and present significantly underwhelming effects for education and religion in relation
to clientelism. This makes sense on the qualitative level within the cases as well. For example,
the presence of pre-communist middle class in Russia has been shown to correlate with postcommunist educational and democratic values rather than a result of communistic influence or a
religious awakening in the 1990s (Lankina and Libman 2021). In Poland, religiosity is nearly
universal which makes any differentiation in democratic outcomes noncorrelative to religious
identification. Although, there is a much higher degree of contention between secularization and
social liberalism in Poland (Arnold 2012).
There are also aspects of preceding corruption within post-communist societies to be
accounted for. While I do not dispute its variating presence within CEE countries, there is a
matter of causal directionality that must be considered. Authors who emphasize the fundamental
nature of corruption on macro level outcomes imply that the counterfactual ‘removal’ of
corruption would allow CEE states to function as if they were normal democracies (Dawisha
2014; Ledeneva 2013). Instead, governments are inhibited by corrupt practices at all levels in
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society or are increasingly succumbing to this type of behavior. My thesis countermands this
argument. I emphasize that corruption is the resultant nexus of dependencies between state
patronage and the elements of society that feed off it. It should be examined as an effect, not a
cause. The results of which emphasize patron-clientelistic practices. Clientelism is often
associated with weak democracies or economically poorer states, but it also exists when there is
a large gap of trust within civil society and the government’s capacity to deliver public goods
(Berenschot 2018; Weitz-Shapiro 2008). In these instances, private transfers of resources
become more economically efficient and valuable to the middle class (Sánchez and
Senderowitsch 2012).
3.3. Marketization and Inequality
The marketization and liberalization reforms initiated in CEE countries after 1989 produced a
capitulation of the old communist guard to liberal reformers and free markets along with all of
their attendant hazards. The dramatic struggle between an increasingly infirm command
economy and an agitated citizenry trapped in that system had reached its breaking point. Soviet
influence retracted at a rate of collapse that not only undid the communist parties of its satellite
states, but it brought down the entirety of the USSR along with it. This led to a profusion of new
countries, and the reemergence of some old ones. Each of which embraced liberalization of
markets and democratic institutions to various degrees.
New experiences, like inequality, crept into CEE countries which undermined the
democratization process along with economic reformation (Haggard and Kaufman 2012, 2016).
It was little understood what kind of impact that a dramatic upheaval within the social strata of
previously flat societies would have on burgeoning inequalities in CEE countries. Recent
economic crises in Central and Eastern Europe have led to a reassessment of marketization and a
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reinterpretation of the liberalization events of the 1990s. The outcomes of this transformational
process has even led some scholars to reapply the principles of Polanyi’s Great Transformation
((1956)) and the presence of double movement due to marketization and reform (Davis 2020;
Özgür and Özel 2013).
A discussion of Polanyi’s transformation of free markets and subsequent social response
expresses two key components that are critical to the interpretation of middle class clientelism
and constituent vulnerability. First, that the process of liberalization has invoked a societal
response as a reaction to the excesses of free markets. Second, such an invocation, or double
movement, creates a political call to action in which elites can attend to in order to balance
countervailing forces. According to Polanyi, double movement is the societal response to when
markets become “disembedded” from the community. Markets will seek out their own
protections from the disciplining hand of society and influence government to create laws and
institutions that allows it to proliferate. Polanyi saw the function of markets as antagonistic to
humanity’s communal nature as it exploits the atomization of individuals and redistributes the
gains unevenly. The dislocation of social groups under market conditions creates a counter
movement to reharness economic powers and embed them back within society, hence double
movement. After the end of the Cold War, Polanyi’s articulation of market expansion and
societal response has provided a useful critique of the Washington Consensus and the neoliberal
paradigm, more generally.27
Polanyi’s work falls short in several regards. His discussion centered around an
interpretation of laissez-faire markets and did not consider how capitalistic relationships may

27
The Washington Consensus was a program of economic and political reforms that were often
recommended to liberalizing states after the end of the Cold War. It promoted institutional oversight, rule of law,
private property, and free markets as being most productive to economic growth and development. This typically
came at the cost of welfare and redistributive programs exercised by the reforming state. See Easterly (2019).
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vary from country to country. Yet these systems still function with markets and may induce their
own set of double movement responses. Polanyi also assumes that labor, as a collective social
force, will respond to the coercions of business in Marxist fashion. This abstract
conceptualization of the personified society who knows how and when to protect itself from the
predations of the market has been critiqued previously (Block 2008). I interpret a more nuanced
approach which balances these shortcomings. For one, it is more appropriate to assume a
disconnect between middle and lower waged labor in terms of their interests and ability to
challenge market forces. I likewise impose a comparative capitalism to interpret which states
already socialize their markets to varying.
It is important to consider the implications of double movement when studying how
vulnerable constituents may avail themselves to state capture in exchange for alleviating market
problems. It provides room for economic re-etatization that may have likewise been missing.
Crisis fuels systemic uncertainties that Blyth (2002) argued obscured critical information under
the long shadow of an uncertain future. Winners and losers become less identifiable or certain,
and it becomes less clear which groups will become the dominant forces in society after change.
There is no “a priori way of predicting the new equilibrium” once a disequilibrium has been
achieved (Blyth 2002, 8). This creates a slew of commitment problems between societal groups
who seek to advance their own relative position and interests. Blyth’s (2002) solution was that
ideas act as a cohesive glue that binds likeminded groups together. In such instances, simpler
identities, such as religion, nationality, and class, become more functional as they are more
compelling and significant within populations adrift in instability.
This occurred in CEE countries when they reordered their societies after their postcommunist transformations in the 1990s (Saar and Trumm 2017). The outcome of this
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reshuffling was a process of social stratification as groups transitioned out of their flat,
pretransition societies in a polarized fashion. The extremity of the bifurcation of economic
success and failure in Central and Eastern Europe has attributed in some part to how liberal
reforms were introduced and whether those reforms had any staying power (Frye 2010). Up until
the 2000s, the divergence between democratizers and those countries unable to do so correlated
with better middle class prospects during a wave of economic growth (Pressman 2010).
However, the effects of the global recession (Özgür and Özel 2013; Roy-Mukherjee and Udeogu
2021), and the deregulation of financial markets (Munir and Bukhari 2020) had produced a wide
gap in middle class prosperity. Incomes have become polarized between wealthier and poorer
strata with the middle class is gradually being sifted out (Derndorfer and Kranzinger 2021). The
effect of globalization was especially profound in the CEE countries who are tied to global
production chains and foreign investment dollars (Večerník 2012).
The impact of increased inequality had the impetus to set the middle class in a responsive
mode that is more likely to be oriented towards political leaders who seek to redress those
grievances. But there are a variety of ways middle income workers could seek to promote their
own interests in electoral systems. Piven (2008) identifies the term “interdependent power” to
describe how groups in society may effectuate change as divisions emerge between governing
elites during crisis and uncertainty. These instances give labor groups more room to express their
own interests and gain concessions. Members may seek to constrain the market, but they may
also seek to harness it for their own purposes because the effects of market displacement are also
unevenly distributed across social groups. Importantly, groups will seek out interest-specific
alliance rather than a unified or grand social response.
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In CEE countries, growing income inequality has indicated a change in values and
increased tolerance for social inequality in society with a psychological gap forming between
citizens who see social inequality as legitimate or otherwise (Josifidis, Supic, and Glavaski
2018). As such, interests regarding the economy are not common between low, middle, and high
wage individuals and those interests often clash. For instance, lower class labor is often in
competition with foreign, migrant labor that drives down the price of unskilled local wages
(Petrova and Inglot 2020). Meanwhile, members of the middle class are often more vulnerable to
the destabilizing effects of market fluctuations. They are much more likely to be plugged into the
market but lack the resources to weather large downturns (Pressman and Scott 2009). For
instance, these individuals are far more likely to be dependent on credit and are much more
sensitive to market swings that can inflict deteriorations of their status (Pressman and Scott
2009). Many in the vulnerable middle class are only one crisis away from becoming lower
income citizens (Vaughan-Whitehead 2016).
With these factors in mind, my theoretical expectations for middle class clientelism gain
more traction within the social vulnerability hypothesis. It is beyond refute that the middle class
in Central and Eastern Europe has undergone striking changes (Vaughan-Whitehead 2016;
Žičkutė 2013). The OECD (2019) estimates that the middle class has been eroded and squeezed
in the race between lifestyles and incomes. Fewer opportunities for prosperity indicate a
reverberating crisis rather than a passing phenomenon. A crisis which places lower middle
income families especially at risk (OECD 2019).
I visualize data from the European Value Survey which asks respondents to identify
themselves by household income deciles. Using the method described in the first chapter, I
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distinguish these households by proportion of middle income respondents per EVS waves.28
These waves ranged from 1990 to 2020 and provide compelling evidence as to what the middleclass is experiencing in Central and Eastern Europe. The charts in Figure 3-3 include nine
countries from the region and an overall trend line reference purposes. The downward trend in
the proportion of middle-income respondents is quite apparent in most cases except Russia. It is
also worth noting that individuals from these household incomes may be sorting upwards as well
as down. This would still decrease the overall proportion middle income households per survey,
but we should assume the effect should be different.29 Either way, middle income households
have experienced decline in the past several decades in Central and Eastern Europe.

Figure 3-3 Respondents Who Identify as Middle Income

28

Throughout this paper I often refer to the middle-class by their economic standing and association with
75%-200% of the median income. See Appendix A.1 for details of coding.
29
See Appendix B.1 for Figure 3-3 Supplemental with lower and upper income household proportions.
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Economic inequality is becoming more normalized as well in the region. The
transformations in the 1990’s that allowed states to emerge from mass poverty is no longer
producing the kinds of middle class prosperity (Mareeva 2020,4). Initial gains of prosperity that
were commonplace in the 2000s are especially out of reach for younger generations who must
navigate a transformed labor market with fewer resources at their disposal (Petrova and Inglot
2020). All of this makes for compelling fodder for enterprising politicians to exploit. With higher
levels of state management of the economy comes a capacity to distribute and transfer resources
as an exchange for political support. Loyalty in no uncertain terms. With the expressed
understanding that those politicians and parties can transform the state into a tool of the party at
the behest of their vulnerable constituents. In other words, a middle class constituency employs
the state for their own interests for better social and economic conditions. for As Block (2008, 2)
describes it:
“Polanyi suggests that the exercise of state power fundamentally shapes the relative
strength of different social actors, so he broadened his analytic lens to encompass battles
over government regulation, over the provision of public goods and services, and over
international flows of labor, goods, and money. It is implicit in his analysis that these
conflicts ultimately influence the balance of forces on the shop floor.”
However, Brock and Polanyi underestimated that political forces may be bargaining with
societal forces as a means of gaining their own political advantage. Nor did they take seriously
that workers may align with firms rather than seek out state-capitalist solutions. I make this
distinction clear between those middle class interests that are aligned with the state’s capacity to
“re-embed” the market under societal control and those who see the market as the better option.
The particularity of middle class needs for prosperity drives them to seek greater access to
influence government action, employment mobility, and to protect their wealth. So too, then, can
markets and firms satisfy middle class appetite for status and material wealth. Polanyi’s focus
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was too heavily centered on a laissez-faire interpretation of free markets and did not envision
how states could variably arrange the relationships between firm, labor, and themselves.
3.4. Middle class Vulnerability
Societal responses to marketization and its disparities have helped inure the tensions and
dependencies within the middle class and the parties that invest in them for political gain. This
had led to a profusion of populist parties in CEE countries. To quote Ann Davis (2020, 398),
populist parties are successful because of the “…increasing inequality… automation, declining
labor share, increasing indebtedness financialization; and erosion of protective labor market
institutions, such as welfare and unionization.” Populism, however, is merely a platform in
which politicians may package their goods and offerings. The unequal spread of market gains
and political exploitation of the middle class’s vulnerabilities are indicative of an inability to
influence policy rather than be influenced by it. I express this shortcoming as a fragility inherent
in middle class inequality in tandem with the systemic reduction of organized labor
representation in CEE economies that prohibits collective action solutions.
Economic vulnerabilities can be measured in a variety of ways. There is a series of
scholarship that focuses in on the material losses or even the threat of loss as motivating factors
for citizens (Ranci et al. 2021). Osberg (2015, 5) identifies economic vulnerability as the
inherent potential of downside risk that plagues an individual’s future which they cannot ignore
or avert. To this end it is important to operationalize insecurity under the consideration of future
prospects as an incentivization to act commiserate with those imminent pressures. Ranci et al.
(2021, 542) identify three aspects of insecurity as “(1) exposure to temporary poverty as result of
income downward volatility; (2) financial strain of the households; and (3) incapacity of
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households to meet their financial obligations and consequent their over-indebtedness.” I use a
similar definition and measure middle class vulnerability in this dissertation.
The vulnerability expressed in middle class feelings reflects the current dynamics of
formal and informal relationships within society. In CEE countries, attitudes of economic
displacement and uncertainty are pervasive with middle income individuals. Figure 3-4 presents
data from the 2019 EU Election Survey and shows the percentages of those who identify as
middle class. I estimate percentages of those that appraised the economic conditions of their
country as worse compared to 12 months ago and if they think the economy will be worse 12
months into the future against respondents who identified as middle class.30 The results indicate
that a large percentage of the middle class population have a negative perspective about the
economic conditions of their country.31 Unsurprisingly, the two reported values are often
evaluated at similar levels and similar across cases.

30

See Appendix B.2 for survey question coding.
It is important to note that this data was collected before the onset of Covid-19 economic recessions.
These evaluations would have likely been much bleaker if the results included data from 2020 or 2021. Also worthy
of note is that there is no correlation between democratic quality and economic satisfaction in the middle class.
Those democracies which are in retrograde report similar levels of negative economic appraisal that is on par with
their democratic counterparts.
31
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Figure 3-4 Middle Class Perceptions of the Economy
The lesson taken from Figure 3-4 is that there is a tangible proportion of the middle class
that feels the economy is not serving their interests in these countries. Some researchers have
reported that these economic outlooks have only gotten worse since the onset of Covid-19 and
the concomitant globalized shutdown of global trade and industry production (Ranci et al. 2021).
Exposure to temporary poverty, financial strain, and incapacity are increasing with middle
income groups. Over indebtedness and financial strain were especially salient for middle class
groups who were more likely to be affected by any changes that exacerbated those issues.
Middle class insecurity had its start in the 1990’s. Welfare in CEE countries was
extremely limited then due to a lack of capital or a robust class system to redistribute gains from
winners to losers (Karger 2007). The widening of economic disparities between economic
gainers after the capitalist transition meant higher demands from lower- and middle income
citizens for welfare and government services. Where public services weren’t as prolific, private
services stepped up to take up the slack. For instance, decreased returns on public education in

98
Poland and Ukraine have been adapted to by the middle class with an increased reliance on
private tutoring programs (Długosz 2016).
Political parties in Central and Eastern Europe are more responsive to wary middle class
constituents. Often at the cost of lower income citizens. In CEE countries “only a small elite
have opted out of public services, with the middle class still tending to both utilise (sic), and vote
for, public services” (Cerami and Stubbs 2011, 20). Although the neoliberal process of
marketization in the 1990’s led to a decline in services and quality, the re-etatization of capitalist
economies has given politicians more leeway to promise and obligate themselves to welfare
spending and social support (Karger 2007). This produces a corrupt bargain between dependent
groups and elites who have access to the redistributive process.
Beyond redistributive demands, extralegal behavior is not out of the ordinary in Central
and Eastern Europe either to make up for insecure statuses. Its history of communist elitecentered politics known as nomenklatura is quite definitive (Karklins 2002).32 The flatness of
communist CEE societies encouraged clientelistic linkages, both formal and informal, in order to
provide access to specialized goods and services that were unavailable in a non-market system.
Even after ascension to the EU in the 2000s, the corrupt relationship of quid-pro-quo exchanges
has remained. In fact, the process may have been amplified as CEE governments will often
contract with firms along partisan lines to manage public administration processes in order to
meet EU standards (Miklos Szanyi 2019).

32
Nomenklatura were the group of elite agents within the bureaucracy and administration of Soviet and
Eastern Bloc countries. Exclusive access to this group was controlled by communist party elites. As a result of their
extant control over economic, social, and political functions they had power over both public and private resources
that the common citizen did not. See Pipes (2000).

99
3.4.1. The Downfall of Organized Labor
The reduction of labor institutions since the 1990’s in Central and Eastern Europe is one of the
more relevant factors of middle class vulnerabilities. Weak labor is also a pertinent component of
separating CEE cases from other possible cases that experience large welfare states, or statecapitalism mixtures and don’t have problems with their democracy. The estimated presence and
articulation of labor as a political-economic force is also integral for interpretating comparative
economic systems. In Hall and Soskice’s (Hall et al. 2001) two typologies of capitalism, labor is
either identified as highly organized or greatly decentralized and disorganized. Comparative
advantages are associated with each type in terms of educational standards, sectoral
transportability, cooperative or adversarial relationships with management, and wage
coordination. This approach is incomplete and incoherent in Central and Eastern Europe but has
been enhanced by scholarship in recent years.
In this dissertation, I define labor as the organized or disorganized management of
contractual obligations between workers and firms as coordinated by the government using
informal or formal regulations. As such, organized labor in CEE countries has become a shadow
of its once universal status. The command economies before 1990 placed labor at a critical
juncture for managing worker interests and coordinating with the state and its state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). These once high levels of labor coverage and coordination has drawn some
noted comparisons to the coordinated market economies of Central Europe due to labor’s strong
presence and its influence over politics and policy (Pravda 1983).
Labor was also integral in undermining the communist authoritarian states in Central and
Eastern Europe as it was able to activate various interests and coordinate them through powerful
unions and trade groups that represented nearly every worker in the country. The Solidarity
movement in Poland during the 1980’s was one such springboard which helped to undermine the
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strength of the Polish Communist Party and was ultimately successful in bringing about much
needed liberal reforms. It is ironic then that labor in Central and Eastern Europe has seen such a
sharp decline since the 1990’s (Magda 2017).
I demonstrate the decline of organized labor with data from the OECD’s ICTWSS dataset
(Visser 2019). This data estimates the levels of labor coverage and union membership per
country from the 1990s to the mid-2000s. The data in Table 3-1 presents this information with
proportion of the working population that is covered by unions and bargaining. I also include the
first and year a datapoint is available in parentheses. Bargaining coverage is the amount of
working population covered by collective bargaining for wages. Union density indicates the
proportion of the population that is in a trade union. The values for each country plummeted after
1990. The collapse of coverage and union density is stark considering how these values were
near 100% during the communist era.
Table 3-1 Bargaining Coverage and Union Density
Bargaining Coverage
Union Density
country
Earliest (year) Latest (year) Earliest (year) Latest (year)
Bulgaria
36.4 (2002)
23.4 (2018)
27.3 (2000)
15.3 (2016)
Czech Republic
47.5 (1994)
32.9 (2019)
67.2 (1993)
11.4 (2008)
Estonia
14.5 (2006)
6.1 (2018)
93.9 (1992)
4.2 (2019)
Hungary
45.1 (1993)
21.8 (2019)
88.6 (1990)
8.3 (2018)
Latvia
28 (1995)
11.6 (2018)
Lithuania
12.5 (2000)
7.9 (2019)
33.3 (1995)
7.4 (2019)
Poland
25 (2000)
13.4 (2020)
63.6 (1990)
13.4 (2017)
Romania
100 (2000)
15 (2017)
45.4 (1998)
21.4 (2018)
Russia
28.3 (2007)
22.8 (2013)
84.3 (1992)
27.5 (2017)
Slovak Republic
52 (2000)
24.4 (2015)
59.8 (1995)
11.3 (2018)
The reduction of labor’s capacity in CEE countries has been an ongoing and systematic
trend as CEE governments have embarked on a campaign of deregulation in favor of marketoriented solutions to labor. Despite initial attempts to build tripartite relationships like that in
continental Europe, much of these institutions were eroded by reform (David Ost 1996). High
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levels of union membership during the reform process were unable to counter mobilize to stop
this trend. In fact, scholars argue that the presence of unions undid labor’s importance in the long
run. They point to the prevalence of labor-protecting institutions which limited the amounts of
reactionary protests that could have occurred during the reforms (Hethy 1994; Iankova 1998). In
this instance, researchers believe that weakened labor organizations syphoned off dissatisfied
workers whose energies could have been directed more coherently. However, these same
scholars are unable to fully explain the degeneration of organized labor’s appeal throughout the
region that experienced similar tones of reform.
The political and social weakness of labor may also have been the result of labor’s
flexibility to move between industries, and the decline of labor union’s legitimacy whose legacy
was closely linked to the communist party (Crowley 2004). Some scholars have argued that the
reduction of labor’s power has been a positive development for transitioning CEE economies
(Åslund 2006; Greskovits and Bohle 2001). Reform was a value generating process that was
designed to increase investment appeal to foreign firms, to align with EU values to make
accession more likely, and to invigorate economic growth during uncertain and dynamic times.
This procedure depressed labor costs and encouraged development to reach deeper into Eastern
Europe. As a result, unemployment was greatly reduced which made labor organization even less
appealing. Private and state-owned firms would become reliant on non-standardized employment
which pushed back against bargaining and restricted labor organizations to the firm level and
public sector.
Myant and Drahokoupil (2012) are less sanguine about the decline of labor. Over the
years, decreases in labor costs have added to the woes of wage dependent workers who rely on
export-oriented firms who are motivated to keep wages low (Wiliñski 2012). The systemic
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weakening of labor has also had the effect of making workers less resistant to some of the more
destructive aspects of marketization(Bohle and Greskovits 2007; D. Ost 2001). According to Ost
(Ost 2001, 47), a convincing parallel of weak labor and strong economic development has not
been drawn in Central and Eastern Europe. The continued proliferation of wage bargaining in the
public sector has increased disparities between private and public workers and private wages lag
behind in some cases due to the dynamism in the labor market (Socha and Weisberg 2002). The
exogenous shock of the Great Recession in 2008 has further pushed the state to intervene and
grab more control over the reins of the economy.
The middle class possesses more influence over government policy and firm bargaining
when integrated into organized labor (Northrup 1948). It is estimated that middle class interests,
along with lower waged workers, benefit from the collective bargaining power because it
provides wage protection, access to benefits, and decreases income inequality (Shierholz 2020).
The middle class is further connected to labor protections as it creates professional organizations
that may coordinate to overcome collective action hurdles to better express their interests.
Northrup (1948, 163) identified these organizations as “collective bargaining groups”, as
opposed to unions. The effect and style are the same.
The impact of diminished labor in Central and Eastern Europe have materialized in middleand lower class groups in disproportionate fashion. The loss of organization capacity by middle
class labor is unlikely to be shared by lower skilled workers and vice versa. For one, diminished
bargaining over wages is likely to trickle down to benefit lower skilled workers by increasing
hourly and minimum wages. Lower class groups are also more likely to experience different
negative aspects. Lower income earners are more vulnerable to temporary poverty and the lack
of in-depth benefits coverage makes them more inclined to seek welfare and unemployment
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policies from the government. On the other hand, middle income groups are more likely to be
vulnerable to issues that affect their material status, such as inflation, and be more oriented
towards policies of debt relief. These inequalities coupled with the distinct divisions between
labor in the public and private sector has created a centrifugal force which has pushed out the
more fragile groups from the middle class’s core constituent body (Kivinen 1989).
The bargaining power of labor is theorized to help induce responsivity by the government
as it reduces the collective action costs to influence favorable policies (M. Olson 1989). In times
of weakened labor, labor’s capacity to influence policy is especially damaged. In fact, weakened
labor may face more rollbacks and cuts to their preferred policies when crises and reforms are
introduced that favor of business interests and their preferences. For instance, the Great
Recession saw labor’s power and organizational capabilities in CEE countries curtailed further to
maintain business growth and political stability for government leadership (Glassner and Keune
2010, 8). One way CEE states responded was to create new regulations that established positions
for labor representation outside the direct control of unions. This increases non-associated
worker’s bargaining positions which undercut union representation. The result of these
regulations in CEE countries was higher levels of labor localization that further reduced worker’s
overall collective bargaining power because it atomized labor and made it more sensitive to state
and firm level patronage. As such, modern CEE organized labor is more tightly interwoven with
political parties and elites compared to the collective bargaining of other European countries
(Kahancova 2015).
In functional terms, decreased organization capacity for labor has intercepted with the
economic disparities and uncertainties that have occurred in the middle class. The consequences
of which have induced middle class workers to become increasingly attendant to parties and
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politicians who develop platforms that attempt remedy their grievances (Vanhuysse 2007).
Responsive elites become more vigorous and animated in managing their constituent’s economic
insecurities (Becker and Vasileva 2017; Kozarzewski and Bałtowski 2019). In some cases,
they’ve increased the shares of state ownership of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These
companies are a valuable aspect for wealth generation and a modernized rent seeking tool for
capitalist minded elites can use those revenues to generate patron-client relationships.
3.5. Middle class Loyalties
Disparities from market effects lead to alternative pathways for various class-based interests for
political elites and parties. When labor is weak, so too, should we expect, that middle class labor
will be hamstrung and unable to effectively influence policy towards their preferences
independent of other working class groups. Hence middle class vulnerability may lead to
dependence on the support from the other factors of production via the actions of firms or
government. Dependence for the middle class goes beyond these factors and can also be traced to
two more important aspects. First, we should consider if the vulnerable middle class have
alternatives to choose between state-capitalism or private enterprise. Second, do those
alternatives interfere with clientelist principles of exchanging political support for goods and the
follow through of exchange. I describe these dependencies as call and response actions that can
be summed up using the logic of voice or exit within those structures akin to Hirschman’s 1970
book, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.
Vulnerable groups are not always stuck within a single system of decision making.
Hirschman (Hirschman 1970, 3) identified “alternatives” that exist within different groups that
allow individuals to express their displeasure on the inefficient allocation of resources. In the
case of this paper, the middle class has two avenues to express its interests and allow it to
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coordinate: voice or exit. Voice has been described as kinetic political action such as voting or
protest whereas exit is the act of resisting participation such as abstention from voting or leaving
a political party (Zagórski and Santana 2021). Such activities are meant to enhance decision
making and provide clearer information to politicians and businesses when systems are not in
equilibrium. However, when information becomes less clear, say due to the presence of
vulnerabilities and crisis, exit and voice are influenced by a third component: loyalty.
Loyalty changes the calculations of participants by decreasing the chance of exit and
increasing the costs associated with voice. In essence, it’s a functional influencer over exit and
voice (Hirschman 1970, 78). Loyalty’s effect is not as coherent when the divisions of quality for
services, both economic and political, are widely understood and clear. It is only in the absence
of informational clarity that loyalty becomes critical because it “raises the cost of exit”
(Hirschman 1970, 80). This factor is also compounded when exit for a polity may not be an
option either as tangible or credible. In those cases where the state or market has monopolistic
control over socio-economic conditions, actors will be limited in who may credibly exit that
system because of limited choices. As a side effect, it will also amplify supportive voice as a
reliable signal of loyalty.
Loyalty changes the payoff incentives for systems that suffer from information
asymmetries (W. R. Clark, Golder, and Golder 2017; A. O. Hirschman 1980). Hirschman’s
interpretation of exit and voice also assumes a certain level of autonomy or dependence within a
given system which will influence the value of voice or exit. It is here that many issues begin to
arise when considering the practical applicability of middle class clientelism and support for
political actors who seek state capture. Exit and voice may be limited in such exchanges when
there is a reinforced linkage between monopolistic forces and social groups. As I argue in the
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case of middle class clientelism, the costs of buying off the middle class vote goes down in
relation to experienced vulnerabilities and the number of resources a political party has at their
disposal. However, this calculus changes along with the credibility to potentially exit from
clientelistic deals when the state-economy or free markets are the only available options this.
Loyalty becomes a valuable tool for obtaining group and individual level rewards from patrons.
Whether it is the state or from firms.
According to Rosenfeld (2021), the entrenched dependencies of the middle class on the
state for public sector employment makes them less likely to vote against Putin’s regime.
Russia’s state-capitalist network not only allows Putin’s party to dominate the state completely
but also limits access to welfare and patronage. The private sector can’t compete because skilled
workers prefer jobs in the public sector, despite potentially higher wages, owed to the non-wage
incentives that compliment working for the government (Klepikova 2016). Goods and services
create loyalties that stifles the potential risks of exit or voicing negative opinions. Hybrid
mixtures of statism and marketization enforces higher levels of costs for loyalty considerations.
The encroachment into business by the state has created systems of party selection over
executive leadership which induces firms to operate in lockstep with the government agencies
and complements state capture by those same parties. As a result, workers are less apt to
challenge firm policy when they view it as an extension of the ruling party.
Lack of credible routes for exit or even the threat of exit is just one way that ensures that
corrupt and predatory behavior can be successful and achieves the same results every time
(Clark, Golder, and Golder 2017). In such systems, especially those that are highly contested,
loyalty can be exchanged through mutual acts of services for services. Reciprocal acts of
exchange need not be limited to the material but can be reflective of status as well. Reciprocity
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can manifest itself as thin conveyances of contractual exchange or in communal forms.
Reciprocity, as noted by Mauss (1990), can be either thick or thin with thicker reciprocity best
able to explain exchanges in a nonmarket context. Social trades are typically unequal, nondyadic,
and obligates reciprocity to multiple agents and not just the giver. In other words, these
clientelistic bargains are ultimately one-sided against the client which makes exit a likely
occurrence.
When the state or market holds a monopolistic control over access and dispersion of
resources, political discourse becomes entirely susceptible to corrupt participation rather than
exit or abstention (Stokes 2011). In such systems, corruption, or the participation within informal
and illicit actions, can be a method to ensure loyalty, and reciprocity as well as monitor against
those who would defect against the original vote buying agreement. To tighten up these
relationships and ensure proper coordination, elites need to be sure that costly clientelism and
patronage handouts procure the outcomes they were wanted to produce. While the constrained
democracies of Eastern Europe have always struggled with this relationship, the recent roll backs
to the rule of law and the expansion of party reach in the retrograde democracies have
demonstrated that susceptibility is a dynamic proposition. It is here that the functional aspects
government and firm level solutions better explains the Janus-faced actions of middle class
voters. Responses by political elites that have elevate modernized state capitalism have grown
beyond single party state control and has reconciled itself with democracy and free markets
(Kurlantzick 2016).
3.5.1. The Costs of Middle class Support
Previous theory has emphasized that the nature of the middle class should make it more resistant
to clientelism in general as graft reduces in efficacy with a large and prosperous middle income
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society. Yet, the supportive data is not necessarily locked in on this conclusion. Berenschot
(2018) noted that clientelist bargains deepened the more that middle class groups were dependent
on the state for rents and transfers. I concur with this assessment and extrapolate further by
arguing that the middle class is likely to accede to party clientelism and corrupt bargains for
public services and goods when the state management of the economy is high. This makes
buying off the middle class more affordable but so do the lack of alternatives which inhibit the
credibility of options for voters to exit from the deal or voice their displeasure.
This is not a standalone factor. Taken together with the vulnerabilities experienced by
CEE middle class groups and their lack of organizational capacity, it becomes more apparent
why some political options might produce an underwhelming effect or even be punished. In such
instances, the middle class may turn their preferences towards those who advocate for
monopolistic control rather than those who advocate for political competition. As Hirschman
argues (Hirschman 1970,), when exit has decreased in expediency or effectiveness, further
reliance on market competition may only deliver lower quality services. By regarding democracy
as an open and competitive market, middle class voters may in turn sell their votes for illiberal
solutions because they may view competition as an inefficient method for delivering the policies
they want. For instance, in 2021 the Prime Minister of Poland’s promised “a middle class for all”
along with selective tax schemes in their favor and did so in conjunction with constitutional
reforms that better secured his party’s future dominance (Reuters Staff 2021).
Paternalistic elites who link themselves to the plight of the middle class often take on an
anti-ideational quality and express a more personalistic approach instead. In CEE countries
clientelizing elites are typically aligned towards anti-communist stances and motivated by short
term economic goals. These types of parties gain political support when the more traditional
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programmatic parties lose popular appeal when levels of corruption exceed their traditional
levels (Engler 2016). Populist parties avail themselves to social groups who feel dispossessed
and vulnerable. In extreme cases, the linkages from demand-side populism and elite response
have been a cultural backlash and rejection of liberal norms and attitudes (Owczarek 2017). The
demand for illiberal politics has been shown to be quite potent among CEE voters when
controlling for policies regarding anti-immigrant attitudes and Euroscepticism (Zagórski and
Santana 2021).
Loyalty motivates and organizes groups in relation to the goods and services that can be
offered by parties offering such payouts. Per this argument, I establish a stream of loyalties
which run from the middle class to the main determinants of the economy which are exchanged
by political parties for votes. Even when markets and the state offer alternative potential paths,
middle class groups are coerced to opt-in when access to public services and goods can be
artificially limited. Such systems are likely to be polarized between firm- or state-loyal middle
class groups with much lower costs for joining and defecting between organizations. In these
cases, support can be used to reward or punish by issuing goods and services or by withholding
them. The cost of purchasing loyalty is also driven down by polarization because the entire
group’s loyalty is unavailable to be bargained for. Instead, only a section of the population is
likely to be coerced into supporting a political organization’s predatory behavior (Clark, Golder,
and Golder 2017). Vulnerability to a loss of access to goods and resources is especially salient in
scenarios of possible exit choice and polarization.
We should assess seams of loyalty by the thickness of reciprocity within clientelistic
relationships. Where there is competition between parties or even between the state and markets
then reciprocity and obligations will be thinner. Opportunities to renege on obligations will be
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too plentiful in these systems and clientelistic practices will change as well. When those
opportunities are neutralized, either because of historical or institutional events, the likelihood of
defection decreases, and reciprocity relationships will be much thicker and more personalistic.
Clientelism along with corrupt behavior are more likely to pay off in these systems because
relationships are more likely to be transfixed and hardened to nonmarket contexts.
Finally, one must consider the credibility of exit threats by loyalist groups when such
threats are credible in the absence of class vulnerability. The threat of exit by supporters is
estimated to have an effect on tempering the actions of an organization and reshaping them to
better fit the needs of the client (A. Hirschman 1970, 82). The response of the organization is to
change or continue its behavior. This is likewise linked to how dependent that organization is on
that group’s loyalty (Clark, Golder, and Golder 2017). If the middle class is a potent tool for state
capture, then so too could party dependence on that support be exploited. Central and Eastern
European parties play into this discourse and orient their policies towards middle class issues
which indicates some measure of loyalty dependence. For example, these parties often attempt to
elevate the status of families, educational resources, and tax breaks centered around middle class
constituents (Szántó 2021).
3.6. Between the Market…
The vulnerability of constituent groups has allowed for political parties and elites to exploit their
access to state resources in order to lower the cost of engaging in clientelism with the middle
class. The power of the state has been in ascendency since the 2000s as CEE parties gain more
authority and subsequently more control over the economy. The growth of institutional control
over the economy has been in proportion to the politicization of capitalism for electoral gain
(Dolfsma and Grosman 2019). The analysis here is that state-capitalism and state capture work
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hand in glove when clientelizing a middle class constituency. However, private firms have also
come into a particular status in some Central and Eastern European countries that provides
access to resources and status through private employment opportunities.
In CEE countries, there has been two overarching themes for firms when considering a
comparative capitalist framework. The first is that firms are largely dependent on external capital
(Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009). Their dependency on foreign capital has been described in
vigorous terms by scholars who advocate that dependent capitalism as a valid archetype for
understanding Central and Eastern Europe. CEE countries lack capital and their labor-intensive
economies have made them an ideal location for export-oriented investment since the late 1990s.
This trend should shift over time as CEE countries lose their investment edge but the continued
reliance on foreign capital has made economic prosperity increasingly inconsistent (Wiliñski
2012). Government management of the economy has gained traction as an alternative to
dependent capitalism instead.
Beyond international firm dependencies, scholars have also identified a general
weakening in the organizational capacity of firms in Central and Eastern Europe (Feldmann and
Morgan 2021). Rapid deregulation and the dispersion of capital during the collapse of
communism and the subsequent liberal transformations undid much of the potency of local
interfirm coordination and their mechanisms. The attention paid to the neoliberal organization of
markets and the imposition rule of law institutions has decreased the need for firms to organize
against the state (Kurlantzick 2016) For one, the reduction of the state’s regulatory capacity to
oversee market functions meant there was very little to bargain over as a result. The increased
focus on short term gains and maximization of shareholder value has created a collective action
problem for interfirm cooperation (Feldmann and Morgan 2021, 4). This dispersion of the
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organized firm and their weakened capacity to challenge state encroachment has become a
central theme in the re-etatization of state capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe.
The evolution of markets outside of society’s control and the problems that go along with
it are argued to be one of the main triggers of crisis and vulnerability (Dolfsma and Grosman
2019). Firms will try to harness their full market potential while simultaneously using the
government as a tool to secure that position. This has the potential to generate corporatist
feedback loops. As I have argued, the middle class have responded to the crisis associated with
deregulated market capitalism to exchange votes for rents and resource that are within a party’s
sphere to trade. When firms are a powerful enough force in the economy, the amount of
management over the economy is likewise diminished.
The exertion of political monopoly over the forces of the market have allowed some CEE
governments to subjugate more political authority to their parties and the leadership who wield
regulatory and fiscal policy to shape market outcomes (Szanyi 2019, 8). I argue that the state’s
domination of the economic is the main determinant of the middle class clientelism because it
trades the independence of middle income earners for corrupt side transfers. To borrow a phrase
from McMann (McMann 2012, 28), it destroys the ‘personal economic autonomy’ of the citizen.
It allows parties to buy off voters with the largesse of the state and encourages them to punish
those who challenge their authority with economic reprisals.
3.6.1. …And the State
The spread of neoliberal liberal policy in Central and Eastern Europe saw the balance of the
economy tip towards firms as the main arbiter of prosperity in the 1990s. This was theorized to
be a supporting bulwark for economic growth and societal modernization. Neoliberals have
argued business interests act as a kind of glue between prosperity and society without interfering
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directly with government function (Barnes and Hall 2013). This is in contravening expectation to
those arguments by scholars, like Miliband (Miliband 1969), who proposed that the extended
reach of business’s resources and influence makes them a more potent threat to democratic
processes. Nonetheless, the retreat of the state in the early 1990s shared a similar fate to that of
labor power as international and domestic firms became more influential at the cost of national
sovereignty (Barnes and Hall 2013). In CEE countries, the initial process of liberalization
underwent a reversion in some instances as the state expanded its governmental authority over
the levers of economic power.
The status of government in comparative political economy is typically restricted to the
function of institutions and regulatory control. The reduction of state interference in the market
after the collapse of communism was considered to be the beginning of a regulatory race to the
bottom in order to influence capital and investment decisions (Cerny 1994; Strange 1996). The
VoC’s firm-centric approach likewise emphasized government’s invalidity. Business
relationships would now be the main manager of market and non-market coordination. In
coordinated market economies, the government involves itself as the enforcer of compliance and
rule building between businesses and labor demands rather than manager of the economy.
Schmidt (2009) rightly pointed out the fallacy of consigning government’s potential to influence
markets to the background of economic theory. Government’s influence over their own capitalist
systems in Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern and Central Europe has reaffirmed the utility
of ‘bringing the state back in’ was necessary to the discussion of capitalist typologies (Schmidt
2009, 12).
The estimation of the state’s management of economic matters in CEE countries had
been described as neo-corporatist since the late 1990s (Iankova 1998). The presence of the state
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in economic functions is a hold-out from the communist era when the commanding heights of
the economy was managed exclusively by the Communist Party (Szanyi 2019). Rapid
deregulation and divestment by the state from its economic responsibilities fell into increase
tension with firms whose motivations were focused on maintaining the deregulatory state in
Central and Eastern Europe. In constrained democracies, the reversion back to state domination
of the economy was swifter. This has been argued to be a function of the continued unequal
distribution of capital in those societies that have produced a higher demand for state interference
in the economy (Becker and Vasileva 2017). Meanwhile, democracies in decline have
experienced a resurgence of state-capitalism in competition with the continued presence of
competitive firms. As such, a hybridization of economic deregulation and close state
management of the economy has occurred in these countries.
In hybridized economies there is less informational certainty for societal actors to make
decisions. State-capitalism selects economic winners and losers as a solution to this discrepancy,
but private companies are less able to. This creates countervailing pressure in the shadow of
crisis as the uncertainty of the market bleeds over onto middle class workers. In this case,
uncertainty presses both present and future economic concerns for the middle class. I argue that
in such instances, polarization is likely to occur between groups who compete to gain access to
resources and to maintain their status as the ‘winners’ of that society. Personalistic and populist
parties are both the cause and consequence of this feature whose presence creates an
environment of noisy politics. Parties seek to harness the economy for their own constituent’s
benefit against the counter forces who wish to untether it (Feldmann and Morgan 2021).
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3.7. The Primacy of State Control
State encroachment on the modes of capitalism is a puzzling occurrence. Capitalist systems
reflect their propensity to protect property and freedom on a contractual basis within a rationallegal system of laws and institutions. Yet, the expansion of free market ideology into Central and
Eastern Europe has brought about an acceleration of state dominion over their own markets.
Changes towards state-centered capitalism is a function of a political landscape that makes
transformative-market processes much more likely to be captured by neopatrimonial elites.
These individuals will then insulate themselves within the institutions that they’ve hijacked via
state capture. The condition of constrained democracy reflects a nature of state of capitalism in
which the government dominates all aspects of the economy while firms and labor have very
little room to strategize or organize in opposition. High levels of state management of the
economy will be the result. I refer to these as state primacy economic systems. The costs to coopt
the electorate is comparably less than reward of state capture that is on offer which makes
incumbent neopatrimonial and clientelistic relationships with constituencies like the middle class
more cost effective to procure.
Becker and Vasileva (2017) conceptualized an expansion of capitalist typologies that
placed state managed capitalism front and center in their analysis. They refer to this system as
‘patrimonial capitalism’ as it is dominated by neopatrimonial systems. The word neopatrimonial
purposefully calls to mind Weber’s (1972) classifications of authority.33 It adapts these
classifications to better reflect the mutated amalgamation of modern governments who use
personalistic ties and close networks of affiliation to ascribe clientelistic rewards for those

33
Weber’s (1972) classification of authority evoked the manners of accepted power and could compel
consent by all elements of a society. The three forms of leadership he argued were rational-legal, traditional, and
charismatic and personalistic. Weber theorized that legal-rational authority was the outgrowth of the modern state
who derived its authority from law, bureaucracy, and the power of the office.
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deemed as loyal subjects. The term gained increased traction in the development literature as a
way of referring to states that relied on traditional and paternalistic connections while using a
rational-legal authority as a means to gain legitimacy (Eisenstadt 1973). This type of functional
legitimacy is a façade for its corrupt practices. Neopatrimonialism has gained a negative
connotation over the years of scholarship as it has been associated with the modern notion of the
predatory state or the failed developmental country (Bach 2011; Kohli 2004).
The emergence of the neopatrimonial state in post-communist societies has produced
some debate amongst scholars. The coercive power of the government was a relic of the
communist era and so any development and reform during the 1990s had to contend with an
already strong state which did not want to relieve itself of its economic responsibilities (Becker
and Vasileva 2017). This led to a less profound distribution of resources during marketization
and an even more skewed society with a new set of dominant elites on top and very little society
left in the middle. However, this argument leaves out further scrutiny of the state capture process
and implies that strong states are all it takes for parties to seize power. The divergent quality of
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe confounds this argument as all CEE countries had
similarly strong states going into their liberal transition. Instead, I argue that the state’s coercive
power over the economy was a result of the weakened status of labor and the failure of firms to
emerge as a potential counterbalance. This gave elites an opening to pave the way for partyfusion with the state by way of middle class constituent support.
Firms may fail to emerge as a viable alternative in these economies due to the chain of
events in how liberalization occurs. In cases where high polarization is present, information
asymmetries prevailed (Frye 2010). This leads to a highly politicized reform processes and a
higher likelihood that reform will be captured by self-interested elites because the costs for
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winning and losing are debilitatingly high (Frye 2002; Rodrik 1996). In accordance with the
theory, the middle class voters remain quiescent and even supportive of those elites who corrupt
the process because their options are also limited. Exit and voice offer very low payoffs in this
system unless there are alternatives to rally behind. Furthermore, voicing one’s support for an
alternative candidate is dangerous because winners and losers are not yet been determined.
Lastly, low organized labor capacity keeps collective action costs high for those with less
political resources at their disposal.
The state’s primacy over society allows it to control most aspects of the economy and
their network of clientelistic goods and services creates stronger bonds of loyalty amongst their
cadre of supporters. Even the middle class, who should be a bulwark against the corrupt practices
of selective patronage, will buy into this system when it supports their position in a social
hierarchy. As such, economic dependence on the state will encourage further state capture and
lead to a dependent relationship which makes challenging this new status quo difficult. The risk
of losing one’s livelihood overcomes any sense of voting or protesting for liberal freedoms or
policies. Instead, it is more likely to induce workers and businesses to signal their loyalty and
maintain their good relations with the government (Feldmann and Morgan 2021). Participation in
corruption is one way of signaling loyalty in this case as dyadic reciprocity will be much thicker
given its dependent structure. Parties do not have to control all aspects of the economy, just
enough to overcome the costs of vote buying and lower the odds of defection. However, this may
be a double-edged sword as it can impair future rents and drive up clientelism costs in the long
run (Shchukin and Arbatli 2022). In this case, it becomes important to keep middle income
patrons depressed, receptive, and cheap.
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A state driven market economy reflects an equilibrium of weak labor and weak firm
organizational capacity. Instead, the economy is monopolized by the government. The
government has access to control firms through regulation, corruption and patronage, financial
controls, and industry dominating state owned enterprises (SOEs). This results in a coercive
control of capital which produces an environment wherein private competitors are entirely
restricted by both formal and informal obligations (Kurlantzick 2016). The limited options for
exit and voice are conducive for the middle class as an option for vote buying without fear of
party switching or reneging on the state capture bargain. I expect that these arrangements will
make the middle class much cheaper to buy off and allow parties and elites to coordinate state
capture effectively. Democracy will be highly constrained as lack of alternatives will prevent
defection to other political alternatives.
3.8. The Hybridized State-Market Control
When the state has a monopoly of economic coercion within a country, a vulnerable middle class
can be a useful survival weapon for parties to enlarge their control over the machinations of the
government. However, a much less destructive response occurs when neither states nor firms
have a dominant position in society. In CEE countries that experienced full transition to
democracy in the 1990s, independent firms had a much more significant role in promoting the
future of markets. The recent re-etatization of markets within the market has challenged this
position and strengthened governments coercive power over and firms. It has also given elites
and parties more to bargain with for power. However, the state’s management of the economy
may not be as fully potentiated in all cases. In some cases, private companies and corporations
provide a valid alternative and counterbalance. I refer to these systems as hybrids as they possess
both strong market and state-capitalist institutions and represent mid-level SMotE.
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Hybrid market economies represent a blend of “small private local firms co-existing with
large state-owned enterprises in the dominant command economy environment” (Rapacki et al.
2020, 582). In these systems there is a balance of liberal market coordination with an increased
mixture of state command of the economy. The fragile balance between the two implies an
ongoing oscillation between the private and public economy with neither able to gain total
dominance. This fluctuation follows patterns electoral outcomes and party preferences. Those
parties that promote the state do so as an inside challenger as it does not seek to supplant neoliberal markets but, rather, to gain influence over it (McNally 2013). Politicians do not seek to
undermine private property rights or the modes of neo-liberal prosperity but only to apply
enough pressure to make it work for their constituents (Szanyi 2019).
Economies that comingle statism and liberal markets often do so inefficiently (Baboš
2010; Iankova 1998). Despite the intentions of CEE politicians to angle for more power of the
economy to benefit their prospects, additional infringement creates more tension because using
the state to coordinate more aspects of the economy comes at a steep cost to private businesses
(H. Schneider 2012). What emerges is a conflict over interests and resources. Firms are pressed
with their own decisions to either support or exit the system. Local businesses are more likely to
be subjected and constrained to act as they lack a viable exit strategy while multinational firms
will be much more resistant. This tension will also likely create loyalty challenges for domestic
businesses with attendant spillover effects onto their workforce (Feldmann and Morgan 2021).
The conflict between private firms and governments has compelled some scholars to rethink
the nature of the state’s position in deciding market outcomes and how it may affect vulnerable
constituencies (Dolfsma and Grosman 2019). For instance, governments can use fiscal policy as
a limited coercion tool to balance their rule of law obligations with popular demands for more
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redistribution. When a party seeks to bypass this function of the state and go straight to popular
redistributive demands democratic conditions will begin to suffer. Parties engage in corrupt
practices like welfare capture as a means to reward political loyalties and bypass institutional
constraints (Cerami and Stubbs 2011).
The strain to decipher winners and losers as the public and private economic spheres
clash will create a polarization effect. While international firms may have the luxury of exiting
from these systems, exit does not necessarily rebalance the disequilibrium that compels the
conflict (Hirschman 1970). In some instances, it may make the matter worse by encouraging
polarization in the electorate when there are fewer countervailing voices. The middle class will
be split in their loyalties between political actors who promote state-capitalism and those
politicians who may promote private firms as both have potential to generate status and material
advantage. Reciprocity will be much thinner, and corruption will have less utility in this system.
However, governments have a monopoly on several keyways to gain support for their causes.
They can use welfare, political patronage, and speak directly to the masses. Political access to
SOE boards and executive positions gives political leaders leverage over employees within the
realm of state-managed businesses which further exacerbates private-public competition.
Political parties that have capitalized on the state’s moderate access to resources and
management of its economic affairs are able to target the middle class for support. However,
without total access and a potentially adversarial relationship with private enterprise the costs to
coopt the middle class remains higher than if parties had complete access to the complete
treasury. Voters can, likewise, defect quite easily between alternative parties that can meet their
interests without leading to destructive state capture outcomes. Therefore, political parties that
offer clientelistic packages must be more discriminating to lower the overall costs associated
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with capturing middle class voters. High costs produced by exit (alternatives) and voice
(competition) makes for a less democratically fraught environment. Democracy will not be
constrained in this case but erode when parties are able to activate clientelistic linkages to their
advantage by finding ideal constituencies in the middle class. Moderate amounts of party control
over the economy are likely to produce more polarization which could then invoke higher levels
of state capture, increase SMotE, and heighten strategic dependence between patron and clients
even further.
3.9. The Primacy of Market Control
Most CEE countries embraced neoliberal policies and reform in the aftermath of the Soviet
Union’s collapse, but few were able to fully develop firm-centered solutions to the problems that
may be incurred by free markets (Feldmann 2006). These systems represent the least amount of
SMotE although they are not completely bereft of governmental oversight. I refer to these
countries as market primacy systems. They are noted by their deconstruction of the regulatory
state and how they embraced foreign firm investments as essential to economic success. As a
result, these market-oriented states tend to respond to crisis by favoring further deregulation and
fiscal incentives in order to maintain economic growth (Feldmann 2017). Low levels of
government access to the economy produce very few clientelistic offers from parties and elites
who may seek to capitalize on vulnerabilities in their constituencies. Instead, parties are more
likely to promote market-based solutions to social problems like employment and wages.
Due to their preference for attracting foreign investments by making themselves more
appealing to international industry, these market economies are closely associated with FDI and
dependent market economies (Fainshmidt et al. 2018). Such attachments make them vulnerable
to the problems associated with globalization and social inequalities. For one, there is a stronger
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propensity for unequal distributions of gains and wealth due to their over reliance on the market
which enhances the middle class’s fragile position. Despite this weaker position, these states still
offer welfare packages akin to their hybrid neighbors. However, the guarantee of welfare
promises contained in their social pacts are also more exposed as social spending is more likely
to suffer from austerity measures during times of crisis (Feldmann 2017).
Therefore, the middle class is not immune in these economies which has developed
vulnerabilities in the wake of state abdication of market responsibilities in favor of private
business coordination. Yet, popular demands for patronage due to deregulation, even in the
aftermath of crisis, is underwhelming. During the Great Recession, the market-centered
economies in Central and Eastern Europe promoted some of the steepest austerity measures on
the continent. The Baltic governments were especially aggressive and cut wages and welfare
payments at extreme rates. The reduction prompted many citizens in these countries to accuse
their governments of reneging on their social commitments and obligations (Feldmann 2017).
However, their dependence on foreign financing and investment meant that there was a likewise
dearth of domestic bailouts and countercyclical management of the economy.
Despite some vocal reactions, such policies did not generate much in the way of counter
mobilization. In Estonia, for instance, the parties most associated with austerity won more seats
in the next election cycle. The mobilizations that did occur, came from state sector employees.
These were middle class workers like teachers who had suffered from the cutbacks. The
destruction of Estonian’s dependency on the government for economic solutions had clearly
tempered the effects political parties, competition, and clientelism. However, it is not from a lack
of agency on the part of Estonian citizens. The Estonians who mobilized in the teacher’s strike in
2012 were able to gain a round of concessions from the government in the form of wage
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increases for 2013. Overall, however, Estonia’s market primacy economy did not falter
throughout the crisis.
Countries with little SMotE provide very few resources that parties, and elites can use to
elongate their tenure through corrupt side transfers. Crisis may provide openings for political
leaders in other countries to abuse vulnerable constituencies, but it is very cost prohibitive to
clientelize the middle class in market primacy systems. In Estonia’s case, politicians upon firms
more responsibility over the market while demoting the government’s own obligations. This
affords business interests a fair amount of leverage over the economy and the directions it may
go. A fact that even financial crisis could not deter.
Middle class workers promote voice in politics and exit between individual firms and
sectors as a viable strategy for maintaining their economic standing in society. The lack of state
involvement in the economy is a result of the institutional oversight and good governance
procedures that act as a counterbalance against the weight of foreign and domestic firms. I
hypothesize that when state management of the economy is low, state capture will be low. This is
the case even when crisis destabilizes the middle class and creates a possible voting block to
patronize. Parties will be unable to capitalize on such groups as the cost to coopt will be beyond
the capture capacity of the state’s resources.
3.10.

Conclusion

I have presented a theory of middle class clientelism that explains democratic outcomes in
Central and Eastern Europe. I theorize that the clientelization of the middle class is predicted by
the capture capacity of the state and constituent vulnerabilities of that group. The state’s capture
capacity is determined by the level of state management of the economy which ranges from
minimal to maximal levels. Middle class vulnerability is reflected in their material losses in the
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aftermath of financial crises and growing rates of inequality. The destruction of organized labor
also adds to their vulnerability status and places them in a constrained state of strategic
dependence whereby the state’s resources become a useful shield against. State capture can occur
when parties and enterprising elites take advantage of middle class vulnerabilities by
clientelizing them as a group and redistributing resources of the state to secure their loyalty and
support. The availability of alternatives for middle class patrons alters this calculus by making
defection more or less of a possibility.
These arrangements are grouped with the outcomes of constrained, retrograde, and
functional democracies. The failure of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe is due to state
capture by parties who have coopted the middle class. When SMotE is high along with a
vulnerable middle class then state capture and middle class clientelism is likely to be the
outcome. The lack of alternatives lowers the costs of clientelizing the middle class and ensures
future support for the party. Consistent party domination ensures state capture is thorough and
complete to the point that competition both electorally and economically is constrained.
Moderate levels of SMotE produces a polarization effect as the costs of buying off the middle
class are lower but there are fewer resources for parties to redistribute. Targeted clientelism will
be the most effective tool in this case which increases polarization and contestation between
private companies and the government.
The presence of alternatives cannot prevent state capture by dominant parties unless
consistently challenged during each election cycle. However, this prospect declines over time.
When parties gain more control over the state in exchange for patronizing middle income
citizens, democracy will erode. Finally, when the state has very little control over the economy
political parties cannot target the middle class because it becomes cost prohibitive to do so.
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Instead, they will engage in institutional provisions that ensure competition and politically
counterbalance against prolific interests in the electorate and a competitive marketplace.
From this point, the dissertation delves into the empirical elements that test the hypotheses of
this paper. When SMotE is a monopoly, we should see middle class coordination with political
elites and state capture as a result. It will disassociate with democratic ideals and become
dependent on their patron’s government for their own social wellbeing. In this case, I examine
how Russia emerged from its democratic and liberal market transition into the statist and
neopatrimonial economy it is today. The corruption of its transformation as it dealt with crises,
vulnerable constituent groups, and clientelistic practices explains why it continues to persist as a
constrained democracy.
Next, I explore how the confluence of highly organized firms and state-capitalism leads to an
environment rife with polarized contestation and challenges. The middle class is less cost
effective to buy off in this case as there are alternative opportunities for status maintenance and
elevation which will raise the cost of buying loyalty. In this case, parties must effectively target
patronage to prospective buyers. I utilize the Polish case to uncover the relationships between
economic and political polarization that occurs when parties attempt to patronize the middle
class. The result is a clash between state-capitalism and corporate interests. This competitive
inconsistency has given rise to retrograde democracy with the recent domination and
proliferation of populist parties.
Finally, I use Estonia to elaborate how state-capitalism is not the only dominant aesthetic
present in Central and Eastern Europe. This emergent liberal economy has maintained its
democratic status and possesses very little in the way of economically motivated polarization.
The state has given way, even in the face of crisis and vulnerability, to market solutions and
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high-capacity, private companies. Estonia’s social cleavages are represented by tensions between
ethnolinguistic minorities and ethnic Estonians rather than as an economic clash.
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4. RUSSIA
The emergence of state primacy capitalism in Russia was a graduated process that occurred over
the span of twenty years. In this time, the country transformed from a socialistic command
economy to one driven by governmental overwatch of quasi free markets. A cyclical revolution
from state control back to state control. Over the course of several crises, political leadership in
the Russian government was able to gain more and more control over the whims of the economy
by satisfying key constituent needs. In conjunction with this, the Russian middle class’s
dependence on the state’s management of the economy would become more deeply entrenched.
Elite political corruption fed into those dependence by deepening its clientelistic reach into the
middle class. As a result, Russia emerged from its liberal revolution in 1993 as a country that
never fully embraced the core tenets liberalism.34 Along with these momentous events in
Russia’s history, middle class clientelism coevolved with the rise of Russian political parties who
used their access to the government’s ever-increasing control over the market for their own
political gain.
Russia represents a tale of two transformations. Its first transformation was the initial
neoliberal reform processes undertaken even while the communist party was still in power. The
communist government’s embrace of outside party competition would be its undoing in the end,
but it would not immediately dissolve away. During this transformation, Russia experienced a
complete collapse of its GDP and monetary stability. Many citizens lost wages, and their savings
as consumer goods prices skyrocketed. Through a series of reforms, the government was able to
gain more leverage to right the economic downturn and what emerged was a corrupt bargain
between a new set of business elites and an ideologically polarized government. Despite this,

34

Those tenets of liberalism being strong support for individually driven free market and the legal
protections of private property.
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Russia entered a decade of prosperity after the unexpected electoral victory of Vladimir Putin
and the emergence of a new political party bloc, the United Russia Party, which dominates to this
day.
Despite gains for the middle class in the 2000s, high levels of economic and social
inequality emerged as wealth became more unevenly distributed. Greater pressure was placed on
Russia’s government to interfere more in market activities leading to more restrictions on firms
and more middle class dependence. Today, Russians are left with few alternatives for market
solutions outside of working with, or for, the government. The affordability of clientelizing the
middle class has led to a reciprocal dependency effect on the continued domination of United
Russia and weak democratic attitudes in the country. This dependence is not just a tale of state
sector employment, but one of loyalty and lack of credible strategic choices for voters.
Throughout this chapter, I emphasize the escalating nature of a narrow set of Russian
political actors whose control over economic forces has widened and hardened throughout the
years. I demonstrate this with the use of economic data and several primary and secondary
source analysis which shows the influence Russia’s government has gained over their economy
through the promotion of clientelism and corruption. Such gains came at the cost of private firms
and business capacity who lost a great deal of autonomy alongside organized labor in the 1990s.
Putin’s policies in the 2000s led to an ever-increasing nexus of loyalty between the middle class
and support for his party’s illiberal rulership. I place a heavy emphasis on the use of polling data
from several sources to show how middle class attitudes developed and how they conform to the
middle class clientelism thesis. Furthermore, I show how state capture has entrenched over the
years which has given way to a neopatrimonial economy that has the support of compensated
middle class voters.

129
4.1. Russia: A Tale of Two Transformations
The transformation of Russia after communism was quite dynamic. While many CEE countries
experienced variable rates of transition towards liberalism, Russia’s liberal path was less direct
and led indirectly towards state capture. This is because Russia went through a series of reforms,
financial and economic destabilizations, and eventual economic re-etatization. These processes
were nearly always dominated by elite leadership and the promotion of patron-clientelism. The
results of this transition took nearly twenty years to codify into its current political system.
During this time, organized labor was largely deconstructed, managerial elites formed the new
basis of patron-clientelism that would function as the heart of Russia’s economy, and the state
was able to reabsorb the commanding heights of commerce while still maintaining the illusion of
free market capitalism. I determine that Russia, starting in 1990, experienced two
transformations. One of attempted liberalism and one of state capture through state-capitalism
that shut out alternative economic influencers. What resulted was the dominance of the state in
economic matters and a middle class whose interests were beholden to the new status quo.
Russia’s exit from communism produced a legitimate attempt to democratize and open up
its economy Carothers 1997). Despite this honest attempt, the process was largely captured by
elites as a result of the methods used to liberalize. High levels of polarization in society and the
country’s legislature created moments of contradiction and confusion which was exploited by
enterprising elites. Reformers in the legislature were motivated to ensure that the changes to the
economy would be permanent while the lingering presence of the communist party threatened to
roll back those changes after every election. The collateral damage of this collision between
liberals and old guard communists was an economic collapse due to aggressive marketization
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and a new set of business owning elite that became increasingly reliant on the state to confirm
their new status.
The manner in which liberalization proceeded was tied to state assurances that were often
contradictory. The ruling government would continue to offer support to its new economic and
political elites while likewise promising to elevate the living standards of the middle class.
Russian political leadership often did not differentiate between the two. In fact, they often tied
their survival together in both legal policy and corrupt insider deals with multiple tiers of the
population (Cook and Dimitrov 2017). One way this was done was through privatization or
selling off state assets. A procedure that led to asset appropriation by a few wealthy individuals
(Becker and Vasileva 2017, 89).
The second Russian transformation was the result of the close associations between
regime insiders and inflamed corrupt patron-clientelistic practices. These practices had continued
largely unabated from the communist system and were aggravated when free markets were
introduced. The domination of the United Russia Party and Putin’s electoral victories diminished
much of the legislative and mass polarization of the 90s. In its place was a more unified
government that was focused on stability and enhanced state coercive power through state-party
fusion. The government-business pipeline was further reinforced as Russian leadership embraced
state-capitalism throughout the 2000s and 2010s. What resulted was a system in which business
and government were near indistinguishable and entrepreneurial alternatives were crushed.
During these two transformations, the middle class experienced existential crises, twice.
First, during the decline of Russia’s living standards that hit the middle class considerably hard.
During this time of heightened polarization, however, middle class voters put themselves behind
then President Boris Yeltsin’s and his restructuring programs. The next crisis occurred after the
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Great Recession in 2008 as President Putin’s promises went unfulfilled and middle class futures
began to rapidly diminish. However, Russia had become too entrenched in its neopatrimonial
market economy and its system of patron-clientelism for any alternative parties to come along
and sweep away United Russia. The destruction of organized labor and the embeddedness of
unions into the party apparatus of United Russia made collective action and protest quite
impossible for the majority of Russian workers. Since the 2000s the middle class sees its fortunes
now with maintaining the neopatrimonial system with Putin at the head of the state.
4.2. The End of Communist Russia
The end of communist rule was as abrupt as it was dramatic. Communists had proliferated
Central and Eastern Europe since World War II and had come to define the majority of post war
politics in the region. In the case of Russia, or the Russian Soviet Federative Soviet Republic as
it was known at the time, the process of liberalization, market reform, and competitive politics
had its start in the 1980s. Growing dissatisfaction in the USSR’s ability to keep up with
persistent Western economic growth had entreated a host of liberalizing reforms from the newly
appointed General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. What followed was a series of events that
unraveled all of the Socialist Republics and the catalyst for a proliferation of new governments in
its wake.
Mikhail Gorbachev was a proponent for much needed reforms within the Soviet Union.
Indeed, Gorbachev’s rise to fame in the Soviet Union was centered around his support for the
destalinization process that occurred after Stalin’s death in 1953 when the new General
Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev’s, rolled back the communist party’s more violent and coercive
excesses. In 1985, Gorbachev sought to implement greater personal freedoms, allow political
parties to organize, and abandoned large tracts of the old soviet economic model (Evans 2011,
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44). The most famous of his policies were perestroika (“reconstruction”) and glasnost (“openness
and clarity”). With these policies Gorbachev set in motion a demand for liberalization and the
political room to enable it. While there were several other exogenous effects that spurred the
decline of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev’s policies were noted for providing the political space
for these forces to undermine the capacity of the soviet system.35
Events came to a head by 1990 for Russia. Gorbachev’s tolerance of organized informal
groups around non-communist interests had given rise to a formidable liberal movement known
as Democratic Russia.36 One of the main figureheads of the Democratic Russia movement was a
former Communist Party member Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin, like Gorbachev, was a reformer. He had
risen through the ranks of Communist party in support of Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms but
quickly became disillusioned with the gradualist scale of their implementation. Instead, Yeltsin
staunchly advocated for nothing short of multiparty representative democracy (Carothers 1997).
His popularity surged with his role as critic to the Gorbachev regime. However, he gained
premier dominance in Russian politics when he became the first member in history to resign
from the Politburo in protest in the late 80s.37
By 1990, events were now beyond the control of the Politburo. Russia had declared itself
sovereign and beyond the dictates of the USSR and was joined by the Baltic states, Ukraine, and
Armenia. Yeltsin’s protest movement had gained him the seat as chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the Russian SFR. He then won the election to become the first president of the Russian

There is an extensive literature that seeks to identify and explain the main causes of the USSR’s collapse.
For more detail as to some of these causes, I recommend: Strayer. Robert. 1998. Why did the USSR Collapse:
Understanding Historical Change. Oxfordshire: Routledge.
36
Democratic Russia was a collection of liberal activist groups in the Soviet Union that advocated for the
liberalization of Soviet politics, specifically in the Russian SFR.
37
The Politburo or the “Политическое бюро” was the Soviet Union’s main governing and policy making
apparatus since the October Revolution in 1917. While it was formally subordinate to the Central Committee, the
executive authority, by the 1980’s it was the de facto authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
35
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Federation in 1991. He won with 57% of the popular vote against the Communist Party’s pick
Nikolai Ryzhkov. Despite his strong showing at the polls, scholars have contended that Yeltsin’s
base support was hollow and never fully materialized after the election in 1991 (Evans 2011).
Nor was Yeltsin’s liberal reformist platform all that revolutionary at the time. Evans (Evans
2011) would go on to argue that the changes to the Soviet Union were inevitable given the
situation on the ground. He writes:
“…those who had specialized in the study of communist regimes warned that the postcommunist states would need to carry out radical economic and social changes as well as
sweeping political transformation” (44)
Despite the inevitability sentiment expressed by Evans, Russia’s headlong dive into
liberal reform could not appropriately be described as a simple march towards independence and
radical reforms. In 1991, economic collapse pressed hard across the Soviet Union with food and
goods quickly disappearing off of store shelves. The crisis came to a head with a coup in August
led by Communist Party hardliners who attempted to re-exert control over the breakaway
republics.38 The coup collapsed within days and with it, the entirety of the Soviet Union. Each
Socialist Republic was re-constitutionalized as an independent country and Russia becoming the
Russian Federation. However, that would not be the end of crisis, reform, or contestation for
political and economic power in Russia. Instead, it represented its transition towards
liberalization and the first stages of patron-clientelistic entrenchment.

38
The August Coup was an attempt by hardliners of the CPSU to recapture the breakaway territories of the
Soviet Union and wrestle control of power from Mikhail Gorbachev who was viewed by regime insiders as inept
and incapable of stopping the current crisis. An emergency committee was created, and several military units were
deployed in Moscow, but the coup gained little traction or popular support and was quickly dismantled in several
days.
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4.2.1. Russia’s Liberal Transformation
The process of liberalization in Russia can be described as corrupted from the start. Instead of
forging a new, economically independent society that marginalized state or business predation
and control, Russia’s transition rewarded a new set of enterprising elites while much of the
citizenry saw a substantial decline in their status and lifestyles. Reforms forged along by shoring
up of patron-clientelistic ties despite popular backlash. The Russian middle class, in the
capitalistic sense, had yet to be fully formed but there was already the beginnings of rumblings
and popular discontent split along nascent class lines. In spite of this, Yeltsin moved ahead with
his sweeping reforms.
Despite the mounting popular sentiment for change since the 1980s, the policies that were
implemented were essentially organized in top-down fashion with an eye towards effectuating
asset capture by a new set of economic elites. Russian oligarchs, as they came to be identified,
were able to eke out more and more control over state owned assets as the boundaries of Soviet
control withdrew.39 They were composed mostly of those in managerial positions which gave
them leverage and insider access for asset purchases and also gave them connections to political
elites. While the behavior was encouraged by the vestiges of Soviet corruption, this new
economic class was able to use their insider knowledge on the changes in policies and access to
state-owned firms to secure more resources in tandem with state action rather than in spite of it.
The emergence of these new economic elites was not the sole invention of Yeltsin, either.
They had been an ongoing and quickly ascendant phenomenon since Gorbachev had

39
David Hoffman (Hoffman 2011) makes the argument of the rise of the Russian oligarchs as predicated on
the collapse of soviet control and its turn towards “rapacious capitalism”. However, the use of the word oligarch
implies rule by the few and, yet the Russian case was replete with extended asset grants and fire sales of entire
sectors targeted large swaths of the general population. The oligarchs, while powerful and influential, were still
dependent on state action to one, secure those new property rights, and two, guarantee that they wouldn’t be lost.
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implemented his initial reform policies. Economic reforms had allowed managerial elites to
procure deeper levels of control of the assets they were managing and allowed their economic
consolidation to reach new levels by the 1980s. This was especially the case as the oversight of
the Politburo had been aggressively curbed and allowed managers to operate more independently
during that period (Åslund 2006). In essence, Soviet managers in the 1980s had gained access to
insider ownership over state-owned firms without having to purchase them or own them directly.
The new class of oligarchs were not a continuation of the former old guard of Communist
Party leadership although they often operated within the same circles. Instead, they represented a
break from the old world of communist economics but with an eye towards maintaining
privileged accesses afforded by their nomenklatura rank. Yeltsin did not attempt to bridge his
reform policies with the old elite. Instead, he pushed for a break entirely with the old system and
its old masters. By breaking with the old guard, the reform process advocated for by Yeltsin
could push ahead without alternative inputs but at a serious cost. The old guard of the
Communist Party would eventually push back to reassert control and maintain their hegemony in
the Russian Federation. To not do so would see their once prosperous position in society be
perpetually reduced.
The resultant backlash of Yeltsin’s relentless reform pressure produced an environment
of intense polarization between the divesting communist elites and the newly invested reformists.
The level of polarization that existed between these two groups is important when considering
the next phase of liberal transformation and crisis that occurred in 1993. Coming just two years
after the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, a constitutional crisis had erupted on the streets of
Moscow which ended with over 100 people dead, and the last remnants of the soviet system
extirpated. In response to the economic reforms in 1992, financial instability had led the
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communist dominated legislature to try and oust, then president, Boris Yeltsin one last time. In a
historical turnabout, the Russian military backed Yeltsin and the remnants of the Soviet system
were swept away by a new, federal constitution. The elections that followed produced the
beginnings of Russia’s trudge towards democracy (Evans 2011).
The motivation to attack Yeltsin’s presidency was fueled by the loss of communist
hegemony and Yeltsin’s approach to marketisation. His over reliance on “shock therapy”
policies had induced a sharp and swift change to the old Soviet hierarchy, but it also destabilized
the economy. The economy shrank rapidly along with the livelihoods of most Russians. Tangible
capital and highly skilled workers began to flee abroad as a result of Russia’s now open
economy. Assets that did remain were stripped of valuables by their new owners during the first
round of voucher privatization. As privatization of Russia’s SOEs began to increase apace, firm
workers and managers were offered a dichotomous choice: seek outside purchasers or distribute
the shares of state-owned assets to workers and managers. Some 51%, chose the latter (Åslund
2006).
The effect of this process was extreme. Figure 4-1 presents a picture of the Russian
economy in the 1990s by considering of SOE percentages and GDP growth for the decade. 40
The share of state-owned enterprises went from nearly 90% in 1990 and quickly plummeted.
Large tracts of industry were sold off using the voucher system between 1992 and 1994 and
again during the Loan for Shares program in 1996. The voucher program was thought to be ideal
by leadership as open auctions were seen by the public as corrupt bargains between politicians

40
GDP Annual percent growth was provided by World Development Indicators and the World Bank
(World Bank 2022). SOE percent ownership data was provided by di Bella, Dynnikova, and Slavov (2019, 22) that
estimates SOE ownership using European Bank of Reconstruction and Development data. See their article for more
information on their methodology and approach.
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and the new Russian business elites. The retrenchment of state-owned assets finally led to
positive growth rates for Russia in 1999.

Figure 4-1 Russian GDP Growth and Share of SOEs
Vouchers acted as proxies for shares of Russia’s national wealth and were distributed
equally amongst the population. Yet the problems of wealth concentration persisted as the
managers of businesses found ways to pry away vouchers from workers. Workers were hindered
by misinformation, insider trading amongst elites, and the fungibility of the vouchers that made
them easily tradeable. To add to their troubles, Russia had entered a devastating depression and
had experienced a negative percent GDP growth since 1992. Desperate workers were more
motivated by short term survival rather than long term equity accrual and sold their voucher
shares in order to make ends meet. The end result was capital and firm ownership had collapsed
around a new set of business owners which were comprised of the former managerial class and
nomenklatura, nonetheless (Becker and Vasileva 2017).
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In the midst of growing dissatisfaction with the Yeltsin’s shock therapy policies and its
attendant depression Russian politics remained highly competitive. The legislative election in
1993, just months after the constitutional crisis, brought more contention to Russian politics. The
Russian legislature, or the State Duma and, to a lesser extent, the Federal Council, did not
produce parliamentary majorities for the liberal bloc. The increasingly unpopularity of rapid
privatization was beginning to challenge the consistency of Yeltsin’s reforms. The extent of
Russian political and social polarization emboldened opposition party leaders to act increasingly
intransigent and hostile towards Yeltsin’s reforms. Shock therapy was causing economic
instability and the Communist Party of Russia (CPRF) was able to capitalize on this uncertainty.
The CPRF was able to maintain a large 30 to 40 percent presence in the Duma throughout the
1990s with a platform in outright opposition to Yeltsin’s new policies (Frye 2010).
The events of the first wave of liberalization in Russia formed two effects. First, it produced
a corrupt exchange of state-owned firms between a small group of entrepreneurial, exploitive
elites and the reformist government led by Yeltsin. These new elites did not attempt to foster a
new business climate where firm competition was encouraged or attempt to disentangle their
codependence on Yeltsin’s government. Instead, events further encouraged their mutual
codependence. As will be seen below, the presidential election of 1996 and the Loans for Shares
program exacerbated the issue. Second, liberalization heightened distrust in the fledgling Russian
Federation and increased levels of polarization within the population and between politicians.
Destabilization will play an important role when analyzing popular and middle class responses
from the Russian citizenry moving forward. The stage was set for an economic system with weak
corporate independence from government authority. On top of that the decline of organized labor
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and a devastating economic depression led to a complicit middle class in Russian politics in the
1990s and 2000s.
4.3. The Decline of Organized Labor
Western academia was fairly convinced that Russia had begun a transition towards democracy in
the 1990s and the presidential election in 1996 marked the turning point for the country’s
democratic future (Evans 2011, 42). Elections had become the primary vehicle for distributing
political positions in the government and the rule of law was increasingly normalized in the
country (McFaul 2002). Although obvious flaws and inconsistencies persisted. A lack of
consensus between elites and the population on what Russia’s transformation should include
drove confusion and polarization (Bunce 2004). Within this nexus of confusion and polarized
hostility was the early machinations of a middle class that never truly materialized as
independent from government support. Even in the wake of crisis caused by one of the worst
depressions in the industrialized world, middle class Russians continued to vote for Yeltsin until
he resigned in 1999.
Positive accounts of Russia’s democratization have to be considered in tandem with
Russia’s economic decline. Many in the government and the population viewed the economy’s
tailspin with apprehension. Some went as far to term the destruction of the economy as
“economic genocide” of the Russian people (Bohlen 1992). In conjunction with the collapse of
Russian wages and their purchasing power, organized labor was also undone quite extensively.
What remained of the trade union movement in the Soviet Union fragmented and left workers to
suffer from currency deflation of currency and missing wages without collective recourse. In
comparison, Christensen (2017) estimates that industrial production in Russia fell by 60 percent
and light industry production fell by as much as 90 percent compared to pre-1991 levels. An
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obsolete Russian workforce was now exposed to external market pressures for the first time, and
they could not keep up.
The economic inequality created by the Yeltsin’s shock therapy was just as extensive. Up
until the 1990s, the Soviet Union was composed almost exclusively of ‘middle income’ workers
although Soviet citizens were unlike the middle class characterized by the market economies
(Alexeev and Gaddy 1993). They lacked access to goods and services outside of the
government’s distribution networks and they had little opportunity to rise to higher income
brackets because incomes were leveled off. In 1985, middle income workers in the Soviet Union
comprised over 70 percent of incomes in Russia and represented wages between 75 and 200
rubles a month. An additional 18 percent were below this threshold and represented itinerant
workers and pensioners. It was also estimated that less than 0.01% of the population earned over
400 rubles per month, or $356 in 1980’s US dollars (Department of Treasury 1985).
The earnings of Soviet citizens were highly structured which made the effects of
economic disenfranchisement and the “monstrous stratification” of Russian incomes in 1990s all
the more sensational (Grinberg 2012, 61). By 1992, the “the incomes of 10% of the population…
exceeded those of the least well off 10% by eight times” (Bodrunov 2017, 222). The seismic
shift over from public sector employment to the private sector was abrasive and rife with abuse
and infirmity. In short, Russian workers became “victims of the Washington Consensus” for
liberal reform and policy (Siegelbaum 2004). Labor protection that could have provided some
organizational support against such predations, but organized unions had melted away by this
point (Siegelbaum 2004). Payments for wages were often in the arrears and inconsistent. Only 18
percent of workers reported being paid on time and 57 percent indicated that they had not been
paid at all for the year of 1998 (Siegelbaum 2004, 645). What remained of the former strength of
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collectivization and organized trade unions was highly polarized and fractionated between
support or detraction from Yeltsin’s policies.
During the Soviet era, all labor organizations were organized under the powerful All
Union Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS).41 This council worked in tandem with the
Communist Party and emphasized near universal membership for all employees in the USSR.
Trade unions under the VTsSPS networked with the Communist Party and acted as an official
tool for collective labor to organize but only on behalf of the Communist Party (C. Chen and Sil
2006). The VTsSPS was eventually replaced by the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of
Russia (FNPR) in the early 1990s but was able to keep many of the same functions. Despite this,
trade union membership dropped precipitously. While membership had become a given during
the communist system, very few workers were actually motivated by collectivist ideologies to
remain as members during Russia’s transition (Siegelbaum 2004). As organized labor became
confederated, more and more fractures began to appear between pro-decentralization and procentralization forces.
The tripartite relationship between businesses, labor, and the government also became
highly contentious and muddled. For instance, the FNPR was typically organized in opposition
to Yeltsin’s reforms and was motivated to regain their loss of position in their association
between the state and labor. These organizations were highly disorganized as well as they were
pulled in many directions by agents who schemed for their own interests. The main forum for
negotiating labor-firm agreements was the Commission on the Regulation of Social and Labor
Relations (RTK) and this organization was split between pro and anti-reformer groups. The deep

The organization VTsSPS is the latinized abbreviation of “Всесоюзный центральный совет
профессиональных союзов” which was founded in 1918 and represented all the separate unions and workshops
within the Soviet Union until 1991.
41
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cracks of fragmentation within organized labor allowed Yeltsin’s government to gain even more
of an advantage in the ongoing negotiations for reform. As a result, Yeltsin was able to convert
his stronger position with the FNPR in order to gain several concessions. The FNPR would retain
much of its inherited resources from the VTsSPS in exchange for pledging fealty to Yeltsin’s
reform programs and also act to minimize worker protestations.
Society was not just divided in terms of which forces that organized labor should support
but was also highly fractionated along political lines. This political breakdown played out
between supporters for Yeltsin’s reforms and advocates for a return to communism. Support for
a return to communism seemed to be on the rise. Evidence for this was reflected in the legislature
at the time which had increased the size of communist bloc parties in the Russian parliament
after the 1995 legislative elections. The result of this increased polarization within both the polity
and the legislature added to the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the liberal reforms. The
winners in the business community that had gained the most from the reforms had grown
increasingly worried that the reforms that had given them access to the coveted resources of the
state could be undone in the future (Frye 2010). Yeltsin, for his part, was determined to institute
a reform process that could not be realtered once started. This led to continuous clashes between
reformers and anti-reformers in the communist bloc during the mid-1990s that boiled over during
the 1996 presidential election.
Economic destitution combined with uncertainty over which ideologies would overcome
the other had placed workers in a very tenuous position. Disagreements were found on nearly
every level. There was a lack of consensus within the population over what, if any, a new
economic system in Russia should even be or if the new system should reflect market capitalism.
All the while, the economic situation deteriorated. Despite an estimated 17 percent increase to
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salaries by 1990 due to the shift towards legal private companies and cooperatives, inflation had
far outpaced those gains at 230 percent by 1995. Unemployment was near 9 percent as well
(Mason and Sidorenko-Stephenson 1997). Along with the economic collapse came the
destruction of living standards as prices skyrocketed and supply dwindled.
Yeltsin spoke out that he was still hopeful in the development of a new, independent
middle class but the reality did not seem to reflect his words. The economic transformation that
was supposed to grow the middle class by creating millions of new property owners had instead
created a condensed cadre of elite owners of capital and the rest of the population mired in
economic collapse. The effects of the downturned economy were not uniform as the economic
reforms were leading to larger levels of social stratification within Russian society. Optimism for
the economy was stratified along these lines as well. Using the data from the 1996 Russian
Election Study by Colton and Zimmerman (2002), I broke down reported monthly income data
by quartiles to analyze which earners self-reported their experiences as the worsening or
improving after Yeltsin’s reforms. The charted lines in Figure 4-2 shows the probability an
individual’s ranking their family’s material condition in the past year as either “improved a lot”,
“improved a little”, “remained the same”, “worsened a little”, or “worsened a lot” by income
quartiles.42 The likelihood of low-income earners having a negative experience from the
economy is much higher than the inverse proposition. Only the highest quartile earners were
likely to declare that they saw economic improvements. Most telling was a 10% likelihood
increase for respondents who noted that their economic conditions did not change when moving
between income quartiles.
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Figure 4-2 Family’s Material Improvements Over a Year by Monthly Income Quartiles
What this data demonstrates is that there were very few positive experiences for the
economy in the year leading up to the election, yet lower income workers were clearly most
affected. They had the lowest experience of economic change that year. Meanwhile, higher
income earners were more likely to report that the economy “improved a little” but very few
stated the economy “improved a lot”. All aspects of Russian society were experiencing the
negative effects of an economic downturn. Still, the electoral prospects of Yeltsin would not bare
out the kinds of consequences one should expect from these results.
4.3.1. The 1996 Election
Support for Yeltsin had him trailing in the polls during the 1996 election campaign against his
communist rival, Gennady Zyuganov. Zyuganov and the Communist Party of Russia had not
made any attempts to bridge the divides that remained between reformers and hardliners and
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political polarization was high as a result of collaborative failures in the Duma (Frye 2010, 172).
The depressed economic conditions along with other shortcomings, like the failed Chechen War,
led many observers to discount Yeltsin’s prospects.

Figure 4-3 Second Round Vote Choice by Monthly Income Quartiles
The results from the 1996 presidential election astounded observers. Not only did Yeltsin
win after a second round of voting but received fourteen more points than Zyuganov in a turnout
of nearly 70% of eligible citizens. Breaking down the vote across incomes, Figure 4-3 shows the
probability of voters by income group. Much of Yeltsin’s vote support was centered in the new
middle and upper income earners.43 This data is from the 1996 Election Survey of Russia, and it
estimates the probabilities of which quartiles would vote for Yeltsin. At the low middle income
level, the vote split was approximately even. However, the upper middle and highest income
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earners were more likely to vote for Yeltsin in the second round of the election by a multitude
.68 and .78 times than for Zyuganov
Despite the downcast economic conditions, Yeltsin was able to capitalize on several
important electoral aspects within the middle class to gain an edge in the election. Mason and
Sidorenko-Stephensen (1997) explained that his success may have been the result of a disconnect
between real versus perceived decline by Russian voters at the time. The decline of trust in
communist institutions had placed Zyuganov’s communist ticket at a serious disadvantage
despite nostalgia for the past. As the authors pointed out, reminiscence of the “good old days” is
not unique to post-Soviet Russia and may have led to a false impression about Russian’s desires
to go back in time (Mason and Sidorenko-Stephenson 1997, 701).
While there were very few in post-reform Russia that saw their situation as improved,
only a minority were interested in returning to socialism and saw capitalism as the better
alternative. Data taken in 1991 and 1996 showed that over 50 percent of Russians agreed to
strongly agreed that free markets were essential to development compared to 20 percent in 1991.
A similar poll found that 33 percent of polled Russians 1996 advocated for a return to socialism
(Mason and Sidorenko-Stephenson 1997, 708). In fact, Brudny (Brudny 1997) touched on this
very point stating that Yeltsin was able to cobble together an anti-communism coalition within
the middle class more efficiently than the Communist Party’s anti-capitalism platform could
reach. Fear of a return to the illiberal past, complete with Stalinist repression and censorship,
drove many Russians to the polls in favor of Yeltsin.
Economic instability in Russia is causally linked to Yeltsin’s victory as well. The mass
appeal of informal money-making practices and an increased distrust for institutions acted as a
dissuasion mechanism for Russians to participate more aggressively in politics (Ledeneva 2013).
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The tenuous economic ground that most Russian families were on pushed many to retreat
inwards into their family units as a matter of survival which made them much less interested in
engaging with politics. Indeed, reduced political activism in terms of donations has been noted
but very little could have been given in the first place (Evans 2011).
These arguments fail to really grapple with the stratification that was being experienced
across all of Russian society in terms of earners and economic losers during the reform process.
Nor does it take seriously the massive electoral response and support Yeltsin received when the
results were totaled up. The wage-earning classes of Russia, while activated by economic
depression, were not motivated by the crisis to re-embed the market back into society. Instead,
the decline of organized labor and the huge levels of distrust in the former Soviet System lent
credibility to Yeltsin’s reforms and changes. Furthermore, middle class workers had very little in
the way of alternative options to turn to. The fractious nature of organized labor under the FNPR
and independent unions, who were more loyal to Yeltsin’s reforms anyways, made mobilization
unlikely (Siegelbaum 2004).
Mobilization labor was depressed by agents within the trade unions themselves. Firm
level power remained highly capable of going around the dictates of organized labor as well.
Labor organizers were more dependent on management for concessions and bargaining which
often took the forms of subsidies and clientelistic kickbacks (Siegelbaum 2004). The weak
capacity of the government allowed firms to effectively circumvent labor laws which further
drove worker dependence to the beneficence of their employers for social protection. What
organizational capacity labor still possessed was only activated in order to maintain status quo
bargains rather than challenge the losses that labor had incurred (Siegelbaum 2004, 657).
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Weak labor was unable to organize effective in the aftermath of crisis against either
collaborative firms or the government. Instead, Russian voters were effectively forced to choose
between Yeltsin’s government or a return to communist politics. Those in the middle and upper
class saw their best outcome with Yeltsin. A return to distrusted Communist Party control was
highly unpalatable despite the shambolic state of the economy. In addition, middle class workers
viewed a coalition with Yeltsin as a better opportunity to share in the economic spoils that the
Russian oligarchs had experienced a few years earlier. Yeltsin was elected by “people who
wanted to raise both the floors and the ceiling” with regards to incomes and wealth (Mason and
Sidorenko-Stephensen 1997, 712). In other words, Russians wanted the social protections of the
past to work with the limitless potential of a prosperous economy unbounded by communist
wage setting.
The evidence for this in worker compliance with Yeltsin’s reforms in the 1990s. Rather
than striking, workers embraced an increasingly clientelistic and informal system which
reinforced their dependence on businesses for non-wage goods and services (Siegelbaum 2004).
There was little room to maneuver outside of the patron-clientelistic system. The FNPR, which
remains the premier labor organizing body in Russia today, became increasingly dedicated
towards government interests rather than its own members. Unions are motivated towards
maintaining order and social harmony through the issuances of social services and to placate the
mobilization capacity of their own members. Worker’s grievances are largely ignored and
undercut as a result and the FNPR has become ubiquitous with the Russian government
(Christensen 2017; Cook and Dimitrov 2017). While it was possible for pressure from below to
activate in order to keep Russia’s transitional process on track, Evans (2011) writes:
“That did not happen in Russia when the Yeltsin administration allowed the privatization of
state assets to be hijacked by avaricious insiders, and when the oligarchs achieved
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dominance of political parties, the media, and the government. Perhaps surprisingly, in the
face of sharply declining economic security during the 1990s, most of the population of
Russia withdrew from political life and became cynical about parties and politicians.” (46)
4.4. The Seeds of the Neopatrimonial Clientelism
The transformational process undergone by Russia in the 1990s was successful in reducing the
effectiveness of organized labor, but it also tied state-firm relationships closer than ever. Despite
the collapse of living standards, what remained of Russia’s middle class mostly stayed aligned
with Yeltsin and supported his successful reelection campaign in 1996. The new business elites,
however, had less opportunities to choose from. When faced with the prospects of a return of the
communist party in the 1996 presidential election, Russian oligarchs feared losing the economic
status they had achieved some five years earlier. The response by the new business owning class
was to aggressively invest in Yeltsin’s reelection campaign but at the cost to their autonomy. In a
move to fund his campaign, Yeltsin took the future of Russian business hostage in a suicide pact
known as the “loan for shares” program.
As Frye (2010, 69) notes, Yeltsin wasn’t motivated merely by the economic gains of
what liberal reform could induce. Yeltsin was very aware of how reform could be used to keep
the communist party from regaining the upper hand in the government or halting his efforts for
reform. As such, he set about ensuring that his economic reforms would be permanent. Whatever
the costs may have been to the economy or political system. However, the highly contentious
political environment increased fears of policy reversals amongst the new business minded elites.
The communist party’s control over the legislature and the polling data suggested Zyuganov
would win in 1996 had yanked Yeltsin’s expectations back to reality.
This reality “blunted incentives for businesses to invest or restructure” and instead, most
opted to buy into safer ventures and fixed assets (Frye 2010, 172). Insecurities in the market and
political environment reinforced the New Russian’s, as the oligarchs came to be known as,
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codependence on the Russian government. They relied heavily on government credits, and tax
breaks in order to maintain their bottom-line which Yeltsin continued to provide as long as they
would remain loyal to his policies (Frye 2010). As a result, neopatrimonial processes were
becoming baked into the new system as a factor of Yeltsin’s reform process.
Corrupt social pacts were nothing new to Russia. Russia had been dependent on
patrimonialism and crony elite corruption since it’s imperial days which was carried into
communist rule. The all-dominant Politburo’s effect on individual behavior was so dramatic that
it kept nearly all aspects of society below a certain threshold of wealth in an attempt to equalize
prosperity. Single party dominance had left no room for legal opportunities by individuals to
work or earn outside of what the state could provide. These excessive restrictions only allowed
for selective remittances and transfers to be allotted to the most loyal of agents and societal
actors. Such access and privilege gave some citizens unique advantages while simultaneously
playing up clientelistic linkages. In imperial Russia, the system was known as “kormlenie” and it
had been effectively carried over after the communist revolution.44 In this system, agents with
access were nearly always incentivized to engorge themselves on patronage networks and
syphon off as many resources as possible (Pipes 2000).
During the Soviet era, the lack of a monetized market system for exchange meant elite
networks were especially crucial. Building trust through elite networks was essential for
converting resources into useful goods and services (Becker and Vasileva 2017; Vasileva-Dienes
2019). The state’s total domination of property and resources meant access was restricted to only
a selection of insiders and apparatchiks whose very appointment was dictated by the communist
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Kormlenie - “feeding” was a system in which tsarist rulers granted land in exchange for loyalty and
taxes. Under communism, this system was exacerbated due to most property being controlled by the state and doled
out to supporters at the Communist Party’s discretion. See Richard Pipes work (2000) for a more detailed account of
this system and its effects.
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party. Loyalty, therefore, was fed rewards and begot future loyalty. After the Soviet Union, it
was these same insiders who had privileged access and valuable information which gave them an
upper hand in the privatization process. The political-economic connections to Russia’s elite
cadre gave these entrepreneurs unfettered access to the highest profit-making enterprises. Even
within the new Russian bureaucracy there was high levels of elite continuity with former
communist bureaucrats which allowed for many corrupt practices to be carried over. The New
Russians weren’t always part of the original nomenklatura, but they typically did have deep
linkages to the former ruling groups either through youth organizations like Komsomol or other
networks (Dawisha 2014).
Access to state resources for exploitation during Yeltsin’s reforms allowed private
industry to be captured in the clientelism net because political elites in the government could
control who gained these privileges in the first place. The Russian leadership had ensnared
society in a state capture trap and the costs of buying out its constituent parts was cheaper than
the alternative. No cost would be too little if it meant the communists would return to power.
This thinking spread all the way through the bureaucracy which fomented interpersonal
guarantees rather than public allotments of resources (Becker and Vasileva 2017). As Becker and
Vasileva claim (2017, 86), the patrimonial aspects of Russia are not incidental, they are
structural and defined at nearly all levels of societal interaction.
4.4.1. The New Business Class and the State
Throughout the 1990s, rent seeking elites were able to funnel more and more resources into
smaller and smaller hands under the watchful eye of government. Building on its patrimonial
traditions, the reforms in 1996 pushed Russia closer towards a market economy with high levels
of clientelistic linkages. The failure to grow an independent business sector, and the failure to
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build strong business associations that could coordinate against government policy all served to
hamper the creation of an independent business sector in Russia. While economic reforms came
at a price in terms of pressure for companies to align closer to Yeltsin’s regime, they did very
little to inhibit informal practices that were used as an advantageous shortcut for admission to
wealth and newly marketed state assets (Valieva-Dienes 2019). The 1996 presidential campaign
and the “Loans for Shares” scheme pushed firm-state relations closer than ever.
As stated earlier, in 1996 the Russian economy had drastically shrunk and consumer
prices had skyrocketed. By the time of the 1996 presidential election, it seemed as if political
winds were blowing in favor of Zyuganov and the new Russian Communist Party. Yeltsin, who
had initially taken ill, tore back into the campaign with massive spending to promote his
campaign. To gain more support, Yeltsin needed to seek out business support. In exchange for
their support and investment in his reelection, Yeltsin instituted the “Loans for Shares” program
to give his donors more buy in to his reforms.
The marriage between Yeltsin’s plan and the New Russians was not a foregone
conclusion. While the average Russian citizen had experienced a fusion of nationalism and
liberalism since 1991, the new and old elites of Russia were more heavily divided. As stated in
the previous section, many Russian voters found the cause of national liberation from the old
communist regime to be more appealing (Bunce 2004). In that sense, they were driven against a
return to their communist past or the support of the old communist party and a Zyuganov
presidency. There was a large disconnect compared to the business class of Russia. A large body
of Russian leadership felt that Yeltsin’s policies represented a repudiation of the past and that he
had embraced European liberalism in rejection of Russia’s core identity (Appel 2004).
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Yeltsin’s electoral success hinged on ensuring that the New Russian elite understood that
an ascendent communist party would reverse their invested gains. This fear compelled business
elites to tie their lot in with Yeltsin’s government with the incentive of short-term profits in case
the gamble failed. Yeltsin understood this bargain and structured the Loans for Shares program
as a supplemental vehicle to finance his own reelection prospects. In the program, managerial
shares in valuable state assets, like Russia’s coveted oil and gas firms, were auctioned out to the
highest bidders. To sweeten the deal, the assets would come under the sole ownership of those
investors in case of a default to pay back the loans by the Russian government. The program was
also structured in a way that allowed the loans to be issued before the election had commenced
while the actual SOE assets would only be auctioned afterwards. This maneuver effectively
bound Russia’s new business elites to Yeltsin’s electoral fortunes and further reinforced
business-clientelist ties in modern Russia.
While Yeltsin had compromised much of the reform process from 1992 and onwards, the
Loans for Shares was a unique moment in that it solidified the coalition between important
business elites and the new market-based economy (Bunce 2004). Furthermore, it allowed
Yeltsin to sell assets while the government retained a significant degree of ownership in those
same companies because it only exchanged managerial ownership. It allowed the new set of
business elites to tap resources that were previously unavailable without having to own them
which produced a whirlwind of profits for both parties (Aslund 2006). This move also weakened
business’s organizational capacity and enthralled business associations to government policies
(Schmidt 2009, 6).
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4.4.2. The 1996 Election and the Economy
Despite a close 1996 presidential election, Yeltsin won in a runoff against his communist
adversary. The buyoff of Russia’s business class was complete, and the die was cast. Russia’s
independent corporate sector would be compromised moving forward which would reduce the
costs of buying off other parts of society in the long term. However, the economy was not back
on solid footing yet. Along with the shrinking economy, the tax base continued to contract after
1996 and the government’s relationship with the New Russians became more clientelistic in the
form of a golden pipeline of patronage networks that reached deep into the Yeltsin’s
administration.
Not all businesses benefited from the deal. Outsider entrepreneurs and startup businesses
found themselves mired in a punitive regulatory quagmire. High payroll tax rates (up to 38%)
dissuaded many startups to enter the Russian market in the first place. Additionally, an
aggressive bureaucracy which would extort large sums of bribes presented a challenge for
‘unconnected’ businesses and became a consistent obstacle in order to conduct business. Becker
and Vasileya (2017) state:
“Russia’s privatization program did not create a full-fledged liberal market economy but
rather implied two waves of patrimonial asset appropriation by well-connected insiders
in the context of a weak state.” (89)
After the 1996 election, the communist dominated parliament had lost much of its
potential to challenge Yeltsin. Without much opposition, the Duma supported the appointment of
Yeltsin’s deputies which implied a turning point in Russia’s national politics. The appointments
had little positive effect on the economy which continued to flounder until 1998 when the
financial market completely collapsed. This spectacular downturn would be even more
destructive because the government had been trading on bonds to finance the government’s
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coffers as the tax base shrank.45 Loss of tax revenue, the collapse of the Asian financial markets
in 1997, and a shortfall in oil prices depleted much of the government’s income. The government
sought out short term solutions by constricting social payments and arrear’s payments
skyrocketed.
Tax receipts in Russia were consistently short because of the fragmented and hostile
environment in which private business had to conduct itself. While the private economy was
supposed to make up the largesse of free market industry, it could only muster “10 to 15 percent
of total employment” (Frye 2010, 178). High regulatory burdens, taxes, and bureaucratic
obstacles stifled private growth. Compared to neighboring post-communist countries, private
businesses made up a very marginal percentage of Russia’s GDP. This only served to incentivize
the government to rely more on the elite centers of the economy, such as banking and energy.
Businesses were further hampered by the ineptitude of the state in protecting independent firms
from the predations of aggressive regulators and government officials who sought out all sources
of revenue (Yakovlev 2006, 1036). While the state decentralized, smaller business associations
failed to materialize. The result was an elevation of the necessity for businesses to cooperate with
the government’s schemes, despite the losses, rather than work outside of the governments
purview.
4.5. The Election of 2000 and Re-Etatization
By the time 1998 arrived, the Russian economy was in a total financial meltdown. The
overreliance on selling bonds to float the Russian government’s finances was quickly undone
after the demand for energy collapsed. The result was the resignation of Boris Yeltsin in 1999,

Russian bonds or GKOs (Государственное Краткосрочное Обязательств) were short term bonds
issued for face value and were traded to domestic and foreign banks in 1996 (Frye 2010).
45
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approximately three months before the 2000 presidential elections. Although he had survived
several impeachment scandals, Yeltsin declared that he wished to give Russia over to a new set
of leaders in the new millennium. The case was more likely Yeltsin’s grave unpopularity, which
was working against his party’s, the Unity Party, chances in the upcoming election (Evans 2011).
The Communist Party had gained larger number of seats in the 1999 Duma election and the field
of presidential contenders was broad. Acting president and current prime minister, Vladimir
Putin, however, was in a strategic position to win the election despite his close connections with
the Yeltsin administration.
Putin did not campaign at all during the 2000 presidential election. Instead, he released a
series of open letters about his platform. This approached undermined his competitors as he did
not participate in the debates and was difficult to align on specific policies. Instead, Putin was
able to play into media biases due to the strings of loyalty that Yeltsin had created from selling
broadcast assets to a select group of new Russian media owners (Pietiläinen 2008). In addition,
cooperation between the Communist and Unity parties in the national Duma undermined several
important outside contenders for the presidency such as Yevgeny Primakov, and Sergei
Kiriyenko who had both been a part of Yeltsin administration as prime ministers.
Unequal access to mass media was not the only progenitors of Putin’s success. The First
Chechnyan war that had ended so poorly for Russia in 1996 had reignited in 1999. Chechen
rebels had attacked northwards into Russian Dagestan and had captured several villages. More
importantly, a wave of bombings had ripped across Russia in late 1999 and killed approximately
350 people. While it has been considered that Putin was in favor of a limited exercise of a
renewed war with Chechnya, even before their invasion of Dagestan, the bombings was a
crystallizing moment for Russian politics (Resnick 2012). The Russian population clamored for
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enhanced state security and Putin directed much of his platform rhetoric towards that end. After
Yeltsin’s resignation, Putin’s position as both president and prime minister put him in a position
of power to conduct the war in Chechnya and receive the benefits of any successful military
campaigns. By February of 2000, one month before the election, Russian armed forces had
captured Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, and effectively ended the war. Russia had reversed its
fortunes from the disastrous first war and Putin was swept into office as a result. Newly elected
Vladimir Putin beat out Zyuganov by 24 percentage points and won a majority of the vote which
removed any need for a runoff.
Putin had come to power in a position of relative strength compared to his predecessor.
But he also was no stranger to utilizing the tactics and clientelistic techniques that were perfected
by Yeltsin’s previous campaigns (Sakwa 2008). With media owned and operated in tandem with
the United Russia party, elections were now much easier to manipulate (Lukin 2009). While
Russia has always had a problem with corruption with its electoral practices, Putin was able to
perfect that process on a grander scale (Sakwa 2008). As a result, Putin’s United Russia party
gained more representation in the legislature and across the government’s many ministries and
governorships.
Contested politics also declined rapidly after Putin’s successful presidential election in
2000. Resistance from leftist parties, while still very much a potent force in 2000, had been
depleted overtime. Polarization greatly declined both in the legislature and in the population. The
Communist Party of Russia was rudderless in terms of offering a counter argument to United
Russia’s platform. Not to mention the socialist path that was largely unfavorable to Russians
with only 18 percent of survey respondents in 2000 interested in a return to the old Soviet model
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(Lukin 2009, 83). That is not to say they favored a turn towards Western liberalism either.
Instead, most polled Russians favored a path that would be unique to Russia.
The failure for alternative parties to gain broader appeal became even more apparent four
years later. The results of the 2003 parliamentary elections saw the Communist Party of Russia
lose nearly 40 seats in the Duma and the dominance of the United Russia party with 223 seats
out of 450, just short of a ruling majority. With United Russia’s position secured, Putin was able
to capitalize on the lack of coherent political contestation and captured a greater share of the state
under his executive authority. The country became more unified around the president who had
widespread popular support despite enacting legislation that reneged on the initial liberal reforms
of the 1990s. These laws constrained labor and enlarged the state’s reach over the economy.
By the 2000 election, the middle class of Russia had been gutted. Most Russians had felt the
strains of economic stagflation from the 1998 crisis, but it squeezed lower- and middle income
workers mercilessly. Russian voters supported Putin because they saw him as a Thermidorian
candidate that could put an end to the economically destabilizing clashes between the free market
and communist political tribes (McFaul 2002).46 A young Vladimir Putin represented that
Russian third way that voters were interested in. A path that was away from the Soviet past and a
European future. By and large, Putin was successful at delivering Russian citizens from the
economic quagmire of the 1990s into a more prosperous 2000s. Rising energy prices allowed
Putin to buy off larger portions of Russian voter’s interests and the middle class became more
intrinsically linked to Putin’s government. Putin presided over a torrent of economic growth and
was able to more neatly envelope the state around voter’s needs.

46
Thermidorian reaction is a term that refers to the reactionary events that proceed a political revolution in
effort to gain more stability within the country. Named after the month from the French Revolutionary Calendar, it
refers to the events where the more radical elements of the French Revolution, then led by Robes Pierre, were
overthrown, and replaced with more conservative leadership and institutions.
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4.6. State Primacy
After 2000, low levels of party polarization in Russia allowed for the state to absorb more
political and economic power. The domination of United Russia party allowed a reversion back
towards manual control of the economy (Becker and Vasileva 2016, 89). The weak oversight
capacity of the state during this period made it a hotspot for abuse from within the bureaucracy
and political elites who could leverage rents and prebends through formal institutions (Ledeneva
2013, 170). During this time Putin’s administration was able to better secure several important
reforms that would debilitate the viability of entrepreneurial businesses and organized labor.
Market solutions and middle class access to private wealth declined rapidly in the 2000s.
The pervasive clientelistic linkages that had emerged during the reforms of the 1990s had led to
the development of the power vertical. This is a hierarchical model that attaches formal and
informal levels of authority to decision making and the networks of patronage that exchanges
goods for loyalty (Gel’man 2016). Secondly, this power vertical pushed businesses, bureaucrats,
and elites to coordinate with the state for privileges and access to resources. Those businesses
that could not directly benefit would be extorted by in-network elites. A quid pro quo of dirty
business dealings gave the state leverage over elites who were lower in the hierarchy with the
threat of prosecution acting as a cheap monitoring tool for defectors. Finally, the primacy of the
state over markets and organized labor raised the collective action costs of societal coordinating
outside of the regime. For the middle class, economic dependence on the party-state for
employment, goods, and status would alleviate any desire to organize against Putin’s tenure.
4.6.1. Clientelistic and Neopatrimonial Traps
Throughout the 2000s and 2010s the government actors took advantage of the corrupt business
practices that had become commonplace in the 1990s (Vasileva-Dienes 2019). The pervasiveness
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of the power vertical absorbed the Russia’s oligarchic elites into the state capture economy as
they were sanctioned to act in clientelistic compliance for material gains or face reprisals
(Gel’man 2016). Corrupt practices within the business world of Russia are not a bug of the
system, it is a feature. It suffuses all aspects of the business environment. Corruption
participation is a useful tool to dirty the hands of participating economic actors and to raise the
cost of opting out by compromising the actors within that system (Ledeneva 2013). To quote
Gel’man (2016, 461), “Almost every actor can easily be accused of criminal acts, and the threat
of criminal prosecution is an even more efficient tool for maintaining control than its actual use.”
As a result, there were very few business and capital owners whose hands were ‘clean’. This is
cheap source of loyalty making as it makes participants unlikely to organize against a violator’s
excesses.
Vasileva-Dienes (2019) refers to this as the ‘informality trap’. Actors may act in informal
ways to their short-term benefit but ultimately undermine the credibility and legality of their own
position. She argues that “by behaving informally many small Russian companies inadvertently
dug their own graves” by taking advantage of patronage and administrative shortcuts (VasilevaDienes 2019, 336). Even those businesses and companies that acted within the legal system were
ultimately undone by the race to the bottom created by such a cheap source of bureaucratic
abuse. In tandem, bureaucrats and other governmental agents were likely to extort a heavy toll on
business owners. As corrupt bureaucratic practices ate into profits, companies would then turn to
other shortcuts to make up that shortfall. Tools such as tax evasion was not just a way around
corrupt bureaucrats but also a means for replacing losses (Vinogradova 2006). In response,
Russian bureaucrats have developed a range of methods at their disposal such as extortion,

161
bribes, and regulatory raids as a form of business harassment tactic to beat rents out when
necessary.
Putin added to the contention between business interests and the state’s enhancements to
its coercive power and security (Carnegie EIP 2017). This institutionalized corruption within the
state and formalized many impersonal practices. In other words, it strengthened the state and
increased the likelihood of businesses to act in coordination with the corrupt excesses of the
government. For example, since 2010 police and prosecutors have aggressively pursued
economic fraud cases and approximately 150,000 cases are filed annually. However, very few
are fully prosecuted. Instead, it is estimated that these arrests act as a source of rent seeking
which is especially effective against smaller businesses who are more vulnerable to such attacks
(Volkov, Paneyakh, and Titaev 2010). One could estimate the growth of Russia’s coercive power
over the course of the 2000s by charting the increase of raids (raderstvo) year-on-year (Rochlitz
2014, 103).
One major change that gave the state more leverage in the realm of administration and
bureaucratic oversight of business were a series of tax reforms that were enacted in 2001. These
reforms replaced the 1990s tax code with a flat tax designed to close loopholes, sure up
enforcement, reduce of tax evasion, and increase tax compliance. The effect of these new tax
policies increased revenue dramatically with revenue from personal income taxes increasing
twenty percent in 2001. While some scholars like Gaddy and Gale (2005, 986) contended that
the new revenue was the result of a more robust tax administration and a growing economy,
skepticism remains as to how a state with weak capacity was able to implement a strong tax code
and target new streams of revenue so effectively. Instead, it is likely that elites and voters went
along with these changes because the payoff of patron-clientelist networks encouraged the need
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to cooperate and facilitate a more efficient tax code (Gel’man 2016). These kinds of reforms fit
within neopatrimonial theory as it produces higher levels of stability that can grow the economy
for the sake of new rents that the state can then redistribute the client’s benefit (Gel’man 2016,
462).
Whatever the case may have been, the 2001 changes to the tax code gave the state more
capacity to capture additionally levels of the economy. Even those firms and businesses that
would not cooperate within the power vertical were not immune. The new law allowed
administrative agents to physically coerce and commandeer assets using the pretenses of tax
fraud and failed payments to expropriate private property. The stiffened regulations did not
enable better oversight either. Instead, it had the effect of pushing legal businesses to rely on
bribes and payoffs at a higher rate because the fines for infractions were so high. For instance,
the changes to the Code of Administrative Offenses in 2016 made penalties for infractions so
punitive that informal behaviors, like bribery, was nearly always a necessity compared to the
costs of the fine (Vasileva-Dienes 2019, 347). Instead, it would be cheaper for managers to pay
the bribes and for officials to look the other way rather than try their luck in court.
Imbedded state agents, or those agents that traced their lineage to the confluence of partystate fusion and state capture, also use tax codes and other economic crimes to go after business
owners who are viewed as uncooperative to the Russian government (Dawisha 2014).
Prosecutors will often go after business owners in order to directly seize their assets for the
government’s coffers. Mikhail Khodorkovsky was one of the more famous examples of this. The
oligarch had acquired the oil company Yukos during Russia’s loans for shares program, but his
criticism of the government got him prosecuted in absentia and his assets seized by the
government in 2004. The list also includes names like Media Most’s owner Vladimir Gusinsky

163
and Sibneft’s Berezovsky. All of whom were vocal critics of Putin’s government. More recently,
network megaserver Nginx was raided in 2019. The owners of that company, Maksim Konolov
and Igor Sysoev, were taken into custody for supposed infractions of Russia’s administrative
codes.
While state capture presents hazards for entrepreneurs to navigate, business minded elites
do not actively work to undue its corrupt institutions or directly challenge the neopatrimonial
practices it provides (Gel’man 2016). The fear of losing out on selective access to resources, the
costs of trying to maintain legality, and relative ease in which businesses can conduct corrupt
behavior has made for a climate where firms have weak influence over markets. Functionally,
the system is self-managed. The state gains its own rent seeking advantages by letting
bureaucratic politics take place between competing interest groups while Russian political
leadership disengages (Remington 2018,304). The government only weighs in when necessity of
profit would allow it to arbitrate beyond its divide and conquer strategy.
Policy is also restricted due to the high levels of oversight over the economy within the
spheres of Russian elite governmental circles. Alternative policy proposals that gain traction are
often coopted by the regime in an effort to dismantle whatever regime destabilizing effects they
may produce (Khmelnitskaya 2021). According to Khmelnitskaya (2021), executive control over
policy confounds regime-outsider efforts to change Russia’s dysfunctional system. She goes on
to state that since Russia was unable to develop sophisticated oversight measures in terms of
policy and governance, massive amounts of power has been concentrated in the executive
government whose officiants can act with impunity (Khmelnitskaya 2021, 630).
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4.6.2. State Capture Capacity in Russia
The ability for firms to independently operate had been much reduced since 2000. In the absence
of fully realized markets, Russia began a process of re-etatization which is the recapture of the
economy by the state. The United Russia government has increased its managerial privileges
over the economy to the point of being the preeminent economic player. Certainly, independent
businesses and the free markets exist but not nearly to the extent or reach of the Russian state.
Russian state capture is connected to access over finance and banking, ownership of larger
swaths of the economy through SOE buyouts, and the practice of selecting champions of
industry that gives government agents exclusive rights to the most revenue producing elements
of Russia’s economy. The financial crisis in 2008 exacerbated all of these qualities due to
Russia’s ‘addiction’ to energy rents (Gaddy and Ickes 2010, 282). The triple shock of oil price,
capital flows, and external financing during the 2008 recession gave way to an intense period of
state capture and resource capacity enlargement while still maintaining a marketized structure
somewhat conducive for business (Bogetic 2013).
There are some inconsistencies to be discussed here regarding the government’s
relationship with private business. By the mid-2000s, Russia directed economic policies that
were aimed at easing the overhead and administrative constraints of operating a private
company. In fact, as of 2018 Russia had a 6.74 out of 10 for its Economic Freedom index score
from the Fraser institute with a 10 indicating the most economic freedom (Yap, Law, and AbdulGhani 2020). Just fifteen years earlier its score was a point and a half lower. This score does not
tell the whole picture in regard to the amount of state capture that has occurred in Russia since
2000.
One reason is that private industry has been unable to modernize Russia’s economy
because there are too many obstacles for business to operate unconstrained. Disorganized
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oligarchs lack the capital and wherewithal to do so. In the words of Sergey Bodrunov (2017,
224), “the ‘invisible hand of the market’ cannot by itself ensure the necessary structural shifts in
the material and technical basis of the economy, while without such fundamental shifts the
further development of our economic system will finish up in terminal stagnation.” Russia has
remained largely deindustrialized after 1990s after its GDP shrank nearly 60 percent (Kornev
2019, 523). Additionally, much of the economy is worn down and obsolete which incentivizes
the government to take a more hands on approach in order to direct markets for efficiency’s sake.
Or at least to the benefit of those who profit from the rents such companies may provide. But
elites who dabble in state capture must tread carefully. Citizens in Russia lack the interest to
revert back to the planned economy of the past and so government elites must rely more heavily
on ways that influence economic outcomes while balancing the needs of the market. As a result,
Russia maintains policies with an aggressive focus on reindustrialization. Government policies
rely on “large-scale and long-term state projects” while not overreaching into every corner of the
economy (Bodrunov 2017, 231).
Government strategies do not directly hamper independent medium, and small enterprises
but the excesses of state-owned industries strain against market competitors. Upon entering
office, Putin worked to reverse Yeltsin’s approach of selling off managerial shares of Russian
owned industries and instead favored reimplementing direct control via loyal government
ministers and outright ownership shares in important industries. Especially in the energy sector.
For instance, the energy giant Gazprom’s executive board was replaced by loyal Putin appointees
in early 2000. This is only one aspect of the patronage network between Putin’s government and
its control of state-owned enterprises (Dawisha 2014, 281).
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High levels of state control are not always detrimental. Expanded state ownership has
given state owned companies softer budget constraints to operate as well as avoid technological
investment costs with supplemental government funds (Kornai 2013)Russia’s high levels of
SMotE means it can better direct resources to their SOEs, placate outside competition, and direct
human resources towards the needs of select industries. Whereas private companies will rely on
market-based cues to efficiently determine inputs and outputs respect to competition and trade.
Russia began enhancing their SOEs throughout the 2000s with a large expansion into the
banking and energy sector. While SOEs are on the rise across the developing world, Russia
remains comparatively high in terms of the government’s share of the economy (IMF 2020). Nor
does Russia show signs of slowing down with SOE expansion and will often do so by acquiring
smaller, competitive businesses through noncompetitive means (di Bella, Dynnikova, and Slavov
2019,16). Debate still remains as to how much of the economy is controlled by the Russian
government as the data is often obscured by internal policies and incomplete reports. Some
estimate that the state’s share of the economy may be as high as 70 percent, although recent
scholarship has argued that this number may be exaggerated, while other estimates place it as 33
percent (di Bella, Dynnikova, and Slavov 2019, 18). This number has been consistent for the last
decade but is still much higher than most developing states or its European neighbors. These
estimates fail to fully account of how politicians can manipulate the economy without overt
action or direct ownership.
Russia has engaged in the manual steering of their economy by setting market and
development priorities through active policy preferences with very little pushback from private
business or the electorate. This heavy-handed approach has had several consequences. First, the
expediency of energy rents has led to a failure of the Russian government to diversify beyond the

167
energy sector or to spend more money on technological enhancements in nonenergy industries
(Gaddy and Ickes 2010). While this may provide dividends during times of high energy costs,
downturns in the economy that lead to less oil and gas demand can be extremely detrimental.
Second, state owned firms retain an advantage over their competitors in the market but
also in terms of managing the demands of their workers. One advantage is over labor pool
curation. Since the higher paying jobs are often with the state, the government is able to pipeline
higher educated and professional workers from national universities back into state owned
industries (Winogradow 2013). Another comparative advantage of the Russian government is
how it controls organize labor. A series of 2002 labor law reforms enhanced employer power and
linked workers more directly to weak employment bargains. The laws shored up some formal
protections for employment but also opened more informal loopholes for employers. For
instance, it formalized payment in ‘black cash’, or off the books, salaries (Cordell 2019). This
frequent phenomenon is especially problematic for middle class workers who are more
vulnerable when working in the private sector where the practice is more likely occur. Finally,
the powerful trade union, FNPR, was incorporated into United Russia party during this period
which married government policy with labor representation.
This last point better explains why workers were largely quiescent to the roll backs to
their employment protections. There was also a lack of collective action because the state
expanded social protections and subsidies to the working and middle class to make up the
differences from employment which were bought and paid for by the energy booms in the 2000s
(Khmelnitskaya 2019). To put it into scale, the revenues from oil and gas sales were so massive
that the Russian government was able to pay off its 1999 IMF loans by 2005. Due to the high
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prices for oil Russia began building its reserves in foreign currencies as a future hedge against
future inflation.
The financial sector was not immune to government take over either. Party accumulation
and control of fiscal wealth was just as invasive as their approach to firms and business. Bank
independence has declined rapidly since 2000. The direction of state bank assets allows the
Russian government to dominate large shares of its market via control over the direction and
availability of finance (Vernikov 2014). Public Banks in Russia hold about 60 percent of the
country’s banking assets, an asset ratio that is on par with Chinese bank’s control of assets (IMF
2020).
Even during the 2008 financial crisis, Russia maintained its course as overlord of the
economy. While public sector debt declined precipitously, private sector debt accelerated at a
rate the far outpaced what their counterparts were able to pay off. Private firms were also limited
in who they could get to invest in their company. Putin was hesitant to let foreign capital in to
invest, especially in the oil and gas sector in Russia during the 2000s boom (Gabby and Ickes
2010, 300). Government policy reflected Putin’s hesitancy who decried foreign investment in
Russia’s resources as a form of colonial exploitation (Abdelal 2010).
The result of the Putin led state capture during the 2000s was a business sector that could
not provide an economic alternative for the middle class. Those businesses that were highly
valued and ran by elites who operated within the neopatrimonial structure were likewise
dependent on the kormlenie system of feeding and glutting themselves on rents. The reaffirmed
coercive capacity of the state, thanks to several key reforms in 2000, meant that any elites who
did not cooperate were likely to face severe prosecution and asset seizure. On the smaller end of
the business spectrum, the informality of working within such a corrupted system undermined
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the ability of entrepreneurs to effectively avoid dirty practices and subjected them to an
‘informality trap’ in order to survive in the clientelistic minefield of Russia’s bureaucracy. As a
result, they would become too dependent on the informal practices of systema and beholden to
the whims of government extortion. Finally, Putin’s aggressive expansion of SOEs and the
administration of direct government management of state-owned firms meant many workers
would also become more dependent on the state.
4.7. The Growing Middle Class
Russia emerged from a near decade of growth into another recession in 2008. The decline of
energy prices, and the invasion and annexation of Crimea hurt Russia’s future growth prospects
as a result. With it, the middle class has also suffered in distinctive ways. During the 2000s,
Putin’s state-capture policies had the consequence of expanding the middle class into a more
coherent identity complete with modern consumption habits, better incomes, and policy
preferences oriented towards increasing their stability. Although debate still lingers as to the
legitimacy of the existence of the Russian middle class and their position in society, increased
proliferation of data and longitudinal studies has provided a strong case that a robust middle
class exists in Russia.
There are two strands of literature that are relevant when considering the Russian middle
class. The first is pretty succinct in its dismissal of middle class identity in Russia. Scholars
argue that there is a lack of diversity among middle income earners and therefore the group lacks
some of the important theoretical characteristics of the middle class: political power, lack of
financial independence, and a unique identity (Samson and Krasil’nikova 2014, 59-60). Instead,
the Russian middle is argued to be a mere myth that has been propagated by the West to explain
the country’s democratic compatibility (Samson and Krasil’nikova 2014, 62). There are
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contradictions here. This perspective over emphasizes the interests of elites and their capacity to
rent seek but says nothing about the legitimacy of government officials to be able to act. This
argument also relies on a qualitative assessment of preferences that overplays social concerns
rather than economic or political ones while simultaneously claiming that the middle class is
motivated by access to property and income.
By most metrics and survey data, the middle class is a coherent identity that is motivated
by unique factors that are shared by neither the top nor bottom deciles of the Russian population.
This brings about the second point of contention when discussing the middle class in Russia:
how to measure their presence. The population that makes up this group can be as high as 70
percent by some estimates and as low as 10 percent (Braun 2020). Meanwhile, there are those
who apply various ways of interpretating middle class presence. Some scholars erect a nucleus
group that comprises the core of the middle class to compare against its upper and lower bands
(Gorshkov and Tikhonova 2016). For instance, assessments of consumption rates help to discern
where these boundaries appear. Gorshkov and Tikhonova (2016, 495) use survey data to
conclude that, “Compared to the rest of Russians, the middle class is much less concerned with
material problems (10 percent compared to one-third), and a greater proportion (38 percent
compared to 16 percent) see no problems at all in their lives”.
It should also be stated that high levels of income mobility provide further evidence of
the emergence and existence of a middle class in Russia, especially among those living in cities
and with university degrees (Nissanov 2016). Based on income measures, it is estimated that the
percentage of middle class Russian increased to 37 percent by 2014 (The Moscow Times 2019).
In dollar amounts, they are represented by earners who make 39,000 to 99,000 rubles a month, or
approximately $700 to $1,600 dollars. Beyond incomes, they are also characterized by other high
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value traits such as professionalization, occupation, and educational attainment (Palchikova
2001) . Ross (2019) defines the Russian middle class as educationally distinct and highly
engaged with employment that relies on educational background. Others refer to the urbanized
core of professionals in Russia’s as the “creative class” rather than middle class in order to
denote “a stratum of highly educated, internet-linked, urbanites, with globalized consumption
habits and a post-modern sensibility” (Treisman 2014, 373).
Coupled with increased government social spending in the 2000s, the middle class grew
exponentially during this period along with levels of satisfaction in government and the economy
(Kulmala et al. 2014; Sutela 2010, 2013). The welfare and growth of the middle class was
financed in large part by high energy prices with oil prices reaching over $170 a barrel in 2008
with a large percentage of the profits redistributed towards welfare programs and social security.
The evidence for Putin’s desire to redistribute the gains of the 2000s are evident in the 2012
presidential election. Despite large protests for increasing the fairness and openness of elections,
Putin focused on building a ‘worker’s aristocracy’ that improved middle class conditions using
social spending and access to education (Belton and Clover 2012).
Middle income earners were a large portion of the population according to the Russia
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (HSE 2021). Figure 4-4 estimates the proportion of the Russian
population in the 3rd quartile of earners from 1995 to 2019.47 This is a narrower selection of
middle income earners but shows these earners made up almost 40 percent of the population. The
‘S’ curve shows that higher middle income earners were relatively sparse by the turn of the
millennium but quickly grew in size, tapering off at around 35 percent by 2019.
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See Appendix C.3 for questions and coding.
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Figure 4-4 Percent of Population in Third Quartile of Earners
Not only did the share of income earners in the third quartile rise in the 2000s, but the
amount of money spent on consumer goods significantly increased as well. Where growth was
not met by the rapaciousness of demand by higher incomes the import market picked up the
slack when local production chains couldn’t keep up (Gabby and Ickes 2010, 286). Consumption
nearly doubled from 2000 to 2008 to approximately 16 trillion rubles per year in retail sales.
Furthermore, consumers exhibited purchasing behaviors similar to “more mature economies”
(Kotov et al. 2018). Even after the economic downturns after 2010, consumer habits have
remained quite high. Figure 4-5 illustrates this consumer growth curve for demand in US Dollars
from 1996 to 2019.48 High spending has reached its watermark in 2012 and has remained stable.
In 2015, squeezed budgets following the drop in oil prices and Ukraine crisis has contracted the
Russian economy contracting and wages were again being outpaced by inflation. This did not
interfere with spending habits. By 2015, most middle class Russians owned smartphones and a
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Data on household consumption provided by Penn World Table that provides data on incomes,
productivity, and government expenditures from 1950 to 2019 for 183 countries (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer
2015).
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foreign car. However, some luxurious lifestyle devices, such as a dishwasher, were less likely to
be owned (Tikhonova 2017, 338).

Figure 4-5 Yearly Household Consumption in Millions of $US
4.7.1. The Middle Class and Neopatrimonialism
The power vertical associated with Russia’s clientelistic state provides some benefits to the
urbanized, creative class as well. The urban core often coalesces within ‘local regimes’, a
concept devised by Mossberger and Stoker (Mossberger and Stoker 2001) that highlights the
amalgamation of “institutions, actors, and the resources and strategies available to them, which
determine the conduct of local politics, local policy and local governance” (Gel’Man and
Ryzhenkov 2011, 449). During the 2000s, when economic growth was at its highest, there was a
great shift from the local towards hierarchical coalition building within urban policy and
coalitions. The result was a decline in the amount of access to public spaces for individuals but
an imposed consensus that allowed for cheaper development when these urban coalitions were
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led locally (Ge’lman and Ryzhenov 2011, 452).49 In the hinterland rayons (regions) and oblasts
(provinces) of Russia, these developmental coalitions were traded in exchange for modernity and
human development in backwater towns (Treisman 2014, 374).
In order to reinforce the power vertical and to further clientelize the middle class, the
Russian government incentivized the urban middle class by giving them access to local resources
and urban development through a process of cooptation. As a result, local governance was
maintained within the umbrella of the government’s hierarchy of control while allowing local
actors to pursue their own interests without much outside interference. It provides a principalagent framework that further lowers the costs of middle class clientelism by removing more
costly oversight methods. To quote Kolesnikov (2019):
“The class of people working not just directly for the state but also for state corporations
and banks, and private structures whose existence in fact depends entirely on connections
with the state and officialdom, accounts for a significant—and growing—proportion of
the economically active population. The state feeds them well, and under the criteria for
income and consumer behavior, officials, public sector workers, and the siloviki
undoubtedly belong to the middle class.”
The middle class still carries political agency despite being consumed and dependent
within this power vertical. The nature of the neopatrimonial system is organized in a way that
allows smaller interests to operate as long as governmental elite’s policies are met. The crises
that occurred during 2008 that has dogged the Russian economy for nearly a decade since has
revived distributional coalitions and has placed higher demands for side transfers which further
increases the costs for maintaining the status quo (Gel’man and Ryzhenov 2011, 249). The
fragility of the system has emphasized Putin’s interest for maintaining the interests and
preferences of Russian voters, especially those in the loyal middle class. Since 2008, this group

Gel’man and Ryzhenov (2011, 452) refer to these coalitions as ‘growth coalitions’ comprised of local
elites and businesses. These groups were allied in trying to expand urban wealth and increasing capital flows
towards urban centers.
49
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have been more likely to demand and receive better governmental protection against the
encroachments of privatization, market fluctuations, and public services deterioration.
4.8. The Middle Class and Vulnerabilities
The 2011 Russian protests in Russia in response to the ongoing crisis and economic instability
represented a possible breakthrough of democracy from below. The middle class that had
enjoyed so much success in the 2000s could be a potential trojan horse for Putin’s electoral
prospects. As (Kramer and Herszenhorn (2011) wrote, “authoritarian leaders who pursue
effective economic policies become victims of their own success…” Some observers were
hopeful that this represented a wave of democratization by average Russians who wanted the
government to reaffirm its commitment to democratic principles. Yet, history proved this
argument to be less prophetical in the case of Russia. Instead, middle class protests for open and
fair elections were less cohesive in achieving those ends due to a concoction of various
intervening variables. For one, a lack of organizations that could lower the cost of collective
action outside of urban centers. Private sector resources were also in short supply to help finance
protest movements against the government. Private companies had never been fully fledged by
the advent of state capture nor were they well positioned to solve the economic and social
problems the middle class were facing. Only the state and its attendant elites remained a
legitimate source for economic solutions in Russia.
Evidence that protestors were motivated by democracy promotion may be less
convincing compared to responses to the terrible economic conditions that were rife in the
country. Treisman (2014, 377) found that, while the creative classes in Moscow and St.
Petersburg were turning against Medvedev and Putin’s regime, they still remained supportive of
United Russia’s plans and policies. High levels of policy support remained even while the
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middle class deteriorated since 2010 (Trudolyubov 2019). Some, like the Institute for Social
Analysis and Forecasting, placed the middle class at just 15 percent of the population
(Kolesnikov 2019). However, Russians continued most of their spending habits from the 2000s.
According to the Ivanov Index by Sberbank, the middle class are individuals who have enough
money to travel abroad, eat out, and still save money (Sberbank 2020). However, even by this
metric the middle class’s disposable income had fallen by 7.3 percent by 2014 (Adrianova 2015).
Despite some shudders, the middle class stuck with its support for Putin. While it could
be due to lack of electoral options, the research here presents a variegated picture of preferences
and voting behavior coupled with middle class frailty. This frailty lies in several key
components. For one, and probably most importantly, Russian businesses were isolated, lacked
cohesion to bargain with the state, and were generally crushed under the weight of state capture.
Organized labor fared no better. The middle class’s access to labor organizations is nearly
entirely beholden to the state, which controls labor unions and associations. Additionally, while
both lower and middle income groups look to the state to solve their economic problems, the
middle class is unique in that their demands center around middle class interests that don’t
necessarily align with the lower income workers in Russian society. Finally, the Russian middle
class, like other Russian cohorts, remains trapped in informality, inconsistent employment in the
private sector, and dependence on side transfers to make ends meet.
Systemic frailty is inherent in the Russian middle class that goes beyond cultural or
historical antecedent. The supposed cultural limitations of Homo Soveticus, it has been argued, is
unable to explain this phenomenon. The Soviet citizen was far too focused on the short term and
has difficulty planning long term strategies without intervention from higher authority (Tyszka
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2009, 510) or ‘learned helplessness’ in the psychological literature.50 However, this explanation
applied to middle class vulnerability is limited. It doesn’t elaborate on how these systems change
across time (the fall of the Soviet Union) and space (between former Soviet countries). Per the
thesis of this paper, stronger structural forces impose a weaker or stronger will over its citizens
which react accordingly and to their own benefit.
Perhaps then religiosity plays an integral role in determining popular support for the
government after crises. The orthodox church pushes pro-state messages with the goal of
increasing social cohesion in exchange for government’s support for socially conservative goals
and values (Aslund 2006). Subservience to church could be construed as a steppingstone to
acquiescence to the state in Russian society. The current relationship between church and state
has been close enough for one research to comment “the policies of the president and even where
there are differences, the church's preference for a close relationship with state power has meant
that major church-state clashes have been avoided” (Aslund 2006, 186). It’s unlikely though that
the Orthodox church sees the state as a vehicle for all of its preferences.
Beyond cultural imposition, the frailty of the Russian middle class lies in their disposition
relative to the state and Putin’s governmental policies. The relative strength and weakness of
middle income earners rises and falls with the economic fortunes of Russia while clientelistic
politicians seek to soften the true impacts of recessions for its constituents. The government is
particularly clued into these cycles of losses and gain as the impact on important voting
constituents is important to predict. One of these estimation methods is the state owned Sberbank
which uses the ‘Ivanov Index’ to measure the relative lifestyle and consumer confidence of
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middle income workers. Ivanov, a common family name in Russia is meant to represent the
average middle class consumer is able to engage in frivolous purchases (Trudolyubov 2019).
The Ivanonv Index may point to a decline in economic confidence in the middle class,
but this is not the whole story. By middle class standards of education, Russia is similar to other
European countries whose populations are comprised in large party by middle income
professionals. Data from the World Value Survey is useful in explaining this fact. Surveys from
waves 1999, 2008, and 2017 were correlated with household income deciles that had been
broken into thirds.51 The first through third deciles represented the lower income groups and
eight through tenth were coded as high-income households. The rest were left in the middle
income box. This coding scheme follows OECD (2019) standard that estimates the middle class
as 75 to 200 percent of the median income that I applied to the WVS’s decile standard.52 I
correlate this data with educational attainment in Figure 4-6 and cluster responses by survey
waves from 1999 to 2017. The probabilities of each income group are then shown for each
educational level.53 The results indicate that there is a strong correlation between educational
achievement and incomes but there is no distinguishing probability between income groups when
an individual has “some college”. Interestingly, the probability of a middle income earner being
a graduate slip a little when moving away from the “some college” category. This information
insinuates that middle income earners in Russia are less likely to be full graduates. A factor
which may limit employment opportunities moving across industries or entering the private
sector workforce where education is more valuable.
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WVS data conditions income groupings based on a “Harmonised variable: Country-specific income
scales labelled by national currency were recoded… according to the buildet deciles of the net household
income distribution” (Inglehart et al. 2021, 32).
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See Appendix A.1 for income coding.
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See Appendix C.4 for questions and coding.
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Figure 4-6 Predicted Probability for Educational Attainment by Income
The middle class’s employment opportunities are affected by the level of state
management of the economy as well. While this has already been explored by previous literature,
the extent of the dependence is such that public sector employment is nearly all encompassed by
the middle class. According to Mareeva and Ross (Mareeva and Ross 2020, 575), the middle
class is comprised almost 50 percent of state worker and only 26 percent are in the private
sphere. This would indicate that there is still a substantial percentage who work for private
companies. These workers are likely to face harsh work environments and unfair pay schemes as
these workers often suffer from the limitations that are placed on their employers due to high
levels of SMotE.
Informal associations in Russia lead to frequent incidences of employer-employee abuses
that typically go unpunished (Siegelbaum 2004). Shortfalls in profit are caused by the extractive
and coercive practices of state actors are balanced against employee salaries, downstream. These
workers are also often paid by extracontractual black and white salaries. It is estimated that 50
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percent of salaries take the form of envelope payments that are off the books and help to keep
employers keep costs “flexible” for businesses (Becker and Vasileva 2017, 90). Worse still for
the employees, private industries are in the habit of using completed products to fill in salary
gaps. These products can be given out in lieu of pay which then have to be turned around and
sold to street vendors by the employee. Tools to tool makers, bras issued to brasserie factory
workers, tires for tire plant employees, etcetera.
Black and white salaries are not just restricted to the realm of the private sector either.
They proliferate in and outside both public and private sectors. Employees are generally weak
with regard to private or public management who use different methods and tricks to ensure
workers remain quiescent. Often employees will be downgraded to an at-work state which
affords less protection and recourse against being fired. The inability to respond is merely a
reflection of the restrictive reforms against collective bargaining in the workplace (Becker and
Vasileva 2016, 90).
Since the 2002 Russian Labor Code changes, unions could no longer block firings or
bargain directly against management. Strikes were largely prohibited where full employee
support wasn’t first achieved. Corruption and neopatrimonial practices had tightened the
clientelistic screws that connected the state with the national union, the FNPR, which made
national level collective action untenable. While unionization rates are relatively high, it is
estimated that Russian union representation is overexaggerated at approximately 35 percent since
national unionization rates are not reported by labor organizations (Christensen 2017).
Employees gain little utility out of unionization as a result of having to bargain with employers
and management directly and independently. Unions provide very little in the form of a
bargaining chip against either private or public employers
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4.8.1. The Middle Class and the State
Russia’s GDP dropped by 7.9 percent in 2009 and continued to decline into the 2010s by
approximately 2 percent each year in tandem with rising inflation rates (Kolesnikov 2015).
Although major Russian banks were spared, unemployment and poverty grew by over 8 points.
At the time, Vladimir Putin was limited for running for a third consecutive term and so Prime
Minister Dimitry Medvedev was elected president from 2008 to 2012. The political survival and
reelection of Vladimir Putin in 2012, while challenged as being highly fraudulent by observers,
may have been related to how government policy responded to middle class interests and needs
as a constituent group. The Russian government enacted a spending package that amounted to
nearly 7 percent of Russia’s overall GDP which included provisions to aid workers such as tax
cuts aimed at income and increased pensions and wages (Bogetic 2013).
The decline of Russia’s economic position fell further when sanctions from the US and
EU were filed after it annexed Crimea from Ukraine and quasi-invaded Ukraine’s Donbas
region. Still, voters remained committed to the United Russia party and reelected Vladimir Putin
in 2012, and 2018. Indeed, Putin’s policies pull more in the middle than they do in the lower or
higher social strata. Lower income workers are more likely to demand higher amounts of
transfers and subsidies that work against Putin’s neopatrimonial market policies. Simultaneously,
the highest earners are more likely to be exposed to governmental overreach when their interests
clash or compete. According to Treisman’s (2014, 384) study, the highest earners were more
likely to hold negative interpretations of the economy during this time. Figure 4-7 contradicts
this assessment.54 It presents HSE data that demonstrates the respondents’ likelihood to indicate
their satisfaction with their life at present predicted by class. The results show that most of the
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See Appendix C.5 for questions and coding.
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optimism for the economy lies in the middle and upper strata. Interestingly, the middle class is
more likely to respond “both yes and no” regarding satisfaction than either upper or lower class
individuals.

Figure 4-7 Probability of Respondent’s Satisfaction with Life at Present by Income
It may be the case that economic outlooks are colored by the tangible divide that exists
between state dependent and private sector workers (Mareeva and Ross 2020). I suspect these
differences are marginal as they often fail to elucidate how middle class Russians vote for
illiberal parties in either instance. In a 2018 poll it was shown that 2/3rds of both public and
private sector workers wanted to increase the state’s control over the economy, revive national
traditions, and censor the media (Ross 2020). The middle class is oriented with other groups such
as the Young Conservative Movement and have an overall philosophy of Russia as being neither
fully liberal nor authoritarian. Support for market reform and an economic system in favor of
free markets is less clear among the middle class who simultaneously want reform but claim that
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the state’s current role in the economy is insufficient. According to a Carnegie and Levada center
poll in 2018, 63 percent said the state’s presence is insufficient while 48 percent claimed private
enterprise was more efficient than SOEs which demonstrates the contradictory overlap
(Kolesnikov and Volkov 2020).
The capacity and self-sufficiency of the Russian middle class reached its zenith in 2008 at
the height of the Russian economy. Since then, it has largely been focused on defending the
gains it has achieved as Russia stagnates under the weight of direct intervention in the economy
and state capture. Moscow is motivated by middle class clientelism, and Putin’s economic
policies call for a robust middle class emboldened within a strong economy. Indeed, Russia’s
long-term strategic economic initiatives, sometimes referred to as the Gref 2010 and the Gref
2020, were aimed at the socioeconomic stability provided by enriching Russia’s core middle
stratum.55 The vulnerabilities the middle class experience in 2009 and onward provided
politicians a chance to buy off this important constituency at lower cost.
4.8.2. Limited Options in the Middle
Russia’s private sector was devastated by the 2008 crisis and lost nearly $1 trillion in market
value. Russia was unable to make up those losses the following year and middle income workers
in the private sector faced a dubious scenario. Those companies able to pay wages consistently
were far outmatched by those who couldn’t keep up. Instead of expanding state ownership, Putin
began selling off state assets while simultaneously directing state owned banks to buy out the
foreign owned debt of Russian companies (Sutela 2010). Companies would owe their debt to
state banks and, as a result, they removed international management for companies. Meanwhile,

55

The Gref plan was named after Herman Gref, the minister of economic development (2000-2007) and
trade who was tasked by Putin to strategize Russia’s entry into the top five global economies.
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the Russian banks were held afloat by unsecured loans from the government to select banks
which created a chain of ownership back to the government.
Personal debt was also refinanced and redistributed to working families. According to
Rosstat data from 2018, 75 percent of Russians have no savings and 19 percent are estimated to
be heavily burdened by debt. Economic minister Maxim Oreshkin stated that Russians are stuck
in a debt trap where many owe more than their annual income and yet continue to take on more
debt (Korsunskaya, Fabrichnaya, and Voronova 2019). The consumerist nature of the debt
suggests a middle class bent, who have proceeded to make outsized purchases in order to keep
up their standards of living. The tethering of debt-soaked workers to high levels of debt has made
employment security highly valued. Leaving a job presents a host of risks and hazards for those
Russians overleveraged even if the economy was performing better.
The quality of borrowing goes beyond just consumerism as loans have taken on the duties
of welfare in order to meet basic needs (Bovt 2018). For the middle class, debt provides a bridge
towards a middle class lifestyle but on shaky ground. As such, it seems relevant that middle class
Russians would be less likely to reject Putin’s offers of patronage for votes. In exchange for
loyalty, they receive government sponsorship for water costs and electricity for subsidized
housing (Belton 2012). The method of procuring assistance helps cement recipients in place.
Support is held hostage by welfare programs that lack a central redistributive program or means
tested benefits (Remington 2018, 408). Therefore, access to these goods and services is highly
dependent on bureaucratic decision making. The shrinkage of middle class incomes makes
dependence on transfers even higher, at least on the surface (Maryganova 2017). While the
financial situation remains dire, middle class Russians are still more likely to visit other countries
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and take out loans to improve their living conditions compared to lower-income cadres
(Tikhonova 2017, 336).
4.9. Evidence for Middle Class Clientelism in Russia
The middle class is unlikely to collectively mobilize against their private employers or the state.
Indeed, it is quite dependent on pernicious state actors. Subsidies that correspond to employment
benefits enfeebles the middle class to seek out other opportunities which may provide better
security. These employment benefits provide entitlements such as healthcare, paid vacations, and
housing and are managed by the FNPR through Russia’s Social Insurance Fund paid by
employer contributions. Housing subsidies are typically represented by cash-in-kind settlements
or guaranteed availability for low-rent apartment. Elderly workers are especially vulnerable.
Russia’s aging population is reliant on pension funds which the state bank rolls and subsidizes
(Belton 2012). One of the main predictors for an individual to fall out of the middle class is to
retire without thorough pension support (Mareeva 2020).
Beyond employment benefits, public and private sector employees also receive
intangibles that fill in salary gaps. For instance, clientelistic bargains with workers enhance
government employment with the “opportunity to earn informal rents” which “binds publicsector workers to the regime… these privileges and side-payments simultaneously produce
private-sector grievances” (Rosenfeld 2021, 123). Such arrangements are not restricted to the
public sphere, either, and manifest in private enterprise and employee relationships as well.
These intangible arrangements are necessary for middle class workers to fill in shortfalls. There
are two distinct locations of support. Social benefits are provided through employers to some
degree, but Russian workers are mostly dependent on the state for rent distribution in the form of
social goods, and pensions (Tikhonova 2017, 344).
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The social benefits offered for middle class employment could explain inertness among
employees who remain fragile and constrained by clientelistic propositions. Certainly, it provides
some logical explanations as to why middle class individuals would be oriented towards selling
their support to state capturing elites as it gives them access to the resources, they need to
maintain their status. Decreases in status is a unified feeling within the social stratum which
reduces the costs of clientelism in the middle class across the whole group. This effect is
consistent even when socioeconomic vulnerabilities depreciate the material status of those of the
middle class to the point of falling out of it. Economist Kirill Tremasov, director of Loko-Invest
writes, “Once people realize that everyone is worse off, not just them, they will again feel they
are ‘middle class.’ Right now they have not yet reconciled themselves to the fact that the decline
is serious and long term” (Trudolyubov 2019).56 Social and material losses might not be as
debilitating when those losses are shared across all individuals.
Economic deficits drive the middle class to seek out and sure up its access to the utilities
and the resources it desires, and the Russian regime organizes the state in a way that delivers
higher quality goods. Voting against the regime may decrease the consistency of patronage,
though there are few alternatives otherwise. Outside voices that pose a threat are often coopted.
A policy of the Putin administration to decrease outside pressure and ensure internal cohesion
(Khmelnitskaya 2021). For instance, the economic expert Aleksei Kudrin, who wrote a paper
detailing how to improve the economic situation, was viewed as a possible boon to opposition
parties in Russia and was brought into the regime and placed in charge of policy and has since
become a strong supporter of Putin’s government and its policies (Khmelnitskaya 2021, 636).

The quote in Russian: «Люди понимают, что у остальных доходы и уровень жизни также упали,
поэтому я не хуже, значит, остаюсь средним классом. Просто сейчас еще не все смирились с тем, что
снижение уровня жизни – это всерьез и надолго».
56
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4.9.1. Modeling Russian Middle Class Clientelism
Democratic outcomes for a society where the state maintains near total control over the
economic lives of individuals and firms is one where those same individuals will be unable to
avoid cooptation in the first place. The party-state serves the interests of voters, and voters, in
turn, serve the interests of the party-state. This is shown to be true even amongst the middle class
whose interests so often get conflated with those who lean democrat in elections. In Russia, the
systematic expression of vulnerabilities in the middle class has eroded their capacity to gain
resources outside of state control or to overcome the collective action problems needed to
promote change. In conjunction, the failure for an independent capitalist class to materialize has
meant that the state often triumphs over the market in nearly all aspects of economic and social
life. The result is a middle class that is more likely to be willing participants whereby welfare
and government services are offered in exchanged for electoral votes. Loyalty to United Russia
Party is consistent throughout middle income earners because the costs of voice or exit is too
steep in scenarios that don’t have a viable alternative.
In return, we should see a noticeable increase of confidence in Putin’s administration and
bureaucracy by the middle class. Participants in clientelism will report higher quality public
goods due to better access. They will also report an increased likelihood of participating in
corrupt activity representative of Russia’s neopatrimonial system since their electoral
participation makes them less vulnerable to the crosswinds of prosecution. To measure these
aspects, I rely on the World Values Survey (WVS) data from 2010-2014 and 2017-2019 that
considered Russian respondents’ assessment of public goods along with questions about
corruption. To better model this behavior, I create a two-factor analysis using a clientelist and
corruption index of WVS questions that pertain to those two variables. I also estimate likelihood
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of protest and respondent’s satisfaction with the regime. I predict that these values will be
integrally correlated with an overall preference that the regime is serving middle class needs.
The theory of this dissertation posits that when high levels of state management of the
economy interact with a vulnerable middle class that alters the costs of buying off the middle
class with targeted patronage and goods. The far-reaching hand of the dominant party projected
over the state’s economy provides the resources that allow it to bargain at much lower premiums
and simultaneously offer more. Meanwhile, crisis and collective action problems make the
middle class willing recipients and participants of graft to support their own position. Monitoring
loyalty is also cheaper in this case because defection costs are driven up by the state’s dominance
over economy which depresses private industry as an alternative preference for middle class
survival. Active engagement by middle income voters in corruption also keeps defection low. If
we recall Hirschman’s thesis, without alternative options, the consumer is forced into a position
of an almost default loyalty. Voice presents too many hazards and is unlikely to offer much
reward. Instead, quiescence would be a better course of action in this case. Those who do attempt
to voice their displeasure are nearly always met with counter protests who seek to reinforce the
status quo.
I again rely on a measurement of middle income households by coding respondents that
were placed in the 4th through 7th deciles, per OECD standards (2019) which produced a
proportion of middle income respondents on par with Sberbank’s estimation although quite high
at 60 percent. This value is stable between 2014 and 2019 survey waves. Predicting support for
clientelistic United Russia was simple given that respondents answer questions as to which party
they would vote for in the next election. I coded United Russia voters as one and all other
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respondents as 0.57 The mean value here was .49 which indicates a relatively even split in the
voter pool while simultaneously matching United Russia’s electoral percentages for the State
Duma. When regressed in a probit model, the results indicate that middle income respondents are
0.18 times more likely to vote for United Russia compared to other households. Figure 4-8
presents this data with a line at 0.45 probability as a reference line. These results indicate a high
likelihood of middle class voters supporting Russia’s clientelist party.

Figure 4-8 Probability of United Russia Voter
With this supporting evidence in mind, I next estimate middle income respondents in
relation to clientelism and corruption. I follow the guidance of (Bue, Sen, and Lindberg (2021)
who created a factorial indices of party linkage and vote buying clientelism. Using data from the
same WVS waves, I predicted a two-factor analysis using middle income households. These are
clientelism which are estimates of vote buying using public goods and services, and corruption
which is a participatory process where agents engage in illegal and informal acts. The thought
here is that middle class Russians both are engaged by vote buying techniques and actively

57

See Appendix C.6 for questions, coding, and model results.
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contribute to clientelism and corruption. This reciprocal process keeps voters imbedded and loyal
to Russia’s neopatrimonial system.
I use maximum likelihood factor analysis using most likelihoods to produce two factor
composite scores using survey responses to questions about confidence in public goods and the
justifiability of performing corrupt actions.58 Public goods estimates asked respondents to rate
their confidence in courts, the police, government, and civil services from a great deal to none at
all. A lower value indicates more trust as the variable was coded 1 to 4, with 4 being no
confidence. The logic with this composite score is that clientelism participants will have much
higher confidence in these goods due to access and targeted spending based on income group. If
not, then it is likely that targeted spending is not occurring. The second factorial predictor used
responses to the justification of claiming benefits not entitled to, avoiding fares, cheating on
taxes, and accepting a bribe. These values ranged from never justified to always justified on a
scale from 1 to 10. A higher value indicates corruption. This bifurcated factor analysis provided
the two dependent variables clientelism and corruption. Since these values are continuous
between their minimum and maximum scores, I use OLS regressions with middle income
participants and United Russia partisanship.59
Table 4-1 show some supportive evidence that clientelism and corruption are
corresponding with middle income household respondents with statistical significance at the 0.05
and 0.01 cut-offs, respectively. The estimators for clientelism suggest that both middle income
households and United Russia supporters recognize more trust in public goods compared to nonUnited Russia voters and individuals outside the middle class. A similar result was gained for
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See Appendix C.7 for factor analysis and details of LR test.
Each model was processed again with multiple control variables for robustness checks. Stata estat tests
were used as well to ensure estimators were not inflated due to model overspecification. See Appendix C.9.
Summary of Statistics is provided on page in Appendix C.8.
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corruption regarding the middle class, however the coefficient flipped for United Russia
supporters. Vote buying, as a tool of the United Russia party, shows some indication that it is
successful in connecting supporters with better goods and services.60
Table 4-1 Estimates of Middle Income Household with Clientelism and Corruption
Clientelism Corruption
Score
Score
Middle Income
-0.157*
0.124**
Household
(0.049)
(0.037)
United Russia
Supporter

-0.363**
(0.034)

-0.114*
(0.047)

0.262
(0.055)

-0.031
(0.069)

N

2,858

2,858

R2

0.04

0.01

Constant

Note: OLS Regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01 * p<0.05
Standard errors are clustered by respondent region: 9 clusters
Negative value for clientelism means higher confidence.
Positive value for corruption means more justified.

These results fall in line with the theory and expectations of clientelization in the
literature. A positive value for corruption signifies that middle income households are also more
likely to actively participate in clientelism and abuse of the system. Either out of recognition that
participation is necessary for survival or that such participation is less likely to be punished by
cooperating with United Russia. United Russia voters were less likely to justify corruption which
indicates that lower and higher income voters may have been biasing the indicator. This
corresponds with whom the regime targets as a principle of vote buying and which constituents
are given legal relief from corrupt activity.

60
I ran the models again looking at upper and lower income participants and middle income as a reference
category. I found similar results with lower income participants showing negative results regarding clientelism and
corruption. Upper income households being statistically insignificant as a predictor of clientelism but were stronger
predictor of corruption. This stronger predictor of corruption demonstrates more evidence for the power vertical and
how it affects Russians on a basis of wealth. See Appendix C.10 for table and results.
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Finally, the results are visualized across all three household income groups to
demonstrate how middle class effects correlate with each factor score. Figure 4-9 presents the
predicted margins of both factor composite scores using all three income groups.61 The left panel
presents the Clientelism composite score and shows a sharp decline when moving from left, or
higher clientelist scores, to the right which indicates the lowest score. Higher household incomes
demonstrate a similar downward trend though not as steep as middle income households. On the
other hand, lower income household have a high likelihood to report the lowest confidence in
public goods. Both higher and lower income households had similarly low incidences of
probability for justifying corruption. However, lower income families were much less likely to
justify it in the first place. Middle income households had a much higher probability of
indicating that corruption was much more likely to be tolerated.

Figure 4-9 Predicted Probabilities of Household Income and Factor Scores
61

Figure was generated using an ordered logit of clientelism and corruption scores by income groups.
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4.9.2. Paying off the Middle
The results indicate a Russian middle class that is akin to Bradshaw et al.’s (1993) thesis who
described middle class citizens a likely to support illiberal parties and policies for fear of losing
out on status and resources. As a result of the ‘low bargaining power’ of the middle class, they
are left with little choice but to seek out patronage from their political leaders (Auzan 2009, 264).
Those same political leaders reciprocate with better goods and services in exchange for electoral
support. The evidence for this was a positive composite score for clientelism associated with
middle income respondents. This could mean that modern party platforms are not as appealing as
redistributive schemes that favor the middle over lower income workers. This results in a harsh
bargain with what amounts to as a “servile class” of dependent workers whose livelihoods are
intertwined with their government’s continued existence (Melville 2017, 227).
Those citizens in the fragile middle are more anxious for change. Measuring the cost of
defection is difficult but we can estimate it by looking at participation in corrupt behavior as well
as indirectly observe its implications on the ground. Table 4-1 has given some indication that
respondents in the middle income group were much more likely to justify corrupt activity. How
much does this indicate that they would actively participate is unclear, but it does indicate that
such respondents are more willing to justify the behavior which we could infer as participation
given the additional evidence that has been presented here. Even more so than United Russian
voters who are less likely to justify corruption when considering both lower- and higher-class
voters. Participation guarantees access, is likely to avoid consequences if the voter remains loyal,
and it produces a cheap monitoring effect within the neopatrimonial system by corrupting the
participants.
Evidence from the data and clientism scores also shows a strong correlation between
United Russia supporters, the middle class, and respondent’s clientism scores. Figure 4-10 shows
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the linear prediction of a one unit increase to a respondent’s clientelism score by middle income
status and United Russia support.62 What the figure shows is that being middle income and
having a lower clientelism factor score, which indicates more clientelism and confidence in
public goods is significantly correlated with supporting United Russia. Those middle class
survey takers that do not support United Russia are more likely to indicate a statistically
insignificant effect of lower clientelism scores. Non-middle income participants indicated the
inverse effect by showing a insignificant correlation between supporting United Russia and
clientelism, whereas those who do not are likely to report lower confidence in public goods. The
result from this figure provides some connective evidence that not only does the middle class
acknowledge higher levels of clientelism, but they are more likely to support United Russia
when accounting for this effect.

Figure 4-10 Linear Prediction of Clientelism Score by Middle Income and United Russia
Supporter
62

Figure 4-10 was generated using a regression of middle income variable interacted with the United
Russia variable. See appendix C.8 for variable details.
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Support for United Russia by middle income voters may also indicate lack of alternative
economic incentives necessary to avoid cooptation or fewer alternative party choices to defect to.
The latter is quite weak as competitive politics have eroded in conjunction with United Russia
fusing itself to the state along with middle class clientelism. As for the former, there is little
room for supporting markets or entrepreneurship as the private sector is tied directly into Putin’s
policies and is codependent as well. It is estimated that entrepreneurial activity declined from
15.2 to 7.5 percent from 2000 to 2018 (Kolesnikov 2019). Yet, there is some room for change.
Polled Russians believe that independent business is still more efficient than SOEs (Kolesnikov
and Volkov 2020). Russians often express high hopes for building a country that their children
can live in as economically independent but concurrently have no interest in pursuing such
independence themselves. This attitude makes sense given the rampant violations of private
property that occurs, and the corrupt practices small businesses must endure. The ‘night of long
shovels’ in 2016 is just one instance in which nearly 100 shops were destroyed extrajudicially in
Moscow as a part of a systemic process of property seizures.63
The middle class in Russia are beholden to a regime that dangles carrots in exchange for
active support or quiescence. Whether viable electoral alternatives exist may not be as important
as the notion of keeping continuity with United Russia and maintaining a system of benefits for
individual citizens. Then there is the payoff for United Russia and Putin who are more likely to
enjoy support from the middle class. This not only manifests as political electoral support during
elections but is seen in the higher demands for public goods from illiberal politicians. It is no
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The ‘night of long shovels’ refers to a 2016 event in Moscow when city officials and authorities
bulldozed and leveled approximately 100 shops (kiosks and shopping centers) across the city in an attempt to
enforce city codes and permit processes. Many of the shops had been there for decades and there it was highly
speculated small-scale entrepreneurs were targeted. This was part of a process by Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin
to create a more modern Moscow where shops are built by the state and rented out through an auctioneering process.
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wonder then that Russian politicians are able to act in illiberal fashion at behest of their
constituents who often support these outcomes.
4.10.

The Future of Russia

Loyalty has yielded inconsistent rewards in recent years. Putin has acted against middle class
interests in several ways with cutbacks to spending and changes to pension programs. The
retirement age for pensioners to receive benefits has been raised along with reductions to
subsidized programs that the middle class take advantage of. The changes to Russia’s pension
fund are especially sobering given that Russia’s aging population will be increasingly dependent
on stipends and government support in the near future. Then there are those workers off the
books who represent approximately twenty percent of the working population that missing from
Russia’s pension fund (Kolesnikov 2019). To make matters worse, healthcare professionals are
in short supply due to education not being worth the cost often in Russia (Kotov et al. 2018).
This has only recently changed when the net gains of attending college finally outpaced the costs
in 2020 (Melianova et al. 2020).
Still, support for the patronage habits of Putin’s government remains high among
Russia’s middle class. In fact, based on Levada polling, the voters who desire the most change
are located in the lower and higher income strata along with those who are approaching
retirement age (Kolesnikov and Volkov 2020). This is obviated by who shows up to protest most
frequently, namely individuals in lower and higher income brackets. This may be a scenario
where the one begets the other. Or poor social services for being a nonvoter leads to higher
likelihoods of protest participation. Then there is also the lack of coherence among opposition
protestors who rally against election fraud, changes to pensions and handouts, changes to how
trains operate, and human rights abuses (Gilbert 2016). In fact, many protests are often in
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response to rollbacks to handouts and are driven to maintain the status quo of their benefits
(Christensen 2016).
Then there are the effects of being bought off by Putin’s policies to support him
electorally. Data has shown that public sector employment is a strong negative predictor for not
participating in protests which indicates that rewards for voting correctly comes in the form of
patronage but also that not protesting guarantees access to those payoffs (Rosenfeld 2021, 124).
Middle income individuals often fall within this class of employment. When survey participants
were asked in the 2014 WVS surveys whether they had or would participate in lawful
demonstrations, 9 percent participants who identified as middle income reported the affirmative.
That number was 13.5 percent for the other income groups. By the 2018 survey, that number had
risen to 11.7 percent for middle income respondents but was still lower than other income
groups.
4.10.1. The Response to Covid-19
Protests have occurred more frequently in Russia since 2019. The decline of disposable incomes
has led to a more protest ready population who was not previously motivated by economic issues
to mobilize. Such protests mobilize on a hair-trigger where “the economic situation may be
creating a background against which any disappointment can provoke a large protest”
(Snegovaya 2020). The global economic depression that followed the Covid-19 pandemic has
also spurred protest in Russia as well as the demand for oil declined precipitously in 2020 due to
lockdowns and work-from-home orders has slowed Russia’s growth trends even further.
Putin’s rating had reached their lowest ebb since the onset of the pandemic crisis
(Snegovaya 2020). Perhaps to shore up control in the wake of declining support, Putin’s
government has responded by rewriting much of the Russian Constitution in 2020. This
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centralized more authority to the Kremlin and allows the Russian president to run for office ad
infinitum because it removes consecutive term limits. The changes were held to a referendum in
July 2020 with 78 percent of voters approving the measures. Included with the constitutional
changes were several other caveats such as banning gay marriage, elevating Russian law over
international treaties, and ensuring Russian educational standards conformed to federal
mandates.
Despite the amendments being passed by a wide margin, polling data showed very little
enthusiasm for the measures among the voting public (Kolesnikov and Volkov 2020). However,
lack of enthusiasm did not translate at the polls either due to voting malfeasance, polling data
inconsistencies, or lack of options credible alternatives. In Russia, alternatives still remain scarce
despite desires for change. Kolesnikov and Volkov (2020) show a growing tolerance for political
change, but disagreement remains high over who should lead that change. For instance, 20
percent of Russians still see Putin as a potential agent of modernization and most still support
him when asked to choose between alternative leadership candidates. Compared to Alexei
Navalny, the much-touted opposition leader in western media, who has less than five percent
support among polled Russians.
4.11.

Conclusion

Russia presents a post-communist case where state capture was produced by high levels of
SMotE. This state primacy over the economy allowed United Russia and Vladimir Putin to
dominate more aspects of the social and political lives of citizens. Taken with vulnerabilities in
the middle class after the crises in the 1990s and the late 2000s, the middle class presents a costeffective voter base to clientelize and expand state capture. Their penchant to exchange support
for better access to universal public goods has transformed Russian society into a much weaker
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democracy as a result of voter support for clientelistic parties. The middle class has very few
alternatives and buys into vote buying programs willingly as it is likely that prodemocratic
changes would fundamentally erode the middle class’s own access to resources and their
stability. State erosion through economic failures is not enough to break this loyalty chain.
Democracy can do little but stay constrained without a strong force for democratic politics in the
country.
I have demonstrated in this chapter that the middle class is more likely to be clientelized
by political elites and participate in corruption rather than be a bulwark of democracy. This is
because the private sector never fully developed to the point where it could provide a secure
counterweight to the state capture demands of the government. Decisions that began during a
politically contentious time in the 1990’s would ultimately undermine the independence and
capacity of private companies. Instead, the state stepped in to fulfill and manage as many
economic roles as possible which left very few credible alternatives for middle class success.
Those individuals at the top and bottom of Russia’s society are more likely to contend for change
and advocate for systemic changes to Russia’s neopatrimonial system but those in the middle
class find themselves in a dependent position to Putin’s policies.
Russia’s future seems uncertain. If the economic condition continues to deteriorate apace
then living standards will continue to be dragged down for the middle class. This may reach a
breaking point where the state is no longer able to offer enough rents to settle the difference for
being in or falling out of the middle class. We may see that more Russians become willing
participants in protests. However, changes to the Russian constitution and reinforcement of the
autocratic systems in Russia in 2020 limit what a mobilized group may even be able to achieve.
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Then there are the limitations of Russian civil society wherein all aspects of social
organization are dependent on the state. Russia is far from fully totalitarian and there is room for
a functioning civil society to operate (Greene 2020, 92). However, the state’s level of
disengagement with civil society and the compartmentalization of urbanized centers that are
spread out over the largest country on the planet has limited the effectiveness of civil protest and
further increases apathy.
Perhaps the Russian case provides some insight as to where Poland may be going. That
country has shifted from low polarization to polarization defined by populist rhetoric. Like most
countries in Eastern Europe, it lacks a coherent organized labor component in society and SMotE
has been growing at a high rate since the 2008 crisis. The middle class has begun to decline as
well. Poland presents a new way of thinking about post-communist politics; one where the state
and free markets vie for political and economic authority and the middle class is split between
state and market loyalties.
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5. POLAND
In Russia, the failure to develop independent markets, outside the purview of the state, placed the
middle class in a position where they were more likely to support party-state politics and corrupt
behavior in exchange for a more secure position in society. This preset stance is so pervasive
that, even when the economic and social wellbeing of the middle class deteriorated with Russia’s
overall economy, the middle class has remained loyal to illiberal political parties and continue to
support President Putin’s entrenchment in Russian society. The effects of high levels of SMotE
in capitalist electoral societies lowers the costs of buying off entire sections of the electorate
which has a unifying effect on the middle class and negative repercussions for democracy
development.
When there are alternative economic forces in society the middle class has more
opportunity to arrange itself in more diverse interest groups, align with a variety of political
parties, and be less prone to support illiberal state capture behavior. Or at least theoretically.
Poland is such a case that has gone from command economy to market capitalism to the reentrenchment of the state into the economy in the span of 25 years. From its first mover
advantage in the destruction of its communist system in Central and Eastern Europe to the
successful implementation of shock-therapy to induce economic liberalism that inspired its CEE
neighbors, Poland was unique in its development of a prolonged democratic movement
throughout the 1990s and 2000s. However, this direction changed after the 2008-2009 financial
crisis. While Poland was able to maintain positive growth rates during those and the proceeding
years, its dependence on foreign capital provided the impetus for a wake-up call to the Polish
middle class who experienced a new set of vulnerabilities.
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As with Russia, Poland’s organized labor apparatus had been largely dismantled in the
1990s in the wake of a dedicated movement to liberalize all facets of the economy. An ironic
outcome for a country that was able to break its communist yolk through worker activism
associated with the Solidarity Union in the 1980s. Without organized labor, the newly minted
Polish middle class, comprised of government workers, professionals, and low-level
entrepreneurs, found itself deeply embedded in a free-market system that would begin to rip and
tear at society after 2008. In response, the Polish government did what Russia had done some 10
years earlier and became an activist in their economy in order to secure the stability of their
capitalist markets. This could be a case of Polanyi’s double-movement in Poland, but whereby
the state has responded by re-embedding its market within the government, rather than society
(Özgür and Özel 2013).
Polish state capitalism is unique in many ways. For instance, it balances the political
needs of the polity, especially those in the middle class, with the demands and corrupt practices
of politician’s who are motivated to seek out rents. The vulnerability expressed by the middle
class would ultimately give rise to populist parties and the political dominance of the Law and
Justice Party (PiS) who have ruled since 2015. This party, whose message is intrinsically middle
income oriented, redirects much of Poland’s class-based antagonisms towards nationalist and
cultural fervor. Furthermore, it has shifted elements of the middle class towards populism.
Polish citizens are now faced with a political party that advocates for an expanded state
welfare and resistance to liberal market principles. The capability of markets and businesses in
Poland since the 1990s has allowed the Polish middle class to gain class stability outside of
dependence on what populist and state capitalist policies could provide. However, the presence
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of both independent firms and moderate levels of state management in the economy has created
polarization amongst Poles. The middle class is no exception to this.
The split between its state-capitalist and liberal free-market future still seems up for grab
in Poland. It remains to be seen whether Poland descends down the path that was trailblazed by
its southern neighbor, Hungary, and continues its illiberal trajectory. At the current moment and
given the PiS’s capacity to reshape government institutions in favor of their continued political
dominance, retrograde democracy seems indicative of Poland’s current future. In the following
chapter, I layout the foundations of why Poland has become so polarized between its illiberal and
liberal middle class. I demonstrate that the middle class can be bought off when vulnerabilities
exist, and parties have enough economic power at their disposal to buy off enough of those
voters. However, participation in corruption will be less likely because of alternatives that the
middle class can defect towards. The result is a state that absorbs more economic decisions that
were once held by the market and a retrograding of democracy when enough of the middle class
vote for state capture parties.
5.1. The Solidarity Movement
Polish history after WWII is similar to that of most CEE countries. The country suffered greatly
during WWII. Not only had it comprised the major battle grounds of 1939 but 1944 as well and
absorbed the brunt of the Nazi regime’s Lebensraum policies and anti-Jewish pogroms as well as
Stalinist purges at Katyn. During the 1946 census, there were 11 million fewer Poles than in
1939 (Hardy 2009, 15). As Poland emerged from the carnage, deep behind the Soviet front. It
was quickly declared a people’s republic began a process of Stalinization along the Soviet
model. Stalin’s control over the country was extensive and went right down to the redrawn
borders of Poland. The Potsdam Declaration created a mass exodus of Poles from the East and
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who were resettled in former German territory that was now to be a part of the Polish People’s
Republic.64 Despite this, Poland retained a large semblance of politically active groups, although
often abused, along with a large degree of private land ownership in agriculture. A fact that made
it unique among CEE communist countries (Hardy 2009).
After WWII, there was a radical shift towards urbanization away from the agricultural
economy. Poland was entering a process of radical industrialization that would reshape it for the
next fifty years into an industrial center. Meanwhile, on the political front, Wladyslaw Gomulka
and Boleslaw Bierut were able to orchestrate the communist party’s coup over the multiparty
Sejm, Poland’s unicameral legislature, using subterfuge and outright oppression. Both Gomulka
and Bierut were members of the Polish Workers Party, the PPR which had been reestablished by
Stalin in 1942 to counter the Polish government-in-exile that had fled to the UK at the start of
WWII. An effort to legitimize Stalin’s designs for the country (Kulczycki 2002). After several
party mergers, the PPR eventually became the dominant Polish United Workers’ Party, PZPR,
which seized control of the country from 1948 until 1989.
The PZPR’s first steps in Poland was a massive nationalization campaign that conducted
the “total nationalization of the basic productive property of the state and the severe curtailment
of virtually all property rights” (Herman 1951, 501). Poland’s industries were compartmentalized
as SOEs managed directly by the state and the ruling PZPR party through its command economy
with the intention of rebuilding Poland and invigorating the state economy. In addition, large
tracts of land that were privately owned were also nationalized and redistributed amongst
Poland’s peasantry. Land hunger and large rural populations had always been a feature of Polish
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The Potsdam Conference of 1945 made Stalin’s gains in the Eastern European theater officially
sanctioned. The Red Armies occupation of much of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria
allowed Stalin to enact communist governments in each of these states and maintain them as a buffer against
Western Europe.

205
society and the PZPR saw this as an opportunity to increase its alliance between the urban and
rural proletariats (Kochanowicz 2014). However, polish agriculture was resistant to the
nationalization of agriculture and so large tracts of land remained privately owned throughout its
communist years.
Poland’s began investing heavily in heavy industry and capital accumulation at the
expense of consumer goods. This raised the Polish economy at the costs of living standards. The
Polish national income grew over 76 percent by 1950 and its nomenklatura ran system was
become completely imbedded by the 1960s (Hardy 2009, 15-16).65 This growth was not even,
however. Uneven growth across Polish society led to constant friction between workers, peasants
and their PZPR overlords. Riots and protests and resultant brutal oppressions recurred often. In
1956, 1970, 1976, and 1980, worker led strikes and protests were broken up with force followed
by a series of concessions (Hardy 2009, 4). After the 1970 protest, Polish leadership began to
integrate its economy further with the West through an import-led-growth strategy. This paved
the way for an increase in consumer goods but increased the government’s debt, decreased
industrial output, and increased monetary inflation going into the 1980s.
The success of activist movements in CEE communist countries was in large part because
the state was in the sole position to address the grievances of workers; as opposed to employers,
or social groups (David Ost 2009, 501). By the time the Solidarity movement emerged in 1980,
Poland had had a long history of activism and protest. By the 1970s, the global crisis of
stagnation and reduction in production had arrived in globally integrated Poland as well. In
response, the Solidarity committee, founded in Gdansk, had mobilized the largest working-class

The Polish nomenklatura were, similar to the Soviet model, comprised of the ruling elite in Poland’s
socialist society. They made up the managerial class and were appointed from PZPR lists for their ideological
reliability and compatibility with the communist command economy system (Tymiński 2017).
65
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movement since WWII in an effort to gain concessions and changes from the government. The
PZPR, at first unsure how to handle the situation, decided to implement martial law under
General Jaruselski’s oppressive leadership. However, the stage was set for the end of
communism, not only in Poland but across Central and Eastern Europe.
5.1.1. The End of Communist Poland
Poland’s transition from communism to liberalism had high amounts of interparty cooperation,
coordination, and, ultimately, success. Indeed, Poland’s overall success in transforming into
Europe’s ‘tiger’ economy with a robust democracy at its center perhaps colored expectations for
other post-communist CEE countries to follow suit (Harding 2009). Poland’s success in
liberalizing most aspects of its society and economy is unique and should be understood as such.
However, Poland’s process of state capture and re-etatization should remind the reader of
Russia’s experience. Poland’s success in liberalizing was limited in its inability to completely
exchange SOEs for free markets. It was unable to fully extract the state from all aspects of the
market. SMotE remained a key aspect of the Polish economy after liberalization as a means of
guaranteeing the social compact between Poles and the government.
Since 1945, Poland had gone down the path of communist state managed economy and
maintained that status in a less than convincing fashion compared to its CEE neighbors. The
collaborative energies of the Polish peasant economy were robust enough to allow them to
maintain an independent network of farmers and private landowners even within its socialistic
society. Agriculture workers in Poland even had their own party, the PSL or Polish Peasant
Party, which was dedicated to farmers and independent landowner’s interests in the Sejm ((Staar
1958, 202). While this party was oppressed after 1948, its potency was such that it reemerged in
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the late 1980s as one of the driving forces for liberalization and the continuation for protections
of Poland’s small-scale landholders.
Beyond independent farmers, the Polish economy had been opened up to the financial
vicissitudes of western capitalism in the wake of First Secretary Edward Gierek’s policies in the
1970s. Gierek began to take on large amounts of debt, mostly from the United States and
Western Germany, in order to rehabilitate Poland’s industry and to open up Poland’s markets for
imported consumer goods (Forestier-Peyrat and Ironside 2020). Per Jane Hardy (2009, 21), this
realigning of the economy towards western markets would undo communist Poland’s fortunes in
the end. Unfortunately for Gierek, the global economic crisis at the end of the decade crushed the
Polish economy and Poland’s sizeable debt made matters worse.
Gierek was replaced by Jaruselski in 1981 out of fears that a Soviet intervention would
respond to the growing protest movements. Many of the labor organizations spearheaded by the
Solidarity movement were repressed but the economic shortfall could not be corrected. Along
with the repressions there were debilitating price and wage adjustments, Jaruzelski’s junta
attempted to reform socialism further and began to introduce markets mechanisms and economic
freedoms (Lewis 1994). Under the guise of socialist reforms, many in the nomenklatura abused
their privileged positions to gain ownership and direct control over parts of state-owned assets
and enterprises. SOEs were stripped of their profitable operations which were then sold out to
foreign buyers on Poland’s black market (Hardy 2009, 25).
The writing was on the wall for the PZPR. Without the support of the nomenklatura, the
reduction of Soviet influence, and the continued collapse of the economy, the Polish government
entered talks with what remained of Solidarity’s leadership. Communism in Poland ended in a
series of round table discussions which resulted in a semi-free election in 1989 that the newly
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formed Solidarity party dominated. They gained a largest percentage of seats in the Sejm that
legally allowed to be contested. Unable to form a government, Jaruzelski stepped aside and let
Solidarity leader Mazowiecki to lead the new government. Poland was on track to undergo a
series of liberal reforms that would soon reverberate across CEE communist countries.
Meanwhile, the Polish private economy had been expanding for some eight years since
Jaruzelski had imposed martial law. Hardy and Rainnie (1996) estimated that privately held
firms increased by over 200,000 companies. Additionally, foreign owned small enterprises
increased by 800 percent by 1989. The private sector accounted for 19 percent of the overall
GDP of the country in this period (Frye 2010, 215). Poland was ready to dip more than just its
toes into free markets with such a large private sector by 1990. Solidarity’s successes in
parliament gave them the mandate to move ahead with their efforts at full speed. By 1989, the
economy was on life support and social instability continued to escalate.
5.2. From Solidarity to Free Markets
The success of Solidarity’s new government hinged on several factors. Firstly, the PZPR was
largely abandoned as obsolete. Parties began racing to the towards the liberal center away from
the socialist left (Frye 2010). Unlike Russia in the 1990’s, there was very little disagreement that
Poland should liberalize and privatize its economy. Though debate remained as to what extent
that should entail. This lack of friction allowed Poland to transition in a process that was
relatively smooth compared to some of its CEE neighbors. Second, because there was such
uniformity in its political appetite for change, the reform process was less prone to the predations
of capital flight and capital hoarding that was rife in Central and Eastern Europe at the time.
Finally, political parties agreed to leave much of the social benefits afforded to workers in place
which kept public support high.
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Poland had committed to a break from its past and to extirpate their markets from the
state control. The half-hearted attempts during the 1980s were not working and Jaruselki’s
reforms could not bring down commodity prices. The newly formed Solidarity government had a
more radical solution. Two economists, Lipton and Sachs (1990) provided the playbook Poland
would follow in regard to its reform agenda. Lipton and Sachs argued that the state had to
deconstruct its socialistic systems and fill in those now raw edifices with markets. To do so, they
recommended a process of shock therapy, rapid economic reforms, and cuts to government
expenditures which all began in earnest in 1990.66
Solidarity may have been successful in pushing for initial change, but they were not alone
in their efforts. After their loss in 1989, the PZPR rebranded itself the Social Democratic Party of
Poland, SdRP, and placed economic entrepreneurialism high on its list of activities (Frye 2010,
216). It dumped the old party elites and took up a more centrist position. The PSL also returned
as the main party of agricultural interests and continued to promote private ownership, and trade
liberalization of agricultural produce as it had done so forty years earlier. Polish politics in the
early 1990s were dominated by those parties who were focused on liberalization and adapting the
country to the new norm of markets.
Timothy Frye’s (2010) main thesis on the process of reform in Poland was that the
country’s success was commiserate with its politically consistent nature. There wasn’t an
existential fear that reforms would be quickly reversed if ideological opposites were elected to
power because there were very few of the old-left parties left in Poland by 1991. The turnover
between political parties and Sejm alliances throughout the 1990s involved mostly liberal groups
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Shock therapy is a radical process in which state economies are exposed to free market effects. This is
usually done so by reducing price controls, reducing government spending and benefits, and privatizing most sectors
of the economy that are in state hands.
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like the Solidarity Electoral Alliance and Democratic Left Alliance led by the SdRP but little
change to the overall tone of reform. Presidential elections consistently exchanged who was in
power. From Aleksander Kwasniewski to Lech Walesa, and, yet the liberalization reforms
remained consistent.
Much of the reform process was planned out using the Balcerowisz Program which was
led by its namesake economist and minister of economics. These were a series of programs that
were intended to stabilize Poland’s currency and massive selloffs of Polish SOEs to both
domestic and foreign parties. Many of these SOEs were distributed through government-owned,
joint-stock companies that sold shares at a discount rate to employees and investors (Balcerowicz
1994). SOEs by half in Poland by 1995, and the private ownership rate rose dramatically to fill in
the emergent gaps (Frye 2010, 222). The economic changes were extensive but so too was the
development of corporate governance structure and securities monitoring that added an edge of
legitimacy to the private economy (Frye 2010, 223). This allowed the state to privatize at a high
rate while maintaining competent, and functional institutional oversight.
Political agreement was also maintained in relation to the government’s social compact
with Polish workers and professionals. The extensive amount of job destruction from SOE
liquidation was subsidized by the boom in job creation by new sets of entrepreneurs and startup
firms (Jackson, Klich, and Poznańska 2005). There was little contestation in the Sejm over the
size of welfare and whether to maintain pensions and benefits at the pre-transformation rates. In
fact, social spending went up 7 percent in 1991 as the government incentivized older workers to
retire and used retirement benefits as a “strategy to ensure support for the program from Poland’s
emerging middle class” (Frye 2010, 226). Many of these programs would be targeted towards
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middle income earners as a political effort to constrain any backlash to their overall reform
efforts.
Despite interparty coordination being high in Poland’s critical reform years there was
disagreement on some issues. One area of disagreement between political leaders was over
whether privatization should be domesticated or exported abroad (Kowalik 2002). The PAIZ,
Polish’s foreign investment department, was in charge of creating lists of opportunities for
foreign investors to enter Poland’s emergent market (Hardy 2009). Even when pushback
emerged against foreign asset purchasing, there were workarounds available to connect savvy
investors to profitable companies. Managers of larger firms would often buy stocks at a
discounted rate just to resell them to outside investors directly (Frydman et al. 1999).
Even with the wave of committed privatization and marketization by Polish leadership,
SMotE remained somewhat high. This was because some SOEs could be rectified with the free
market and the lingering effects of corporatism during its transitionary period. SOE managers
were motivated during this period to adjust and restructure their firms with the goal of making
them profitable. The Polish government had signaled that there would be no bailouts for SOEs
producing budgetary shortfalls. There was an expectation that managers would be rewarded for
successful restructuring and economizing their SOEs when privatization of their firms would
eventually arrive (Frye 2010, 225). This meant that many small and medium public firms were
able to adapt quite handily to marketization and become profitable to the state. Public support
also pushed the state to retain many of its assets out of fear that the government would become
too economically ineffectual. Then there were also those SOEs that were just too large and
unprofitable to sell and would have to remain on government ledgers for the foreseeable future
(Rondinelli and Yurkiewicz 1996, 152-153). By 2000, Poland still retained at least a 50 percent
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share of a quarter of the companies on the WIG20 index, Warsaw’s capital exchange
(Kozarzewski and Bałtowski 2019).
5.3. The Reduction of Organized Labor
Initially, Poland remained committed to its social obligations with regards to organized labor.
Certainly, this made sense given that Poland’s liberal transformation was bound up with labor
movements and Solidarity. Poland’s labor laws were kept consistent with its pre-transformation
rules and a high amount of social spending was conducted to placate those Poles would find
themselves on the losing end of its liberal transformation (Spieser 2007, 117). High levels of
social spending coupled with the politicization and reformation of trade unions undid their ability
to effectively bargain for workers’ rights in the long run. As a result, organized labor deteriorated
both in membership and capacity.
The destruction of organized labor occurred in tandem with the Polish government’s
reform of labor in relation to the emergence of business interests. Initially, the Polish government
attempted to balance trade unions and business interests through a tripartite system that was akin
to the corporatist states of Central Europe. The Tripartite Socio-Economic Commission was set
up in 1993 to oversee and manage the relationships between workers and their employers but the
model often favored the government’s interests and employer rights. These two items were seen
as necessary for the success Poland’s liberal transition (Szklarczyk 2019). In order to placate
labor’s losses, the government maintained a strong welfare system while it commodified labor. A
process that was met with acquiescence by trade unions and labor movements alike (Spieser
2007, 99). Even after social spending was cut and union membership began to fall, organized
labor remained silent. Instead, it acted to mostly to ensure the peaceful transition toward
liberalization of all aspects of the Polish economy.
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The development of institutions that would entrench markets and pro investment and
business policies cannot be understate. Figure 5-1 shows how Poland’s probusiness environment
developed over the past decades using data from the Economic Freedom Index from the Fraser
Institute (Yap, Law, and Abdul-Ghani 2020). This value calculates the country’s business
environment by comparing the size of government, legal structures, property rights, freedom to
trade, and access to credit and aggregates those scores from 1 (least economically free) to 10
(most economically free).67 The trendline of Poland’s Freedom of the World Index score
remained quite steep all the way up to 2008.

Figure 5-1 Economic Freedom of the World Index for Poland Since 1990
As Poland’s free market was codified, organized labor declined. The abandonment of
organized labor by workers, even after the success of one of the greatest worker movements in
the 20th Century is perplexing. Per Ost (1996, 29) “…Polish workers seemed to lose much of
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See Appendix D.1 for questions and coding.
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their militancy. Just when it seemed that they could pursue their class interests with
unencumbered commitment, workers watched passively, even approvingly, as their former rights
were whittled away”. Whereas shifts in popular support for various interest groups tends to be
slow and gradual, the shift from communism to liberalism provided for an explosive event where
more radical occurred (Rozbicka and Kamiński 2021, 3). Accordingly, the transformation of
Poland was one where the organizational interests of labor groups across Poland were moved out
of trades unions and into interest specific associations and parties. By 2021, business
associations outnumbered labor unions 7 to 1 (Rozbicka and Kamiński 2021).
David Ost (1996, 30) claimed that the devolution of polish labor movements was a
response to the exhumation of classes in Poland in the 1990s. Under communism, workers were
a unified class that was commiserate with Marx’s rubric of political discourse that could be
activated and mobilized against the state. Since the state controlled all aspects of society, worker
contestations were aimed directly at the top apparatus as this is where change and reform could
spring from. Before the transition, the interests of workers were holistic and better able to be
represented by unions. However, as Poland liberalized, the ‘honorific’ of being a worker shifted
in terminology and content (Ost 1996). The process of interest diversification led to an
atomization of Poles from the 1990s onwards which would split along a variety of interests,
socio-economic conditions, and cultural divides. Polish workers found less utility in cross-class
party formation. Those interests now began to break down along class lines whereas before it had
materialized in confrontation to the state directed economy (Ost 1996, 41).
Unions had lost their original purpose in Poland’s new system. Unions would now be
tasked with assisting the transitional status of employees and help works embrace their new
status between productivity and wages. Like Russia, unions also acted to pacify worker
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resistance to the harsh reforms and austere measures that were being enacted. (Spieser 2007, 98).
The more severe and labor restrictive of these reforms occurred towards the turn of the
millennium. As Poland sought accession to the EU it began to reorganize its labor unions under a
new set of tripartite policies. In this second wave of reforms, large amounts of social spending
were cut, and changes were made to the law regarding labor contracts. Protections against job
dismissals were curtailed. New laws placed worker organizational power within companies
rather than in trades unions.
Reforms seemed necessary to deal with high unemployment which was at 20 percent in
2002 (Speiser 2007, 100). In response, those most affected by the socioeconomic deteriorations
coped with the system, rather than acting against it. Polish citizens were suffering from the
shocking grips of a free-market transition and labor commodification. As with Russia, Poland’s
labor force had become quite stagnant. Skills and education were not essential tools for
individual growth or prosperity under the communist regime as employment was a guaranteed
right and prosperity had been leveled off. In the process of marketizing labor and opening the
Polish market, a deep vein of cheap, semi-skilled, labor had become available to western
corporations and businesses for exploitation.
Those in the middle class that had more sophisticated skills and education had more
employment options to choose from and could select from the best job opportunities. Meanwhile,
lower wage earners suffered the most from unemployment as they were thrust out into a novel
capitalistic environment with very few skills or technical expertise to take advantage of
employment opportunities. Figure 5-2 highlights the correlative level of unemployment by skill
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level of the respondent from 1990 to 2000.68 The figure shows the probability of being
unemployed and having low skills as much higher than their higher skilled counterparts during
Poland’s transition.

Figure 5-2 Unemployment by Skill Level
Organized labor is also tied down by extensive political alignments that inhibit cross
sectoral organization and an atomization of bargaining power within host companies.
Representative labor has been consolidated between several major trade confederations who
represent nearly 25,000 organizations. The Solidarity union maintains its status as the liberal
union while OPZZ, the former communist trade union confederation, continues to represent the
old left of Polish unions. The use of trade confederations has led to a two-tiered bargaining
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Data was provided by the Euro Value Survey which classified socio-economic status on a four-tier basis:
nonskilled, semiskilled, non-manual, and upper middle. This data was collected in 1990 and 1999 and was
aggregated across both years using a logit function. See appendix D.2 for more details.
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structure. Most collective bargaining is pushed down to the company level while the
confederations handle sectoral bargaining with the government (Trappman 2012, 2). This also
means that, at the company level, only employees are allowed to join that company’s union
which further restricts collective action across organizations and limits access to students, or the
unemployed. Leadership in the OPZZ and Solidarność tend to correspond to political
membership with SLD and the Solidarity party which politicizes membership.
Membership rates are abysmally low but organizational levels remain high in the public
sector and SOEs (Trappmann 2012). However, changes to the labor laws have created new
obstacles for unions to attract new members while allowing companies to avoid labor contracts.
Many companies now rely on fixed terms of employment which leads to higher rates of turnover
and provides less incentive for Polish union leaders to encourage new membership since
employees are often gone in a few years.
All of these changes mean that Poles have become extremely pessimistic of union
representation. A fact that further fuels disengagement. According to survey data published by
Trappmann (2012, 10) “57 per cent of Solidarność members and 49 per cent of OPZZ members
thought at the end of the 1990s said that no trade union represents their interests and revealed
themselves to be pessimistic about their ability to represent workers' interests at enterprise level”.
Organized labor has remained incapable of challenging corporate interests or realigning the state
governance towards the interest of labor despite of living standards declining after 2010. Even
the Solidarity union, who had gained so much power in the late 1980s, squandered their
newfound elite status in Poland by ensuring their own disutility and antiquatedness by offering
very little to its increasingly economically disenfranchised members.
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5.4. Consolidation of Democracy
In its early years, Polish democracy was quite robust. In the proceeding years after 1989, there
was a deluge of political parties that emerged to compete for representation in the Sejm and
Polish Senate. I have already discussed how the PZPR communist party had abandoned its
positions and reemerged as the Social Democrats with a party platform was closer to the center.
The successful consolidation of Polish democracy followed a transition of behavioral changes
and procedural developments that enshrined liberal democracy until around 2010. From that
point, a shift began to occur that realigned those prodemocratic procedures and behaviors away
from liberality and towards state capture.
Poland’s new parliamentary system encouraged party variation with a wide spread of
political ideologies. Comparatively, Polish parties exhibit a high degree of party density and
diversity compared to other parliamentarian systems in the region (Rozbicka and Kamiński
2021). The proliferation of small parties increased the need to consolidate them within political
alliances in order to form ruling governments (Wincławska et al. 2021). This also meant that
there was a high degree of instability as smaller parties would often break off from coalitions and
realign themselves. Indeed, there was a high amount of party switching, especially on the right
side of the aisle, in Poland throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Frye 2010, 215). Then there were
issue-specific parties that proliferated the Sejm, such as the Polish Peasant Party, whose interests
were more narrowly tailored to agriculture, Polish nationalism, and identity.
Voting behavior shifted along with the transition from communist single party state to
competitive democracy. Poles embraced the transformation and saw democracy as a return of
their national identity that had been stifled by WWII and the Cold War (Kinowska-Marzaraki
2021). However, this zeal could not motivate Poland’s democracy forever. Low social capital
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between Poles is beginning to lead to high levels of political and social apathy in the wake of
economic crisis. By 2010, 80 percent of surveyed Poles said they feel they have no say in
government (Carvacho et al. 2013). A number that is consistent in contemporary polling data.
Democratic consolidation has also been arrested and undermined by the development of
procedural processes for democratic security (Kubas 2020). These structural changes provided
key checks and balances via institutional oversight. For a time, Poland seemed dedicated to
rules-based procedures with a strong deference for governance by the majority but with minority
rights protections (Kubas 2020, 12). Many of these institutions were enshrined by Poland’s 1997
Constitution that passed after a 6-year process in the Sejm. A slow process compared to Russia’s
constitutional debate that took only a year. The robustness and debate around Poland’s
democratic institutions ensured that at least some of those procedures would survive
authoritarian attacks.
Democratic consolidation takes a long time to generate and requires repeated iterations of
the same electoral game and compliance to its outcomes are tested each time (Pridham 2005).
This dependence on time means stagnation of democratic transition can occur and even result in
democratic erosion. Foa and Mounk (2017) argues that even if some failures occur, democracy
should still be able to consolidate if adherence to procedural and behavioral democratization
continues. In Poland, adherence to those procedures is not as clearcut.
In the early 2000s, several scandals undermined the integrity of the ruling SLD
government. This led to the first successes of the Law and Justice Party, PiS, under Jaroslaw
Kaczynski and his twin brother, Lech. Their party’s platform had organized itself against what
they termed as ‘western liberality’ (Kubas 2020, 20). While the PiS’s term in power was short
lived, the challenges brought by the financial crisis in 2008, shortfalls in pension funding, and a
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new slew of corruption scandals that rocked the PO-PSL coalition led to the eventual return of
the PiS in 2015.
5.5. The Polish Middle Class Emerges
During the period of democratic consolidation in the 1990s and 2000s, Poland experienced a
growth of class identities similar to that of its Eastern European neighbors. While some scholars,
such as David Ost (2009), have claimed that class has been slow to emerge in Poland, the
evidence bares out several alternative explanations. There was a strong sense of class identity in
Poland before communism flattened society and this class identity remained quite powerful
throughout the communist era. During its transformational years, class identity became more
entrenched as labor shifted towards highly skilled, middle income work centered around urban
cores. Alignments and interests have become more diverse and varied which has allowed many
scholars to identify a significant middle class group in Poland.
Poland’s middle class can trace some of its roots back to the 1800s. After being divided
up by Russia, Austria, and Prussia in 1795 through a series of partitions, Poland’s middle class
was critical to the maintenance of Poland’s identity, culture, and traditions (Kocka 1995). In
Poland, ‘mieszczan'stwo’ carried a similar identification with the middle class as to Russia’s
‘meschane’. The difference between the two was that while the Russian middle class in the late
19th century was hobbled by weak a bureaucracy and overbearing nobility, Poland’s middle was
rule by a network supranational elites from Austria, Russia, and Prussia (later Germany) in the
early 20th century (Kocka 1995, 794). Polish identity was connected to the urban tradesmen
evolved out of the feudalistic milieu of Central European serfdom. While this system entrapped
most of the population on the land in a system of peasantry, it also increased the value of trade
goods and skilled labor in towns and cities as a result. The middle class of the 1800s was critical
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to the renaissance of Polish national identity which allowed it to maintain a counter-cultural
movement against their supranational masters. When Poland gained its independence after WWI,
it further severed its feudalistic past which allowed the country to modernize with a strong
middle core and rural large peasantry based on national and republican principles that endured
until WWII (Jezierski 1992).
After WWII, Poland attempted to modernize the state further through a series of rapid
industrializations to the detriment of its own societal evolution. Or as Ost (2009, 501) puts it,
“communism created a gritty industrial society and stopped there.” Work was universally
guaranteed, and wages were kept flat. The onrush from overpopulated rural villages to the city
meant no shortage of labor, either. There was little distinction between class identities in the
capitalistic sense and instead there were two tiers in Polish society: the nomenklatura and the
workers. The nomenklatura had privileged access to goods and services that separated them from
the rest of society (Hardy 2009, 48).
However, arguments have been forwarded that a middle class remained cogent within
Poland during this period and even pressed against communisms hegemony at the time (Jezierski
1992, 284). Indeed, the Solidarity movement could be seen as just one of many middle class
protests against the nomenklatura. Such arguments regard that middle class Poles existed in
identity and conscious even before the Iron Curtain fell (Jezierski 1992). In an article published
in 1987,Kurczewski (1987) wrote “the middle class, or classes, which have been formed here,
have their moral active status manifested in big conflicts which are the 'last' instances of the
sense of the bonds, which also found manifestation in their politically active status which the
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experiment of Solidarity was” (Kurczewski 1987). The Polish middle class identity may have
been more resilient than their critics let on.69
In the aftermath of 1989, incomes became wildly divergent as vast sums of wealth shifted
away from workers and farmers towards the inner cities and especially towards the new
entrepreneurial class (Hardy 2009, 30). Income inequality substantially grew in ten years with
the GINI index placing Poland as the highest among European countries and even postcommunist countries (Domański and Jedrzejczak 2002, 218). Wages plummeted by up to 30% in
the switch to a market-based system. The situation was dire and dissatisfaction among workers
was rampant, but the reform process went largely unchallenged because of a lack of worker
organization and the economic gains that were experienced by the middle class. As Solidarity
member Kuron (1991) and Minister of Labor from 1989 to 1993 stated, “we can offer nothing
else than the proposition that social advance will occur as a result of a long process and that
skilled workers, future farmers, people employed in agricultural service, and the intelligentsia
will one day become the middle class." That the middle class must emerge from its own effort
within a free market system.
Still, socio-economic conditions were rapidly changing in Poland. From 1994 to 2004,
the share of white collar and professional workers increased 10 percent and the share of business
owners was over 1/10th of those in a profession (Ciesielska and Frąszczak 2014). Meanwhile,
skilled, and unskilled workers fell a similar amount leading to a trifurcation of wages between a
labor-intensive class, the professional middle, and a small proportion of business elites at the top.

69

Critics of class identity in Poland often point to sympathies and interests within the worker strata as
indicative of a failure of class-based identity to coalesce outside of this rigid identity until income and social
inequalities were exacerbated by Poland’s liberal transformation (Ost 2009; Hardy 2009).
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According to the IMF (Obserwator Finansowy 2019), approximately 60 percent of the
population could be categorized as in the middle, either by profession or income status.
Despite divergent incomes, there has still been resistance to class formation in Poland.
Familiarity with egalitarian communist principles has led to push back on social identities by
some older Poles. In Polish politics, class debates have been largely restricted. There was a
generalized fear that class consciousness would undermine Poland’s liberalization period or
create class conflict between an emergent set of ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ in the aftermath of rapid
privatization (Ost 2009). This fear has led many politicians to downplay the concept and keep it
out of the forefront of political discourse. The political displacement of class in this case has
been argued to have been supplanted with identarian arguments in Polish political discourse. The
failure to engage with class-based politics led to the downfall of Solidarity in the 1990s,
according to Ost (2009, 499).
Perhaps this argument could best be applied to lower income earners who stood the most
to lose as a result of Poland’s transformation. Within the middle, politicians and political leaders
were adamant about bringing about a Polish middle class that had all the hallmarks of its
Western European counterparts. Poland’s nascent middle class found itself filling in the roles of
the former nomenklatura elite as their former status did not translate into advantages. Instead, a
new cadre of middle class Poles absorbed these old roles, and began occupying the bureaucracy,
media, colleges, government, civil society, and other professional careers (Ost 2009, 502). The
changes are not just limited to status either. The re-urbanization of old cities like Wroclaw and
Krakow have driven a “cosmopolitan” awakening among middle class Poles (Galent and Kubicki
2012). As a result, there has been a profusion of diverse interest groups and social associations
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amongst the population. It has brought about a cultural panoply but also increases to religiosity
within the middle class and the emergence of traditionalist and rightist politics (Arnold 2012).
The saliency of Poland’s middle class can also be determined by the government’s social
spending. It often spends more on middle income groups who are the target of its subsidies by
(Frye 2010). Programs are often aimed at assisting families with welfare dollars to subsidize
traditional family roles and child rearing (Keane and Prasad 2002). This approach typically
politicizes social transfers and turns them into electoral debates for political parties to run on. For
instance, just recently in 2021, the PiS party launched a campaign to broaden middle class
support through tax breaks and subsidies for young families in an effort to expand the middle
class to all and garner more votes (Reuters Staff 2021).
5.6. A Dependent Market Economy
The proliferation of skilled, but cheap labor made Poland ideally suited for attracting foreign
direct investment (FDI). A feature which has captured the attention of some comparative
economists who have identified the unique complacency between some CEE country’s
comparative advantage and investment dollars (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009; Ban 2013). The
typology of Dependent Market Economy (DME) was meant to recall the hierarchical market
economies of South America which was proliferated with governments reliant on FDI in order to
maintain economic development and growth (Schneider 2009). In Poland, reliance on foreign
investors and transnational corporations was further amplified by its international economic
policies. These policies were geared towards developing regional economic interdependence
with the Visegrad coalition and eventual accession to the European Union. This section reviews
the internationalization of the Polish economy as a necessary component of its eventual rejection
of neoliberal market praxis in favor of rigid state led development after the 2008 financial crisis.
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The dependent market economy literature emerged as an expansion to the early work of
Shonfield (1965) and later VoC arguments by Soskice and Hall (2001). Nolke and Vliegenthart
(2009) correctly identify that the limited typologies of LMEs and CMEs do not adequately apply
to many of the emergent market economies in Central and Eastern Europe. Their response was to
expand and identify new typologies in order to interpret the Polish experience more accurately.
What they discovered was that Poland possessed a particular comparative advantage that was not
found in either CME or LME descriptions. This was an advantage for producing complex
consumer goods with cheap, but semi-skilled labor. These kinds of commodities would often be
outpriced in developed economies and under sourced in developing economies. Nolke and
Vliegenthart (2009, 672) claimed that DME’s like Poland possessed “comparative advantages…
based on institutional complementarities between skilled, but cheap, labor; the transfer of
technological innovations within transnational enterprises; and the provision of capital via
foreign direct investment”.
Foreign capital would not be shy in reaching out to Poland. The nascent market was seen
as an economic powerhouse of cheap labor and in an easily accessible location. Nor was the
Polish government shy about attracting foreign investment. The PAIZ, or department of foreign
investment, was noted for keeping long lists of assets and state-owned firms that it would
provide for the perusal of foreign capitalists and managers (Hardy 2009). However, push back in
government and by citizens against internationalizing Polish industries often compelled FDI
opportunities to obfuscate their intentions. For instance, in the early 90s, the World Bank worked
in conjunction with the Polish government to institute a scheme where Polish banks would buy
up the debt of insolvent SOEs. When these banks were then privatized, the SOEs, who had their
debt owned by those banks, would be transferred with the banks into private hands (Hardy 2009,
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60). By the 2000s, ten of Poland’s largest banks were foreign owned and accounted for 80
percent of Poland’s total financial sector (HSBC 2006).
As a result of Polish propensity towards foreign capital and investment, large tracts of
FDI had become centered within Poland by the 2000s. Net FDI inflows accounted for up to 6
percent of Poland’s GDP by 2000 (World Bank 2022). This amount is even more illuminating
when one considers the rapacious rate of GDP growth experienced after 1990 in the country at a
reported average of 4% growth, year-on-year (World Bank 2022). I present the economic
situation in Poland in Figure 5-4 using data provided by the OECD FDI Index and World
Development Indicators which measure FDI inflows. The solid line tracks net FDI inflows as a
percentage of GDP from 1990 to 2010. These values represent cumulative inflows over outflows
and represent additional investments per year. The dashed line is the OECD FDI index measure
which aggregates obstacles to investments and totals it on a scale from 1, most restrictive, to 0
being the least. Poland has been quite hospitable to FDI, especially from 2000s onwards.

Figure 5-3 FDI in Poland from 1990 to 2010
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Poland was very successful attracting FDI. Almost to a fault. Transnational Corporations
(TNCs) were quick to enter and exploit the available labor supply and the Polish government
was highly motivated to lubricate those transactions (Nolke and Vliegenhart 2009). But this style
of economic management from afar has deleterious side effects. The quest for cheap labor means
little investment in education by investing TNCs as it would subsequently raise labor costs
(Nolke and Vliegenhart 2009, 677). Second, and more to the point of the dependent nature of
Polish capitalism, it keeps technologies and innovations scaled horizontally as much of the R&D
is held outside of the dependent market economy. Instead, there is very little technology transfer
as innovative dependent labor is not readily needed in this kind of economy (Nolke and
Vliegenhart 2009, 678). The effect of this TNC dependent economic cocktail is that large tracts
of the economy is controlled by the whims of external firms and corporate interests with very
little transaction costs in terms of technological, education, or skill exchange.
Perhaps one of the more critical pieces of Poland’s aggressive outward economic policies
was its interest in joining the European Union. As such, it adapted its institutions, opened itself
to European investment, and sought to integrate itself with its western neighbors and away from
Russia’s economic and political sphere. A series of events occurred in quick succession that
oriented Poland into regional integration with Western and Central Europe. In 1991, Poland
joined the Czechoslovakia, and Hungary as Visegrad, Hungary to set out a cultural and political
alliance known as the Visegrad Group, or V4. The process was meant to ensure mutual
cooperation and further integrate into the norms and institutions of Europe.
Following this, Poland applied to join the EU in 1994 and underwent a series of
negotiations and developments to align themselves with EU accession protocols. Contradictory
political demands by Poland’s various parties, but it was the SLD coalition that “catapulted”
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Poland into the EU after their electoral victory in 2001 (Taras 2003, 6). By 2004, it had signed
the instrument of accession to enter the EU and was on track to join the eurozone by 2009.
However, the financial crisis and economic downswing the previous year undercut all domestic
interest in tying Poland’s banks to the Euro. Instead, as with the other Visegrad countries, Poland
has maintained its own currency independent of the euro but maintains the economic access
provided to being a member state.
5.7. Crisis and the Turning Point in Poland
The 2008 Financial crisis affected Poland in a variety of critical ways. While just about every
country in Europe endured some form of economic downturn, Poland was unique in that it
continued to grow during the recession crisis with less than 2 percent GDP growth in 2009. A
phenomenal rate considering that the EU averaged a loss of -4 percent that year (Orlowski 2012).
Despite the economic performance, the economic crisis exposed some serious vulnerabilities in
Poland. First, it highlighted the footloose nature of capital in a system that was highly dependent
on FDI for continued growth. The crisis’s economic effects were not shared evenly across Polish
society and middle class workers became greatly exposed to the violability of the economy. It
gave more room for the state to interject and intervene into the economy leading to a higher rates
of state ownership and investment. Finally, it undermined Poland’s further integration into the
EU by short-circuiting attempts to get Poland into the eurozone.
By 2008, the Polish economy was in a very good position. Polish unemployment rate had
finally recovered to below 8 percent which was on par with the rest of the European Union.
Simultaneously, FDI had reached 40% of its GDP by 2010 (Ho and Lu 2013). Polish
susceptibility to an economic crisis was extremely potent. Even with high rates of FDI,
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efficiency in investments began to fall. There was a decrease in job creation and projects related
to FDI up to 2010.
Yet, Poland remained economically stable during the crisis being the only economy in the
EU to report positive growth. Economists point to several factors that worked in Poland’s favor.
For one, it had the benefit of being in the EU without having its fiscal and financial systems
integrated into the eurozone (Drozdowicz-Bieć 2011). Instead, it could enjoy market access
while still being able to float its currency, the Polish zloty, to best deal with the fluctuations of
the market and retain highly competitive export rates.
Next, Poland was able to promote its own markets because the government could directly
to influence its own economy. As the Polish state retained critical investments in the economy, it
was able to resist short-sighted investors who were reeling from their economic losses in 2008.
Poland’s public owned banks, like PKO-BP, which has 20 percent of the market’s share, was
able to increase lending and lines of credit because it was able to maintain liquidity via
government sponsorship (Piatkowski 2015). Meanwhile, foreign owned private banks, which
made up 75 percent of the finance market, pulled out their investments and shrank lending.
While foreign capital was shrinking, state presence in the economy was expanding to fill in the
gaps.
The Polish government also responded to the crisis by passing a stimulus package meant
to sure up insecure businesses, workers, and provide subsidies to those who lost their jobs. In
terms of total GDP, however, Poland would spend very little. It had earmarked 2.49 percent of its
2008 GDP for total spending. In reality “only about 50% of the amount planned in the package
was realized…” and this “covered mostly the largest enterprises, often owned by the state”
(Drozdowicz-Bieć, 63). Poland’s hesitation to spend meant it was not as tied into the
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countercyclical spending that was embraced by many European states. Nor was the Polish
government motivated to bail out foreign firms who made up large sections of their economy but
instead sought to keep them placated with the carrots in the form of tax breaks and its relatively
stable market (Piatkowski 2015).
However, things were not always positive as the state responded quite aggressively to
protect Polish enterprise from market collapse. Subsequently, this made it unlikely that further
integration into the eurozone would occur. Commentators note that Poland’s increased
Euroscepticism has left it a “second-class EU member with decreasing influence on the bloc’s
policy and future budget, is an easily imaginable scenario” (Orlowski 2012). However, Poland’s
economic cycle has become increasingly tied to the European Union despite its inside-outside
status (Ho and Lu 2012).
5.7.1. Polish Middle class Vulnerabilities
Despite positive Polish performance during the financial crisis, many middle income workers
had been reduced to a state of vulnerability ever since the crisis. In this section I argue that the
Polish middle class has become susceptible to economic instability and is vulnerable to
clientelistic packages. The kind engaged in by the PiS party. However, this pattern of behavior
was not universal across the spectrum of middle class politics. The stability of private companies
has kept some parts of the Polish middle class inaccessible to vote buying techniques. First
though, I take the time to elaborate on the vulnerabilities expressed in Polish political society.
Many poles in the middle class found themselves in want following 2010 due to a lack of
organized labor capacity or political support by parties who were too focused on securing EU
accession and placating business.
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Perhaps one of the key features of the middle class experience in Poland was how the
dependent market economy constrained upward mobility. While highly skilled labor has been
able to push up the middle class in other Visegrad countries, in Poland the middle has merely
expanded its ranks with educated and skilled labor (Tomić and Tyrowicz 2010). In the wake of
the 2008 crisis, middle income workers were left with little upward mobility inertia and instead
felt a financial and material crunch. This created a sifting effect where those at risk were being
pushed downwards and the few with opportunity were left standing.
The gains of economic growth were being disproportionally shared across Polish society.
By 2008, the gap between the first and third quartile of earners was approximately 40 percent
(Tomić and Tyrowisc 2010, 22). Nor was socioeconomic vulnerability likewise shared. For
instance, middle income jobs were especially vulnerable to automation with 1 in 5 jobs under
threat of automation. This number is well over the OECD average (OECD 2019, 29).
There are additional vulnerabilities faced by middle income workers. Access to higher
amounts of income but fewer assets make them more likely to be reliant on loans. The middle is
particularly exposed in that they lack a reservoir of savings or a large enough safety net but have
the incomes to take on and service large amounts of debt. Debt that is required to pay for the
material and social trappings of middle class existence in tandem with rising prices to education,
housing, and healthcare. While the rise in the costs of these items has been the norm across
Europe, Poland has been particularly hit hard by price hikes that make these commodities less
attainable after 2008 (OECD 2019, 24).
As a result, indebtedness encompasses 44 percent of middle class workers and places
strains on Poles who are interested in financing middle class lifestyles and behavior (Strzelecki et
al. 2015, 43). What has occurred is a process of “indebtedness…” that “increases economic
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welfare by smoothing consumption over time” (Ranci et al. 2021, 543). According to Ranci et al.
(2021), they noted that Poles experienced the highest levels of financial strain of all the European
countries they studied and ranked them relatively high on their other measures of indebtedness
and vulnerability to poverty. Debt to income (DTI) was at 36 percent in 2007 and rose to 57
percent by 2020 (Eurostat 2022; Strzelecki et al. 2015, 48). Figure 5-4, below, illustrates the
increasing rate of debt based on Eurostat survey data (2022) measured as debt-to-income ratio
over the last 20 years.70 This trend has only leveled off in recent years.

Figure 5-4 Debt to Income Ratio
Poles are also vulnerable to debt due to an overall lack of bank deposits and savings. The
Narodowy Bank in Poland estimates that 82 percent of Poles have a little over one thousand
dollars, estimated in euros, as savings deposits (Strzelecki et al. 2015, 36). Comparatively,
Estonians have three times that amount in their accounts on average. The concentration of these
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Data was gathered via Eurostat (2022) indicators on debt-to-income ratio which surveys debt over
household income on a quarterly basis.
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two effects could be generalized across Polish society but it has a significant correlation with
middle income wage earners. Wałęga and Wałęga (2021, 574) found a significantly high rate of
over indebtedness amongst middle income families at a rate of 42 percent of households
affected.
The Polish middle class has been shrinking as well. Figure 5-5 traces this stark downward
trend that has emerged after the financial crisis. The figure was estimated using data provided by
EVS survey’s decile calculations of total household incomes. Similar to the WVS data used for
Russia, I calculated middle class incomes using the standard OECD protocol of 75 to 200 percent
of median incomes and coded all deciles from 4 to 7 as middle income.71 The results show a
decrease of nearly 30 percent since 1990. Poland’s national bank has estimated the middle class
figure as being much higher at 65 percent (Obserwator Finansowy 2019). In practical terms, that
range represents a broad scraping of incomes that can be anywhere from 9 to 25 thousand dollars
a year which should be interpreted as overly inclusive.

Figure 5-5 Proportion of Middle class Over Thirty Years
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See appendix A.1
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The response by the middle class has been divided despite the decline. While in Russia,
the all-powerful situation of the state makes loyalty a no-brainer as to middle class
clientelization, in Poland it’s not so clear. In that divide is a polarized double-movement that has
emerged in response to the global financial crisis with populism being a component thereof and a
rejection of market excess (Davis 2020). The expansion of credit to more and more individuals
had exacerbated the problem of middle class collapse and the subsequent exposures felt by the
middle class. The reforms of the 1990s had yielded a situation wherein “…liberalization attempts
increased the fragility of developing economies and, later, capital flights triggered economic
crisis” (Özgür and Özel 2013, 893). Liberalism has created crisis vulnerability by tying middle
class prospects to capital flows which later hesitated. In double movement, this breakdown
focuses in on the conflicts between classes which threatens social disintegration if left unchecked
(GUS 2020; Hechter 1981).
There has been a noticeable bifurcation in Poland within the middle class to the nature of
Poland’s liberal economy. Some voters still see liberality as a necessary and functional path
forward while the other half has increasingly been beholden to clientelistic offers from populist
parties. These middle class responses seek out better protection from the state for economic
stability in exchange while the clientelizing political party commandeers more parts of the state
for its own uses. Without organized labor to express collective dissent and voice their own
interests to the Polish state or economy, middle income workers remain displaced within the
current system. Instead, some may see the state or the economy as useful to their protection.
Before 2010, this pattern of behavior was less conflictual to as it is now. As of now,
confidence in major private business in Poland is at an all-time low since the financial crisis.
Consumer confidence crashed 25 points, from -5 to -30 over the course of a year (GUS 2020).
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Most consumers expressed a lack of confidence in the economy, but this gradually shifted over
the next 10 years and reached an all-time high in 2020 under PiS leadership in tandem with
gradual state interventionism and state capture outcomes. Confidence in major corporations also
decreased over the span of the financial crisis. Figure 5-6 provides estimated likelihoods of
middle class respondents who were surveyed in the EVS from 2008 and 2018.72 Middle income
respondents were coded following the previous scheme. The probabilities invert over the sevenyear span with middle class respondents in 2012 being least likely to have a favorable take on
corporate activity. As a result, I estimate that there is a strong desire for political-economic
solutions that put parties who engage the middle class on clientelistic terms at an advantage.

Figure 5-6 Confidence in Major Companies Before and After Crisis
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See Appendix D.3 for questions and coding.
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5.8. Resurgent SMotE
In Poland, the government’s relationship to free markets have shifted. The constant retreat in the
face of liberal advances has been undone in the wake of the financial crisis that circled the globe
at the end of 2008. Polish leadership, especially within the Law and Justice party, have sought to
induce a new path of development that is led by the state and compromise private firms into a
position of cooperation or cooptation more and more frequently. Poland has increased its SMotE
in the form of state-capitalism that both evokes markets and politicizes them at the same time
(McNally 2013). While state led development and management of the economy is not a new
concept, Poland has been quite different. For one, it has emerged in an already democratized
state whereas state led development has previously been shown to create opportunities for
countries to democratize. Additionally, it has allowed political parties to gain the upper hand
over markets in order to support their own political interests and fuse their party with the state
(Kozarzewski and Baltowski 2019).
SMotE was never fully diluted in Poland but instead it had changed in nature since the
1990s. The rapid process of liberalization and asset sales had come to a halt by the early 2000s as
leadership in the Sejm were unable to compromise on how to sell off the last of Poland’s SOEs
(Hardy 2009, 45). Unemployment was high at this time and the positive effects of foreign
investment were only just beginning to be felt. The government still felt uneasy about divesting
itself of all of its enterprises, especially those that were the most profitable. Furthermore, there
was a general hesitation by the public to sell off national firms to international bidders for fast
money (Hardy 2009). The “behind-the-scenes deals and rampant corruption that came to light in
political battles threw cold water on citizens’ initial enthusiasm” for the process of privatization
and so it was often stonewalled when it came to medium and large SOEs (Ozsvald 2019, 169).
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Not to mention that SOEs remained a powerful tool of rent seeking behavior for elites to take
advantage of.
The state never fully retrenched itself from the markets or completely turned over the
keys to the economy to private firms as a result. It always had one foot in SMotE door and
parties were able to use moments of crisis and instability to wedge themselves further into the
economy as they saw fit. To illustrate this point, I used data provided by Kozarzewski and
Baltowski (2019, 30) that estimates the percentage of companies with at least 25% state-owned
shares on the Warsaw Stock Exchange and in the WIG20 index.73 While a large percentage of
the total ownership of these shares is below 50% of total capitalization, the trend is quite clear:
state capitalization has advanced radically since 2010 for the top performing companies. The
data in Figure 5-7 shows how after 2015, when the PiS government came to power, the percent
of companies with government ownership increased. This is likely due to the fact that firms with
state shares performed better during this period which is more likely to place them in the WIG20.

Figure 5-7 Percent of Companies with At Least 25% State Control on WIG20

73

The WIG20 index is an index that trades the largest companies on the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
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Some critics of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus have expressed that modest
levels of SMotE is a response from the state to economic crisis (Bremmer 2010; Dolfsma and
Grosman 2019). A response to the challenges of markets that invokes the state to capture markets
and enhance the extent of its own reach over the economy as a form of prudent constituent
protection. The result is a “form of bureaucratically engineered capitalism” (Bremmer 2010,
250). SMotE does not require full ownership of assets to implement its desired policies or enable
state capture. The state can also exhibit control using indirect means such as veto rights and debt
financing, or “subtle means of state involvement in the markets” (Dolfsma and Grosman 2019,
583). This process ensures that the state not only socializes capital but politicizes it as well.
Crisis and vulnerabilities expressed in the middle class allows enterprising parties to use
state resources to buy off votes and prolong their control over the country. In conjunction, the
population that is most affected by market instability are activated to support these actions. The
middle class, or at least the more vulnerable parts of the middle become affordable enough to be
exchanged with by parties that have access to state resources to bargain with. However, because
vulnerabilities are less even in this case and private enterprise remains high, the costs of
clientelizing the entire middle class as a voting block is cost prohibited. Participation in corrupt
behavior is likewise low which gives voters a cost-effective exit strategy if parties fail to deliver.
Instead, engaged parties must use other tools to carve out sections of voters by targeting payouts
and public incentives to their constituents.
5.8.1. Neopatrimonialism in Poland
In essence, Poland is experiencing, to a degree, what Russia experienced in the 2000s. The state
has reemerged as a driving force of development and economic modality. However, unlike
Russia, Poland has erected competent and institutionally entrenched markets for private
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corporations to operate legally within. Poland’s competent bureaucracy, that can be traced back
through history has kept corrupt behavior much lower as well. After privatization, Russia was
able to leverage private industry by using corruption and power vertical. Meanwhile, Poland was
limited as to what its SMotE can offer parties who seek to fuse themselves to the state.
That is not to say that Poland was without corruption or scandal. Their process of
privatization had already experienced several scandals when it was well underway in the 1980s.
The nomenklatura and other managerial insiders of the PRPZ were deft at gaining toehold in
several key SOEs for profit but this was an open secret in Poland at the time. Stories from those
days abound as to managers selling off whole companies, piece meal, on the black market for
easy money and without repercussion (Hardy 2009). These same agents of the state then
proceeded to use their insider knowledge and access to privatization auctions to gain more assets
and wealth during Poland’s liberalization process. The exit of the state’s influence over the
economy did not end cronyism but instead presented elites with new methods and to enable
crony capitalism (Szanyi 2019, 144).
What separated Poland apart from its neighbors was strong institutional oversight without
the oppressive action of corrupt bureaucrats or informal clientelistic policies. The bureaucracy in
Poland, by most accounts was professional, highly educated, and less likely to fall into
corruption traps than their Soviet neighbors. Instead, they tended to be party loyalists who were
also highly specialized, rather than being only the former (Wasilewski 1990, 745).
This formal adherence to specialization would not last forever. Competitive politics made
appointments more political, rather than less as the principle-agent dilemma became more
multifaceted (Heywood and Meyer-Sahling 2013). Bureaucrats had to not only be specialized but
also had to have the confidence of political leadership that was constantly shifting. This is
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reflected in the ongoing debates as to whether civil servants should be lifetime appointees in
Poland. Since 2006, the PiS led government enacted a reformed civil servant act that allowed for
such lifetime appointments. This politicized more of the Polish bureaucracy and quadrupled the
number of political appointees to over 1000 (Heywood and Meyer-Sahling 2013). Polish
bureaucracy has become increasingly personalized since 2007 in tandem with the capture of the
state.
Neopatrimonial practices became even more problematic during Poland’s accession
process as well. Insider firms and lobbies were strategically tapped by political leadership to
handle the work associated with accession (Gadowska 2010). Political leaders gave out favored
contracts and insider information as a means of patronage that allowed corruption to go
unchecked. All the while Poland put up the façade of anti-corruption measures to appease the EU
and receive its structural funds (Gadowska 2010, 188). For the average Pole, corruption was
identifiable and a systemic problem of governmental life with 91% of respondents to a 2003
public opinion poll indicating that nepotism and favoritism held sway in political life (Gadowska
2010, 180). A score that has not improved in the wake of “the collision between bureaucrats and
entrepreneurs which was reinforced by adoption of a laws and regulations needed for the EU
accession” (Kozarzewski and Baltowski 2019, 9).
The Sustainable Governance Indicators estimate a similar decline in capacity to reign in
corrupt behavior. While not a very strong proxy for clientelistic linkages in a country, it does
measure the amount of abuse officeholders can get away with. Lack of mechanisms to prevent
corrupt behavior does not assume clientelistic behavior but these oversight mechanisms go a
long way to preclude such behavior. I present those SGI values of Poland’s corruption index in
Figure 5-8. The trend line is clear. There has been a rapid decline in corruption monitoring
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according to its Corruption Index score. Since 2015, Poland went from “integrity mechanisms
function effectively” to a score that reflects that it does not “effectively prevent public
officeholders abusing their positions” (Teorell et al. 2022, 495). Poland’s lack of institutional
oversight to this behavior correlates with PiS’s electoral successes.

Figure 5-8 SGI Corruption Prevention Score in the Past Decade
5.8.2. Clientelism and the Middle class
For the voting public, neopatrimonial and clientelistic practices have become more imbedded in
politics in the past 10 year which coincides with the rise of the PiS and its brand of state
capitalism. The political right has used a populism as a means to gain political power in
exchange for party sponsored welfare that meets the needs of its constituents left by
liberalization and internationalization. Yet, the distinguishing characteristics of neopatrimonial
politics in Poland has been argued to be an urban versus rural divide (Mamonova and Franquesa
2020). Instead of class-based cleavages, authors emphasize religion and nationality as the main
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unifying feature of right-wing discourse that play out in townships and urban cities (Ost 2009,
506). However, in economic terms, the PiS’s message is both pro-capitalistic but simultaneously
meant to appeal to class frustrations and grievances. Democracy is in decline in Poland because
clientelistic practices have found a home in a large subset of the middle class.
Jaroslaw Kaczynski led the Law and Justice Party to a limited victory in the 2005
elections, but the party wouldn’t reach its current level of success until 2015. The PiS have been
able to capitalize on the different vulnerabilities and tensions within the Polish electorate. Party
leadership took advantage of cultural disillusionment by magnifying the economic
disenfranchisement that had been occurring in recent year and the results gave the PiS a majority
in the Sejm and dominance of the executive. The success of the party has been attributed to
several other sources besides the marketability of their platform. Markowski (2019) argues that
general public support the PiS is actually quite weak. Instead, the PiS has worked to undermine
the 1997 Constitution to efficiently capture the state but does so without popular approval.
However, recent political events have been particularly useful for understanding a
successful electoral dynamic for the Law and Justice Party. One of the more obvious tools the
party uses means-tests of voter loyalty by identifying ‘true Poles’. This is a cultural and national
identifier that is meant to of foster an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dynamic and split the electorate into
more digestible parts. For instance, the death of former President Lech Kaczynski in a Polish
plane crash in Belorussia 2012 has been used by his brother Jaroslaw to heighten distrust of
political rivals and opposition parties who are declared enemy of the people. Other cleavages are
exacerbated along cultural lines which are more easily detected in Poland given its status as a
largely ethnically and religiously homogenous country possessed of fear and anxiety
cosmopolitanism and Western Liberalism.
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Those that tend to vote for the PiS, according to Markowski’s (2019, 115) analysis, are
recognizable by several aspects. They tend to be high in religiosity and represent the vanguard of
Poland’s conservative-cultural backlash to modernization. Yet, in the same article he estimated
that the effect of “costly but popular pledges” were also intrinsic to PiS’s success (Markowski
2019, 113), which highlights an important trend among PiS supporters: they tend to be higher in
clientelistic linkages. Both in seeking them out and taking advantage of them. Supporters
resonate with policies that lowers the minimum tax, keeps the retirement age low, and provides
child benefits to families and encourage stay at home maternity care. The PiS’s platform is
effectively targeted at the constituent needs of middle class Poles.
When looking at the supply side theories of state capture, evidentiary gaps emerge. For
instance, Markowski’s (2019, 120) recognizes that Poland is an extremely divided society but
relegates this contention to his footnotes and emphasizes what is occurring in Poland is a
horizontal cleavage amongst elites. However, he contradicts himself in the following pages in
regard to PiS’s electoral clientelism stating “…yet it is clear that the level of clientelism differs
significantly once PiS is juxtaposed vis a vis electorates of other mainstream democratic parties
in Poland” (Markowski 2019, 125). It is not clear whether or not the PiS trumps up issues and
creates electoral demands for political is not necessarily clear. It could be argued that the PiS has
built up a façade of economic decline that the population has bought into. But the key words here
are ‘bought into’.
The population buys into clientelism in several ways. They provide electoral support to
candidates who promise social transfers that are clientelistic rather than programmatic. Higher
rates of SMotE following the 2008 crisis means the PiS is in a unique position to offer more to
select constituents. More SOEs means more rents to the state and deeper coffers for elites to pull
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from and patronize their supporters with (Kozarzewski and Baltowski 2019). It also provides the
government with an alternative stream of income that can allow it to cut taxes to patronconstituents and still maintain positive inflows. Whereas decreased access to economic resources
would limit the state’s ability to offer patronage, even selective, state capitalism in tandem with
state capture affords elected officials’ a myriad of carrots, sticks, and other incentives.
The erosion of law and the separation of powers has allowed the PiS to switch from
formal to informal practices more easily which has served to integrate personalistic linkages with
their constituents (Zgut 2021). It also allows them to exploit long-term payoffs like job
opportunities. A high volume of turnover and worker volatility is present in public industries
which can be used to cement loyalty among public sector workers either by patronizing them
with jobs or ensuring their job’s stability. The PiS has used this turnover to its advantage as Zgut
(2021, 8) states “…under the guise of PiS’s policy of ‘decommunization…’ the party has used
this process to distribute a large number of jobs to loyalists”. Access to corporate boards and
party appointed regulators all allow state capture to reach deeper into the economy for political
purposes and sustain rent transfers (McNally 2013).
5.9. Economic Hybridization and Polarization
Unlike Russia, the Polish economy is intermixed with capable and independent firms who are in
competition with an encroaching state-capitalist. Both the government and private economy
seem secure at present and able to operate with a high degree of efficiency in tandem or in
opposition. The hybridization of Poland’s economy has been an ongoing process since the late
2000s. The availability of state run enterprises gives the government a line of revenue which
compels state actors to protect those rents from outside competition. The regulative
administration allows the state to interfere in ways that are not directly measurable, and whose
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effects trickle down to smaller organizations and businesses. Paperwork obfuscates
administrative practices which crushes down on the capacity of local, smaller businesses to
operate. Poland, as it were, had begun its transition from the ‘invisible hand’ to the ‘grabbing
hand’ (Kowalewski and Rybinski 2011).
Debate remains in academia as to the status of the Polish economy in general with some
seeing it as a liberal market economy that has some coordination mechanisms (Rapacki et al.
2020, 571). These authors emphasize Poland’s social protections and its large stock market
capitalization as evidence for this. However, these same authors don’t contend much with the
influence of the state as an economic agent or one with a large stake in the private and public
economy. Others have more astutely identified that state capture requires “an interventionist
state… to combine with multi-national businesses and low skilled and segmented labour markets
to make for a very different dynamic” (Vasileva-Dienes and Schmidt 2019, 262). In other words,
a form of national capitalism that balances both the political desires of the state and the economic
benefits of foreign business and investment.
Ideally the state as a primary shareholder should operate in similar fashion to private
investors. It should seek to maximize shareholder value as its main source of risk. However,
political parties can corrupt this bargain to better serve themselves influence groups
(Kozarzewski and Baltowski 2015). A PricewaterhouseCoopers survey in 2015 found that 86
percent of managers stated that the Polish state as a shareholder “entails politically motivated
engagement” and 83 percent reported that the state “distorts competition” (Oszvald 2019, 176).
The ability for the government to corrupt its political relationship with the economy makes
Poland’s hybrid approach vulnerable towards state interventionism.
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Hybridization should not be intrinsically thought of as inefficient or autocratic. Denmark
is noted for its successful use of hybrid institutions that balance between discouraging market
exposure and encouraging collective learning (Campbell and Pedersen 2007). State capitalism
takes on a different tone and kind in Poland as it has both a hybrid reliance on state and market
capitalism. That is capitalism that relies on markets but operates with increasing amounts of state
intervention either as a means of exercising executive power in formal processes or through
informal and indirect control and authority (Kozarzewski and Baltowski 2019). In essence,
Poland’s “state capitalist systems do not employ markets primarily for efficiency gains, but for
political purposes, especially to enhance national power and state elites’ chances of survival”
(Bremmer 2010, 5).
Over the years, state operated and influenced enterprises have become a key component
of the Polish economy. In 2016, revenues generated by SOEs accounted for 24 percent of
Poland’s GDP (IMF 2020). However, government influence is not restricted only to ownership.
Kozarzewski and Baltowski (2019, 5) identify several key methods of indirectly influencing
markets and firms that aren’t readily apparent. For example, while SOEs comprise about 10
percent of the Polish economy on paper, the government is able to use non-ownership tools to
exercise informal control over large tracts of private enterprise (Kozarzewski and Baltowski
2019, 26). A feature which the Kozarzewski and Baltowski refer to as state-controlled
enterprises (SCEs) that isn’t typically captured within the SOE concept.
The state encroaches into the economy in several ways that manages and manipulates
economic decisions of private firms. Besides the more direct path of developing and securing
SOEs or the reliance on a ‘national champions’ model to protect against the “evil designs of
foreign capital” the state has a variety of tools at its disposal (Kozarzewski and Baltowski 2019,
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19). These include ownership and quasi-ownership tools, limiting property rights, regulatory
actions, and persuasion. The Polish government, after 2010, is more capable in its ability to
orchestrate the economy and pick winners and losers. The government can infiltrate business
boards and stack them with party members and sympathetic elites. Kozarzewski and Baltowski
(2019) continue the argument, stating that SMotE is:
“…often found in countries at a lower level of development, including Poland and some
other CEE countries, consists in the state using, with respect to formally privately-owned
listed companies, the phenomenon of ‘control leverage’ (also voting power leverage), i.e.
gaining significantly more corporate power than warranted by the (minority) stake held by it.
This group also includes companies in which the state has no shareholding but it controls
them indirectly (they are formally owned by entities that are independent from the state).”
(4)
When the free and the state-tethered economy collide, the PiS party has resorted to
authoritative actions that favors more SMotE which has alienated and weakened economic and
political institutions. The systematic delegitimization of private enterprise has been the primary
method for the state to seize more economic control. A process that has required the methodical
undermining of the rule of law, and constitutional oversight to better exchange more power over
the economy and maintain that access to power. As a result, a self-enforced paradigm has
occurred. As the PiS increased its power over the economic, control over the economic markets
by the state it simultaneously becomes more vital to maintain within party control (Kurlantzick
2016).
Simultaneously, the actions of the government have been primed towards increasing its
economic share. For instance, after the PiS party took political control in 2015, two of the largest
private owned banks in Poland were nationalized. This gave the government a stake in over 12 of
the 20 listed companies on the WIG 20 (Kozarzewski and Baltowski 2019, 28). This also has
allowed the state to control the financing and savings of larger portions of the population. A fact
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that is more similar to Chinese authoritarian state capitalism rather than state capitalism in
Western Europe (Kurlantzick 2016, 34). The economic utility of controlling more revenues
secures the party’s future successes and “thus, SOEs are used as sinecures and a source of
finance, both for private gains and for party objectives” (Kozarzewski and Baltowski 2019, 10).
As far as the government is concerned, it has sought more control and a tighter economic
grip in recent years. In 2020, Poland amended the investment procedures for foreign acquisitions
(Wnukowski and Lasowska 2020). The government placed limitations on who can invest and
increased the regulatory oversight over more private companies. The change also extended
protections to indirect investments and purchases. Polish ministers argue that they remain
committed to investment, but the largesse of these investments come from the own state’s budget
and delivered to state owned firms. Morawski (2021), who reported on a conference attended by
Jaroslaw Gowin, Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development,
stated
“This coexistence of large state enterprises and the private SME sector points to the
target model for the Polish economy. It should be based mainly on a network of mediumsized and large private enterprises conducting business globally with effective state
support. The network would be complemented by a carefully designed ecosystem for
startups in advanced sectors of the economy.”
The Polish economy isn’t only made up of the state. Unlike Russia, the private sector
makes up the largest percentage of employment and its overall GDP at around 75 percent, in
2015 numbers (Szczurek and Tomaszewski 2020). Strong free market mechanisms and a
regulatory landscape favorable for investments are also identified with Poland’s economy. The
private sector makes up such a large percentage of the overall economy that state capitalism is
unlikely to supplant private company’s disaggregated forces. Indeed, there has been strong
pushback in recent years against the imposition of statism over the economy leading to an
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unstable balance as to which way the scales of hybridization may tilt. Each are in a kind of stasis
where neither is able to fully exert its will over the other. Authors Uminski and Borowicz (2021,
83) warn against what increases to the levels of protectionism that PiS’s government means for
the economic balance in the long term. However, they fail to identify the high levels of
hybridization of foreign firm and state-capitalism present in Poland or how elites manipulate it to
their advantage.
Poland also retains a strong investment climate for foreign capital. Relatively cheap
skilled labor and export access to EU markets keeps Poland’s comparative advantage for FDI
relatively high. Private firms are still viable for wage earners as well though that gap is
shrinking. World Bank Indicators (2022) provide evidence to this case that I present in Figure 49. Wage compression is much narrower in the public sector with a ratio of 3.5:1 when comparing
median wage earners to new hires. Private sector wages have a much wider spread, but this has
narrowed in recent years. While the wage compression data is only until 2016, Figure 5-9
provides a stark contrast as to how wages in the private sector have become less competitive in
the past decade.

Figure 5-9 Wage Compression Ratio by Sector
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5.9.1. The Loyalty of Markets
The Polish government never fully divested itself of its economy in the wake of the neoliberal
transition. The government retained a large share in the economy as it began to be dominated by
foreign investment dollars that were after low wage and skilled labor. As the state re-emerged in
the early 2010s as a contending force in the market, private enterprise would have to adapt
accordingly. Following Hirschman’s (1980) thesis, private businesses have two options, to voice
or exit. As will be seen, domestic and international firms have different risk-rewards for either
response.
In terms of exit, domestic and international firms must approach Poland’s state capitalist
economy differently as the consequences and possibility of leaving Poland’s market are not
equal across all firms. International companies have a much easier time of exiting Poland’s
economy in response to over aggressive regulatory policies and political favoritism towards its
national champions of industries. FDI is typically vertically integrated into Poland’s market
which allows multinational companies to produce locally without having to place much capital
inside Poland’s borders (Cieślik 2020). Exit, in this case, is the cheaper option. It allows
international firms to leave the market and avoid competing against state backed firms and the
punitive regulations that go along with them (Szanyi 2022, 148).
The PiS party is not without options to limit capital mobility and have responded by
raising the stakes for a foreign firm to exit its markets. In 2018, they introduced an exit tax for
individuals and firms seeking to relocate capital outside of the country (Matusik and Mikolajuk
2018). Such tactics raise the costs of divestment from Poland’s increasingly regulative
environment. Taken together with a recent law that added government oversight to most foreign
acquisitions and mergers, the PiS government has increased the barriers to exit and entry as well.
For the time being, Poland’s relative cheap labor costs allows it to continue to attract foreign
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capital. Polish labor costs are estimated to be a quarter the cost to produce what a company
would pay in Germany (Zimny 2015, 855).
The costs for exiting from the Polish market have gone up for international firms but it
was always a costly endeavor for domestic companies. Much of Poland’s industries are only
locally invested. Domestic corporations have been slow to invest abroad via outward FDI
(OFDI) given Poland’s large market and low levels of competitive advantage in the quality of its
domestic goods production (Gorynia et al. 2015, 330). Instead, Poland follows Dunning’s OFDI
strategy of seeking out resource and strategic acquisitions in nearby markets; namely
Luxembourgh, but other EU countries as well (Dunning 1988; Gorynia et al. 2015, 332).
Outward investment still remains relatively insignificant to the size of inward FDI at 5 and 40
percent, respectively (OECD 2017, 2). Domestic firms are also limited in their capacity to retreat
from the market in protest given stricter oversights on capital outflow. Instead, they are more
likely to play up loyalty or at least remain silent as a means of retaining access to the state’s
resources and not draw the ire of regulatory agencies.
In response to state intervention, domestic businesses are limited in their capacity to push
back due their overall sizes compared to SOEs. For instance, SOE tax rates of 9 percent,
compared to the regular corporate tax rate of 19 percent is a clear advantage in SOE’s favor. In
response to Covid, the PiS’s recent policy, the Polish Deal, has been aimed at relieving some of
the tax burdens for the country’s smallest companies, but this has also served to break up their
capacity to coordinate. Polish business associates have responded by criticizing the tax plan as
inconsistent and placing more power in the hands of the PiS directly through ‘legal loopholes’
(Kurasinska 2021). Those business associations that do not challenge the PiS engage in a
strategy of ‘elite replacement’ (Bill 2022). The political leadership systematically pushes out
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oppositional associations and interest groups and replace them with more friendly or allied to PiS
interests.
Those companies that stop competing in Poland also change the estimated costs
associated with the ones who remain or voice their displeasure with the system. As the number
of oppositional firms decrease, those that remain to challenge the current status quo have less
information to recalibrate policy or political decisions. However, in Poland this is not the case.
Instead, domestic firms are motivated by economic patriotism (Naczyk 2014). Favored industries
and national champions are used by the government to enhance its own prestige and political
clout while smaller companies buy into the nationalist zeal through participation. The state may
focus on bigger companies that are important drivers of innovation and technology development,
but smaller firms gain in less direct ways. They can reap the benefits of technological
enhancements and a larger market to sell their goods to (Morawski 2021). Positive effects are
more likely to encourage Polish enterprises, especially smaller ones, to voice their loyalty to
PiS’s state capture practices rather than their disapproval.
Increased intervention into MNC’s affairs limit both their strategic freedom and
managerial autonomy but leaves room for adaptation (Doz and Prahalad 1980). This may be
wiser option given Poland’s host market for affordable labor. Moreover, international firms can
use their leverage over foreign capital, technological advantages, and selectivity in placing
investments to wrench concessions from their host markets. Scholars predict that dependence on
FDI will likely increase in the aftermath of COVID-19 along with the advantages, or ‘premium’
over domestic firms, that foreign investors provide (Uminski and Borowicz 2021, 83). The
correlational benefits of hosting FDI and being hosted in Poland create a stable and mutual
interest that ensures both party’s participation. Unlike domestic firms that lack the capacity to go
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abroad, FDI selectivity ensures a level of compliance with their host country and Poland is no
exception. As such, there is a strong current of investment and support for investment that has
occurred in Poland and the PiS is unlikely to challenge that overall theme despite more
protectionist measures introduced in the past year.
5.10.

Polarized Strategic Dependence in the Middle Class

What has been described thus far in this chapter is how Poland has undergone a democratic
transformation only to slow and decline away from democracy in the 2010s. The elite-led
transformation that occurred in 1989 provided a path to include the former communist leadership
in the new Polish government which has allowed present-day leadership to point out the
continuity of ex-communist interests and alienate the past from the present (Szczerbiak 2019). I,
however, contend that uneven growth, middle class insecurity, and modest levels of SMotE were
paramount in leading to state capture by this new group of enterprising elites within the PiS
party. State-capitalism, while not on its own anti-democratic, has been traded with middle class
voters. However, the middle class does not share vulnerabilities across all earners in this group
which fuels an uneven demand for clientelism. On the one hand, there are those that insist on the
more liberal and market-based future for the Polish economy and who remain out of reach to the
PiS. On the other hand, another contingent sees state-capitalism and clientelistic opportunism as
ideal solutions for growing economic inequality.
In a country with such a large middle class, clientelism that targets middle class
recipients should be more expensive (Hicken 2011, 300). Vertical transfers become too costly
when there are too many mouths to patronize which makes it an inefficient method for political
power promotion. However, in a system where political control is not concrete, easily
informalized, and doled out in partisan fashion, these costs may be reduced. By splitting Poland
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between ‘loyalists’ and ‘outsiders’, the PiS government can effectively target its main supporters
in efficient ways. Kaczinski’s PiS party is selling clientelism and targeted welfare policies to
‘coerce’ voters to increase his party’s electoral success (Zgut 2021).
Welfare transfers are often designed in a way to assist the most financially strained
elements of society and become more critical as income inequality grows (Paweł Bukowski and
Novokmet 2021). However, PiS policy directs most aid to those ‘who need it least’ in an effort to
gain electoral support from the broadest swath of the electorate (Ciobanu 2019). A fact which
motivates middle class recipients to seek out these transfers for added support. Take for instance
the current Prime Minister Morawiecki’s new reforms to raise the standard of living for middle
class Poles. The Polish Deal is an attempt to subsidize middle income earners who politically
lean towards PiS. He’s raised the tax exemption allowance to ten times its previous rate which
hits Poles right at the cusp but avoids the highest earners in the middle class. This plan also
targets the middle class with an increased amount of health spending and covers home loans up
to 20 percent of the loan value when that family has children to subsidize family building
(Wilcsek 2021).
Voters who support the PiS party have outstripped their rival’s electoral capacity by
proportionally outvoting them in the past two election cycles. This has given the PiS a large
share of the Sejm and control of the executive but not all middle income households support the
party or clientelism. Markowski (2019, 118) is correct in his assertion that the PiS is not a
‘demand side revolt’ for large scale democratic and economic changes. In the end, his analysis is
short sighted though. He does not disentangle voters across groups but treats PiS supporters as a
coherent voting block that is attracted to the kinds of state-capitalist behaviors the PiS has to
offer.
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This split is often difficult to align with ideological differences because of the
incoherence of Poland’s party system. The middle class is internally polarized which makes
identifying alignments difficult. While middle class voters in Russia stand out as a coherent
voting bloc, in Poland their electoral preferences are not as clear. They are often chaotic and
contested. The largest oppositional party in the Sejm, the liberal Civic Platform or Platforma
Obywatelska (PO), is also able to concentrate on middle class support with programmatic
appeals to liberal urban voters and which has been successful.74 Although unable to gain back the
majority and unseat the PiS in the Sejm, the Civic Platform only lost its race for the Polish
presidency to PiS aligned Andrej Duda by 2 percent of the popular vote in 2020.
The lack of discrimination between ideological differences is unique to middle income
voters. Using data from European Values Survey’s 2017 to 2019 wave, I demonstrate in Figure
5-10 the statistical insignificance related to middle income households and ideological
alignment.75 Income groups used the same decile coding method and was regressed against the
survey respondent’s ideological placement. The likelihood of middle income voters being left, or
right is indistinguishable which bodes well for my theory of a polarized electorate. Meanwhile,
survey takers from lower and higher income households reported a much stronger relationship.
These individuals bifurcate in ideology with higher income voters being less likely to align with
the rightest politics while lower income participants have the highest likelihood. A factor that is
likely capturing the conservative rural and liberal urban divide.

74
The Platforma Obywatelska (PO) was a union of the defunct AWS (Solidarity bloc) and Freedom Union
that gained prominence in the 2007 under the leadership of Donald Tusk until their defeat in 2015. They have been
the opposition since and maintain a large percentage of the Sejm and Polish Senate.
75
See Appendix D.4 for questions and coding.
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Figure 5-10 Probability of Political Alignment by Household Incomes
Polarization within the middle class highlights the strategic dilemma faced by the middle
class. The choice between a state-capitalist future or a liberal-market future has broken down
along lines of who supports the PiS. However, the availability of economic alternatives in Poland
makes defection a real possibility. Certain elements of the middle class are affordable, but
clientelistic endeavors must be careful not to overpromise to constituents that can switch their
votes when they find a better opportunity elsewhere. This also effects rates of corrupt
participation too. We should see higher levels of clientelism for certain groups, but unlike
Russia, corruption participation will be less likely because the state doesn’t dominate all aspects
of social and economic life.
5.11.

Evidence for Middle class Clientelism in Poland

The hypotheses of this chapter are that modest amounts of SMotE and a vulnerable middle class
should make buying off some of these voters with public goods as relatively cost effective.
Relative in this case because parties are limited in the totality of their transfers without a large
pool of resources at hand. Additionally, the presence of strong free market forces provides a
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valid and credible alternative for middle class Poles, and this makes exit strategies much more
potent. Targeting supporters is essential. Therefore, we should not see a differentiation of
clientelist measures within the middle class. There should be theoretical a split between pro and
anti-market camps that should detract or support the state capturing party, respectively.
I hypothesize that, as with Russia, clientelistic practices should be visible in measured
confidence to public good’s quality. First, I expect that middle income voters won’t be predictive
across my models due to the polarized split within this group of voters. For this reason,
statistically significant variation will only occur when looking directly at middle income
respondents while controlling for party preferences. Second, corrupt participation will produce
low correlations as well. Higher levels of political competition means that a lack of discretion is
much easier to observe and punish. Instead, PiS voters should not report any more of a likelihood
of participatory corruption.
To estimate middle class clientelism, I use a similar method to the Russian analysis but
with datapoints from the European Value Survey (EVS) collected from Poland in 2017 to 2019.
This was the latest survey and accounts for PiS’s electoral victory effects and post-financial
crisis effects. It also included more assessments of public goods that survey takers responded to.
I again use maximum likelihood factor analysis with two composite scores: clientelism and
corruption.76 Clientelism is composed of responses to confidence in civil service, education,
social security, health care, courts, and the police. These were measured on a 1 to 4 ordinal scale
with 1 being the highest confidence reported. Corruption is a composition of responses to
claiming benefits, cheating on taxes, accepting a bribe, and avoiding a fair. These were coded 1
to 10 which 10 being the highest level of justifiability for these actions. The independent

76

See Appendix D.5 for maximum likelihood factor analysis and questionnaire information.
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variables included middle income households of 4th to 7th household income deciles. Next, I
include a dichotomous measure of PiS voter that I then interact with my middle income
measurement to produce a variable of PiS middle income respondent as 1 and all other
respondents as 0.77
I regressed each model twice. The first model includes only the middle income and PiS
variables.78 They were then ran again including the interactive term to measure the correlative
effects and are included in Table 5-1.79 Per the polarized hypothesis, middle income households
failed to correlate with clientelism or corruption scores when not including the interaction term.
Being a PiS voter is statistically significant with a negative clientelism factor score which
indicates higher confidence and therefore more potential clientelism. A result which aligns with
the tone of my argument. In model two, middle income PiS respondents were statistically more
likely to report a higher degree of confidence in clientelistic public goods. More so than PiS
voters alone. When including the middle income-PiS interaction, middle income voters flip their
relationship to clientelism, which signifies less clientelism when controlling for PiS voters within
this group. This provides some evidence that while being in the middle class in Poland doesn’t
correlate to better access to goods and services from the government, being a PiS voter and being
in the middle class does. The corruption score was insignificant for most variables except PiS
voter. This score was negative indicating lower justification of corrupt behavior among PiS
voters. Participation in corruption is less likely to be associated with middle class clientelist
theory when polarization and political competition is high. Exit potential is too higher for voters.

77

See Appendix D.6 for Summary of Statistics Table.
See Appendix D.8 for robustness checks with included control variables.
79
Each model was estimated again looking at upper and lower income respondent effects with middle
income as the reference category. The results indicated that upper income survey takers were statistically
insignificant when estimated with both models. Lower income effects were insignificant regarding corruption but
were significant in predicant higher income scores compared. I examine this linkage in this section. See Appendix
D.9 for results.
78
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Table 5-1 Regressions of Clientelism and Corruption by Party and Household Income
Clientelism Clientelism Corruption Corruption
Score
Score
Score
Score
Middle
0.05
0.157*
-0.006
-0.015
Income
(0.059)
(0.071)
(0.055)
(0.067)
PiS
Middle
Income
(PiS)
Constant
N
2

R

-0.271**
(0.062)
-

-0.13
(0.08)
-0.34**
(0.125)

-0.177**
(0.058)

-0.189*
(0.076)

-

0.029
(0.118)

0.063
(0.043)

0.017
(0.046)

0.03 (0.04)

0.038
(0.044)

934

934

934

934

0.021

0.029

0.001

0.001

Note: OLS Regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01 * p<0.05.
Negative value for clientelism means higher confidence.
Positive value for corruption means more justified.

The association with PiS and clientelism goes further. I modeled respondent’s party
choice as predicted by all Polish parties in 2015 using the same clientelism score provided by the
factor analysis and present the predicted probabilities from an ordered logit by middle class
respondents in Figure 5-11.80 The graph shows that not only is there a strong correlation between
confidence in public goods and PiS but that there is very little association with clientelism and
Poland’s other parties. The probability of a higher clientelism score degrades rapidly when
moving towards a lower composite score. Meanwhile, most parties are indistinguishable when
considering the probability of a lower clientelism score.

Each respondent’s party variable (EVS 2018: E179) was interacted with middle income respondents.
Figure generated with ordered logit of clientelism score and middle class party choice.
80
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Figure 5-11 Middle income Respondent by Party and Clientelism Score
Looking at all income groups and clientelism presents some confounding features,
however. Figure 5-12 shows the linear estimations of a one unit increase in clientelism score, or
a lower clientelism score, between each of the three income groups.81 The results indicate a
similar value between having a high clientelism score and supporting PiS between middle and
lower income groups. However, the surface evidence may be misleading as having a higher
confidence in public goods is a very strong predictor of being a PiS voter in the middle class but
not so with lower income households. Instead, there is a strong overlap between PiS and non-PiS
voters in lower income respondents regardless of clientelism score. If that’s the case, Poland may
also be exhibiting class clientelism or even programmatic welfare programs for its lower income
citizens. Certainly, it shows that polarization does not exist with lower earning Poles as it does
within the middle class. The results do not indicate a failure of the main hypothesis but do

81

Figure 5-12 was generated using an OLS regression of clientelism scores and an interaction between PiS
voter and income group variable. See Appendix D.6.
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insinuate that the PiS’s payoff schemes are not targeted explicitly at one group like they are in
Russia.

Figure 5-12 Linear Prediction of Clientelism Score by Income Group and PiS Voter
5.11.1. Targeting the Middle
The results from the models indicate several important takeaways. First, a common ideology or
partisan identity is unlikely to exist amongst middle class Poles. While this is logical within a
strong democracy, high levels of polarization may preclude the ability for inter-partisan
cooperation and give room for exploitative elites to use disagreement as a tool to aggregate more
power. Certainly, this would explain the current scenario in Poland in which a small minority of
the population has been able to elect the PiS to a political majority in the Sejm and Polish Senate.
The PiS have used this to their advantage in order to rewrite the economic and political
relationship in Poland. Second, middle class Poles who vote for the PiS are especially attuned in
to PiS spending.
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There are limits with using public spending as a means of rewarding or punishing voters.
Selective goods are often enough to reinforce clientelist networks and keep politicians in power,
but universal programs can also be rewarding if the party designs social assistance with a
selection bias built in for their supporters. In this case, the PiS can use the urban versus
provincial divide to more likely place public spending into their voter’s pockets. President
Andrej Duda, who has official PiS support though ran is an independent, was able to exploit this
divide by focusing on provincial towns and smaller settlements during the 2015 election and
again in 2020. Duda visited every one of Poland’s 380 districts on his campaign which aided in
his appeal as a rural champion provincial voters (Walker 2020). In return for votes, the
government was able to credibly exchange better services and welfare dollars.
Another example of how the PiS awards middle income supporters is the Family 500+
Programme that was instituted in 2016 by the PiS to promote higher birthrates and ‘family
values’ in Poland (Sussman 2019). The logic makes sense for an incentivization program for
citizens to start and have bigger families in a country whose population is rapidly aging and slow
growing. The program has also attracted the ire of some women’s groups who’ve accused the
PiS of enticing women out of the workplace and into motherhood (Sussman 2019). Its payout
awards 500 zlotys, about $125, per child past the first, to their families. This was changed in
2019 to include every child do the program’s popularity. While universal in its appeal and
access, the family income program is also able to function as a vote buying tool in several ways.
First, family size variates between rural and urban populations which correlates with voter
preferences. Second, the application process places a lot of oversight control within the
voidvodeships, or Polish states, that are overseen by administrative governors appointed by the
prime minister. In this case, Mateusz Morawiecki of the PiS party. This allows for effective
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monitoring of the credibility of voters by increasing or decreasing the volume of payments as
needed.
The use of family size to determine social spending allows the PiS to aim more dollars at
their middle income supporters. Estimates suggest the most utility from the program is gained
from those participants in the 2nd income decile all the way up to the 8th decile (Sowa 2016, 2).
Outside those six deciles the program loses much of its benefit. In other words, this program was
engineered for benefitting the middle class (Sussman 2019). This program allows PiS to funnel
zlotys directly to its supporters who tend to live in more suburban and rural areas (Wanat and
Cienski 2020). One reason for this is that Polish cities have lower fertility rates in large part due
to the higher percentage of women in the workforce. While the number of live births is quite
similar between urban and rural settings, at 1.47 and 1.43 respectively, urban centers are in
decline as residents move to the suburbs where municipal spending is higher and social welfare
coverage is better(Wichowska 2021). There is also a higher likelihood that rural residents will
apply to the program because the size of rural families is much larger. The average household
size between urban and provincial families is 2.54 and 3.4, respectively (Potyra 2016). This
value goes up even higher when disaggregating between suburban and the smaller townships.
The PiS has tailored the Family 500 + Programme to reach the pockets of their supporters
as well as screen, to a certain extent, who is able to secure those dollars. The program was
modified in 2018 to be monitored by local governments led by voivodes who are administrative
governors appointed by the prime minister (Sowa 2016). These provincial leaders have the
power to withhold benefits at their discretion or promote applications so that applicants receive
their benefits in a timely manner. As of December 21st, 2020, almost 297,000 applicants, or 13
percent of total applications, were still being held up in this administrative process (Topolewska
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2021). Applicants are denied for different reasons such as improper procedure, or mishandled
paperwork. The Ministry of Family and Social Policy, which oversees disbursements, also
alleges fraud and deception practices as being a common reason to deny applicants (Topolewska
2021). To top it off, applicants must also reapply each year which gives administrative services a
high degree of control for loosening or tightening access to this welfare check.
5.11.2. Evidence for Provincialized Middle class Clientelism
The Family 500+ Programme has only been in effect for a short time, but it has allowed PiS
candidates to run on the program’s wide net and social spending as a means of getting more
supporters to the polls. For instance, data on the amount of spending between 2019 and 2020
shows a strong correlation with vote shares in the 2020 presidential election. After 2019,
spending for the program increased greatly with the average spending per voivodeship increasing
240 zl per capita. However, this difference in spending was inconsistent across voivodeships has
a scrupulous connection with turnout for the incumbent President Duda.
I used the data from Poland’s Central Statistical Office and Electoral Commission which
breaks down voter percentages and spending social spending programs by voivodeship to
examine this connection. The raw spending is laid out in Table 5-2 along with various measures
such as per capita averages and per capita spending differences between 2019 and 2020. I also
align voivodeship spending with electoral outcomes. Each province was marked if it received an
increase support for Duda in the 2020 election compared to the 2015 turnout, even if Duda lost
the province. Provinces that increased in support for Duda saw an average increase of 694
million zlotys from the previous year. Regions that did not increase support and Duda lost in
2015, only received an extra 320 million zlotys on average. Not far behind regions that increased
support were regions that did not increase support for the Polish president, but support was high
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in 2015. These provinces saw an increase of 620 million zlotys. These numbers are stark
although they tighten up somewhat when considering per capita spending. I visualize this data in
Figure 5-13 with the differences in zlotys per capita labeled in each province.

Figure 5-13 Difference in “Family 500+” Spending Per Capita by Voivodeship and
Change in Electoral Support for Duda (PiS)
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Table 5-2 Spending on Family 500 Plus Program by Voivodeship
Difference Per
2019 Family
2020 Family
Capital
500+ Spending 500 + Spending
Spending per
Voivodeship
per Capita (zł)
per Capita (zł)
Capita (zł)
Opole
666.89
884.46
217.57
Lubusz
748.35
1002.36
254.01
Podlaskie
794.01
994.93
200.92
Holy Cross
742.68
938.33
195.65
Warmian-Masurian
808.19
1013.03
204.84
West Pomeranian
705.08
951.13
246.06
Kuyavian-Pomeranian
794.83
1018.82
223.99
Lublin
801.62
1002.62
201.00
Subcarpathian
823.15
1034.58
211.43
Pomeranian
855.89
1124.03
268.13
Lodz
762.77
997.34
234.57
Lower Silesian
709.19
970.21
261.02
Lesser Poland
862.38
1112.87
250.49
Greater Poland
864.96
1137.26
272.29
Silesian
731.29
986.68
255.38
Masovian
864.57
1154.67
290.10
Increased Support (Duda - PiS)
Average
Yes
249.73
No (high)
226.31
No (low)
234.97

Increased
Turnout
for Duda
(PiS)
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No

Percent
Won
47.36
40.2
60.14
64.41
46.84
41.24
46.77
66.31
70.92
40.16
54.46
44.61
59.65
45.07
48.99
47.74

Note: zł are values in Polish złoties. Millions of zł where noted.
Spending data provided by Central Statistical Office of Poland. Published as: Świadczenia na rzecz rodziny w 2020 roku.
Electoral data provided by Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza at https://wybory.gov

Total
Difference
(millions of zł)
212.52
255.82
235.74
239.6
290.15
415.36
461.85
421.15
448.49
629.22
571.88
754.69
854.28
952.06
1147.27
1573.81
Average
694
620.71
320.44
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The amounts in give some indication that higher spending returned for Duda more votes
in those provinces he did more poorly in during the 2015 race. High levels of spending in
provinces he had won in 2015 kept the loyalty of his backers secured in 2020. The reward for
this spending was potent even in regions that did not yield higher levels of voter support since
voter support increased in enough provinces than decreased. There are also issues of whether
such behavior could be considered vote buying or clientelism. The availability of this public
good means the PiS policy is far from a scalpel and more like a hammer. Its precision is
uncertain but the relationship between spending and Duda’s success is readily apparent in the
data.
Table 5-3 Clientelism Score by Town Size

Town Size
Middle Income
PiS
Middle Income (PiS)
Constant

Clientelism
Score
0.105**
(0.021)
0.16*
(0.067)
-0.097
(0.08)
-0.357**
(0.118)

N

-0.26**
(0.071)
934

R2

0.055

Note: OLS Regression with robust standard errors in
parentheses.
** p<0.01 * p<0.05.
Negative value for clientelism means higher confidence.
Positive value for corruption means more justified.

Further analysis can help pull out the connection between the rural and urban divide over
public goods access and quality. EVS data from 2017 provides useful demographic information
which gives the town’s size of each respondent which I use as a proxy for provincial or
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urbanized settings. I used the same factor analysis composite score for clientelism to assess
confidence in public goods and assess its relationship with clientelism. For the independent
variable, I used an ordinal measure of town size that scales 5 times from under 5,000 to 500,000
or more. This variable was regressed against the clientelism score along with the middle class,
PiS, and middle class PiS voter variables from Table 5-1.82
The results in Table 5-3 bare out what has been argued here. Middle income and middle
income PiS estimators maintain their effects from the initial model of clientelism composite
scores. The new town size variable correlates with a lower confidence and, therefore, a lower
clientelism score. This provides some evidence that there is a relationship between town size and
non PiS middle income voters with identifying poorer public goods quality. I converted this data
into a graph using marginal probabilities for each town size demographics and controlling for
middle income respondents.

Figure 5-14 Probability of Clientelism Score by Town Size in Middle Income Households
82

See Appendix D.7 for town size variable and coding.
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Figure 5-14 shows the highest probabilities of a high clientelism score for middle income
respondents were in towns under 5,000 people.83 A function of a higher proportion of
respondents being from these environs. However, the mean response was 2.5 on an ordinal scale
of 1 to 5 so I don’t suspect this muddled the values. Respondents from the smallest towns were
followed d by the next smallest town measures which were at a predictive probability of 0.08
points each. On the other end of clientelism scores were large cities, whose respondents were
most likely to rate the least amount of confidence in public goods.
5.12.

Populism and SMotE

The coordination between state capture elites and sections of the middle class is on full display in
Poland. As Kinowska-Mazaraki (2021) claims, Poles have given up freedoms in exchange for
promises of the state to intervene on their behalf. The author points to “imaginary” social
enemies as preeminent motivating factors, but the underlying economic and material issues are
genuine to many Poles as well. The challenges faced by some of the Polish middle class is
pressing on many of them to exchange liberal democracy for a state where the government can
more forcefully intervene on their behalf. As a result, populist dogma has a very fertile staging
ground in Poland. Social issues provide a screen to otherize minority groups in the population
while promoting state-capitalist and welfare solutions. Even if the PiS were to lose the 2025
elections, much of the changes that have occurred in the last six years will be unlikely to
resurrect Polish liberal democracy in the immediate future.
Populism is on the rise in Europe in what is characterized as a union between left- and
right-wing nationalized sovereignty or re-establishing the nation-state as the dominant discourse

83

Figure generated with an ordered logit of clientelism score and town size.
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(Kallis 2018). While procedural populism is a method of activating popular sentiment on the
elite level, its “anti-liberal market, protectionist economic and social policies” have real
downstream effects on Poland’s democracy and institutions (Kitschelt 2002). Most of the state
capture gains that have occurred have been under the PiS, but, as I have claimed in this chapter,
the blueprint for state-capitalism were legacy elements of Poland’s transition in the 1990s. It is
unlikely that a parliament under a different party would be able to or even want to retreat from
the neopatrimonial and state-capitalist gains the current government has made.
One aspect where state and private institutions have comingled in Poland that will be
difficult to roll back is the state-controlled media. The PiS have increased government control of
independent media outlets in a process that is commiserate with other populist leadership around
the globe in an ongoing effort to keep foreign influences out of Poland. In 2021, the PiS
introduced a media bill that would effectively silence foreign owned media outlets while critics
argue it is a pretense to silence dissent (Wlodarczak-semczuk and Florkiewicz 2021). The bill
was vetoed by President Duda in December, who cited treaty obligations to the US as an issue
since one of the main companies that would have been affected was owned by a US based
corporation. Concern over press abuse was not a priority.
The current Polish government is in the process of creating a corrupted state where
society serves the government not unlike that of Hungary which has shifted from populist statism
to authoritarian statism in the past decade (Szombati 2017). Increased nationalism and a rejection
of the Washington consensus has promoted a demand for a ‘third way’ of economic development
that suggests an air of inevitability to Poland’s state-capitalist future. The recent covid crisis has
served to heighten those demands for state intervention. Poland’s economy has emerged quite
strong from the Covid crisis, but political processes have taken a beating (Pawel Bukowski and
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Paczos 2021). The recent 2020 presidential election has been criticized for its failure to be fair
and democratic (Zgut 2021, 15). The process was strictly held by mail-in-voting only and the
oppositional candidate was further limited in access to state resources and media coverage.
Additionally, government leadership has also been more reliant on the Constitutional Tribunal,
Poland’s supreme court, to pass through controversial changes to Polish law. A process that
critics have cited as a means of circumventing parliamentary procedure (Kinowska-Mazaraki
2021).
The correlation between statism and populism will likely mean that Poland continues
down its current trajectory for some time. However, it is important to note that populism is
merely a means to an end in order to package palatable party platforms to those vulnerable voters
who can be adequately bought off with the redistribution of the state’s rents. The support for PiS
and the party’s promises to the middle class gives it’s a lot of political capital to exchange on
perceived vulnerabilities within this group. Many of these welfare promises are now too popular
for any alternative party dissolve, were they to be elected to a majority in the Sejm in any case
(Ciobanu 2019). The demand for protectionism against the market remains high within the
voting electorate as long as inequality and material instability within the middle class remains a
factor.
5.13.

Conclusion

Poland presents a case of two transitions. On the one hand, the 1990s provided an opportunity for
growth and expansion which allowed private enterprise to flourish in a relatively stable
environment. During this time, social classes became more coherent, and the middle class
emerged as a political and social force within Polish society. Changes occurred in the 2000s,
after Poland’s overall economic situation had become even better followed by an abrupt
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downturn in 2008. While the Polish economy continued to grow, foreign investments that many
workers depended on became less secure. This process left many Poles feeling embittered to free
markets and the volatility and vulnerabilities they experienced after a decade and a half of
growth.
Poland’s uniqueness is identified in its hybrid quality. On the one hand, state-capitalism
has been on the rise since 2012. The government is enlarging its shares of once privately owned
companies and extended its reach by using regulative action. Unlike Russia, Poland retains a
high degree of liberal and free markets with a large contingent of foreign owned enterprises. Its
regulative environment remains open and designed to encourage continued foreign direct
investment. Meanwhile, the PiS government has strengthened nationalistic ties within the
economy as a means of gaining electoral leverage with a narrow class of Poles.
For the meantime, Poland’s hybrid economy remains functional. Foreign investment is
able to continue while PiS’s government increases its nationalized capitalism development
model. While the two exist in a tension, the conflict has not reached a point where private
industry, both domestic and private, have needed to reassess Poland as an investment market. At
the same time, domestic firms that are too small are unable to challenge the PiS’s growing
superiority over economic regulations and state-capitalist policies. A scenario of cooperation
rather than voice or protestation is more reasonable. As long as Poland remains a valuable, high
skilled market with cheap labor foreign firms will continue to risk their investments and trade in
spite of the government’s continued encroachment.
Higher rates of SMotE are in congruence with elements of the vulnerable middle class
who remain polarized and split between those who seek protection from the fickleness of the
market and those that see an increasingly authoritarian state as a danger to Polish democracy. I
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have argued that the financial crisis played havoc among a large portion of Polish society and
none more so than the middle income earners who experienced a shift in access to material
advantages as a result. Per this logic, democracy is waning in Poland because there is a large
section of the polity that finds the anti-market and pro-welfare sentiments of populist elites to be
beneficial. Where the state encroaches, so too there are losses to private freedoms as dependence
on the government grows.
The future of Poland is not written. While the PiS have done a lot to secure political and
neopatrimonial control over many institutional and economic aspects of Polish society, they are
still beholden to elections. It remains to be seen if another party would be willing to roll back the
government’s extended management of economic matters or if the middle class enters a new
phases of prosperity which makes them less prone to clientelism. Poland never fully divested
itself of its public economy during its transitory period in the 90s and it is unlikely that the reemergence of a liberal political party in Poland would reimplement the Washington Consensus in
a post-2008 economy. The popularity of the PiS and their populist platform is relative to the
demand for these kinds of political policies from the electorate itself. The desire for welfare
protection and state-capitalist remains high and is unlikely to change. Perhaps as Poland
continues to grow and develop the demand for government solutions to the middle class’s
vulnerabilities will wane as well.

274

6. ESTONIA
The Russian and Polish cases have highlighted several important facets of this dissertation’s
argument. First, there is theoretical utility in exposing how middle class voters may determine
clientelistic outcomes. Second, the effects of post-communist transformation played a huge role
in setting up how the 2008 financial crisis affected these countries and their populations. While
Russia had already fallen into a state-capture paradigm by the early 2000s, the crisis spurred
United Russia to control more political-economic power at the cost of middle class compliance.
A process that dramatically damaged democratic politics in a country that struggles with
neopatrimonial and clientelistic problems. On the other hand, Poland was able to endure a more
liberal market transition and established stronger democratic conditions in the 1990s and 2000s.
The turning point arrived during the late 2000s during the crisis which lowered the costs of
clientelistic engagement to intervene in the economy and establish a hybridized system of
foreign capital promotion and political dominance over the domestic economy. As a result,
democracy has suffered due to the natural consequences of the middle class’s polarization
between support for anti and pro-market sides in the political debate.
In post-communist countries, the transition and development of independent markets that
can operate outside the confines of state interventionism, or at least political corruption, is vital
to the stability of its democracy when state capture is a probability. Voters will be less enamored
by exchanging liberty for economic and political stability in such instances because the state will
have a reduced capacity to exchange or limit public good access in the first place. To examine
this final hypothesis, I explore the small Baltic country of Estonia. Estonia followed a similar
path of economic liberalization and democratization akin to Poland, but it has resisted populism
and democratic backsliding. Its economy could be described as dependent on FDI but with less
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regulative oversight when compared to Poland. Where the PiS government after 2010 began to
trade electoral gains for economic protection to the middle class, Estonia has engaged in extreme
austerity measures and diluted its welfare programs.
The demand for welfare is no less potent in Estonia despite less offerings by the
government. It emerged from its Soviet past with a highly skilled labor market and an economy
oriented around technology. However, Estonia suffered from the rashness of FDI divestment in
the wake of global foreign capital slowdowns as well. Estonia’s middle class makes up a smaller
proportion, about 1/3rd of the country, compared to Poland (The Baltic Course 2018). However,
they have endured similar hardships and reductions in material wealth. In some instances, they
are more vulnerable to credit dependence while earning, on average, much higher salaries than
most CEE citizens. A salary that is high even by EU standards. Estonian organized labor also
was gutted in the 1990s in a similar process to its neighbors. Yet, democracy scores have
remained quite high in Estonia. Furthermore, Estonia has remained quite resistant to antidemocratic parties or even corporate overreach in the aftermath of extreme deregulation. This
presents an interesting puzzle that requires further investigation for understanding how the two
variables of SMotE and a vulnerable middle class affected Estonia and the previous two cases.
What has occurred in Estonia is a commitment to liberal markets that has bypassed the
need or even capacity for social rehabilitation of the market that could be demanded for in the
wake of crisis. For several notable reasons. Estonia was able to extirpate the government from
the economy more extensively in the 1990s compared to Poland. This left few pathways for
reentry back into the economy after political turnovers in Estonia’s parliament, the Riigikogu.
The effects of the 2008 financial crisis presented different challenges to Estonia’s periphery
market which lacked Poland’s size and qualities. This led to precrisis policies that deemphasized

276
class and focused on enhancing the economy through deregulation. Lastly, Estonia’s class-based
society has strong ethnic cleavages as well. The country is divided by about 68 percent native
Estonians and 25 percent Russian speakers (Helemäe and Saar 2012). As a result, Estonian class
competition is tainted by ethnic instability as well and less suited to the debate markets from the
lens of socioeconomic status.
6.1. A Leader in Post-Soviet Transformation
Poland may have been the first within the USSR’s sphere of influence to break away and begin
the process of liberal transformation, but Estonia was one of the first soviet republics to declare
independence in 1990. It declared its independence from the Soviet Union on April 3rd following
the Estonian Supreme Council’s declaration that the Soviet occupation of Estonia since WWII
had been illegal. A status quo ante that had long been held by Western countries and a large
contingent of the Baltic country’s citizenry since 1940. Estonia gained full independence in
August 1991 after a round of bloody crackdowns and eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops. The
discourse surrounding Estonia’s occupation and subsequent independence movement would be a
major element of its modern, post-communist identity.
The Estonian independence movement has its roots in its occupation by Soviet forces at
the start of WWII. It had gained its independence from the Russian Empire in the fallout of WWI
and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which secured the German Empire large swaths of territory to be
ruled by German allied regimes throughout the Ukraine and the Baltics. Germany was unable to
fully capitalize on its gains being forced to settle WWI in disfavorable terms at Versailles, but
the Baltics retained their independence. Not for lack of interventions either. Bolshevik incursions
were par for the course during its formative years which Estonia repelled thanks to alliances with
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Latvia, Lithuania, and Germany’s Freikorps.84 Estonia enjoyed a short-lived status as a nationstate after 1918 but was later annexed by a more competent Soviet Union in 1940 during Stalin’s
expansion westward following the conclusion of the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop pact with Nazi
Germany (T. Lane, Pabriks, and Smith 2002).
Estonia suffered extensively from the oppressive tactics of Stalinization and attempted
Russification of the country. Unlike Poland, Estonia was too close to Russia to resist
Stalinization pressure and succumbed to most of its programs. Aggressive Sovietization of
Estonia, like the other Baltic countries, meant Estonian nationalism was violently repressed.
These repressions targeted and deported Estonian elites, intellectuals, and anyone else who
resisted. Estonian President Konstantin Pats was deported along with an estimated 60,000
Estonians in just 1941 (Buttar 2013). Like many of those deported, President Pats did not survive
his internment. Only after Stalin’s death did these policies change and many of the exiled
Estonians were allowed to return.
While dissidents were being exported, the Soviet centralized economy imported
industrialization and modernization into Estonia. Before WWII, Estonia’s industrial base was
quite small, and its economy was almost entirely dependent on agriculture (Saarts 2016). The
Soviet planned economy changed this by industrializing much of the country and exploiting the
few natural resources Estonia had which were essential to the USSR’s economy (Mettam and
Williams 2001, 138). Estonia possesses shale-oil for energy production, fertilizer (phosphorous),
and uranium. As a result, Estonian experienced a great deal of heavy industry investment well
beyond its own capacity to produce or even consume (Saarts 2016).
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The German Freikorps was a volunteer paramilitary force that had a legacy dating back all the way to the
Napoleonic wars. At the end of WWI, they were used extensively to suppress communist uprisings in Germany and
Eastern Europe (Gerwarth 2008).
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The solution to the local shortfall of supply was a process of Soviet colonialization
(Mettam and Williams 2001). According to Kukk (1991, 4), after the previous economic system
was dissolved, an “alien migration” occurred that redefined Estonia’s national identity in order to
satisfy the USSR’s economic demands for electricity and other materials. Russian speaking
workers began to overwhelm the small country that was already devastated by WWII. It is
estimated that in a population of around 1 million, around 200,000 citizens were lost to the Nazi
and Soviet occupation. A fact which made Russophone migration all the more appealing to
Soviet planners (Mettam and Williams 2001, 139). During the forty-five years of Soviet
occupation after WWII, Estonia’s homogenous society was diluted to be a little over 60 percent
ethnic Estonian by the 1980s (Eesti Riiklik Statistikaamet 1996). This demographic shift would
have consequences as Estonian nationalism once again became salient in the 1980s and Soviet
influence waned.
6.1.1. The End of Communist Estonia
Resistance to Soviet occupation has a long history in Estonia but its transition towards
democracy can be traced back to 1985. Park (1994) argued that, generally speaking, Estonia’s
transformation into a liberal democracy could be perceived as a nonviolent, anti-communist, and
democratically aligned movement. However, the demands for Estonian independence were
deeply imbedded to its own sense of national identity and as a counter movement to what
Estonians viewed as the destruction of their ethnicity and culture. Their desire to transition was
also interconnected with the necessity for completely severing ties with Russia and to
‘reintegrate’ with western Europe (Park 1994). Therefore, democratization and marketization
were emblematic of that necessity to quickly distance themselves from Russian
countermobilization.
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Estonia’s transformation could be categorized as peripheral and nonconforming in
tandem with its Baltic neighbors (Kitschelt et al 1999). Previous theories of post-communist
transition have played up its agricultural and industrial distributional factors as critical to this
outcome (Kitschelt et al 1999) along with elite political mobilization and cooptation (Frye 2010).
Yet, Estonia transitioned, in large part, without its pre-transition elites (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003).
The communist party in Estonia had lost all legitimacy over the span of several years and was
declared outright illegal in 1991. Unlike Poland, the communist party did not transform into the
liberal party but instead disintegrated with its elites being scattered among emergent parties who
were reluctant to take them in. Nor could it be compared to Russia which continued its
communist party traditions as a minority bloc in the state’s Duma.
Another unique aspect of Estonian, and moreover Baltic, transformations are the cultural
and ethnic contentions. Huntington (1993), in his famous thesis of cultural competition, argued
that Estonians were a western country, at least in religion and pre-communist societal
arrangements. The Russophonic incursions of nonethnic Estonians were all the more alienating
for locals who feared that they would fast become a minority in their country by the 1970s
(Pettai and Hallik 1999). This motivated many Estonians to protest when, in 1985, the Soviet
Union decided to begin mining large quantities of phosphorous from the central part of the
country.
In Estonia, as with other peripheral Soviet Republics, the selection of Mikhail Gorbachev
in 1985 to lead the USSR was paramount to the mobilization of liberal and nationalist
movements. Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost gave room to open up dialogues of
resistance and allow for politically contentious and counter-soviet mobilizations to take place.
Estonian leadership was quick to exploit this opening (Park 1994). Liberal publications, like
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Vikerkaar, began publishing Estonian nationalistic and counter-regime messaging by 1986.
Another major crisis would emerge the next year with the Phosphorite War where protestors
aggressively voiced their opposition to the expansion of phosphorite mines in Virumaa for the
environmental and ethnic impacts they would induce. These protests were successful in getting
concessions from the Supreme Soviet.
“The Soviet Estonian authorities initially tried to quash the revolt using the same old
methods. But it soon became clear to them that concessions were unavoidable and the
construction of the phosphorite mines was halted. The Soviet authorities had been forced
to back down in the face of public opinion and protest actions.” (Laar 2004, 228)
From these protests a major shift occurred in Estonia’s mobilization. Peaceful protests on
the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which had come to define the Soviet occupation
since the 1940s, were organized in 1987. These protests quickly gained traction and the Estonian
SSR authorities were unable to regain control over the situation. Nationalistic symbols such as
the white, blue, and black Estonian flag became a frequent attendee at highly organized rallies
across the country. Rallies were often musical affairs as well. Estonians of all age groups
participated and used folk songs as a tool to organize and overcome the collective actions
problems that are associated with mass protest events in authoritative regimes (Nicoara 2018).
Folk songs have a long history in Estonia’s culture and were adeptly interwoven within the
national and cultural consciousness that was fomenting in the late 1980s. This protest movement
would be dubbed the Singing Revolution.
The main stable feature of these protests was Estonian identity, especially in regard to its
folkloric and cultural traditions. Nicorara (2018, 70-71) argues that Estonian traditions
emphasize liberality and individual responsibility both in governance and society. A stark
contrast to the Soviet model. According to Nicorara’s theory of collective action during the
Estonian independence movement, singing folk songs was a cheap method of harmonization
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between entrepreneurial elites and organized protestors. The use of a shared Estonian identity
and its rich tradition of musicality was a much more cost-effective rallying cry compared to
having to unify around an ideology or anti-Soviet themes which may not have been universally
shared.
Leadership was unable to ignore the potency of the Singing Revolution. As a
consequence, the Estonian SSR formed the Popular Front as a means of more clearly expressing
Moscow’s policies. However, the Popular Front of Estonia reversed course and began to distance
themselves from the communist party which gave it more legitimacy, popularity, and members
(Laar 2004, 231). Moves for greater Estonian independence in 1989 drew condemnation from
the Central Soviet Committee in Moscow which was still committed to the hardline position of
the Baltics, and all Soviet Republics for that matter, were to remain within the USSR. However,
the situation by then was outside of Moscow’s control. Changes in the Estonian nomenklatura
and lack of pressure from Moscow allowed the Estonia to gain more independence leading up to
1991.
Elections in 1990 to the Supreme Soviet of Estonia and its Estonian congress swept the
Popular Front into power. With many former leaders choosing not to run, the Popular Front’s
victory moved authority away from the Supreme Soviet directly into Estonia’s parliament, the
Riigikogu. The new Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar quickly acted and pushed for independence.
Meanwhile, the dissolution of the Soviet Union was fully underway. Russia and the remnants of
the Soviet Union attempted to federalize the Baltic states, but this offer was deftly refused. By
1991, the Moscow coup had occurred which allowed Estonia to declare its full independence.
The communist party was completely abolished and banned in Estonia and its independence was
fully secured that year (Park 1994).
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6.2. Commitment to Liberal Markets
As with most of the post-communist countries, Estonia enjoyed the full weight and commitment
of international economic institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and G7 (Åslund 2018). Unlike
Russia and Poland, Estonia’s markets were quite small and required large amounts of investment
to stabilize its economy as its transitioned from Russia’s sphere of influence and committed itself
to free markets. As will be discussed in this section, not only did early Estonian politicians
commit wholeheartedly to the cause of liberalization and free markets, but they went even
further. There was little counter mobilization and a coherent political consensus as to what
Estonians were willing to endure on this economic path. These early politicians were driven by
integration with the rest of Europe.
Estonia had a legitimate fear of re-annexation by Russia that could not have been said of
Poland. Its demographics included a large Russian diaspora and historical insight pointed to a
long road of Imperial Russian and Soviet occupation. Transformation and integration with
western institutions would be Estonia’s way to guarantee its future independence. The Estonian
Constitution, which was ratified in 1992, drew heavily on its 1920 constitution implying a
continuation with the pre-occupation government of the early 20th century. Key tenements of the
constitution were directly aligned with liberalization and imposed on parliament to initiate liberal
market reforms in earnest. Integral to this process was Estonia’s second Prime Minister Mart
Laar. Laar was heavily influenced by Milton Friedman and concepts of shock therapy that were
popular prescriptions for countries introducing market reforms (Kasekamp 2010, 181).
The selection of Mart Laar and the success of liberal Estonian parties was reflective of
the limitations placed of those who could vote at the time. Russian minorities would likely have
resisted Estonian nationalist, western oriented reforms, and free market principles had they had
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more access to sway the elections (Pettai and Hallik 2002). At the time, citizenship for Russian
speakers was divided over including former Soviet migrants within the political system or to
nudge them back to the former Soviet empire, turned independent countries.
Aside from its ethnic disputes that had to be managed, the radical reform process also
meant that policies were inevitably controversial (Aslund 2018, 859). Liberal reforms created
instability and pressure to slow the process down from below. Estonian elites pressed on despite
moderate levels of popular opposition. This transformation included price liberalization,
monetary and budget policies, foreign trade, and privatization the likes of which were foreign to
citizens of a planned economy (Mikloš 2021). Wages liberalized along with commodities and the
former sunk rapidly as demand for labor declined while the economy contracted. The
devaluation of its new currency, the kroon, was implemented to adjust against rampant inflation
that had reached 90 percent by 1993 (Kasekamp 2010). The economy continued to shrink, and
wages fell to 45 percent along with a 30 percent loss to production (Mart Laar and Kelam 2017,
50). However, Estonian politicians were dedicated to maintaining the course. Mart Laar was
adamant for rapid reform and transition away from its planned economy. “To wait is to fail” Laar
famously said in regard to the necessary reforms (Aslund 2018, 857).
The political parties of pre-independence Estonia, especially the Popular Front party,
played a vital role in stabilizing its nascent party system by providing a high degree of reform
consistency. Kreuzer and Pettai (2003, 86) noted that Estonia’s early politics were extremely
volatile with many politicians jumping to other parties during each election period. However,
many of these parties had already been quite established by 1990 which kept a consistent
network of developing parties rather than electoral collapse or deadlock. The lack of an old
communist guard meant there was very little opposition to Estonian policy despite the high rates
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of political turnover. Unlike Poland, Estonian politics converged around the liberal and
nationalist parties rather than a rebrand of the old communist party.
It did not take long for those reforms to begin to payoff (Kasekamp 2010). By 1996 the
economy had grown by 4.9 percent. Estonia’s ultra-liberal, free market thinking allowed it to test
more experimental reforms, such as a flat tax revenue system. A system that was successful to
the point of emulation across many other Central and Eastern European countries. Wages were
beginning to recover, and inflation was on a downward trend. I demonstrate the improvement of
Estonia’s economic situation in Figure 6-1. The graph tracks the GDP growth and inflation rates
since they were first measured by the World Bank across the 1990s (World Bank 2022). Inflation
fell drastically since its 1993 high following the reform process. In response, Estonian GDP has
grown at a considerable rate since 1994. A reference line for 1997 was included to better
estimate the height of GDP growth for that year.

Figure 6-1 Percent Change of Inflation and GDP in Estonia
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In conjunction with the return of positive growth rates, the private sector exploded.
Approximately 10,000 new companies had been established in 1995 which were mostly small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) and digital startups (Agenda 2000 2012). Estonia had
determinedly privatized much of its SOEs which greatly increased the share of the private
economy to 70 percent. The size of Estonia’s market was likely a factor here as its smaller size
meant that medium and small enterprises proliferated and allowed for Estonian assets to be more
readily privatized during the liberalization process (Gerndorf, Elenurm, and Terk 1999).
Privatization of most state-owned assets was completed by 1997. Estonia only retained some key
assets in energy production, ports, other infrastructure companies (Gerndorf, Elenurm, and Terk
1999). This process should be regarded as much smoother when compared to Poland and much
more complete. Estonia’s rapacious effort in liberalization and privatization of the economy
served to make it more attractive to foreign investments.
“Free enterprises within a non-intervention state economic model became (almost)
universally accepted within the country. To the liberalization of different industries
(which in Estonia rapidly occurred after 1991), privatization advanced fast, and by the
end of 1996, practically all of the large enterprises had been sold, except for transport,
telecommunication, and energy sectors.” (Gasparaini 2021)
6.3. Organized Labor Retreats
Like much of post-communist Europe, Estonia experienced an abrupt retreat of organized labor
following their independence and liberal transformation. Before 1990, Estonian labor
organization represented nearly all Estonian workers. This rate fell abruptly to one of the lowest
rates of union participation in Europe. As with neighboring, post-communist countries, Estonian
workers associated unions with their communist lineages and disassociated from organized
representation and bargaining in the workforce (Feldmann 2017). On top of that, Estonia’s
policies towards liberalism and free markets eroded much of the bargaining power unions had
after the independence movement.

286
There are two trade confederations that principally represent labor in Estonia: the EAKL
and TALO. The localization of unions outside of the communist party did little to shore up
membership, however. Estonia’s economy had shifted from industry and agriculture to the
service industry and so too did the labor market (Gerndorf et al. 1999, 4-5). Kerem and Randveer
(Kerem and Randveer 2008, 87) noted that Estonian workers had to update their qualifications at
2 to 3 times of a typical development pace (15-20 years) as “technological changes, accompanied
by the decline in labor intensity, have exerted influence on employment in transport and
communications, etc.” Per modification of market demand, labor had to become more flexible as
wages ebbed and flowed with the market. Large scale bargaining organizations or confederated
trades unions lost much of their utility and appeal as a result. Additionally, government policies
and laws began to regulate less aspects of the economy which left companies and firms more
room to bargain with their own employees.
Organized labor also faced losses in terms of how Estonia privatized its many coops and
state-owned firms in the early 1990s. By 1989, Estonia had begun experimenting with worker
coops and leasing state-owned assets and companies to their respective workers. This act gave
workers large amounts of control over their own companies who were only limited in their
ability to transfer their companies to a third party (Kalmi 2003). This would not be a major factor
during the privatization process although many employees were offered opportunities to
purchase their leased companies. It is estimated that only 300 companies were privatized and
purchased by their employees in this way (Kalmi 2003). Instead, the Estonian Privatization
Agency’s (EPA) was established to market assets to strategic investors rather than workers.
Farms, however, enjoyed higher rates of labor ownership. As they were decollectivized, farms
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were replaced by private coops owned by former collective farmers who bought up the assets
with ‘labor shares’ based on their length of service (Kalmi 2003).
There was no less demand for worker representation or the need for collective action
despite the rapid decline of organized labor. The flexibility of labor had also produced higher
demands on employees. For instance, 54 percent of respondents to a Baltic Working
Environment and Labor (BWEL) survey in 2007 reported that work pace intensity had increased
since the previous year (Woolfson, Calite, and Kallaste 2008, 318). Whatever the perceived
negative health impacts from high intensity work environments, it has had little effect on
unionization rates. Instead, worker’s voices have been radically individualized. Employee and
employer relationships are typically managed at the local, and individual level between
supervisors and workers (Woolfson, Calite, and Kallaste 2008). Wage bargaining occurs in
similar fashion at the firm level and on an individual basis (Feldmann 2017).
Labor representation has been decollectivized as well with representatives often being
elected from outside of unions. In 2007, the Employees Trustees Act broadened the scope of
worker representation to employee representatives elected within the company which
subsequently increased the number of rights and obligations conferred to them. Non-union,
employee representation is the norm in the Estonian workplace (Kalmi 2003). This outcome is
supported by workers. According to a Working Life Barometer survey in 2007, only 2.4 percent
of respondents preferred salary issues to be handled collectively (Woolfson et al. 2008, 328).
Limited organizational capacity and individualized representation is shared with limited
labor benefits and social support offered by the government. Estonia’s government has spent
anywhere from 0.15 to 0.93 percent of its GDP on its labor market policies in the last two
decades (Eamets 2013, 7). Minimum wage and unemployment insurance are some examples of
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these policies, but limited offerings lead to fewer unemployed workers registering to receive
benefits (Kerem and Randveer 2008, 86). In 2006, monthly unemployment insurance was
approximately 13 percent of the minimum wage in Estonia (Eamets 2013, 6). Instead, labor
policy has been focused more on vocational training for under skilled workers and enterprise
start-up allowances to support entrepreneurs and ensure Estonians stay at work (Kerem and
Randveer 2008, 92).
Estonia is not unique in its experience with organized labor. Across CEE countries,
organized labor collapsed to levels comparable to those in liberal market economies. Estonia is
unique in its approach to liberal free markets that forced labor to become highly flexible and
atomized around the individual worker. Paltry government protections against labor market
externalities and a low demand for unionization and collective bargaining amongst employees
have placed more power with the firm to distribute benefits and labor protection. This policy has
paid off for Estonia’s limited population of skilled workers who are in high demand for their
labor. This particular confluence has led to an increase in the quality of employment benefits and
salaries despite organized labor’s exit from Estonia during the past three decades (Meardi 2007).
6.4. Estonian Democracy
Estonia engaged with democracy building from the onset of its independence movement. There
was wide public support on the referendum of the Estonian Constitution in 1992 which carried
over much of the original wording of the 1938 constitution but with a unicameral parliament.
Estonia’s democratic transition was not without its hiccups or qualms. Its party system was
highly fractious but simultaneously retained high levels of cohesion when compared to the other
Baltic countries of Lithuania and Latvia. Additionally, interests along class lines were less salient
as compared to ethnic cleavages between Estonian and Russian speakers. Certainly, it could be
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evidenced that class politics were less impactful in a country which initially had to deal with an
immigrant population that accounted for nearly 40 percent of its total population. However, as
will be seen below, Estonian democracy has been impacted by class politics under the weight of
wealth redistribution in the wake of hardline liberal economic policies.
Rein Taagepera (1991) was revisiting Estonia for the first time in 1990 after leaving the
country in 1944 when he noted that his experiences with the early Estonian parliamentary
processes were astute in their appreciation for democratic transition. However, he critiqued the
immigration status that left many Estonian residents out of the electoral process. The Citizenship
Act of 1992 disenfranchised most Russian speakers by de facto and prevented them from
participating in the initial stages of Estonia’s democratization process (Cianetti 2014, 91).
Despite the initial disenfranchisement of non-ethnic Estonians, Estonia would eventually begin
the process of providing electoral opportunities to its Russian speaking residents. The initial
move to restrict Russian speakers from office, according to Cianetti (2014, 93), “deactivated the
radical section of the Russian-speaking political elite” who were unlikely to apply for Estonian
citizenship in the first place.
This changed with the Law on Local Elections which was passed in 1993 and gave
political power to the Russian minority population and permanent residents who could apply for
citizenship or resident status. This was done in an effort meant to defuse tensions where Russian
speakers were in the majority. Mostly along the Russian border region and the town of Narva
(Cianetti 2014, 93). This change produced some political changes and Russian speaking parties
gaining seats in local elections and eventually the Riigikogu. Political parties, such as the Centre
Party, would eventually coopt ethnic Russian voters over time which allowed Estonia to realign
its party politics along class lines (Toots 2003).
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The absence of Russian voters in Estonia’s formative years may have been core to its
own success. Cianetti (2014, 95) argues that ethnic tensions were mollified in Estonia because of
limited polarization over non-citizen participation. The initial exclusion of Russophonic voters
from Estonian politics allowed for coherent reform along liberal and free market principles to
process unabated. As such, there was little counter mobilization to extending enfranchisement
towards non-citizens.
Aside from ethnic political mobilization, Estonian party development also followed a
path that excised much of the old guard and communist nomenklatura from participating in its
post transformation democracy. Lack of specifically tailored lustration laws made it more
difficult for former communist leadership to run for office after 1991 for instance (Saarts 2016,
119).85 There were high levels of party fragmentation in early Estonian politics as a result of the
novel politics and interests being propagated in its initial years. Therefore, Estonian party politics
leaned heavily on its stable founding parties. Throughout the 1990s there was a series of party
mergers which compressed Estonian parties into more cohesive, and well-rounded organizations
that made them less volatile or prone to radical swings in the future (Kreuzer and Pettai 2003,
94).
Estonian governance remained dedicated to its liberal transformation even with a
fractious political environment. Policies and reforms were aimed at aligning Estonia with
Western Europe and eventual accession to the European Union. This meant there was a strong
motivation to organize, reform, and reorient Estonian institutions in both liberal and democratic
fashion (Aslund 2018, 857). This also allowed good administrative governance to flourish in
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According to Roman David (David 2003, 288) a lustration “law is a special public employment law that
regulates the process of examining whether a person holding certain higher public positions worked or collaborated
with the repressive apparatus of the communist regime”. These laws were unique to post-soviet transformations in
CEE countries in the 1990s.
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Estonia. The Supreme Court of Estonia has previously ruled that competent governance is a
fundamental right that is enumerated in the Estonian Constitution of 1992 and the Administrative
Procedure Act (Laffranque 2005, 114). Representation and governance are therefore frequently
harder to corrupt and clientelize to the same degree as their neighbors.
6.4.1. Class Politics in Modern Estonia
As will be shown in the next two sections, experts have not come to a consensus on Estonian
politics and whether it could be best articulated by class or ethnic conflict. David Ost’s influence
over the topic has guided many scholars to assume class politics have very little status in postcommunist states due to lingering societal notions about class that make it incompatible. In
Poland, argues Ost (2009), class was displaced in favor of identity and culture. However, this
dissertation has gone to great lengths to demonstrate class identity in the politics of postcommunist states were an issue. They emerged in the 1990s as the capitalist economy sorted
incomes and were greatly disrupted by the financial crisis of 2008. Societal dedication to class
equality could also promote stronger, more deleterious effects on the conscious of those who feel
themselves vulnerable to falling out of the middle class. For Estonia, aggressive liberalization
was no different in creating a highly structured society and one that possessed similar levels of
inequality amongst its population.
There is a debate between scholars how much class cleavages play a role in Estonian
party politics and amongst the voting public. The classic cleavages theorized by Lipset and
Rokkan (1967) may be less salient in Estonia’s formerly flat society with very little mobility in
either direction (Saarts 2016). Instead, emphasis has been placed on identity (Lupu 2015) and
culture (Ost 2015) for CEE political parties. In Estonia, the ethnic struggles within the USSR for
decades implicate identity as the eminent category on which political parties will form and
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compete. As radical egalitarianism was often forefront in the socialist society, it is difficult to
quickly embed class structure and identity in the post-communist psyche (Helemae and Saar
2012, 50). Class discourse and political representation have been slow to respond in the Estonia
case if one applies this logic.
As for parties, ethnicity is said to have been substituted for classist interests. Yet, some
holes remain this logic and Kitschelt’s (1999) articulation of post-communist party formation
provides some evidence. Kitschelt (1999) emphasized the communist party’s standing within
society as either being patrimonial or accommodating based on the historical level of urban and
industrial development already present. More specifically, percent of employment in agriculture
in pre-communist societies was the decisive factor. As far as Estonia is concerned, it should be
evaluated as both. The communist faction was able to gain legitimacy by industrializing the
economy but had to maintain clientelist linkages for expediency given its level of nationalism. If
this were the case, then Estonian politics should be more clientelistic rather than programmatic.
However, clientelistic and patrimonialism was more likely to be resisted in Estonia due to its
highly professional bureaucracy (Saarts 2016, 128). The constitutionality and dedication of good
administrative governance supports this supposition (Laffranque 2006).
I contend, as with other scholars, that Estonia’s transition to a liberal market economy
generated class groupings and were especially potent in the wake of wage and material sorting
based on a rejection of its communist legacy. Classless societies had become illegitimate in
Estonia. Kennedy (2002) referred to this phenomenon as ‘transition culture’ wherein the
discourse about socialism has been exhausted and market capitalism was seen as both optimum
and a normative good.
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Estonia’s ethnic cleavages grew less potent in time as the government extended electoral
privileges to its Russian minorities. This is evident in the cooptation of ethnic Russians into more
heterogenous parties, such as the Centre Party. These shifts were emblematic of partisan
exchanges for welfare and social policy for votes (Toots 2003). Consequently, Estonian parties
were mainly programmatic rather than clientelistic in their offerings. Those few clientelistic
practices that could be observed were attributable to the old cadre of communist elites who
sought to gain legitimacy in the new democratic system by “deliberately” shifting their message
and brand along ethnic lines (Saarts 2016, 128). This effort would remain incoherent in the wake
of Estonia’s shift towards a liberal-right nationalist cleavage.
Additional studies show that class identity has emerged and become quite stable in
Estonian politics and society as the result of increased wage inequality and the flexibility of labor
and work opportunities (Eamets 2013). Those groups that have been more successful posttransition are noted within Estonia’s middle class emergence as being materially advantaged and
politically more potent (Helemae and Saar 2012, 51). Still other scholars point out the symbolic
unification of middle class lifestyles and individual success by noting that “notions of ‘middle
class’ and ‘good life’… have become nearly synonymous” (Gross 2020, 442). Educational
advantages have especially benefited middle income Estonians over lower income groups.
Estimations of the middle class’s size tend to vary. Using a data from Eurostat, Zickute
(2013, 185) found that Estonia’s social stratification presented a diamond pattern in the 2000s.
She estimated that the middle income cohort made up at least 50 percent of Estonia’s population
whereas the lower income group lagged behind at 40 percent. Other estimations tend to place
middle class figures at one-third of Estonia’s population (Derndorfer and Kranzinger 2021, 919).
However, this figure uses data after 2008’s financial crisis which decreased the percentages of
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those estimated to be in the middle class by several percentage points. Swedbank found a similar
datapoint with 1 out of three Estonians reporting themselves to be middle class (Swedbank
2018). I followed my previous analysis of Russian and Polish social class estimations presented
in Chapters 4 and 5 by using Euro Value Survey data and household income deciles to estimate
class proportions for the past 30 years. The data, presented in Figure 6-2, finds evidence similar
to Zickute’s results.86 The middle class is on the rise along with the proportion of higher income
individuals but is still lower than 50 percent.

Figure 6-2 Proportion of Class by Income from 1990 to 2020
Previous scholarship has emphasized the lack of class consciousness in Estonia, but I
have indicated differently. Class structuration emerged in Estonia as the natural outgrowth of the
free market economic policies. Competition in the labor market, the internationalization and
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marketability of skills, and the commodification of private property all served to shuffle
Estonians into respective socioeconomic categories. It is highly likely that class cleavages are not
as salient due to the limited political regard for disparate wealth between high- and middle
income earners (Helemae and Saar 2012). Instead, lower social status individuals may be the
main source of class identity and demand for class specific welfare and social policy. This was
promoted by its liberal transformation which displaced Estonian society into pools of winners
and losers. Harsh losses were faced by those with fewer resources or access to them while higher
rewards were doled out to those in society that were already better off (Helemae and Saar 2012,
52). Some of the major losers of this reshuffling were the Russophonic Estonians that found
themselves in a no man’s land of political and social status.
6.4.2. Ethnic Politics in Modern Estonia
Class should be seen as a cogent issue in Estonian society. Helemae and Saar (2012, 54) state
that middle- and upper class Estonians have achieved a “strong enough class-consciousness” as a
result of their material wealth and sophisticated advantages in society. So too are ethnic and
cultural divisions at play. The question becomes as to what degree and if one overrides the other.
Ethnic cleavages in Estonia could be summarized as one of ethno-linguistic competition. I
continue my examination by exploring this tension in the context of modern Estonia in order to
analyze this potential counterweight to my overall theory. The evidence demonstrates that while
ethnic tensions are apparent within Estonia, the degree they impacted clientelism is not as clear.
Russian speakers are more likely to make up the lower rungs of Estonia’s socioeconomic sphere
and be more dependent on social spending such as welfare and unemployment insurance while
suffering from less representation in Estonian parties.

296
To reiterate from the previous section, previous scholarship on the topic has posited that
class identity coalesced in Estonian society to some degree (Helemae and Saar 2012). However,
ethnic problems are also quite visible. Estonia’s politics represented a shift where “the
communist-anti-communist cleavage is effectively merged with the ethnic cleavage” (Saarts
2016, 119). These scholars argue that the use of discursive language of soviet occupation and
tracing back Estonia’s government to before WWII are necessary tools to bind the polity on
ethnic terms. Weveral prominent Russian scholars argue that occupation discourse is merely a
pretense to justify “discrimination of Russian speaking inhabitants” (Chernichenko 2004). Such
discrimination, it is argued, was critical during Estonia’s insecure years of liberal transformation
towards western alignment. Had, ethnic Russians been allowed to participate, it may have been
less likely that pro-market outcomes would have been so crystalline (Pettai and Hallik 1999,
524).
The clarity of post-communist Estonian party formation also served to align Estonian
parliament in nationalistic fashion. Unlike other countries in the region, Estonia had very little in
the way of lingering communist legacy or a transitory party. According to Kitschelt’s (1999)
theory of post-communist typologies, new political cleavages would have to emerge in the
vacuum of elite and nationalistic interests. Yet, Saarts (2016, 117) notes that Kitschelt’s
nomenclature of communist typologies should be reevaluated regarding Estonia. In this case,
Saarts argues that a novel typology of ‘communist-colonial legacy’ better explains Estonia. The
failure of post-communist leftist parties is a result of the ease of associating them with Estonia’s
soviet legacies. It was a legacy that was both foreign and illegitimate accordingly.
It is also important to note that there were no ethnic clashes after independence despite
the sizeable Russian minority and the country’s discriminatory practices. These methods served
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to keep Russophones from competing in many aspects of Estonian life. For instance, educational
exclusion has kept many ethnic Russians from advancing within Estonian society or attaining
higher levels of employment (Lindemann 2013). Separation in education was a continuation of
the old Soviet school system that was linguistically bifurcated. Estonian language requirements
in higher education are now a stumbling block for Russian speakers who went to schools that did
not teach in Estonian (D. Greene 2010). Ethnic Russians are often linguistically disenfranchised
to fully take advantage of Estonia’s opportunities as they “often lack the native language
proficiency, educational credentials, and even formal citizenship status needed to match the
prosperity of the majority ethnic groups” (Petrova and Inglot 2020, 880).

Figure 6-3 Probability of Importance to Speak Estonian by Ethnicity
Nor is there much incentive or drive for Russian speakers to learn Estonian. Data from
the 2008 to 2018 EVS, presented in Figure 6-3, shows that there is a much higher probability that
Russian speakers only view Estonian language as “quite important” and are more likely to report
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that it is “not important” to some degree.87 I was able to assess ethnic Russians by using the
coding for the language that the interview was conducted in. This assumes that the language used
was the language the respondent was most comfortable with rather than some other selection
mechanism. The high likelihood that Russophonic Estonians to not view the Estonian language
as necessary may be due to the geographic concentration of the Russian minority population.
Russian speakers tend to be isolated in specific areas of the country which allows these
communities to remain linguistically homogenous.
Politically, Estonia’s Russian minority population has been able to integrate into the
electoral landscape with disparate outcomes. After the citizenship laws of the early 1990s, ethnic
Russians have established political parties that were able to gain seats in the Riigikogu.
However, these parties were noted as having an unpredictably negative effect on Russophonic
integration (Pettai and Hallik 1999). Their ethno-partisan position in Estonian politics has
allowed Estonian parties to coopt ethnic Russian voters more effectively while keeping
linguistically representative parties marginalized in a kind of “permenant opposition” to the
majority (Pettai and Hallik 1999, 514). This would eventually bleed over to the Riigikogu as
Russian speakers began to switch their votes to more established and mainstream Estonian
parties (Cianetti 2014, 95). Russian parties have not gained any seats in the Riigikogu since 2003
and most have since merged with the larger, social welfare parties. As a result, ethnic Russians
are often in a politically and economically weak position in Estonian society when compared to
ethnic Estonian citizens.
There has been little demand for counter mobilization by ethnic Russians despite their
materially and politically weaker positions in Estonian society. The electoral reforms that
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extended voting rights to Russian speakers was important to coopt and neutralize Russophonic
mobilization before it could ever materialize. There are also the psychic implications of Estonian
discourse which has emphasized the historical consequences of Soviet ‘genocidal’ behaviors
which makes Estonian policy seem ‘reasonable’ and ‘liberal’, even, by comparison (Pettai and
Hallik 2002). The collective guilt associated with the Soviet conquest in the Estonian
consciousness leaves many citizens with a feeling of indifference or lack of concern for the
limitations placed on ethnic Russians in Estonia. Or, to put it in the words of former Estonian
President, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, “I don’t see what people are complaining about” (D. Greene
2010).
Estonian politics could be referred to as a tale of two polities. On the one hand, ethnic
competition in the immediate aftermath of Estonian independence has led many scholars to
conclude that ethnic cleavages are the defining characteristic of Estonian society. A feature
shared by fellow Baltic state Latvia. Unlike Latvia, Estonia has extended political rights to its
Russian populations despite their non-citizenship status. This has allowed other identities,
especially class, to become more relevant in Estonian society which does not translate to
increased ethnic friction. Instead, it endears itself to socio-economic tension as lower income
individuals are more likely to be strained in the competition for jobs with ethnic Russians who
make up the lower economic rungs of Estonian society.
6.5. Baltic Dependent or Liberal Market Economy
Throughout this paper I’ve argued that the contestation of democracy and democratization
processes are closely tied to levels of SMotE in the aftermath of post-communist reforms. The
presence of specific economic typologies, akin to Hall and Soskice’s VoC, are not necessary but
they help paint a picture as to the legitimacy and direction of state economic policy that would
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inhibit or allow for such state level management to occur. Per this logic, it is important to
identity Estonia as a country that has embraced liberal market credentials in a way that has made
state economic interventions somewhat illegitimate amongst the population. The historical
precedent of Estonian policy choices since its independence provides highly suggestive evidence
that its markets comply with voter preferences. It is the contention by some authors that Estonia
reflects a dependent market economy traits similar to Poland, however (Fainshmidt et al. 2018). I
posit that Estonia reflects an emerging liberal market economy that is dedicated towards free
market principles and has done so even in the wake of economic crisis.
Nolke and Vliegenhart’s (2009) important work on dependent market economies was
critical for understanding Poland’s economic transition. The proliferation of semi-skilled and
cheap labor across Central and Eastern Europe made it a prime target for investment dollars by
transnational corporations. Estonia was a center of European and EU investment dollars
throughout its early transition period as well. On average, Estonia received a larger percentage of
FDI inflows as a percentage of its GDP than compared to Poland (World Bank 2022). DMEs
tend to be target of cheap product line integration which is deemed essential given that those
same products neither go through R&D or are locally sourced in the host countries. In other
words, these countries act as an “assembly platform for semi-standardized goods” (Nolke and
Vliegenhart 2009, 679).
The dependence on foreign investment dollars for such an isolated section of the
European continent would be hard to dismiss but this comparative economic typology does not
seem to fit within Estonian context. For one, Estonia is comprised mainly of low to medium
sized enterprises (SME) and investments are controlled chiefly by foreign owned banks. Focus is
on primary good exports, technologically intensive products, and the service industry rather than
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cheap manufacturing (Lane 2007). The earnings and wages in Estonia reflect this fact. A skilledintensive tech market has given Estonians some of the highest earnings among CEE countries at
approximately 800 euros a month in 2007 which had doubled in 2020. This places them just
behind the Czech Republic and Slovenia.
In response to the limitations of applying the dependent market category to Estonia,
Fainschmidt et al (2018) place Estonia in the novel category of “collaborative agglomerations.”
This group is determined by a necessary coordination with labor, similar to coordinated markets,
but decentralized banking and financing does the heavy lifting. The authors go through great
methodological rigor to produce their clusters of economic typologies, yet their analysis appears
incomplete. Collaborative agglomerations are made up of former communist, CEE countries
whose primary focus is development rather than welfare (Fainschmidt et al. 2018, 10). In the
attempt to unite most CEE economies under one umbrella, the authors leave out some of the
more distinctive characteristics of these post-communist countries. The economies of CEE
countries should be seen as more different, but this kind of analysis is missing from their work.
The description of Estonia as a liberal market economy seems to fit best given Estonia’s
low union participation, unequal distribution of incomes, and low regulative environment
(Feldmann 2006). By some metrics, such as social cohesion, Estonia may be more liberal than
some more typical developed liberal economies like the United Kingdom (Fagerberg, Srholec,
and Knell 2007). Certainly, in terms of labor protections this would be the case. Feldmann
(2006) agrees with this assessment and argues that historical legacy and policy choices have
reinforced a liberal market framework during Estonia’s transition. These choices were a limited
welfare state due to constitutional limits on the government’s budget, weak interfirm
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coordination, open labor pool who possessed generalized skills, and an early fiscal policy that
was pegged towards European integration.
Estonia’s liberal approach to free markets and deescalating the state’s involvement in the
economy after 1992 sets it apart from those countries that sought to inject the state more directly
into the economy. As a result, Estonia’s market freedom index score improved its position from
53 in the world to number 7 in the span of 20 years (The Heritage Foundation 2021). The
Estonian state is dedicated to ensuring liberal market doctrine is upheld and has done so even in
the wake of economic crisis. This is because, as Bohle and Greskovits’ (2007) argue, Estonia’s
transformation was more focused on state building and the ideations behind that process rather
having to balance social and political needs.
6.6. The Financial Crisis of 2008: Estonia
Estonia’s approach to free market capitalism did not make it immune to the economic predations
of market failures and externalities. Come 2008, Estonia became one of the worst hit of the
European countries affected by the 2008 financial crisis. Its over dependence on foreign capital
made it susceptible to a sudden economic reversal of global proportions. Yet it is this moment
that sets Estonia apart from its Central and Eastern European counterparts. The Estonian
government’s response was crystal clear in embracing some of the most severe austerity
measures in the European Union. Instead of embracing state intervention, the state shrunk its
obligations to citizens. This process galvanized market primacy in Estonia and had the side effect
of enabling stronger democratic conditions by suppressing clientelistic and patronage linkages to
class and ethnic groups in the wake of economic recession.
In 2008, Estonia’s GDP fell 3.7 percent followed by another 14.3 percent a year later
(Feldmann 2017). Estonia’s need for FDI to sustain its economy meant that as the economies in
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the investor’s countries begin to turn, so too did Estonia’s prospects. Estonia’s government
responded with incentives for investors to keep any reinvested profits in Estonia tax free
(Friedrich and Reiljan 2015). This pattern of dependence created cascading failures where
financial markets failed, credit lending shrunk, and markets became volatile. Unemployment
increased to 20 percent by 2010 (Friedrich and Reijlan 2015, 39). The recommended path
forward was to promote budgetary and fiscal policies through quantitative easing to take on the
shortfall losses as debt and increase government spending through borrowing (Feldmann 2017).
Instead of increasing its spending, Estonia increased its value added tax (VAT) and began
eliminating tax exemptions. The Estonian government increased social security contributions,
sold off state assets, scaled down social programs, and decreased wages in the public sector. The
zeitgeist of Estonian policy in regard to the 2008 financial crisis was to curb spending and
increase revenue. This stood in total contravention to the counter cyclical model of the time.
Counter cyclical spending faced several obstacles in Estonia. First, monetary policies
were outside much of the government’s ability to influence. The Estonian Currency Board (ECB)
controlled most of the policy levers and kept monetary policy out of reach of parliamentary
action (Friedrich and Reijlan 2015, 39). Furthermore, the ECB was dedicated to meeting the
requirement of the Maastricht Treaty and bring Estonia into the eurozone. This meant keeping
deficits and inflation as low as possible. As the crisis began, Estonia opted to continue down this
path and used the crisis as a tool to meet the Maastricht Treaty’s strict demands.
The intensive dedication to retrenchment was likely the result of the confluence between
the governing party’s ideological position and their desire to integrate deeper into the EU
(Raudla and Kattel 2011). Before the 2008 crisis, Estonia was noted in its desire for accession to
the EU along with the extremely favorable business and regulatory climate the government tried

304
to foster (Woolfson, Calite, and Kallaste 2008, 317). By 2005, EU accession was complete, but it
had yet to move into the eurozone. The ruling coalition at the time was the right leaning Reform
Party and Pro Patria parties which favored austerity as a tool for adopting the euro as Estonia’s
currency. The discourse in the Riigikogu was heated to the point that the Social Democrat Party
eventually left the governing coalition in the wake of more and more severe cuts to spending and
social programs. Raudla and Kattel (2011, 176) described the tension at the time as follows:
“While in the public discourse, the right-leaning Reform Party and the Pro Patria and
Res Publica Union persistently favoured fiscal austerity and complying with the
Maastricht criteria in order to join the common currency, the other parties in the
parliament were rather equivocal. The left-leaning Centre Party and the People's Union,
for example, became more and more critical with each round of cuts and voiced concerns
that the economic and social costs of the austerity packages may outweigh the benefits of
joining the euro-zone.”
Estonia joined the eurozone in 2011.
6.7. The Galvanization and Primacy of Markets
Estonia broke the typical counter cyclical dogma implemented by neighboring states because of
several important historical characteristics. Estonia’s path to independence and reform was
successful in cutting out illegitimate socialist elites and parties to a degree that Estonia’s
liberalization process went largely unimpeded. This would carry over into later years with high
levels of cooperation and acceptance of liberal Estonian institutions, the constitutional provisions
for a balanced budget, and its process of privatization that reached further than most CEE
countries could achieve. Additionally, Estonia’s desire to join with the rest of Europe and move
as far from Russia’s influence as they could manage meant accession to the EU and eurozone
was of paramount concern and there was little political opposition to this pact. By 2009, Estonia
was on calculated path of liberal market economics which meant that retrenchment was a natural,
legitimate response to the economic instability at the end of that decade.
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Estonia’s reply to the crisis should not be viewed as a simple exercise of path
dependence. Raudla and Kattel (2011, 177) concluded as much in their analysis of the events
stating that Estonia was following a trajectory that had been laid down in the 1990s in regard to
previous crises and reforms. However, such analysis may be short sighted. The government has
been dedicated to its current policies, but it fails to grapple with the Reform Party’s political
successes after they were implemented. Instead of the more popular platform of spending more
and taxing less to boost the economy, Estonia radically reigned in spending to the point of
teetering on destroying the government’s social welfare obligations. Reassessing the market and
socially embedding it back into the government, a la Polanyi’s double movement, was unlikely
because there was little desire to do so. The few protests that emerged as a result of Estonia’s
three austerity packages in 2009 were quite impotent. Nor was the government receptive to such
pressures. Low levels of SMotE and the primacy of its markets should be thought of in terms of
positive feedback loops between voters and political decisions rather than as tracked in with very
little room to maneuver.
From below, especially, there was little direct input on austerity. As Feldmann (2017)
iterates, organized labor was not consulted nor negotiated with as measures passed through
Estonia’s parliament. In fact, “the government reneged on various commitments made in its
national social pact prior to the crisis and included planned increases in unemployment benefits
and changes to the eligibility criteria for unemployment insurance” (Feldmann 2017, 15). These
measures were very impactful on voters as they raised the VAT tax and gutted social spending
by placing the costs on employers through higher unemployment taxes (Raudla and Kattel 2011).
Estonian parties did not resort to populist rhetoric or state capture either (Friedrich and
Reiljan 2015; Feldmann 2017). A benefit of its status as a small and externally dependent
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economy with strong liberal economic policies and institutions. Unlike Poland, which possessed
large swaths of ownership over the financial sector as a means of stabilizing growth and
production, the Estonian government had very little access to manipulate the economy. Its
currency was pegged by independent control boards and its financial sector was near completely
dominated by foreign owners. Estimates suggest that foreign owned banks make up
approximately 75 percent of Estonia’s banking sector and comprise almost 98 percent of all
transactions (Friedrich and Reiljan 2015; World Bank 2022). Dependence on foreign owned
banks meant that domestic lending and credit was higher in Estonia compared to all the former
communist states of Europe (Drozdowicz-Biec 2011, 46).
Firm dependence on foreign capital was also a boon for Estonian spending. The global
downturn led to fewer dollars coming in, but the Estonian government was insulated against
having to issue bailouts for banks or other underwater companies as they were mostly foreign
owned. As a result, no bailouts were issued or thought of as necessary since the mainly
Scandinavian owned banks were likely to receive government restitution domestically. The
Estonian government’s strict constitutional limits due to budgetary obligations and the kroon’s
fiscal levers being outside of the government’s direct control impeded political party’s from
engaging in interventionist policies in the first place (Feldmann 2006, 846).
By 2010, the crisis had been overcome and Estonia had caught back up to its precrisis
GDP by 2014 (Friedrich and Reijlan 2015, 38). Many Estonian’s felt that the high growth rates
and accession to the eurozone validated their government’s draconian approach to the crisis
(Feldmann 2017, 16). Not everyone saw the path as an ultimate positive however and there
would be lingering issues that would come to ahead in the following decade. Popular protests to
austerity mobilized more frequently as the economy recovered and desire for more social
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protections increased. However, the Reform Party’s dedication to retrenchment in the wake of
global financial crisis had lingering post hoc affects. Estonia was able to avoid some of the
clientelistic, personalistic, and populist pitfalls that have now befallen its democratically
declining neighbors. The government’s hands off approach, intentional or not, has produced very
few popular demands or parties who advocate for higher levels of SMotE or attempt direct vote
buying with their platforms. Estonia has achieved a level of liberal market primacy that sees the
state as an illegitimate actor in the realm of economic control.
6.7.1. Does Market Size Matter?
Estonia was resistant to bringing the state back into the economy. As the economy collapsed
several percentage points, the government remained resolute in its dedication towards liberal
market ideals. Unlike Poland in 2010 or Russia in the 2000s, the economic crisis was not enough
to push the government towards state-capitalism as seen across Central and Eastern Europe. This
was because of ideological commitments towards Western Europe, joining the eurozone, lower
levels of SMotE, and little demand from below for parties to change course. Yet, these three
cases vary in regard to population size and market share. Surely this could be a confounding
factor as to why Estonia could maintain such retrenchment policies in the first place. I argue
precisely the opposite. Population and market size does not intervene in this model because
clientelistic parties are concerned only with the cost efficiency of buying off the middle class
relative to the amount they can offer.
Firstly, I do not consider that the size of Estonia’s population as relative to the demand
for economic protection through clientelism in a country. In fact, it may make a parliament more
susceptible to popular interference rather than less as smaller societies tend to be more
consociational and tightknit (Lijphart 1980). As such, we should expect to find higher rates of
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patrimonial and clientelistic practices shared informally between these smaller groups and more
institutionalized power sharing in larger populations. Veenendaal and Demarest (2021) find this
effect when looking at the countries of Nigeria and Suriname. However, Estonia presents the
opposite case. Its small population has been resistant to corrupt practices while the much larger
countries of Poland and Russia are especially vulnerable. Russia, with a population of 144
million is more indicative of informal power sharing among elites and materialist side transfers
to the population writ large.

Figure 6-4 Control of Corruption Scale by Country and Year
We can measure Estonia’s proclivity towards corruption and clientelism, or lack thereof,
by using the World Bank’s Governance Indicators (2022). The WBGI provide a factor scale of
total corruption control by country on a yearly basis. Scholars have used this as a useful guide for
assessing clientelism and corruption over time and between countries (Kraay, Kaufmann, and
Mastruzzi 2010). The index is scored from -2.5 to 2.5, with the highest score representing the
most control of corruption in a country and the lowest indicating elite state-capture. I present the
three countries from this dissertation and their WBGI score over time in Figure 6-4. Estonia
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overtook Poland’s corruption control estimate in 2000 and has maintained a score positive of one
since.
Estonia challenges expectations of population size beyond clientelistic terms. Its smaller
market should make it more vulnerable to economic crises as it is highly dependent on outside
investment dollars arriving at its shores. This fact is no different than the economic dependence
on foreign investment in the case of Poland, but Estonia has less leeway in regulating the market
and to still be targeted by investment dollars. However, here the investment dollars were already
localized in Estonia. The country’s approach to deregulated market capitalism made it a target
destination for capital since the 1990s. Very few obstacles were available to foreign investors to
act as owners and with profit repatriation of 100%, Estonia is an ideal setting.
Consequently, investments in Estonia are likely to be of a vertical nature with a focus on
utilizing its skilled labor market advantages (Cieślik and Gurshev 2021). This gives parent
multinational enterprises (MNEs) more flexibility regarding their investments as less of their
production chain is hosted within country. Compared to Poland, which has a much larger market
size, vertical and horizontal investments are much more critical. This gives MNEs in Poland
access to Polish production chains and resources with simultaneous access to its market (Cieslik
2019). This also places corporations more directly under Polish law and restricts the MNE’s
capacity to avoid or contest regulatory policies. This is not the case in Estonia.
Another aspect that size may impact Estonian policy is in relation to company size.
Smaller to Medium sized corporations proliferate the Estonian market which has had several
long-term benefits in relation to its low SMotE. For one, during independence and reform it
made SOEs easier to sell off as the assets were more widely affordable and the profits of selling
them were more favorable than if they were kept or too large to sell. This made Estonia’s
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privatization process more consistent, less contested in terms of openness to outsider investors
(Feldmann 2006, 847). Foreign ownership expanded rapidly and now dominates nearly all
sectors of the economy as a result.
Population can’t alone predict such economic outcomes, however. In a recent
comparative study, Feldmann (2017) compared Estonia and Slovenia. These are two countries
that are similar in size but are split over economic policies with Slovenia possessing higher
levels of market coordination, wage bargaining, and corporatist policies. This division in policy,
despite comparable population sizes, highlights the fallibility of assuming liberal policy trends as
a result of country size. Size should not be viewed as a path dependent recipe for liberal
economic reforms.
While this variable cannot be fully disassociated from my argument, I have expounded on
what the limits population size could yield on my theory. My expectation is that middle class
voters can become a cost-efficient source of voter loyalty in exchange for patronage when they
are vulnerable, and the party has access to state resources. The size of a country should not
theoretically confound a party’s ability to determine what a legitimate clientelistic response may
be during a crises as opposed to the interacting variables I’ve described. It may be that the size of
Estonia’s guided its approach to liberal reform and market-based policies during the
independence movement and economic transition of the 1990s, but these can hardly be seen as a
full gone conclusion of size dictating outcomes.
6.8. Estonian Middle class Vulnerabilities
A clearer picture of Estonia after the 2008 financial crisis is beginning to be emerge. Despite the
economic downturn and losses suffered by Estonian workers, especially those in the middle
class, there was little to no desire to socialize Estonia’s market. Three waves of austerity
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measures, the destruction of much of Estonia’s welfare spending, and the raising of taxes surely
would have been enough to compel a middle class crisis in response to government
retrenchment. The lack of a counter-cyclical response was not because Estonians were any less
damaged than Polish or Russian middle class voters. As will be shown below, they were just as
likely to suffer from economic instability. More so in some cases. Instead, there was a lack of
motivation to compel state intervention because the government and politicians were in no
position to compromise the economy’s independence or offer solutions to that effect. Unlike
Poland, there was no back door to the economy for the government to begin redistributing rents.
As such, there were very few parties even offering state intervention solutions to middle class
voters.
The simple math that Estonia resisted brining the state back into economic affairs due to
the disparate impact of the financial crisis is not complete. Estonia’s embrace of its total
conversion to free markets and liberal economic policies perhaps made Estonians, who depended
on employment to maintain their livelihood, even more vulnerable. The middle class were much
more susceptible to the slings and arrows of market degeneration and with very little
parliamentary will power to interfere on their behalf. In the words of Helemae and Saar (2012,
53) “political decisions had radical economic consequences: the Estonian political elite delegated
economic power to the ‘invisible hand of the market’, resulting in a very thin welfare state”. The
results were staggering for workers. Job tenure in Estonia is one of the lowest in Central and
Eastern Europe (Feldmann 2006, 841). Emphasis on vocational training and general skills placed
Estonians at a disadvantage in terms of marketing their skills for employment opportunities
(Feldmann 2006, 842). In short, Estonian dependence on the market makes them more likely to
absorb the full weight and impact when markets soured.

312
No more was this more apparent than the middle class. Household incomes have
experienced the greatest losses in the middle in the aftershock of economic crisis (Ulbrich 2015).
It is estimated that the Estonian middle class shrunk approximately 4 percent by 2014 and
increased the likelihood of middle income workers to depend on welfare transfers to make up for
those shortfalls (Derndorfer and Krazinger 2021, 920 & 931). The measurement of their decline
is not consistent between scholars. For instance, Zickute (2013) found a different result with the
middle class. She estimated they grew almost 10 percent during the crisis period. This may be
due to her method of measurement which was based on consumption and living standards and
doesn’t account for government transfers. Zickute (2013, 186) follows up on this finding stating
that, despite Estonia’s ‘fair’ distribution of social classes, its GINI coefficient is quite high due to
fact that “Estonia’s minimum monthly wage is 1.5 times higher than the required amount of
money to satisfy socially acceptable needs.” Figure 6-5 reports on World Bank data of Estonia’s
GINI score from 2005 to 2018 (2020). The peak score of 35 was reached around the time of
Zickute’s publication. From 2013 onwards, Estonia’s GINI score crashed back down towards
pre-crisis levels but still remains relatively high by EU standards.

Figure 6-5 GINI Index from 2004 to 2018
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The impact of the economic downturn was not just felt in Estonian’s wallets. Consumer
credit underwent some severe challenges as well. From 2000 to 2010, consumer credit exploded
from approximately 500 million euros a year to nearly 8 billion euros. Credit and private loans
were lent at a much higher rates in Estonia compared to its CEE neighbors (Kattel 2010, 44). The
proliferation of international banks and their primary focus to loan to individuals and SMEs
made debt easy to acquire. For middle income workers, much of this debt was acquired through
home buying. The 2008 housing bubble in Estonia compromised many of these loans when the
housing market corrected in 2007 (Raudla and Kattel 2013, 428).88 As credit dried up in 2008,
many Estonian homeowners found themselves with devalued asset compared to their incurred
debt. The percent of debt-to-GDP among consumers declined 10 percentage points in two years
(CEIC DATA 2020).
The financial crisis in Estonia produced a vulnerable middle class who experienced
income and credit instability along with higher levels of market exposure in repercussion to the
government’s destruction of its social spending obligations. However, despite these changes
there was very little reaction or protest (Kuokštis 2011). Instead, confidence in the government
remained quite stable despite the “draconian” measures implemented (Feldmann 2017, 16). In
fact, the austerity promoting parties like the Reform Party, Union of Fatherland, and Res Publica
gained electoral seats in the subsequent elections of 2010 and 2011. Even among political parties
that trended more towards the left and advocated for social spending there was little was little
pushback except in the form of demands for more taxes to cover the shortfalls in the budget
(Feldmann 2017).
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Like many other countries at the time, Estonia experienced a housing boom that accounted for doubling
of real estate prices over the span of five years (Lamine 2009, 26).
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Protests, when they did occur, were typically not aimed at market volatility or the crisis,
per se. Instead, the biggest strike in Estonian history would occur in 2012 after austerity and the
crisis had ended. The protest was comprised of 17,000 workers from the education sector who
mobilized for better wages after their incomes had been slashed by budget cuts. This strike
prompted several ‘sympathy strikes’ which forwarded the debate over the legality of such crosssector bargaining and solidarity between industries and between the public and private sector
(Feldmann 2017). In the end, the government made several concessions. The economy was
already experiencing a full recovery and extensive popular sympathy for the educators simplified
the calculus of the government. In fact, several labor market reforms took place during the early
2010s that gave more bargaining power towards labor (Eamets 2013, 8). During this period, a
University of Tartu survey found that collective agreements rose substantially (Kuusk, Staehr,
and Varblane 2017). However, this should not be regarded as a shift towards organized labor as a
favored status. Participation remains quite low to this day (Eamets and Tiwari 2019).
Estonia presents a case where crisis occurred and spared very few in the population.
What mobilization that did occur was only a protest by government workers for pay raises which
the majority of the population was open to. This also implicated a shift in the party preferences
with the electorate. The gains in popularity for the social democratic parties have pushed the
ruling Reform Party to cooperate more directly with the more social welfare-oriented parties in
Estonia’s parliament. Data from the Euro Value Survey validates this point as well. I compare
across income groups in the 2017 to 2020 wave and find that middle income groups, in the last
five years of reporting, are likely to depend on welfare subsidies but not as much as lower
income or Russian families. The data is presented in Figure 6-6 and shows that lower income
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respondents have a much higher welfare dependence probability.89 Popular pressure may be
shifting towards more social and economic intervention on behalf of middle class families, but it
is not outpacing any other group’s need except the highest earners.

Figure 6-6 Probability of Income Group and Welfare Dependency in 2018
6.8.1. Ethnic Vulnerabilities
Market dislocation among the middle class did not compel Estonians to reimagine their capitalist
system. There was very little desire amongst the polity or elected officials to push for radical
economic change or to reembrace the state as an economic actor. This innervation from below
allowed the Reform Party to continue its path of Estonia’s laissez-faire economics while also
coopting popular demands such as welfare, and issues of nationalistic concern when they saw fit.
It is important to include some measure here of ethnic vulnerability as a substitute for class
competition. While a subsequent lower, middle, and upper class developed during the transition
into a liberal market economy, the discourse around socioeconomic status remains fixed on
ethnic competition and conflict (Hellemae and Saar 2012, 53).
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See Appendix E.1 and E.2 for questions and coding.
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The logic here would reduce Estonian tensions to one of an ethnic modality. Instead of
the middle class pressing back against market volatility, it would be Russian speakers who have
the least to gain from free market institutions. This is because Russian speakers lost out the most
in Estonia’s transition which favored ethnic Estonians with property redistribution and electoral
access after 1990 (Andersen 1997). As a result, ethnic Russians and Russian speakers tend to
proliferate more frequently in the bottom rungs of society. The changes to the labor market
would also go on to hamper Russian speakers as well. During the Soviet era, non-Estonians were
predominantly in the industrial while Estonians were the majority of agriculture and bureaucratic
workers. By 1998, the trend had reversed. The non-Estonian share of the work force was
concentrated in less skilled jobs while ethnic Estonians were entering professional, and whitecollar careers at much higher rates (Pettai and Hallik 2002, 518). This can be connected to
Russian speakers lack access to higher education opportunities which require proficiency in
Estonian, and the geographical concentration of Estonian Russians that allows business capital to
be strategically concentrated in ethnically Estonian locals, like Tallinn and Tartu.
The labor market is very much tied into these ethnic vulnerabilities as well and
instabilities can be estimated as due to how jobs are unevenly distributed in Estonian society.
Using data from 1993 to 2008, Hansson and Aavik (2012) released a study in 2012 which found
that earnings and job security were correlated highest with Estonian men and lowest among
Russian women. I explored this distinction myself using income data from the EVS from 1990 to
2017 waves with surveys taken in 9-year intervals. The results in Figure 5-7 determine how
bounded, in terms of incomes, Russian speakers are compared to all Estonians.90 After 2010,
there was no difference in probability that a Russian speaker in Estonia would be in the middle
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Figure 5-7 was generated by interacting income groups with Russian speaker variable. See Appendix A.1
and E.1 for questions coding.
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or lower income. The probability of a Russian speaker being in the highest income group has the
lowest probability. Another interesting result of Figure 6-7 is the decline in proportion of
Russian to Estonian speakers over time.

Figure 6-7 Probability of Income Group for Russian-Speaking Estonians
The post-independence shift towards ethnic Estonians in terms of material and political
advantages has also created a higher level of dependency for nonethnic Estonians (Pettai and
Hallik 2002). These individuals frequently assess their life prospects to be much lower and are
often more likely to be dependent on the state for welfare benefits and support. However,
Estonian policy has not been overly inviting to these fragile groups. The immediate limitation of
political rights for nonethnic Estonians followed by a policy that nudged Russian speakers to
“emigrate” back to their home country all served to create a less than welcoming environment
for non-Estonians. Many of whom were born and have lived in Estonia their whole life making
such returns less feasible as time goes on. Even today, many Russian minorities still exist in a
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quasi, extra-legal citizenship status referred to as ‘undefined citizenship’.91 Individuals can
become naturalized citizens in Estonia if they pass an Estonian language test that many have
never studied. However, alienation and lack of interest means many of these individuals have
little interest to do so or are motivated to emigrate to Russia (Greene 2010).
It is unclear whether Estonia should be interpreted as defined by ethnic or class
cleavages. Many scholars have made the point that Estonia has a decisive cleavage along
language lines, yet the saliency of political interests is not as clearly defined. For one, Estonia
has been very open to providing non-citizen and residents the right to vote which has allowed
Russian speakers to participate in the electoral process. In doing so, most Russophones vote for
welfare parties, rather than Russian speaking ethno-parties. Their political interests are often
identified along these welfare and economic issues and are shared with fellow Estonians.
For instance, on the issue of immigration, for instance, Russian speakers, regardless of
class, are closely tied to the perspectives of lower income Estonian speakers. EVS data in Figure
6-8 presents respondents answers to immigration questions that were collected from 1999 to
2018.92 Lower income respondents and Russian respondents are closer together when asked
about their concerns for immigration with the greatest difference at the “very much” level.
However, even at this extreme level, Russian speakers are still closest to the lower income
survey participants. This provides some indication that Russian speakers, like lower income
households, feel more vulnerable to immigrant populations in Estonia and who they see as more
likely to compete for lower income positions.
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Undefined citizenship is a term for residents of Estonia who have failed to attain new citizenship in the
wake of the USSR’s collapse.
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See Appendix E.3 for questions and coding.
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Figure 6-8 Probability of Response to Immigration Concerns by Income Group and Russian
Speakers
6.9. Clientelism in Estonia
Estonia was able to resist state capture by elites and populist parties because there was very little
of the state to capture for clientelistic purposes. The government’s adherence to free market and
liberal economic principles kept the state’s access to the economy at minimal levels. Low
amounts of SMotE was resistant to each crises, whether it was the transition in the 1990s or in
2008. As a result, there are few ways for elites to fuse their party with the state or dispense
clientelistic rents to their constituents. What little of the state’s economy that could be harnessed
for this purpose. The state-owned sector is extremely small relative to Estonia’s GDP, there are
very few public jobs to exchange as patronage, and Estonia’s governance quality for corruption
monitoring makes clientelism cost inefficient and unpalatable to the general public. However,
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some populist parties have gained in recent years. Their brand of social and nationalist offerings
is unique compared to the welfare populists previously discussed in the paper.
The vulnerability of the middle class, while economically real, is not as visible. Nor is
there a discursive motive in Estonian politics to express these problems in terms of clientelist
solutions. Parties, instead, opt for programmatic offerings that distribute public goods as widely
as possible. In response to the changes in political and economic climate of the 2010s, the Social
Democrat Party gained more seats in the Riigikogu which prompted the formation of a new
coalition with the Reform Party. While the coalition was short lived, it demonstrates that political
competition is still a relevant factor after the financial crisis. It also highlights the Reform Party’s
ability to cooperate with other parties which ensures that broad swaths of the population are
represented in parliament rather than only by a narrow constituency. This is a useful deterrent
against the more radical and populist parties forming a stronger oppositional movements.
However, the breakdown between the Social Democracy Party and Reform Party in the 2019
election has allowed populist parties, like the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE) to
become more of a contender in electoral politics (Veebel 2019)).
The rapid rise of the EKRE has been a shock to Estonia’s political system after the party
gained 20 percentage points in popularity in the 2019 parliamentary elections. This put them at
19 members in the 101-member house and ahead of the more traditional parties like the Social
Democrats, and Isamaa, or the Christian-democratic part. The populist party has its roots in
ethnonationalism that had gained a lot of traction in Estonia at the end of the Soviet era. Unlike
the Polish PiS Party, EKRE’s political message is less geared towards culture, economic
performance, and patronage. Instead, EKRE’s message performs like a shotgun that is aimed at
all Estonians on matters of national identity and maintenance of their sovereignty in the wake of
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Russian aggression and perceived EU overreach. Although they include some social policies in
their platform, their broad nationalistic aims mean the EKRE has very little appeal in urban
centers and so the party focuses on rural, and poorer areas that desire more social spending and
protection (Puddington 2019). Even with Estonian politics more fractured than they were ten
years ago, the EKRE is not part of the current coalition government made up of the Reform and
Centre Party (Veebel 2019). Nor would it be likely that a populist party could shift Estonian
politics towards clientelism given the limited offerings available for patronage and strong
anticorruption practices.
Estonia is resistant to corruption on both an institutional and societal level. There are
powerful audit institutions which exposes the majority of government business to public
scrutiny. High levels of institutional oversight being the result of intense political competition as
parties seek to monitor all abuses and hold their rivals to account (Grzymala-Busse 2008). This
overwatch capacity places Estonia’s corruption ranking quite high at 13th globally in 2021
according to the Corruption Perceptions Index. The effect on clientelism is obvious. According
to Ornebring (2012, 40), Estonia ranked somewhere in the middle of their 87-country analysis of
clientelism and corruption indices in 2012.
Strong governance and anti-corruption measures prevents political parties from coopting
or abusing access to insider trades and backroom deals with private companies as well (Kasemets
2012). The passage of monitoring laws such as the Ombudsman Act of 1993 and Public
Information Act of 2000 made it much easier for day-to-day business affairs to be scrutinized by
the public and analyzed more closely by government accountants. Whether this was indicative of
Estonian culture, the historical legacy of an inherited Germanic bureaucracy, or because of actor
exposure, Estonians are largely intolerant of corruption in politics. In 2021, Prime Minister Juri
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Ratas of the Centre Party resigned along with his entire cabinet as his party was implicated in a
corruption scandal involving real estate sells (Henley 2021). It is important to note that the
implication of impropriety was enough to bring down the entire government as a result of some
very thorough investigative journalism rather than actual proof of wrongdoing.
This cooperation between anticorruption measures and open governance makes abuses
unlikely even among individuals. The Global Corruption Barometer in 2021 reported that only
18 percent of surveyed Estonians thought corruption was getting worse in their country while 63
percent said it stayed the same or the situation was improving. There is very little outside of
universalistic public goods the state could generate in exchange for electoral support, however.
For instance, job patronage opportunities in the public sector are very limited. It is estimated that
public sector employment accounted for only 4.2% of the entire workforce in 2019 (The Baltic
Course 2020). Although this number has risen slightly, year-on-year, it is unlikely to see more
gains as salaries lag behind the private sector with pay gaps as large as 11%.
In the bureaucracy and administrative arm of the Estonian government there is also
limited patronage to be offered. The past five years has seen Estonia engage with the digitization
of its bureaucracy which has pushed most of its business and citizen affairs online. Estonia’s ebureaucracy provides the cutting-edge digital democracy by making its systems more directly
accessible and accountable to its citizens (Kirka 2018). One outcome of this digital bureaucracy
is higher amounts of government trust because the civil society has streamlined access and
efficiency. The other outcome has been a lack of government jobs due to centralizing online and
shrinking government’s physical presence.
Along with a smaller, more resource efficient government is a lack of SOE’s in Estonia.
Estonia was successful in uprooting state management out of its economy across nearly all
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sectors. What remains is a fraction of its once vast ownership of assets and firms which are now
concentrated in major utilities and infrastructure companies. Compared to other European
countries, Estonia’s private sector accounts for the bulk of its GDP with only several hundred
SOE’s still owned by the government. These assets are not likely to be coopted by political
parties as tools of patronage or rent capture any time soon. The corporate boards of these
enterprises tend to be directly managed by the government, but transparency and disclosures are
extremely high and reflective of OECD benchmarks (Mortensen 2021).
This approach has also kept Estonian SOEs as profitable assets. According to European
Bank Group (Mortensen 2021) they estimated that from 2014 to 2016 SOEs delivered a 4
percent return on assets and showed an average 1.5 percent profit compared to current GDP and
over that same period. Estonia’s value-added enterprises have led to higher public scrutiny and
trust in the ability for the government to manage its SOEs. Over 60 percent of respondents in a
2020 Baltic Institute of Corporate Governance poll agreed that the government’s management of
SOEs was producing profitable enterprises. That same poll reported that respondents were more
incredulous that the government makes overall good managers while expressing high levels of
trust in the auditing and accounting processes.
State capture by elites in Estonia is does not a present a hazard to its democracy. It is able
to maintain strong democratic governance because there is very little access for parties to dip
into the government’s coffers and weaponize rents for electoral gains. Nor is there much
tolerance for this within society. As will be seen in the following section, voters were not forced
into a strategic dilemma of having to choose the state over capitalism as a result of the market’s
foibles. Good governance may have been a deciding factor in this outcome, but without the
reciprocal effect of parties and political elites seeking to meet the demand of vulnerable middle
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class constituents there has been little desire by elites or the citizenry to breakdown Estonia’s
democratic institutions.
6.10.

Strategic Non-Dilemma for Voters: Estonia

The resultant lack of clash between government and free market forces places Estonia on a
unique path. Without high levels of SMotE, I conclude that state capture by elites would be both
inefficient and costly despite the presence of a vulnerable middle class in Estonia’s polity.
Targeted clientelism has been thoroughly hamstrung by forces outside the control of political
parties. Those forces are the primacy of the market which the majority of voters, across the class
spectrum, depend on. As organized labor is quite frail and political parties are unable to alleviate
economic hardships by transferring rents to their popular constituents, Estonia should be
regarded as programmatic in their party system. Democracy is an effective tool for interests to
compete and monitor abuses but offers options for populist rent redistribution.
Had Estonia embraced more state intervention during the 2008 financial crisis it may
have led to some breakdowns of their democratic norms. For one, state selectivity for welfare
and bailouts would likely have been heavily influenced by ethnic biases. The determinants of
welfare dependence and advocacy in Estonia’s liberal political economy are highly correlated
with this language division. This theoretical move would likely have opened the door for
clientelistic practices and policy corruption when the redistribution of goods to constituents was
most politically expedient. Instead, Estonia avoided this pitfall because of the liberal market
embeddedness had extirpated most of the state from the economy and allowed very little
opportunity for its return. Middle class voters were less likely to see the state as their deliverer
and therefore the demand for intervention was minimal.

325
For labor, especially middle class labor, credible options to switch between are limited.
Similar to the Russian case except with market primacy instead of state dominance. Middle class
workers aimed to promote voice in politics and exit between individual firms and industrial
sectors as a viable strategy for maintaining their economic standing in society. Low regulation
and welfare support has put most of the country to work under a bargaining status that is almost
completely managed on an individual basis. This can be seen in Estonia’s retention rate amongst
its employees. Nearly one in four employees leaves a job every year to seek out alternative
employment, one of the highest in Europe (The Baltic Times 2018). The lack of a state sector
alternative in the economy induces the middle class to use their access to institutions and good
governance as a counterbalance against the political weight of foreign and domestic firms.
6.10.1. Evidence for Weak Clientelistic Support
Since independence, elites in Estonia have not pitted the middle class against capitalist or free
market interests. Instead, they elevated the free market in a way which instigated Estonian voters
to respond with pro-market leanings that results in more democracy rather than less. This
corresponds with high rates of individualism, competition, responsibility, and an acceptance of
the market as the main source of economic power in the country (Baliga and Santalainen 2006).
These factors bleed over as reluctance to accept the state’s management of the economy. A
recent Baltic Institute of Corporate Governance survey (Mortensen 2021) indicates very little
trust in the state to manage SOEs or engage in the economy effectively. For example, the survey
results showed that 60 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that “SOEs
performed as well as their private sector counterparts”.
With the preliminary evidence in mind, I predict that Estonia should not present
correlative effects between the middle class clientelism or participatory corruption. For one,
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confidence in public goods and services should not be discriminatory between groups and its
effect should be indistinguishable between groups. Second, corrupt practices are quite difficult to
achieve in a country with such high levels of transparency and anti-corruption institutions.
Finally, it may be that these factors present more of a pattern when controlling for Russian
speakers. I do not expect that Russian speakers are more likely to engage in this behavior mostly
due to limited access and the state’s resources being focused on ethnic Estonians. I estimate this
effect, nonetheless.
To estimate the validation of these arguments I use EVS data collected from 2017 to
2020. I again create two factor composite scores using maximum likelihood around clientelism
and corruption.93 The clientelism score is enabled by confidence measures of public goods and
services that include civil services, social security, health care, courts, and the police. These were
evaluated at 1 to 4 where 1 is the highest level of confidence and 4 the least. So, a lower score
should correlate with higher clientelism values. The corruption score was built using questions
regarding the justification of accepting unearned benefits, bribes, as well as cheating on taxes,
and fares. These were ordinally scored 1 to 10 from least to most justified. I run these two
variables against several larger models but restrict my analysis to my two main terms for
Estonia: income grouping and ethnicity.94 Middle income respondents were identified the same
way as the previous chapters with 4th to 7th household income deciles and coded as 1. Ethnicity
was coded as a 1 if the survey was conducted in Russian.
Table 6-1 demonstrates supporting evidence for what I suspected in Estonia: middle class
clientelism and corruption is a relevant phenomenon.95 At least, not according to the statistics

93

See Appendix E.4 for maximum likelihood Factor Analysis breakdown.
See Appendix E.5 for Summary of Statistic Table.
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presented in the composite score regressions. This finding goes a long way to support my middle
class clientelism thesis as a relative effect of the state’s proportion of the economy they control.
Russian speakers were not statistically more likely to participate or possess clientelistic levels of
confidence in public goods as well.
Table 6-1 Regressions of Clientelism and Corruption by Middle Income and Ethnicity
Clientelism Corruption
Score
Score
Middle
-0.025
0.047
Income
(0.063)
(0.057)
Russian

-0.104
(0.074)

-0.088
(0.066)

Constant

0.039
(0.042)

-0.005
(0.038)

N

845

845

R2

0.002

0.003

Note: OLS Regression with robust standard errors
in parentheses.
* p<0.10
Negative value for clientelism means higher
confidence.
Positive value for corruption means more justified.

The evidence that Estonia is a non-case of middle class clientelism seems quite strong.
However, a little more analysis is necessary in this regard. I recoded the income deciles to reflect
each class group: lower (1-3), middle (4-7), upper (8-10). With this new coding, the middle
income respondents were out, and the models were executed again to see what effects each other
income group has on clientelism and corruption composite scores. The results are in Table 6-2
and show that corruption does have some commiserate relationship when disaggregating income
deciles. 96 Clientelism score does not correlate with either lower- or upper income respondents.
However, the corruption score does. Lower income respondents are less likely to see corrupt
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See Appendix E.6 for full model robustness checks.
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behavior as justified compared to middle income respondents. Meanwhile, upper income
respondents are more likely to see the behavior as justified in some conditions. This pattern may
indicate an element of access to particular methods of abuse that lower income respondents don’t
actively have at their disposal. The probability loadings presented in Figure 6-9 supports this
contention.97 Higher income individuals are much more likely to have the highest corruption
composite scores while middle and lower households were trending downwards.
Table 6-2 Regressions of Clientelism and Corruption by Lower- and Upper income Groups and
Ethnicity
Clientelism
Score

Corruption
Score

Lower
Income

0.076
(0.069)

-0.157*
(0.062)

Upper
Income

-0.071
(0.082)

0.156*
(0.073)

Russian

-0.12
(0.074)

-0.055
(0.066)

Constant

0.018
(0.052)

0.035
(0.046)

N

845

845

R2

0.006

0.024

Note: OLS Regression with robust standard errors
in parentheses.
* p<0.05
Negative value for clientelism means higher
confidence.
Positive value for corruption means more justified.

97

Probabilities based on a ordered logit of Corruption Score and income grouping.
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Figure 6-9 Probability of Income Group and Corruption Score
6.11.

The Future of Estonia’s Democracy?

As the Estonian government has given way to free markets and the decision making of private
companies, the Riigikogu remains an important aspect of Estonian society. It is less likely that
the average Estonian would want to empower one party, or one ruler to a position where they
could capture the state. Even if it meant better economic conditions for those particular voters.
There is much to consider in regard to Estonian democracy given its penchant for ethnic
cleavages, the economic instability for workers, and a more aggressive Russia on its borders. I
consider some of these elements looking into the future of Estonia’s democracy.
Clientelistic reactions to class vulnerability, as expressed in neighboring CEE countries
has not reached Estonia, though there are some inklings that it may. After 2014, demand for
higher social protections saw the Reform Party shift to advocate for more social policy on top of
its dedication to liberal market identity. Yet there have been very little gains for any one party to
target its platform at single electoral groups. A reflection of the fact that political parties in
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Estonia have remained competitive. While the Reform Party remains the most powerful party
since 2005, there has yet to be an occasion where one party has been able to effectuate total
control, as in the cases of Russia and Poland. Shifts in the popularity of welfare and social
policies amongst Estonians has kept the partisan landscape in the country towards cooptation and
cooperation. The Estonian government is also in a strong position to offer more. It has the lowest
debt to GDP ratio in all of EU which makes them more adept when responding to social needs of
the population (Feldmann 2017, 18). This change led to gains for welfare parties at the expense
of the Reform Party in 2019.
There are indications of breakdowns in the system, however. The success of the EKRE
party, which surpassed the Social Democratic Party in the 2019 elections for representation in
the Riigikogu, were evocative to say the least. While the EKRE has yet to gain much of a
foothold in the rest of Estonian politics, there are reasons to believe that this party could enjoy
more success in the future. For one, the 2021 scandal that brought down the Centre Party’s
coalition reshuffled Estonia’s politics. The Centre and Reform Parties that were able to form a
government in the scandal’s aftermath, this time. In the future, if the EKRE continues to gain
representation, it could mean that they become a major partner in coalition deals.
This hinges on whether or not the EKRE continues to gain seats in the future. While the
Reform Party has shown adaptability in coopting social policies as Estonia’s economy continues
to grow, the EKRE’s welfare platform tends to target the more rural, and poorer population
centers. However, their nationalistic rhetoric may find firmer footing as international politics
continues to destabilize in the wake of Russian aggression in the region. It is unclear what
Putin’s overall plans are for the former Soviet territory, but ongoing conflicts and threats have
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heightened Estonia’s fears. Its long history of being absorbed by the Russian Empire and Soviet
Union may be enough for the EKRE to convert Russophobia into political hay.
This highlights the other point of contention within Estonian politics: Russophones. The
large population of ethnic Russians who remain, whose citizenship status is already quite
shallow, provides Moscow with ample fodder to interfere with Estonian politics. While the
EKRE has exacerbated the issue by insinuating that the Russian population represents a potential
‘fifth column’, it is unlikely to spill out into outright conflict (Puddington 2019). Instead, it is
more likely that Russians organize an oppositional party which may overburden the Riigikogu
with ethnic polarization and more instability.
There also remains the minefields of Russian hybrid warfare that concentrates on hitting
Estonia’s digital assets (Stoicescu 2021). Estonia is extremely vulnerable to electronic warfare as
much of their government is dependent on technology. This has also been a useful tool after the
advent of Covid-19 which caused much of the world to lockdown. The availability of
government resources online meant Estonians enjoyed less destructive lockdowns as a result
(Petrone 2022). Much of the technological infrastructure was already in place for Estonia to
aggressively shift its citizens to use electronic government systems. The prevalence of small to
medium technology firms in Estonia even served to meet the demands by locally sourcing
application development for the government.
6.12.

Conclusion

Estonia presents an interesting paradox. On the one hand, its population is quite dynamic in
terms of incomes and those same earners have suffered greatly in the aftermath of the 2008
financial crisis. Earners in the middle of Estonian society endured a similar fate to their
counterparts in Poland and Russia. However, the outcome was different. SMotE is low and has
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remained low since the 1990s. State capture was resisted in Estonia, not because of Maart Laar’s
libertarian ideals in the 1990s, but because his successful reforms meant there was no state
economy to capture. No parties emerged that took up the cause of the middle class as a specific
group that could be catered to in exchange for political support. As a result, Estonia remains
quite democratic to this day.
The reason behind this was quite simple. Low levels of SMotE acted as a screen that
stomped out clientelistic offerings from political parties before they could materialize. Demand
from constituency groups may have been available. Certainly, the vulnerabilities of the middle
class were readily apparent, but supply was deleteriously low. Estonian parties have little to offer
in terms of clientelistic public goods nor can they directly target constituent groups effectively.
Institutional oversight prevents most corrupt practices from gaining traction which further
hampers these efforts. The middle class presents as a cost inefficient target for clientelism and is
likewise unlikely to be courted by parties. The results presented in this chapter suggest that it’s
not just the middle class. Lower and higher income earners are unlikely to correlate with better
access and interactions with public goods because of those same limitations.
Estonian democracy seems locked in at the moment. Its economy is doing quite well and
its approach to electronic bureaucracy is ideal for avoiding the pitfalls of clientelism and
democratic erosion. Of course, there are opportunities for change in the near future. Populism,
like the rest of Europe, is on the rise to a certain extent. However, it would be wise to point out
the limitations that populist parties in Estonia must operate under. Furthermore, the ethnic
cleavages in the country operate as a likely culprit for future polarization rather than the middle
class demand particularistic goods and patronage from their elected representatives.
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7. CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I have laid out a novel theory and hypotheses in regard to middle class
clientelism. By emphasizing economics within previous theories of state capture, I have
highlighted that clientelism is not merely a function of political will power but instead
emblematic of specific vulnerabilities within a country. I was motivated to understand why
democracy was doing so poorly in Eastern Europe, despite its economic gains. I believe I have
provided a reasonable, and empirically grounded assessment as to why that is the case. However,
it is worth highlighting the limitations of my argument as well as provoke additional cases that
may further test the legitimacy of its finding.
7.1. The Argument in Brief
In summation, my argument is as follows: the quality of democracy in CEE countries is
dependent on the intersection of how much of the economy the state controls and constituent
vulnerabilities within the middle class. The strategic dilemma of vulnerable voters provides
openings for political elites to engage in state capture practices which arrests and erodes
democratic institutions. Most importantly, though, in order to exchange goods for loyalty there
must be a degree of the state’s rents that can be captured and redistributed for political gains. The
most important takeaway from this paper is that large state-run economic sectors operate as a
backdoor for political elites to capture and then disperse for political gain. This is not a claim that
state investment in the economy inevitably leads to democratic erosion or failure. Instead, it
operates as a vehicle of state capture that populist parties, and enterprising elites can operate in
exchange for popular support.
Constituent vulnerabilities, in these cases, have manifested as a weakening of middle
class material and psychological wellbeing. This was due, in large part, to the financial crisis of
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2008. Along with financial instability, organized labor was totally gutted as a component of
liberalization and reform during the 1990s. I have argued that these two aspects have created
strategic dependencies amongst middle income workers. This group that is critical for the
function of the democratic state as they represent the confluence of educated and material status
that makes them politically potent but not immune to political and economic changes. Their loss
of status, since the 2000s, has incurred negative repercussions when parties and political elites
were able to take advantage.
State capture should be thought of as an economic phenomenon and so too should
clientelism. The arrangement of economic forces in the state and the governance capacity of its
institutions for managing its economy all serve to limit or enhance the capture of those functions
for clientelistic and corrupt purposes. If we conclude that rents to constituencies is the main
elements of state capture, then we should consider what elites are able to offer in the first place.
Without state hands in the economy, there is very little political elites can bargain with in
exchange for support and vice versa. Instead, we should imagine the state in those instances of
paucity as a grabbing nub rather than a grabbing hand. The fusion of party to the state serves to
embolden the state-economy management relationship as those parties that are able to leverage
their position in exchange for rents will require access to additional rents in the future.
This argument also rejects notions of state capture being a unidirectional phenomenon.
Previous theories have declared that poorer members of a polity are cost effective targets of
patronage when politicians seek to gain political power. I’ve countered this argument promoting
the middle class as an additional culprit of democratic unraveling because they should be a
lynchpin of democratic attitudes and be more likely to challenge anti-democratic behavior.
Instead, strategic vulnerabilities have allowed them to be less costly for parties to exchange
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goods for loyalty with. The middle class’s material advantages allow parties and elites to
discreetly target the shortfalls that vulnerability induces. This makes them a more cost effect
group to patronize than once hypothesized. It also provides a means of loyalty maintenance as
the middle class becomes dependent on state to resources to maintain their own status into the
future.
Lastly, this argument moves away from treating populism as a causal variable. This
argument contends that populism as a political platform is just a means to an end for plebiscite
demands. While populist parties have the propensity to be destructive for democracy, I
emphasize that it is the admixture of state control over large swaths of the economy and a
vulnerable middle class that defines the state capture associated with democracy failure in CEE
countries.
7.2. Primacy of the State
In such instances where the state dominates most sectors of the economy there is very little room
for countervailing forces in the electorate to achieve or maintain their status independent of the
government. State capture is a relatively simple affair when vulnerable groups in society require
additional assistance. In this case, they trade patronage for support, which allows nearly all
aspects of the state to be taken over by the elite leadership. Critical aspects of SMotE support this
hegemony. High levels of corruption keep many interactions and exchanges informal and beyond
institutional control. A lack of potency in the private sector annihilates any strategic decision
making by middle class voters who, when in a vulnerable economic state, must seek out a patron
to ensure their status in society.
The Russian case provided a clear example of this confluence of variables. Its experience
in the 1990s was one of polarized reform leading to a disjointed and corrupt outcome for its
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socialist economy. While the state did engage in ‘shock therapy’ reforms, the manner in which it
did so kept private industry relatively weak and state in control of the commanding heights of the
economy. Social classes began to materialize and coalesce after this great swing to liberalism
which led to a proliferation of a few economic winners and many losers in the new economy.
The growth of the Russian economy in the 2000s and its subsequent shrinkage provided Putin
and the United Russia party enough room to leverage middle class dependency in exchange for
more political and economic control. The grabbing hand of the state has kept private firms from
countermobilizing and made the strategic dilemma of the middle class quite simple. Support
Putin with votes and continue to receive patronage and access to restricted public goods in
Russia’s ailing economy. Democracy never fully actualized in Russia because state capture was
too potent.
Russia is not the only CEE case where democracy failed to take root nor is it the only
case of a state dominated economy. Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and most of the
Central Asian republics are permeated with weak democracies and deeply imbedded
governments in their economies. In such cases it would be of great importance to test this theory
against their history of reforms, the status of their middle class core constituencies, and how they
may collide to stifle democracy. Moving beyond CEE countries, cases like China provide further
tests of the theory. Party capture of the state is emblematic of the Communist Chinese Party’s
control over the country and its economy. The rising middle class has provided fodder for many
academics who seek to explain why democracy has failed to take hold in the country.98 I would
suggest looking at the dependent connections between the state’s economy and how
economically dependent the middle class is as a client constituent group for the CCP.
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Furthermore, we should engage in understanding how organized labor in Chinese society
functions and whether a case of middle class vulnerability is a dominant factor.
7.3. Hybrid Economies and State Capture
The state does not always engage in the economy with ham-fisted measures of near total control.
I have argued that gradations exist between state control of the economy and the effects of state
capture. Those cases that permit enough state control over the economy while also possessing a
capable and effective independent private sector represent an interesting dynamic that both
rigorously tests and supports my hypotheses. In those cases that have a vulnerable middle class,
there is a polarized strategic dilemma for which voters may see the state or private sector as a
potential ally to coordinate with. This polarization provides an opening for state capture by elites
and parties who turn those elements of the economy that are managed by the government to their
electoral advantage. Democracy can be undermined and retrograded, especially when more and
more pieces of the government are captured by those party forces when they proceed to buy off
portions of the middle class.
Poland provided a strong test case of this theory. For one, it was a state that engaged in
successful political and economic reforms in the 1990s. It adopted the status of a liberalized,
democratic state that had its focus on joining the EU and making their country an economic hub
of international commerce. However, Polish reforms were not totally complete in their execution
as large tracts of the state ran economy remained in place. This would become more of an issue
as the material situation of the middle class deteriorated in the late 2000s. The PiS Party used the
vulnerability of middle class voters to their advantage by offering goods in exchange for
electoral victories. This exchange was highly successful and led the PiS to dominate Sejm to this
day. It is unclear how long the PiS can retain this lead though. State capture will only be as deep
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as the state’s reach is into the economy. In the case of Poland, it allows them to informalize and
use clientelism to high degree but not to the same extent as Russia. Democratic quality has
declined in recent years, but this trend is reversable should competitive politics be reintroduced,
or the middle class’s position greatly improves.
The Polish and hybrid state capture case provides the most startling implications for
democracies on a global scale. With middle class prosperity on the wane as a near universal
phenomenon, it becomes a potent tool for entrepreneurial political elites and political parties to
design their platforms around and engage with. Exchanges of goods through side transfers, the
abandonment of programmatic parties for clientelistic linkages, and outright corruption will
likely increase in the future. The questions are: to what degree and for how long? Cases outside
of Central and Eastern Europe abound as to where this argument can be applied. Western
Europe, North America, and Latin and South America provide useful testing grounds to examine
how variance in state management of the economy can lead to differing levels of state capture
when there is a vulnerable constituent group that can be effectively targeted. Scholars must pay
much more attention to where government’s reach goes and how political parties parlay that into
political advantage.
7.4. Primacy of Markets
It would be easy to dismiss this paper as a diatribe of the pros of neoliberal economies for the
promotion of democracy against the cons of state investment. The relationship between the
government’s reach into the economy and the lack of state capture as a result would support this
theoretical narrative. However, this is reflective of a commonsense position that state capture
requires political elites to offer patronage in exchange for political support. Without rents to
exchange, there is very little political elites can therefore offer. The middle class Estonians were
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vulnerable, but the lack of a state economic alternative did little for parties to organize
themselves around clientelization of this group. The strategic dilemma for voters, in this case, is
to rely more on democracy as a tool to balance the interests of private companies and to ensure
no one party is able to dominate the system.
The Estonian case provided a rare glimpse into a CEE country that not only underwent
reform but went further than most of its neighbors. Its commitment to the Washington Consensus
in the 1990s and austerity during the Great Recession provides for a unique case. There was little
pushback by the middle class, who endured hardships on par with their CEE neighbors. Nor were
there motivated political parties who attempted to parlay dissatisfaction with the government into
a clientelistic system of exchange for votes. Indeed, state capture did not occur because there was
no ‘state’ to be captured. Good governance, high levels of audit protection, and very few
government assets suggest there is very little enterprising elites could legitimately offer to voters
in exchange for support in Estonia.
The main question that comes to mind after explaining Estonia’s case is whether this
represented a rare aberration in Comparative Political Economy with very little comparative
utility. Social spending retrenchment and austerity is often dismissed in the wake of financial
crisis in favor of pro-cyclical and quantitative easing measures. Further analysis is necessary.
Testing Estonia against the other two Baltic countries, Latvia, and Lithuania, would be one
starting place. More fertile ground would be begin examining liberal market economies who are
more likely to have low amounts of SMotE and see where the Estonian case can advance our
comparative knowledge.
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7.5. Looking Forward
I can say with some confidence that higher levels of state management of the economy coupled
with middle class vulnerabilities is likely to present parties with a cheap constituency to
clientelize. This has the potential to lead to higher degrees of state capture and lower democratic
quality. Despite the inherent limitations of the argument, the use of Central and Eastern
European countries provided an ample testing ground and opportunity to develop my theory of
economic state capture. It permitted me to control for as many confounding aspects that are part
and parcel with a cross-case analysis, but no analysis is perfect. There remain some aspects of
the theory that need to be further developed and tested.
For one, my argument was limited down from its original scope due to exigent
circumstances related to covid. More in country research would be useful along with supportive
interviews of elites in business and government to truly isolate the causal mechanisms. The use
of supplemental survey data was effective, but the data is starting to show its age as the latest
rounds were collected in 2018 to 2020. The occurrence of a global pandemic and the economic
instability it left in its wake provides ample suspicion that a shift in public opinion may have
occurred since 2020. However, this shift is likely to reinforce my argument as the government
has become more involved in managing the affairs of its citizens through the economy than ever
before.
An additional limitation lies in the measurement and operationalization of important
variables. This argument would be greatly improved by devising more accurate ways to measure
state capture directly rather than democratic quality, governance, or individual voter preferences
by proxy. This weakness is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but it demands more attention
in the future, nonetheless. The use of in country experimental designs trailblazed by Wantchekon
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(2003) would greatly enhance this argument too. It could provide a more direct measure of
clientelism and patronage by exposing participants in political systems to a more rigorous, and
formal evaluation of these concepts with higher levels of reliability.
I wish to reiterate that high levels of state management of the economy are neither a bad
nor a good thing for democracy. It highlights the potential reach that state capture can have.
Ultimately, state capture is undertaken by elites and with some level of acquiescence of their
voters. In the case of a vulnerable middle class, some aspects of society actively encourage state
capture as a rational, measured, and strategic choice. The quality of democracy, in these cases, is
ultimately up to the voter who has the unenviable task to choose between long term democratic
stability and short-term economic payoffs.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Chapter 1
Appendix A.1: Income Deciles and Middle Income Measurement for models
European Values Survey and World Values Survey use the same coding scheme.
X047_WVS;_EVS - Scale of incomes
Response categories in EVS Trend File:
-5 Missing: Other
-4 Not asked in survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
-1 Don´t know
1 Lower step
2 second step
3 Third step
4 Fourth step
5 Fifth step
6 Sixth step
7 Seventh step
8 Eighth step
9 Nineth step
10 Tenth step
11 Highest step
Deciles -5 through 0 were dropped from the analysis.
Middle Income was coded as 1 for all values 4 through 7. All other values were coded 0.
Lower Income was coded as 1 for all values 1 through 3. All other values were coded 0.
Upper Income was coded as 1 for all values 8 through 10. All other values were coded 0.
Note: 11 Highest step was not included in any models as it is from an older coding scheme.
Appendix B: Chapter 3
Appendix B.1: Figure 3-3 Supplemental
Figure 2-2 Supplement was produced by taking the means of lower and upper income
households per EVS Wave and by participant CEE country.
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Appendix B.2: Figure 3-4 Middle Class Perceptions of the Economy
EU Election Survey (2019) Questions and Coding
D7 If you were asked to choose one of these five names for your social class, which would you say you
belong to - the working class, the lower middle class, the middle class, the upper middle class or the upper
class?
<Source: EES2009 Q114>
1 working class
2 lower middle class
3 middle class
4 upper middle class
5 upper class
6 other
Recoded as values 2-4 are Middle Class (1) all others are (0).
Q19 What do you think about the economy? Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general
economic situation in the <country name>
<Source EES2014 QPP15> 1 a lot better
2 a little better
3 stayed the same
4 a little worse
5 a lot worse
98 dk
Recoded as 4 and 5 (1) Worse and all other values as (0).
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Q20 And over the next 12 months, how do you think the general economic situation in the <country
name> will be? Will it….?
<Source EES2014 QPP16> 1 get a lot better
2 get a little better
3 stay the same
4 get a little worse
5 get a lot worse
98 dk
Recoded as 4 and 5 (1) Worse and all other values as (0).

Appendix C: Chapter 4
Appendix C.1: Figure 4-2 Family’s Material Improvements Over a Year
Russian Election Study (1996) Questions and Coding
How has your family's material situation changed over this past twelve months?
1. Improved a lot
2. Improved a little
3. Remained unchanged
4. Worsened a little
5. Worsened a lot
7. HARD TO SAY
8. REFUSAL
Values 7 and 8 were dropped from the analysis.
103. How much money in total have all members of your family made in
this past thirty days? Sum up everything--wages, bonuses,
profits, pensions, allowances, material aid, incidental pay, and
other monetary income. Include in this hard currency, but convert
the hard currency into rubles.
_______________ rubles
7. HARD TO SAY
8. REFUSAL
Values 7 and 8 were dropped from the analysis. Rubles were then split into quartiles for model.
Appendix C.2: Figure 4-3 Second Round Vote Choice by Monthly Income Quartiles
Russian Election Study (1996) Questions and Coding
118. Would you mind saying for which candidate you voted in the second
round of the election, for Yeltsin or Zyuganov?
1. FOR YELTSIN
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2. FOR ZYUGANOV
96. VOTED AGAINST BOTH CANDIDATES
97. HARD TO SAY -----> Qu. 122
98. REFUSAL -----> Qu. 122
Values 96, 97, and 98 were dropped form the analysis.
103. How much money in total have all members of your family made in
this past thirty days? Sum up everything--wages, bonuses,
profits, pensions, allowances, material aid, incidental pay, and
other monetary income. Include in this hard currency, but convert
the hard currency into rubles.
_______________ rubles
7. HARD TO SAY
8. REFUSAL
Values 7 and 8 were dropped from the analysis. Rubles were then split into quartiles for model.
Appendix C.3: Figure 4-4 Percent of Population in Third Quartile of Earners
HSE Russian Household Survey (1994-2020)
J57
IEA—Income Last 30 Days
99999997
Does not know
99999998
Refuses to nswer
99999997
No answer
Values 99999997-9 were dropped from the analysis. Rubles were then split into quartiles and
recoded as 1 if in the 3rd quartile.

Appendix C.4: Figure 4-6 Predicted Margins for Educational Attainment
World Value Survey (1999-2017)
X025 - Educational level respondent: 8 categories
Response categories in EVS Trend File:
-5 Missing; Unknown
-4 Not asked in survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
-1 Don't know
1 Inadequately completed elementary education
2 Completed (compulsory) elementary education
3 Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type
4 Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type/secondary
5 Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type/secondary,
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6 Complete secondary: university-preparatory type/full secondary
7 Some university without degree/higher education - lower-level tertiary
8 University with degree/higher education - upper-level tertiary
Values -5 through 0 were dropped from the analysis. Values 1, 2, 3 were coded as 1. Values 4, 5,
6 were coded at 2. Value 7 was coded as 3. Value 8 was coded as 4.
For Income Variable see Appendix E.1
Appendix C.5: Figure 4-7 Probability of Respondent’s Satisfaction with Life
HSE Russian Household Survey (1994-2020)
J65
1
2
3
4
5

Satisfaction with life at present.
Fully satisfied
Rather satisfied
Both yes and no
Less than satisfied
Not at all satisfied

All other values were dropped from the analysis.
J62
1
9

Economic rank on a 9 step ladder
Lowest…
Highest

All other values were dropped from the analysis. Collapsed the 9 step ranks into 3 with lowest
(1), middle (2), and upper (3).

Appendix C.6: Figure 4-8 Probability of United Russia Voter
World Value Survey (2014-2019)
E179 - Which political party would you vote for first choice
If there was a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?
643032 RU: United Russia
United Russia coded as 1. All other Russian party values coded as 0
United
Russia Voter
Middle Income
0.203*
Household
(0.022)

Education

-0.014
(0.041)
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Constant
N
2

R

-0.274*
(0.052)
3,201
0.01

Note: Probit Regression with robust standard errors in
parentheses. * p<0.01
Standard errors are clustered by respondent region: 9 clusters

Appendix C.7: Chapter 4 Factor Analysis Tables and Questions
WVS Data (2010-2017)
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Clientelism
2.35952
0.51802
0.5617
0.5617
Corruption
1.8415
0.4383
1
N
2,883
Parameters
15
2
LR test: 2 factor vs saturated prob>x =0.01

Court
Police
Government
Civil Service
Benefits
Fare
Taxes
Bribe

Clientelism Corruption Uniqueness
0.8457
-0.1514
0.2619
0.8201
-0.1795
0.2952
0.6574
-0.0036
0.5678
0.6326
-0.0334
0.5987
0.1478
0.6673
0.5329
0.1645
0.6293
0.5769
0.2459
0.7448
0.3847
0.1734
0.6239
0.5807

Clientelism Score:
Variables: E069_06 – Confidence: Police; _08 – Confidence: Civil Service; _11 – Confidence:
Government; _17 – Confidence Courts
Each variable had the same prompt and coding.
Prompt: Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have
in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?
Response categories in WVS Trend File:
-5 Missing: Other
-4 Not asked in survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
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-1 Don´t know
1 A great deal
2 Quite a lot
3 Not very much
4 None at all
Values -5 through -1 were dropped from analysis. Original coding kept.
Corruption Score
Variables:
F114A – Justifiable Claiming Benefits to which you are not entitled
F115 – Justifiable: Avoiding fare on public transport
F116 – Justifiable: Cheating on taxes
F117 – Justifiable: Someone accepting a bribe
Each variable had the same prompt and coding.
Prompt: Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it can always be justified,
never be justified, or something in between, using this card.
Response categories in WVS Trend File:
-5 Missing: Other
-4 Not asked in survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
-1 Don´t know
1 Never justifiable
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Always justifiable
Values -5 through -1 were dropped from analysis. Original coding kept.
Appendix C.8: Chapter 4 Summary of Statistics
Variables were generated from WVS (2008-2014). See coding analysis.

Obs.

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Coding
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Clientelism
Score
Corruption
Score
Middle
Income
United
Russia
Sex

2,883

Savings
Education
Occupation
Town Size

-2.187

1.660

Factor Analysis
Score (App. C.7)

2,883

0.000 0.892

-1.178

3.197

3,208

0.640 0.480

0.000

1.000

Factor Analysis
Score (App. C.7)
Middle Income
Household
(App. A.1)

3,239

0.439 0.496

0.000

1.000

Votes for United
Russia (App. C.6)

2.000

Is female
(WVS X001)

3,239

Religious

0.000 0.931

1.563 0.496

1.000

3,239

0.704 0.456

0.000

1.000

Is religious
(WVS F025)

3,239

0.435 0.496

0.000

1.000

Has savings
(WVS X044)

1.000

Has university
degree (App. C.4)

3,231

0.477 0.500

0.000

3,239

0.360 0.480

0.000

1.000

Has government job
(WVS X052)

3,239

0.669 0.471

0.000

1.000

Town>20,000
people (WVS X049)

Appendix C.9: Full Model Robustness Tests Table 4-1

Middle Income
United Russia
Sex
Religious
Savings
Education
Occupation
Town Size

Clientelism Score Corruption Score
-0.136*
0.071*
(0.047)
(0.031)
-0.341**
-0.091*
(0.032)
(0.039)
-0.094*
-0.027
(0.034)
(0.028)
-0.143*
0.037
(0.048)
(0.048)
-0.035
0.06
(0.032)
(0.038)
-0.08
0.122*
(0.065)
(0.042)
-0.039
-0.29**
(0.052)
(0.023)
0.009
0.091
(0.074)
(0.063)
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Constant
N
R2

0.548
(0.098)
2,859
0.058

-0.036
(0.068)
2,859
0.045

Note: OLS Regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01 * p<0.05
Standard errors are clustered by respondent region: 9 clusters
Negative value for clientelism means higher confidence.
Positive value for corruption means more justified.

Appendix C.10: Models with Upper and Lower Income Households

Lower Income
Household

Clientelism
Score
0.219*
(0.068)

Corruption
Score
-0.195**
(0.04)

Upper Income
Household

-0.146
(0.094)

0.218**
(0.045)

United Russia
Supporter

-0.357**
(0.035)

-0.121*
(0.046)

0.102
(0.071)

-0.097
(0.048)

N

2,858

2,858

R2

0.054

0.018

Constant

Note: OLS Regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01 * p<0.05
Standard errors are clustered by respondent region: 9 clusters
Negative value for clientelism means higher confidence.
Positive value for corruption means more justified.

Appendix D: Chapter 5
Appendix D.1: Figure 5-1 Economic Freedom of the World Index
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/economic-freedom-of-the-world-2021-annual-report
(Yap, Law, and Abdul-Ghani 2020)
The index published in Economic Freedom of the World measures the degree to which the
policies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom. The cornerstones of
economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to enter markets and
compete, and security of the person and privately owned property. Forty-two data points are used
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to construct a summary index, along with a Gender Legal Rights Adjustment to measure the
extent to which women have the same level of economic freedom as men. The degree of
economic freedom is measured in five broad areas.
Appendix D.2: Figure 5-2 Unemployment by Skill Level
EVS (1990-1999)
X037_01 - Respondent experienced unemployment longer than 3 months
Are you yourself gainfully employed at the moment or not? Please select from the card the
employment status that applies to you.
Response categories in EVS Trend File:
-5 Missing; Unknown
-4 Not asked in survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
-1 Don't know
1 Full time (30h a week or more)
2 Part time (less then 30 hours a week)
3 Self employed
4 Retired/pensioned
5 Housewife (not otherwise employed)
6 Student
7 Unemployed
8 Other
Values -5 through -1 were dropped from the analysis. Value 7 was coded as 1 and all other
values were coded as 0.
X046 - Socio-economic status of respondent
Socio-economic status of respondent
Response categories in EVS Trend File:
-5 Missing; Unknown
-4 Not asked in survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
-1 Don't know
1 Ab (upper, upper middle class)
2 C1 (middle, non-manual workers)
3 C2 (manual workers -skilled, semi-skilled)
4 De (manual workers -unskilled, unemployed)
Values -5 through -1 were dropped from the analysis. Coding was reversed from 1 to 4 to 4 to 1.
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Appendix D.3: Figure 5-6 Confidence in Major Companies Before and After Crisis
EVS (2008&2017)
E069_13 - Confidence: Major Companies
Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them,
is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?
Response categories in EVS Trend File:
-5 Missing: Other
-4 Not asked in survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
-1 Don´t know
1 A great deal
2 Quite a lot
3 Not very much
4 None at all
Values -5 through -1 were dropped from the analysis.

Appendix D.4: Figure 5-10 Probability of Political Alignment by Household Income
EVS (2017-2019)
E181C - Which political party would you vote for/appeals to you - lea/right scale
Which (political) party appeals to you most?
Response categories in EVS Trend File:
-5 Missing: Other
-4 item not included
-3 not applicable
-2 no answer
-1 dont know
1 lea
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 right
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Values -5 through -1 were dropped from the analysis. Values 1 through 10 were reduced down to
1 through 5 by grouping every 2 numbers.

Appendix D.5: Chapter 5 Factor Analysis Tables and Questions
EVS (2018)
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Clientelism
2.319
0.755
0.597
0.597
Corruption
1.564
0.403
1
N
1,113
Parameters
19
2
LR test: 2 factor vs saturated prob>x =0.01

Education
Social Security
Health Care
Civil Service
Police
Court
Benefits
Fare
Taxes
Bribe

Clientelism Corruption Uniqueness
0.4359
-0.0967
0.8006
0.6865
-0.1877
0.4935
0.5872
-0.158
0.6303
0.7058
-0.2086
0.4583
0.5869
-0.1067
0.6441
0.5184
-0.2319
0.6775
0.0859
0.5112
0.7313
0.2035
0.4425
0.7627
0.3213
0.7211
0.3767
0.2232
0.6394
0.5413

Clientelism Score:
Variables: E069_03 – Confidence: Education; _06 – Confidence: Police; _08 – Confidence: Civil
Service;_09 – Social Security _16 – Confidence: Health Care; _17 – Confidence Courts
Each variable had the same prompt and coding.
Prompt: Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have
in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?
Response categories in EVS Trend File:
-5 Missing: Other
-4 Not asked in survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
-1 Don´t know
1 A great deal
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2 Quite a lot
3 Not very much
4 None at all
Values -5 through -1 were dropped from analysis. Original coding kept.
Corruption Score
Variables:
F114A – Justifiable Claiming Benefits to which you are not entitled
F115 – Justifiable: Avoiding fare on public transport
F116 – Justifiable: Cheating on taxes
F117 – Justifiable: Someone accepting a bribe
Each variable had the same prompt and coding.
Prompt: Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it can always be justified,
never be justified, or something in between, using this card.
Response categories in EVS Trend File:
-5 Missing: Other
-4 Not asked in survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
-1 Don´t know
1 Never justifiable
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Always justifiable
Values -5 through -1 were dropped from analysis. Original coding kept.
Appendix D.6: Chapter 5 Summary of Statistics
Variables were generated from EVS. See coding analysis.

Obs.
Clientelism
Score

1,133

Mean
0.00

Std.
Dev.
0.895

Min
-2.612

Max

Coding

2.268

Factor Analysis
Score (App. D.5)
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Corruption
Score
Middle
Income
PiS
Middle
Income(PIS)
Sex
Religious
Education
Occupation
Town Size

1,133

0.00

0.871

-0.561

6.722

1,086

0.416

0.493

0

1

Factor Analysis
Score (App. D.5)
Middle Income
Household
(App. A.1)

1,352

0.314

0.464

0

1

Votes for PiS
(EVS E181A)

1,086

0.125

0.331

0

1

Middle Income
Household and PIS

1,352

1.541

0.499

1

2

Is female
(EVS X001)

1,339

0.921

0.27

0

1

Is religious
(EVS F025)

1,344

1.935

0.783

1

3

Education Level
(EVS X025R)

856

0.369

0.483

0

1

Has government job
(EVS X052)

5

Size of town (App.
D.7)

1,352

2.572

1.4197

1

Appendix D.7: Town Size Variable
EVS (2018)
X049a - Size of town where interview was conducted (5 categories)Size of town
Response categories in EVS Trend File:
-5 Missing: Other
-4 Not asked in survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
-1 Don´t know
1 2,000 and less
2 2,000-5,000
3 5,000-10,000
4 10,000-20,000: WVS 10,000-25,000
5 20,000-50,000
6 50,000-100,000
7 100,000-500,000
8 500,000 and more
Values -5 through -1 were dropped from analysis. Original coding kept.
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Appendix D.8: Full Model Robustness Tests for Tables 5-1 and 5-3
Clientelism
Score
0.187*
(0.083)

Corruption
Score
-0.019
(0.085)

0.003
(0.106)
-0.418**
(0.152)
-0.106
(0.072)
0.025
(0.127)
0.095*
(0.047)
-0.127
(0.074)
0.106**
(0.027)
-0.307
(0.198)

-0.247*
(0.108)
0.141
(0.154)
-0.082
(0.074)
-0.266*
(0.129)
-0.039
(0.048)
-0.109
(0.076)
0.019
(0.028)
0.513*
(0.201)

N

614

614

R2

0.07

0.03

Middle Income
PiS
Middle Income (PiS)
Sex
Religious
Education
Occupation
Town Size
Constant

Note: OLS Regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01 * p<0.05
Negative value for clientelism means higher confidence.
Positive value for corruption means more justified.

Appendix D.9: Models with Upper and Lower Income Households

Lower
Income

Upper
Income

PiS

Clientelism Corruption
Score
Score
-0.173**
-0.012
(0.067)
(0.063)

0.116
(0.073)

0.03
(0.069)

-0.256**
(0.062)

-0.175**
(0.058)
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Constant
N
2

R

0.109*
(0.048)

0.028
(0.046)

934

934

0.036

0.01

Note: OLS Regression with robust
standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01 * p<0.05.
Negative value for clientelism means
higher confidence.
Positive value for corruption means more
justified.

Appendix E: Chapter 6
Appendix E.1: Figure 6-3 Probability of Importance to Speak Estonian by Ethnicity
EVS (2008-2018)
S016 - Language of the interview (WVS/EVS list of languages)
In which language was the interview conducted?
132 Estonian
380 Russian
Russian value was Coded as 1 and Estonian value was coded as 0.
G036 - Important: to be able to speak [Estonian]
Some people say the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others
say they are not important. How important do you think each this is?
To be able to speak [Estonian] [NOTE: if more than one national languages, ask the national
languages]
Response categories in EVS Trend File:
-5 Missing: Other
-4 Not asked in survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
-1 Don´t know
1 Very important
2 Quite important
3 Not important
4 Not important at all
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Values -5 through -1 were dropped from analysis. Original coding kept.
Appendix E.2: Figure 6-6 Probability of Income Group and Welfare 2018
X037_02 - Dependency on social security during last 5 years respondent
During the last five years, have you been dependent on social security at any time?
Response categories in EVS Trend File:
-5 Missing; Unknown
-4 Not asked in survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
-1 Don't know
0 No
1 Yes
Values -5 through -1 were dropped from analysis. Original coding kept.
Appendix E.2: Figure 6-8 Probability of Response to Immigration Concerns
EVS (1999-2018)
E161 - Feel concerned about immigrants
To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of the following groups living
in your country?
Response categories in EVS Trend File:
-5 Missing: Other
-4 Not asked in survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
-1 Don´t know
1 Very much
2 Much
3 To a certain extent
4 Not so much
5 Not at all
Values -5 through -1 were dropped from analysis. Original coding kept.

Appendix E.3: Chapter 6 Factor Analysis Tables and Questions
EVS (2018)
Eigenvalue

Difference Proportion Cumulative
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Clientelism
2.485
1.33
Corruption
1.156
N
930
Parameters
19
LR test: 2 factor vs saturated prob>x2=0.01

Education
Social Security
Health Care
Civil Service
Police
Court
Benefits
Fare
Taxes
Bribe

0.683
0.317
-

0.683
1
-

Clientelism Corruption Uniqueness
0.4997
-0.145
0.7293
0.6535
-0.0801
0.5665
0.5933
-0.1882
0.6125
0.6531
-0.0643
0.5693
0.6409
-0.1241
0.5738
0.6488
-0.1297
0.5622
0.1536
0.4126
0.8062
0.1491
0.4208
0.8007
0.2908
0.6063
0.5479
0.2605
0.5841
0.591

Clientelism Score:
Variables: E069_03 – Confidence: Education; _06 – Confidence: Police; _08 – Confidence: Civil
Service;_09 – Social Security _16 – Confidence: Health Care; _17 – Confidence Courts
Each variable had the same prompt and coding.
Prompt: Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have
in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?
Response categories in EVS Trend File:
-5 Missing: Other
-4 Not asked in survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
-1 Don´t know
1 A great deal
2 Quite a lot
3 Not very much
4 None at all
Values -5 through -1 were dropped from analysis. Original coding kept.
Corruption Score
Variables:
F114A – Justifiable Claiming Benefits to which you are not entitled
F115 – Justifiable: Avoiding fare on public transport
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F116 – Justifiable: Cheating on taxes
F117 – Justifiable: Someone accepting a bribe
Each variable had the same prompt and coding.
Prompt: Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it can always be justified,
never be justified, or something in between, using this card.
Response categories in EVS Trend File:
-5 Missing: Other
-4 Not asked in survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
-1 Don´t know
1 Never justifiable
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Always justifiable
Values -5 through -1 were dropped from analysis. Original coding kept.
Appendix E.4: Chapter 6 Summary of Statistics
Variables were generated from EVS (2018). See coding analysis.

Clientelism
Score
Corruption
Score
Middle
Income
Russian
Lower
Income

Obs.

Mean

Std.
Dev.

930

-0.001

0.892

Min

Max

Coding

-2.187

3.234

Factor Analysis
Score (App. D.5)

930

-0.001

0.814

-0.806

5.633

1,175

0.357

0.480

0

1

1,304

0.244

0.430

0

1

1,175

0.456

0.498

0

1

Factor Analysis
Score (App. D.5)
Middle Income
Household
(App. A.1)
Russian Speaker
(App. E.1)
Lower Income
Household
(App. A.1)
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Upper
Income
Sex
Religious
Education
Occupation
Town Size

1,175

1,304

0.187
0.629

0.39
0.484

0
0

1

Upper Income
Household
(App. A.1)

1

Is female
(EVS X001)

1,262

0.382

0.487

0

1

Is religious
(EVS F025)

1,304

2.163

0.662

1

3

Education Level
(EVS X025R)

1,131

0.424

0.495

0

1

Has government job
(EVS X052)

4

Size of town
(EVS X049a)

1,304

2.353

1.289

1

Appendix E.5: Full Model Robustness Tests for Tables 6-2
Clientelism
Score

Corruption
Score
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Lower Income

0.028
(0.078)

-0.01
(0.065)

Upper Income

-0.031
(0.089)

0.085
(0.075)

Russian

-0.098
(0.093)
0.114
(0.073)
0.024
(0.076)
-0.09
(0.054)
-0.084
(0.072)
-0.048
(0.028)
0.273
(0.143)

-0.101
(0.078)
-0.432**
(0.061)
-0.017
(0.063)
-0.019
(0.046)
-0.072
(0.061)
-0.019
(0.024)
0.368**
(0.119)

N

732

732

R2

0.056

0.096

Sex
Religious
Education
Occupation
Town Size
Constant

Note: OLS Regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01 * p<0.05
Negative value for clientelism means higher confidence.
Positive value for corruption means more justified.
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